The poetics of mid-Victorian scientific materialism in the writings of John Tyndall, W.K. Clifford and others by Mackowiak, Jeffrey Robert
  
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 
 
 







THE POETICS OF MID-VICTORIAN  
SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM  
IN THE WRITINGS OF JOHN TYNDALL,  
W. K. CLIFFORD AND OTHERS 
 













A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED FOR THE  












I, Jeffrey Robert Mackowiak, certify that this dissertation has been  
written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me, and that it 
has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree. 
 
Furthermore, this dissertation does not exceed the regulation length, including footnotes, 
references and appendices but excluding the bibliography. 
 
In submitting this dissertation to the University of Cambridge  
I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use  
in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time  
being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected  
thereby.  I also understand that a copy of the work  









Jeffrey Robert Mackowiak 
Trinity College, Cambridge 











DEDICATED to my mother, Dr Elaine Mackowiak, 
my sister, Dr Lisa Filippone,  
and to the memories of my father, Dr Robert Mackowiak, 





















CHAPTER 1 - The Presentations (and Representations) 
of Scientific Naturalism in Mid-Victorian Literary Culture 
18 
 
CHAPTER 2 - Tyndall’s Crepuscular Materialism:  Orations 
at Belfast, 19 August, and Manchester, 2 October 1874 
50 
 
CHAPTER 3 - Materialism’s Afterlife in the Poetry 
and Thought of W. K. Clifford and James Clerk Maxwell 
73 
 
CHAPTER 4 - Heated Exchanges:  John Tyndall, Thomas Carlyle, 
and the Rhetorics of Thermodynamic Conservation 
118 
 
CHAPTER 5 - Tyndall Among the Glaciers:  The Mid-Victorian  




















I would, as ever, like to thank the Master, Fellows and Scholars of Trinity College, Cam-
bridge, especially Rev. Dr Martin, Rev. Adams and my tutors Dr Morley and Prof. Worster, 
for their support of my research over the (many!) years; the Principal and members of Wesley 
House, Cambridge, especially Iain Merton and Jim Stirmey, for excellent accommodation 
and highly welcome hospitality; and my friends among the Fellowship (notably, Dr Robert 
Macfarlane and Dr Corrina Russell) and the English undergraduates of Emmanuel College, 
Cambridge, for advice, encouragement, and, above all else, collegiality in its most authentic 
sense.  In Prof. Dame Gillian Beer, Dr J. C. A. Rathmell and Dr David Clifford I have not 
only had the benefit of three of the most knowledgeable supervisors anyone could ever have 
wished for, but also – and as critically – three of the most patient.  Dr Clifford, in particular, 
warrants my eternal gratitude for helping me extrude from two hundred thousand or so 
interesting words the right batch required for a Cambridge degree.  Financial backing for this 
dissertation has been provided by an Internal Graduate Studentship from Trinity College, an 
Overseas Research Students (ORS) Awards Scheme bursary from the UK Committee of 
Vice-Chancellors and Principals, and supplemental grants from the Trinity College Ashton 
Fund, the Cambridge Overseas Trust (COT), and the University of Cambridge Board of 
Graduate Studies.  I would in particular like to acknowledge my debt to the COT for the 
awarding of an Honorary Scholarship and my subsequent election as a Fellow of the Cam-
bridge Overseas Society.  I would also like to thank the Master and Fellows of Hughes Hall, 
Cambridge, for their generous offer of a Junior Research Fellowship.  A preliminary year of 
postgraduate coursework in literature and analytic philosophy at the University of Virginia 
was funded by that university’s President’s Fellowship in English Language and Literature. 
 Dr Laura Otis, of Hofstra University on Long Island, NY, and, previously, the Max-
Planck-Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Berlin, who first contacted me while researching 
her anthology Literature and Science in the Nineteenth Century, has become a good friend and 
advocate, her expertise especially appreciated arising as it does from the biological, rather 
than physical, sciences side of things.  Thanks as well to Dr Bernard Lightman, of Canada’s 
- v - 
 
York University, for sending me some years ago an essay – since published in Science Serialized:  
Representations of the Sciences in Nineteenth-Century Periodicals – on the popular reception of Tyndall’s 
Belfast Address.   
The staffs of the various libraries that have supported me during the course of this re-
search have, without fail, been both endlessly accommodating and distressingly knowledge-
able, though I perhaps owe a particular debt of gratitude, for help with manuscript sources 
and permission to quote material from the Institution’s archives, to Yvonne Martins, Lenore 
Symons and Dr Frank James of the Royal Institution of Great Britain.  I also wish to thank the 
staffs of the Manuscripts and Munby Rare Books Reading Rooms in the University Library, 
Cambridge; the Whipple Library of the History and Philosophy of Science, Cambridge; the 
Library of Westminster College, Cambridge; the Wren Library of Trinity College, Cam-
bridge; and that as well of the Special Collections Department of the St Andrews University 
Library, Scotland, for likewise granting me permission to quote from one-of-a-kind manu-
scripts and rare publications in their keeping.  Such collections – and such libraries, generally 
– truly represent an extraordinary resource for the scholar (and for me, too, I might add), 
featuring many unexpected delights, not the least of which was my stunned realisation late one 
evening, having finally deciphered a bookplate inscription, that most of the volumes authored 
by James Clerk Maxwell on open shelving at Trinity were actually donated by the great man 
himself. 
 And finally, there are, as inevitable with projects of this sort, any number of profound 
personal debts which it would be remiss if I did not at the least attempt, if inadequately, to 
acknowledge.  Dr Matt McCullagh, Dr Emma Woolerton, Lauren Sallinger, Oliver Darwin 
(yep, great-great-grandson), Chris Cox, Pete O’Connell, Geoff Chepiga, Ken Hannah, Capt. 
Matt Baker, Lt. John Jackson, the Hon. Adela Bottomley, Sarah Cochrane, Charles Crowson, 
Dr Christine Luscombe, Roger Hensman, Prof. James Secord of the Department of History 
and Philosophy of Science, selected Friends of Bentley (James, Lauren, Edmund and Julian), 
and (fellow St Andrean and finest ball date imaginable) Dr Bella D’Abrera, to name only a 
few, are remarkable – and remarkably friendly – individuals all of whom served to make this 
place as socially and personally rewarding as it is, in my estimation, aesthetically unparalleled.  
Harriet Slogoff, among others, in the David Rittenhouse Laboratories of the Department of 
Physics and Astronomy of the University of Pennsylvania endeavoured to keep me in balance 
by reminding me, over holidays, of what an equation looked like, if not how it could be solved.  
I would also like to recognise in passing the more ‘institutional’ or ‘collective’ kinds of support 
- vi - 
 
provided by the members of the 1st and 3rd Trinity Boat Club, by my Cambridge University 
Golf Club team-mates (in particular, those gorse-scarred veterans of the mighty Stymies and 
Blues sides of 1999 - 2002), by the gentlemen of the Hawks’ Club of the University of Cam-
bridge (GDBO!), and those as well of the Kate Kennedy Club of St Andrews University 
(Floreat Kathrena).   
And, of course, I would like to close with brief mention of my greatest indebtedness of 
all, for without the love, encouragement and good humour of my mother, Dr Elaine Mack-
owiak, and my sister, Dr Lisa Filippone, I would never be where I am today, and it is difficult 
to overstate what their unwavering support has meant to me throughout the course of my 
education – and, indeed, my life as a whole.  Thanks so very, very much, both of you. 
- vii - 
 
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 





The following abbreviations and short forms are used in footnotes and parenthetical docu-
mentation; for full bibliographic details of these and other works see the listing of works cited. 
 
‘BA’  ‘British Association’, The Times, 20 August 1874. 
BA  Tyndall, Address, 1874. 
BA [2]  Tyndall, Address, ‘7th thousand’ ed., 1874. 
‘DP’  Tyndall, ‘Descriptive Poem’, 18 July 1856 [final fair copy]. 
‘DP’ [1] Tyndall, ‘Descriptive Poem’, [1] July 1856 [complete first draft]. 
FoS  Tyndall, Fragments of Science, 3rd [British] ed., 1871. 
FoS [5]  Tyndall, Fragments of Science, 5th [British] ed., 1876. 
FoS [6]  Tyndall, Fragments of Science, 6th [British] ed., 2 vols., 1879. 
LJCM  Campbell and Garnett, The Life of James Clerk Maxwell, 1882. 
LWJT  Eve and Creasey, The Life and Works of John Tyndall, 1945. 
NF  Tyndall, New Fragments, 1st [American] ed., 1897.  
OF  G. Beer, Open Fields:  Science in Cultural Encounter, 1996. 
SSC  Chisholm, Such Silver Currents:  The Story of William and Lucy Clifford, 2002. 
 
 
In the dissertation that follows, substantive insertions and deletions from manuscript sources 
are indicated, respectively, by angle-brackets and strike-outs; ‘BAAS’ stands for the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science; ‘RI’, for the Royal Institution of Great Britain. 
The first British edition is used as the baseline for all discussion of the Belfast Address 
as it was, in a sense, ‘officially sanctioned’ – that is to say, a corrected text, rather than tran-
scription or abridgement, specifically prepared by its author for widespread publication. 
Documentation follows the MLA Handbook, 5th edition. 
The Authorised King James Version is the source for quotations from Holy Scripture. 
 And translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own. 
  
THE POETICS OF MID-VICTORIAN SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM  
IN THE WRITINGS OF JOHN TYNDALL, W. K. CLIFFORD AND OTHERS 
 
My dissertation examines the representations of materialism – a philosophy stereotypically 
associated with a reductive, anti-theological and mechanistic world-picture – in the published 
prose and (typically) unpublished poetry of several figures central to scientific discourse in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, most notably W. K. Clifford, a mathematician, and John 
Tyndall, a physicist and media-savvy ‘champion of science’.  These engagements, and repre-
sentations, were not merely on the level of ‘direct’ argumentation, however.  A self-consciously 
allusive, even polyphonous tone was far from uncommon in the many literatures arising from 
mid-Victorian scientific encounter, and this openness of form permitted both popularisers and 
critics of materialism to choose the vocabularies in which to relate their observations – the 
texts with which they would engage – towards specific ends.  As I argue, such was a task they 
performed with great care and an often astonishing felicity:  an essay on cosmology, after all, 
acquires quite a different colouration when interleaved with the cadences of Milton, another 
again if illustrated with quotations from Whitman or an epigram from ‘Tintern Abbey’.  My 
1st chapter provides a broader context for those that follow, analysing both changing nine-
teenth-century ideas of materialism and also a range of potential reactions to – and inter alia a 
variety of the contrasting vernaculars used in illustration of – contemporary metaphysical or 
‘methodological’ materialism.  My 2nd chapter offers a reading of Tyndall’s August 1874 
Belfast Address, the locus classicus for practically all later elaborations of materialistic belief.  My 
3rd chapter contrasts the theologically orthodox position of James Clerk Maxwell (buttressed 
by allusions to the theologically doctrinaire George Herbert) with the radically atheistic and 
materialistic philosophy of Clifford (underpinned by the similarly atheistic Algernon Charles 
Swinburne).  My 4th and 5th chapters are paired studies in the ‘private’ nuances of Tyndall’s 
ideology, elaborating on my 2nd chapter’s scrutiny of its more public attributes.  The former 
discusses his notions of cosmic connectedness, ironically derived from the non-materialistic 
works of Carlyle.  The latter examines both the exultancy and the despair explicit in Tyndall’s 
poetry and implicit in his prose.  As I note in conclusion, such contrary emotions, phrased 
with striking clarity in Tyndall, are common in mid-Victorian writings concerning material-
ism, directly or indirectly.  They are rooted in the hopes afforded by materialism’s explanatory 
prowess, on the one hand, and the ‘atrophy of spirit’ born of its austere, even dehumanising, 






 ‘Understanding by the theology of the age or country the theory of the universe 
generally accepted then and there, and by its morality the rules of 
life then and there commonly regarded as binding, it seems to me extravagant to 
 say that the one does not influence the other’.  






Modern cartoon by Sidney Harris suggesting something of the dilemma nineteenth- 
century scientific materialists faced when trying to account for human sentience. 
 
 







Science and philosophy are just now in that irritable state which betrays 
secret doubt; and an attack on opinions may be more disturbing than 
one would imagine, because those who are committed to theories feel 
themselves on very thin ice […].   
- Robert A. Watson, Gospels of Yesterday, 18880  
In his preface to Contesting Cultural Authority (1993), Frank Turner traces his abiding fascination 
with the perplexities of labelling to his days as a postgraduate in the late 1960s, ‘suspicious that 
many of the categories used to understand the Victorians were inadequate and misleading’.  
Such concerns, he explains, have since led him to a wariness about uncritical acceptance of 
preordained or pre-existing terminologies, and a concomitant realisation that ‘the experience 
of the Victorians and their intellectual activity can no longer be regarded as unproblematic, 
inevitable, or quaint’ (p. xi).   
Even some Victorians had a like sense that categorisation could be, at least potentially, 
invidious, however.  In ‘Forgotten Bibles’, an article of 1884, Max Müller lamented:  ‘Nothing 
is so misleading as names – I mean, even such names as materialism, idealism, realism, and all 
the rest – which, after all, admit of some kind of definition’ (p. 1015).  One definition of 
materialism, for instance, from a Dictionary of the English Language, overseen by American 
lexicographer Joseph Worcester and published in 1859, provided its key term with an appar-
ently resilient explanation; equally, though, it saddled the term’s philosophical antithesis with 
an appellation that, as the century drew nearer its close (and the drawing rooms of genteel 
New England filled with the sounds of table-rattling and mediumistic divination), might have 
appeared to warrant either replacing or, at minimum, phenomenological clarification:   
 
The theory that the material universe is self-existent and self-directed, and that the functions of life, 
sensation, and thought, arise out of modifications of matter; or the metaphysical theory that is founded 
on the hypothesis that all existence may be resolved into a modification of matter; – opposed to 
spiritualism, or the doctrine that above the universe there is a spirit sustaining and directing it. 
 
Indeed, among materialism’s mid-Victorian advocates and adherents, issues arising out of the 
                                                
Epigraph from Watson, Gospels, p. v; epigraph page quotation from Stephen, p. 331. 
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dictionary’s suggestively split sense (practical ‘theory’ describing how things are accomplished 
in the experiential world; metaphysical ‘hypothesis’ that such an explanatory presumption 
encompasses all that there is to know or believe about the experiential world) were destined to 
remain – and persist to this day as – points of tremendous epistemological stress. 
 
This dissertation is an examination of materialism’s literary representations, and philosophical 
or aesthetic elaborations, in the second half of the nineteenth century, and it offers a reading 
of some of those discourses in which such epistemological stresses were made most glaringly 
manifest.  It proceeds via analysis in the writings of a number of important scientific (or 
tangentially scientific) figures of a concept which might seem, upon prejudiced or cursory 
inspection, to possess the stability of Worcester’s second encapsulation but which, upon any 
closer scrutiny of the particularities of, or problems posed by, individual implementation, 
reveals an astonishing multifacetedness, far beyond even that suggested by Worcester’s first.  
This study in ideological and terminological jostle is counterparted by, and interlinked with, 
my investigation into the techniques by which these individuals interacted with England’s 
literary heritage, into their engagement in practices of renegotiation and renewal with prefab-
ricated lexicons and traditions, crafting in the process a variety of rough, though identifiable, 
personal literary styles.  These styles were then ‘made available’ for other, sometimes non-
specialist, usage, for appropriation by politicians and poets, moralists and philosophers.   
Stripped of mathematical underpinnings, many of the more general conclusions and 
implications of the era’s physical sciences could be grasped, if not always accepted, by most 
among the educated.  Meanwhile, one cultural transformation in particular expedited enor-
mously the popular diffusion of technical ideas, while concurrently facilitating argument and 
interdisciplinary exchange:  the fact that an ever-increasing ‘reading public now had access to 
a vast array of printed materials’ – specialist and generalist, highbrow and lowbrow, periodi-
cals; cheaply priced and heirloom editions of important scientific texts – ‘in which conflicting 
views of science were expounded’ (Dawson, Noakes and Topham, p. 17).  It was, however, not 
merely controversialists, nor disgruntled clergymen, nor outraged humanists, who cavilled at, 
or rejected outright, ideologically troublesome portions of mid-nineteenth-century scientific 
belief; sometimes even those figures behind its most revolutionary physical syntheses did so as 
well, seeming startled or unnerved by what their colleagues’ (or their own) insights said about 
the universe surrounding them, often remaining unable, or unwilling, to embrace the seeming 
ramifications of deciphered equations and conjectured entities.  Their anxieties, like their 
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enthusiasms, sought – and found – expression in books and articles delimiting the meaning 
and interrogating the effective scope and application of theoretical assertions.  Many such 
works, moreover, provide excellent documentation of their authors’ attempts at mediation 
between an array of competing discourses and antagonistic constituencies, at developing fit, 
and privately satisfying, vernaculars in which to summarise, debate, popularise and codify 
both scientific ideas and extra-scientific beliefs.   
At the same time, some of these texts tried also to reassure, even fortify, a population 
increasingly aware that a wide assortment of ongoing investigations into the disposition of the 
phenomenal world hinted at one (potentially destabilising?) prospect:  that physical being, 
animate or inanimate, in the heavens or on the earth, might be of irrefragable materiality.  
Such reductive cosmologies had a long history, of course, but somewhere in this period a 
tipping point was reached, a preliminary consensus established, infusing an old philosophy, 
that of the ancient Greek and Roman atomists, with a resurgent vitalism.  Somewhere materi-
alism, in Worcester’s first usage, began to seem – to such prominent individuals as John 
Tyndall, William Kingdon Clifford, and T. H. Huxley, among others – less an appurtenance 
to theory, more the basis of sound theory itself (a metamorphosis elaborated upon in my 
opening chapter).  Bertrand Russell, for instance, reminiscing in the early twentieth century 
about the changes in the intellectual climate of the middle years of the nineteenth, spoke of a 
‘period often described as “The materialistic ’60’s”’ (Introduction, p. vi), while the Scottish 
geologist James Croll, in an article of 1872, observed:  ‘Physical inquiry in every direction is 
converging towards Molecular Physics, is resolving itself into questions regarding the dynami-
cal action of the ultimate particles of matter’ (p. 2).  Such an idea of a ‘convergent century’ is 
one that both animated nineteenth-century discussions and provided the historian of science 
Harold Sharlin with the title for his influential 1966 study, subtitled The Unification of Science in 
the Nineteenth Century.  This was an explanatory convergence that suggested to many Victorians, 
somewhat misleadingly, a philosophical one as well, and as scientific authors ‘illustrated the 
uniformity of nature by allusions to the atomic theory’, Turner explains, ‘their own mode of 
scientific publicism permitted their readers and listeners to consider them materialists’ (‘An-
cient’, p. 332).  James Clerk Maxwell, not a ‘believer’ himself despite analytical inquiries into 
nominally materialistic topics and themes, quipped, in October 1871, that, ‘[i]n the present 
day, men of science are […] supposed to be in league with the material spirit of the age, and 
to form a kind of advance Radical party among men of learning’ (‘Introductory’, p. 121).   
This widespread popular deduction was at once correct and obfuscatory:  for it was 
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with wholesale adoption of Worcester’s second usage – materialism as metaphysic, rather than 
practical programme – that most practicing scientists expressed the clearest quibble, leading to 
their diversity of opinions about the nature, and significance, of the matter with which material-
ism ostensibly concerned itself, and also about the possible existence, beyond molecular 
perturbations, of a Higher Power.  Such interpretive multiplicity was, however, the inevitable 
outcome of the range of personalities involved in debate, and of the cultural and professional 
climate of the time.  Indeed, excepting Darwinism, from the early 1860s to the 1890s, there 
was, within the British scientific community, no more prevalent, or volatile, topic of ‘non-
technical’ discussion and disagreement than materialism’s remit.  This preoccupation – one at 
once cantankerous and metaphysically provocative – would, moreover, have reverberations 
among figures seemingly peripheral to that community, even wholly unrelated or antipathetic 
to it, provoking strong reactions and engendering passionate dispute, a discourse and process 
of negotiation and reinterpretation which has left a multitude of literary traces:  in published 
sermons, reviews and quarterlies, philosophical tracts, poems, fictions, extant specimens of 
correspondence.   
One such figure was F. W. H. Myers:  though not a scientist himself, he was ac-
quainted with a good number of important scientific personages, a confidant of George Eliot, 
and an intellectual who also, in any number of ways, served as an embodiment of some of the 
feuding personal allegiances associated with the middle and later decades of that transitional 
(if, pace Wallace, wonderful) century.  His biography reveals an astonishing malleability, and 
an endearing sincerity.  He began, as an undergraduate at Cambridge, as a fervent Hellenist, 
transitioning, under the influence of friends, into a vigorous, sometimes evangelical, Christian 
apologist, before succumbing, in the late 1860s, to a sort of existential crisis brought on by his 
increasing acquaintance with the dictates associated with contemporary scientific naturalism.  
He finally chrysalized as a spiritualist, that oddly agglomerated intellectual stance com-
pounded equally of (misunderstood) science, (displaced) religiosity, and a pagan exultation in a 
sense of human spirituality at once unfettered by the doctrines of orthodox theology and 
suggestive of ‘god-like’ transcendent potential.  In ‘Modern Poets and the Meaning of Life’ 
(1893), a product of that final phase, he wrote of two of several conclusions apparently forced 
upon him by the tenets of late-Victorian science (as he understood it), the physical origin of 
human ‘exceptionality’ and the concomitant extinguishing of God, both distressing deductions 
from the materialist hypothesis, while nonetheless also managing simultaneously to embrace 
questions – intimately related, he thought – of morality and behaviour:  
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We are bound to face the possibility that the human race came into existence from the operation 
of purely physical causes, and that there may therefore be in all the universe no beings higher than 
ourselves; not even the remote and indifferent gods of the Lucretian heaven.  By many modern minds, 
in whom the sense of pity for unmerited suffering and the desire for ideal justice have become passion-
ately strong, this conception, which absolutely negatives [sic] the possibility of any pity or justice more 
efficacious than our own, is felt as an abiding nightmare, which seems from time to time to deepen into 
a terrible reality.  This is the mood of mind illustrated in its extreme form in Tennyson’s “Despair”.   
(p. 97) 
 
‘Have I crazed myself over their horrible infidel writings?  O yes, / For these are the new dark 
ages, you see, of the popular press’ (p. 1302; ll. 87 - 88), Tennyson’s nameless protagonist 
laments in that poem, composed in 1881.  He represents a soul driven to attempted suicide by 
the workaday contents of widely circulated journals and newspapers, periodicals carrying the 
writings of much-celebrated and much-feared, putatively anti-religious ‘infidels’ – England’s 
‘scientific publicists’ (Turner’s term, and others’). 
 Nonetheless, as has become the consensus view among modern scholars, such figures 
were themselves far from secure in any advocacy of unmitigated or un-prettified materialism, 
that cosmological and ethical nightmare precipitating the unfortunate soul’s disillusionment in 
Tennyson’s lyric.  Contemporary scientists, it seems, were prone to identify themselves, 
though not always explicitly, among Myers’s ‘many minds’ troubled – or left, on some level, 
unsatisfied – by the mandates of any too uncompromised naturalistic faith.  For instance, 
though Maurice Mandelbaum, in his monumental History, Man, & Reason (1971), pigeonholed 
Tyndall as not only the most intransigent, but practically the lone, materialist in Victorian 
society (‘if materialism is construed […] as a position which is an alternative to idealism and to 
other forms of metaphysics on one hand and to positivism on the other, then there were 
relatively few materialists in the nineteenth century […].  [I]n England Tyndall stands out as 
an almost unique example’ [p. 23]), Ruth Barton, writing sixteen years subsequently, casts 
even such a swingeing classificatory proviso into doubt, redefining Tyndall as nouveau panthe-
ist or closet idealist and suggesting, not without cause, that ‘[p]erhaps dogmatic materialism, 
like Social Darwinism, was an ogre created by its opponents’ (p. 134).   
 Similarly, Steven Kim, in John Tyndall’s Transcendental Materialism and the Conflict Between 
Religion and Science in Victorian England (1996), follows Barton in diligently resituating Tyndall’s 
‘materialism’ amid active Continental traditions of Romanticism and philosophical idealism.  
So, too, Paul Sawyer’s outstanding ‘Ruskin and Tyndall:  The Poetry of Matter and the Poetry 
of Spirit’, an essay in Paradis and Postlewait’s 1981 anthology Victorian Science and Victorian 
Values:  Literary Perspectives.  In it, Sawyer insists that deep-seated resemblances between two 
such (famously antagonistic) individuals ‘illuminate a crucial intersection in Victorian culture:  
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the intersection of Romantic tradition with the triumph of scientific naturalism’ (p. 217).  
Likewise, James Bartlett, in a dissertation stressing Tyndall’s mountaineering narratives, 
‘Preaching Science:  John Tyndall and the Rhetoric of Victorian Scientific Naturalism’ (1996), 
contends that, within the freedom provided by that generic form, ‘Tyndall creates the scientist 
as both nature conqueror’ – literally (through pioneering exploration), figuratively (though the 
pacification of physical law) – ‘and nature lover, as both British imperialist and Wordswor-
thian poet’ (p. 110).  Surveying the intellectual landscape more broadly, Bernard Lightman’s 
The Origins of Agnosticism:  Victorian Unbelief and the Limits of Knowledge (1987) arrives at similar 
conclusions, insisting that, during the period covered by his argument, ‘[…] European materi-
alism was limited almost exclusively to Germany […]’ (p. 25), while Peter Allan Dale, in In 
Pursuit of a Scientific Culture:  Science, Art, and Society in the Victorian Age (1989), reclassifies many 
superficially materialistic writings of that century’s latter half within the anti-essentialist 
discourse of philosophical positivism. 
 My own work, though on one level complementary to such studies, diverges from them 
in its central focus on the languages of representation, not just the substance, or heritage, of 
ideologies.  In particular, I pay attention to the role played in the 1850s and beyond by poetry, 
by poetic citation, and by the notion of ‘poeticised’ science, in qualifying or enriching concep-
tions and descriptions which might otherwise seem uncharitably reductive or brutishly materi-
alistic.  Now, this is, in part, an old story:  the idea that allusion, literary like philosophical, is 
infrequently, if indeed ever, either innocent or adequately constrained, that meaning almost 
invariably overflows metaphor, blurring and distorting surrounding sentences like a drop of 
water falling unexpectedly on a page of fresh ink.  ‘The language’, Gillian Beer notes in one of 
her essays, ‘Translation or Transformation?  The Relations of Literature and Science’,  
 
available alike to nineteenth-century creative writers and scientists had been forged out of past litera-
ture, the Bible, philosophy, natural theology, the demotic of the streets or the clubs.  Scientists as 
various as James Clerk Maxwell and Charles Lyell habitually seamed their sentences with literary 
allusion and incorporated literature into the argumentative structure of their work [...].  (OF, p. 174) 
 
But, following on from Beer’s insights concerning evolutionary narrative in Darwin’s Plots 
(1983), what is particularly striking about many of these grammars of allusion and citation is 
their surprising reciprocity; that is to say, the manner in which their deployment does not 
merely serve to adorn ‘uncouth’ science with some tasteful, literary embellishment, but also, at 
the same time, to suggest a real complementarity – and to establish a (sometimes halting) 
dialogue – between two ancient and empowering traditions.  Commonly, for instance, poetic 
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references in nineteenth-century scientific prose serve not so much to constrain as to liberate 
meaning – to expose both the limitations and the lacunae in certain interpretations (then 
thought to be in the ascendancy) of contemporary materialistic paradigms even as they argue, 
more often than not, forcibly in favour of an unyielding form of obdurate materialism – at the 
level of analysis, if not elucidation.  And, at other times, they tend to roll in, almost surrepti-
tiously (allusion’s ‘benign haunting’, in Harold Bloom’s evocative phrase [p. 16]), the assump-
tions of entire regimes of metaphysical speculation, beliefs and conjectures seemingly at odds 
with, and having no place in any account of, a dawning era of scientific rationalism – and 
preening cultural predominance in both the academy and Victorian society at large.  Occa-
sionally, they are there simply to remind us of the truism that the poet and the scientist are, in 
their own ways, of an imagination compact.  Thus, a poetic (or other) quotation might, in any 
number of these circumstances, serve as a commonplace (worn-out citation decoupled from 
original artistic context), a critical aside, an epigram (pithy, fulsome substitute for several lines 
of prose), a metaphysical rumination:  sometimes it might even function as all four of these 
things concurrently.   
 Figures like John Tyndall and W. K. Clifford (a mathematician more famous during 
his lifetime for the atheism he espoused than the algebras he devised) could, therefore, human-
ise their ‘materialistic’ writings via deliberate interlinkages with, or allusions to, or invocations 
of, a linguistic register associated with a poetic or literary tradition that was decidedly non-
materialist (Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus, Wordsworth’s ‘Tintern Abbey’, the King James Bible).  
They could also relate sideways with up-to-date vocabularies dealing with problems posed by 
materialism (the poems of Tennyson, for instance), or which suggest a meliorist side to a non-
theological cosmos (those, say, of Whitman or Swinburne).  As McSweeney and Sabor insist in 
a recent introduction to Carlyle’s most celebrated work:  ‘[…] Sartor Resartus is essentially a 
work of imaginative fiction that demands a more sensitive and complex response than that in 
which its formal and stylistic husks are stripped away to reveal the doctrinal kernels’ (p. viii).  
Though hardly fictitious, there is certainly an imaginative component to the reality described 
by nineteenth-century scientific materialism – courtship among molecules, unrest among 
atoms, a singing ether – and a similar sensitivity to the form, context and style of recorded 
beliefs reveals a comparable diversity and richness of signification beyond the argumentatively 
explicit, providing further confirmation that Turner, like Max Müller, was right to be appre-
hensive about any too rigid taxonomisation of Victorian philosophical attitudes.  ‘The differ-
ence between Darwin and many who call themselves Darwinians, is as great at least as the 
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difference between the horse and the mule’, wrote Müller (‘Forgotten’, p. 1015); so, too, that 
between the many materialisms of the nineteenth century, not even favoured with such a 
progenitor from which their separate discourses could be said to descend. 
 
THE DISCURSIVITY OF MID-VICTORIAN PHYSICAL SCIENCE 
 
In October 1873, less than a year before he was to bestir the Victorian cultural imagination 
with his stern materialistic pronouncements at Belfast, The Westminster Review ran a rather 
disapproving review of John Tyndall’s Six Lectures on Light, a publication in one volume of a 
series of his American addresses.  The precise circumstances of that disapproval might seem 
somewhat perplexing to modern ears, however, especially when considered in light of para-
digms inferred from present-day precedent, of those ‘manners’ now expected of, or popularly 
associated with, legitimate scientific discourse.  Tyndall’s factual content, the Westminster 
Review(er) suggested, was adequate enough:  not cutting-edge, perhaps, but just the sort of 
thing – a broad-based survey, replete with suggested experiments and a discussion of historical 
development – that one might have expected from such an individual:  a natural philosopher 
and eminent public intellectual of multifarious interests and abilities, with no small measure of 
pedagogic and rhetorical skill.   
Dissatisfaction stemmed rather from its form, from the work’s comparative plain-
spokenness, from the lack within its pages of philosophical or meta-thematic conjectures 
(unsanctioned by empiricism, beyond the reach of then-present theory).  Particularly missed, it 
seems, were those interpolated extrapolations, so prominent and memorable in a number of 
Tyndall’s previous writings and orations, in terms of scale and reference from the microscopic 
to the macroscopic and, from thence, to what would have been deemed by many (though not, 
perhaps, by the scientist himself) the ineluctably metaphysical:  
 
We expected, indeed, that these lectures would afterwards prove quite an original addition to scientific 
literature, if not in the promulgation of novel facts, yet in the striking mode of treating old facts, in the 
manner of illustrating them by experiments, striking or instructive, or both, as each case would require; 
and, above all, we looked forward to the glowing introductions to each subject, the magnificent 
thoughts on the road, by which the Professor concatenates apparently wildly distant facts, and fills the 
minds of his hearers with elevated thoughts often of the highest poetry; and finally, we counted on the 
magnificent perorations, for which qualities, as well as for the other characteristics we have mentioned, 
Professor Tyndall’s lectures have become justly famous.  (‘Science’ [1873], p. 487)  
The reviewer, respectful of the volume’s informational content, recoiled nonetheless from the 
atypicality of presentation, its dull recapitulation of ‘mere’ truth.  He felt plainly the absence of 
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what might be called the characteristic vernacular of Tyndallic exposition:  poetically exuber-
ant, philosophically suggestive, synthesising and readily quotable, a medium, it would seem, 
for far more than the communication of broad theoretical consensus or simple empirical fact.  
His frame of reference, in other words, was not that of science writing considered expansively, 
but rather science writing as perpetrated by Tyndall, with that author’s fixations and propensi-
ties, even if (as the case here) in puzzling non-attendance, very much at the fore.  
Neither rhetorical nor apparent ideological largesse was unusual in the scientific prose 
of the age, however.  On the contrary, from a modern perspective, the discourse’s polymor-
phousness is perhaps as striking as its perceptible oddness; its refusal to be clumped indiscrimi-
nately together as remarkable as its jarring remove from what would seem to be more norma-
tive ‘grammars’ of technical communication.  ‘The humane, intellectual, and moral elements 
of the writing of the great naturalist-publicists are there in the freshness, clarity, cockiness, and 
energy of their prose’, yet that writing was not unitary, at times evidencing neither ‘consis-
tency’ nor ‘philosophic depths’, as George Levine has observed (p. 254).  Still, for all that, 
Darwin’s and Huxley’s works remain models of eloquent exposition (yet unique in their own 
ways, despite similarities of mood); Clifford’s and Maxwell’s, of terse rhetorical grandeur (if 
likewise differentiable); Tyndall’s, of pantheistic effusion atop ever-engaging popularisation.  
Though (to twenty-first-century ears, at least) some of these heterogeneous modes can sound 
elliptic – at times, overwritten; at others, under-evidenced – a bewildering copiousness was in 
fact a more general characteristic of the era’s writing; as Alastair Fowler has noted:  ‘Personal 
styles abound in nineteenth-century literature:  the profusion of letters, journals and memoirs, 
many of them highly influential, never ceases to astonish’ (History, p. 239).  Scientific authors, 
then, like all authors, were of their time.   
Beyond such tonal factors, the range of venues available for publication, particularly in 
the periodical press – which was characterised by extraordinary editorial diversity, with 
thousands of regional and national serials pitched at a wide array of political and religious 
dispositions, not to mention levels of literacy – allowed the nineteenth century’s theoreticians 
and experimentalists, like its essayists and theologians, ample freedom to establish, as Gowan 
Dawson has phrased it, ‘distinct authorial personas with consistent individual opinions ex-
pressed throughout several different articles’ (p. 264).   
The issues of opinion and persona are pivotal.  Greg Myers has elaborated a pair of 
suggestive terms for the classification of modern biological writing:  the ‘narrative of nature’, 
unlike the ‘narrative of science’, focuses more on the phenomena under description than the 
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mechanisms of discovery and analysis (Writing, pp. 144 - 64).  It can seem a difficult, if not 
hopeless, task differentiating any such contrasting modes in Victorian scientific prose, how-
ever, where authors, trying to appeal to (and edify) varied readerships characterised by diver-
gent needs and expectations, took ‘care to make their work as accessible as possible.  Works 
like Darwin’s Origin of Species was [sic] not simply a piece of research written by one scientific 
practitioner for his peers; it was meant to be read by a general educated audience’; simultane-
ously, many of these authors also incorporated what might be considered a ‘narrative of 
meaning’ alongside (or intermingled with) those of ‘nature’ and ‘science’, as many, if not most, 
of their texts sought, beyond instruction, ‘to promote a particular interpretation of scientific 
knowledge’, as Frank James has commented (‘Books’, pp. 271, 270).   
Yet not all was surface and ornament, nor opinion and hearsay.  Obfuscation was as 
dreaded a failing as oversimplification; clarity, an absolute virtue; rigour, essential and cele-
brated.  ‘Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler’, Einstein once 
insisted – this is true, needless to say, for explanation as much as entheorisation, an imperative 
guiding orations and equations alike (qtd. in Cohen and Cohen, p. 116).  In the nineteenth 
century, paradoxically, the same urge could lead to difficulty, confusion, even the appearance 
of muddle.  ‘[T]he selections presented here’, A. S. Weber wrote in his introduction to an 
anthology Nineteenth Century Science:  A Selection of Original Texts (2000), ‘have not lost their value 
as models of rhetorical persuasion, precise observation, and clear exposition of the perennial 
problems of natural philosophy’ (p. xii).  Two years later, Laura Otis was to remark in the 
preface to a rival volume:  ‘It is thus no surprise that nineteenth-century scientists found they 
could be more persuasive by using the story-telling techniques of fiction writers’ (p. xxiv).  To 
‘fiction writers’ she might profitably have added ‘poets, philosophers and preachers’, perhaps 
other cultural groupings.  To ‘story-telling techniques’: ‘vocabularies’, ‘assumptions’ and 
‘strategies of argument’.  Any discrepancy between Weber’s and Otis’s observations is, how-
ever, easily accounted for, a topic discussed at length in following chapters, when considering 
the interrelationships between the ‘two worlds’ shaping mid-Victorian discourse.  First, the 
cultural milieu which scientists of the age inhabited (one of ‘vigorous, non-specialized, poly-
mathic freedom of thinking […]’ [Davis, p. 212]).  Second, the actual world each was trying to 
explain.  That was a place which Maxwell, in a variant text for one of his poems, was play-
fully, if aptly, to describe as ‘atom-haunted’ (‘Hermann’, p. 651n1).  His label, meant to 
characterise a cosmos, could equally be said to designate the Zeitgeist:  ‘The open challenge 
[of Darwinism] was grave enough’, the author and BBC broadcaster L. L. Whyte once wrote, 
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‘but [materialism’s] unconscious shock went deeper’ (p. 241).1  The former brought into 
disrepute some niceties of parentage.  The latter called into question the nature of being itself.  
It seemed a primal wounding, not glancing blow – a new(ish) philosophy casting all in doubt.2 
From the point of view of materialism, the second half of the nineteenth century has as 
its twin spiritual foci the November 1859 publication of The Origin of Species and Tyndall’s 
August 1874 delivery of the Belfast Address.  The latter proclamation, though hardly of the 
pyroclastic invective that some critics claimed for it, was nonetheless one of scientific self-
sufficiency and supreme self-confidence, unqualified in its announcement of the necessity for a 
‘materialistic’ path for future physical inquiry.  Turner has called the stance brazenly advo-
cated within it ‘scientific naturalism’:3  ‘These ideas were naturalistic because they referred to 
no causes not present in empirically observed nature and were scientific because they inter-
preted nature through three major mid-century scientific theories’ (‘Tyndall’, p. 174).  These 
were the atomic theory of matter (a series of principles explaining chemical reactions and the 
behaviour of gasses); the conservation of energy (that is, the First Law of Thermodynamics, a 
precept restricting the outcome of any dynamic process); and Darwinian evolution. 
1859, moreover, was also an important, if now less remembered, date in the field of 
spectroscopy.  Robert Wilhelm Bunsen’s discovery of the identity between ‘lines’ observed in 
solar (and extra-solar) absorption spectra and those found in mid-Victorian physical laborato-
ries for ‘earth-bound’ elements shattered a long-standing cultural myth (the exceptionality of 
the heavens), even as it rendered yet another phenomenon ineradicably ‘material’.  Some 
scientists were astonished as they came to realise that the most distant visible stars could be 
examined for composition, temperature and structure as readily as if they were ground 
mineralogical samples stored in Erlenmeyer flasks.  Others were unnerved about what such a 
revelation – another Copernican decentring:  just as Darwin was perceived as linking man 
with the animals ‘below’ in the biological realm (though he himself shunned such hierarchy), 
so did Bunsen with the stars above in the astrophysical – said about the nature of the cosmos.  
If the 1870s, as William McGucken has observed (p. 73), were the heyday for unification of 
chemical with atomic views of stellar (and other) spectra, Alexandre-Edmond Becquerel, a 
                                                
1  Judeo-Christianity had always featured some form of ‘supervised’ development myth; Gladstone, for in-
stance, eagerly authored articles claiming evolution and Genesis compatible ‘in the broad sense’ (Gould, p. 404). 
2  ‘But now [in 1882]’, as Matthew Arnold warily reported, ‘[…] [materialistic] conceptions of the universe 
fatal to the notions held by our forefathers have been forced upon us by physical science’ (‘Literature’, p. 66). 
3  Many of the texts I quote, both Victorian and modern, use the labels ‘scientific naturalism’ and ‘scientific 
materialism’ more or less interchangeably, though strictly speaking, in Turner’s scheme, the latter would add to 
the suppositions of the former the idea, to be addressed in my next chapter, of psychophysical parallelism.  
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French physicist, spoke for many when he remarked, in 1874:  ‘To study the physical constitu-
tion of the sun and stars, Astronomy employs in general telescopes and the spectroscope; this 
last instrument shows us that the heavenly bodies are composed of the same elements that are 
found in the earth; whence it may be concluded that the forces governing matter are of 
universal existence’ (p. 133).   
I am not suggesting that there was any total change in this period, nor that its scientific 
writings differed utterly in either substance or tone from the productions of previous genera-
tions and established disciplines – or subsequent generations and emergent disciplines, for that 
matter.4  On the contrary, modifications in form or idiom happened along a continuum, even 
as evolution had its precursors, even as materialism had an ideological genealogy (as was 
acknowledged by many at the time, conspicuously Tyndall) stretching back into antiquity.   
I would nonetheless suggest that during this period, and in these writers, something in-
triguing, if not unprecedented, was taking place.  They charted a strange transition, or change 
of phase, describing a time in which physical sciences were grappling with universals of a new 
‘global’ sort, a transformation examined in some detail in my first chapter.  Some of these 
revelations seemed so profound and distressing that they could only be mentioned in a kind of 
awed – or stuttering – fashion.  Furthermore, audiences, whether in print or person, were 
experiencing this ‘as it happened’, in a sense, like watching live television coverage of a 
disaster in progress, and the uncertainty and ambivalence of scientists can be clearly gleaned 
from those texts documenting transmission.  ‘[T]he history of thought’, as early twentieth-
century physicist Alfred North Whitehead phrased it in his important study Science and the 
Modern World (1927), ‘in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is governed by the fact that 
the world had got hold of a general idea’ – that physical behaviour, studied empirically, was 
best explained without reference to the preternatural – ‘that it could neither live with nor live 
without’ (p. 64).  This observation, characteristically trenchant, is nevertheless insufficiently 
precise.  There were multiple ways of ‘liv[ing] with’, even as there were any number of meth-
ods for ‘liv[ing] without’, for denial.   
Prior to The Origin, prior to the formalisation of the Second and First Laws of Thermo-
dynamics (the ordering is deliberate, and follows historical progression), prior to Bunsen’s 
                                                
4  That is not to say there were no quantifiable transformations in, say, language or disciplinarity, however:  
for example, as David Roos has pointed out:  ‘By the end of the nineteenth century’ – unlike nearer its middle, 
before specialisation and increased professionalisation had fragmented what is often stereotypically conceived as 
the unitary character of its intellectual culture – ‘the chances of a major scientific achievement being influenced 
by an article in the Edinburgh Review, or any other generalist, nonprofessional journal, were almost nil’ (p. 162). 
- 13 - 
remarkable discoveries in solar spectroscopy, it seemed that one could find room in science for 
a wide range of ancillary beliefs, suppositions and metaphysical hypotheses.  This became far 
more challenging afterwards.  The change in mindset augured by these transfigurations in 
awareness can hardly be overstated.  Before them, materialism could be viewed as an interpre-
tation of theoretical constructs; subsequently, it seemed to men like Tyndall and Clifford a 
presupposition, something that could not be avoided, only refused.  (In an article of 1875, 
Tyndall scorns one antagonist for failing to accept a fait accompli:  ‘the modern scientific 
interpretation of Nature […]’ [‘Materialism’, p. 587].)  Though The Constitution of Man (1828) – 
a phrenological study by Combe, a work tending towards materialism – had at its publication 
invited a flurry of denunciations, by the late 1830s ‘reflective treatises by Herschel, Lyell, 
Nicholl, and others had shown how natural laws might be discussed without outraging public 
sensibilities.  Outside the shadowy world of freethought, the slightest opportunities for accusa-
tions of materialism had to be blocked […]’ (Secord, p. 75).   
Tyndall and Clifford, by contrast, writing little more than a generation later, actively 
courted such a judgement.  To them, materialism was no longer a prejudice or corollary, a 
‘taste’, it had begun to seem the irresistible condition for advance, the only legitimate way 
forwards, as necessary for a profitable science – and an expansionist Empire – as belief in a 
round earth.   
To assert that the art of Shakespeare was potential in the sun (as the former did), or 
that the universe would inevitably be rendered unfit for life:  not just human life, but life of any 
sort (as the latter, among others, did), is to argue for a qualitatively different role for scientific 
explanation, far more radical than the recalibrations of belief advocated by, say, Lyell or 
Chambers.  These are speculations about process, about teleology, about first origins and final 
endpoints, seeming neither to require, nor admit, ‘the extraneous’.  Few scientists were 
undisturbed by this – not even figures who would actually seem to be arguing in favour – and, 
from within their texts, literary remnants of various and irresolvable discontents can be readily 
exhumed.  It is this that unites such a polymorphous discourse, such a diversity of styles and 
assumptions among mid-Victorian writings in the physical sciences, making them, despite 
divergences, seem like species of one genus:  all had to deal with a likely positioning of materi-
alistic philosophy, no longer alongside, but behind – or beneath – unprecedented revelations. 
Though some ‘non-specialists’ found this possibility a wonder, others were unnerved:  
to F. W. H. Myers it served to suggest a sort of panoptic diminishment, that ‘the Cosmos has 
no true place for man […]’.  For, he elaborated, such ‘inhumane’ belief seemed not only to 
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reveal, but to revel in, the ‘underlying aspect of Nature which, once seized, is no less than 
appalling; when the familiar garden seems alien and terrible as a gulf in the Milky Way; and, 
nakedly confronted with the everlasting universe, man that must die feels more than the 
bitterness of death’ (‘Modern’, p. 103). 
Myers, if uniquely eloquent in expressing it, was not alone in this inference.  Many 
audiences were equally discomforted, finding themselves frightened and adrift.  Not acciden-
tally does Tyndall’s reviewer long for guidance as much as edification; not for nothing does he 
mourn the lack of oratorical uplift, ‘the magnificent thoughts on the road’, a figure stressing 
the scientist’s role as guide, or fellow traveller.  Whether a Virgil among the shades (a parallel 
suggested by T. S. Eliot for Tennyson and his In Memoriam [p. 246]) or a Moses in Judea (one 
implicit in some of W. K. Clifford’s comments on the interrelationships between scientists, 
scientism and progress), traversing a hell or wandering in search of some – hitherto unfathom-
able – promised land, was for many in those audiences worryingly unclear.   
And yet on the answer to that question so much depended.  
 
 ‘METHODOLOGICAL’ MATERIALISM AS SPIRITUAL REFUGE 
 
Turner’s important study, Between Science and Religion:  The Reaction to Scientific Naturalism in Late 
Victorian England (1974), provides sympathetic analysis of the careers and beliefs of gentlemen 
like Myers, Alfred Russel Wallace, and Herbert Spencer, among others, all of whom ‘generally 
accepted the concepts and theories of science.  At one time or another each had contributed to 
the naturalistic synthesis or had been trained in scientific procedures and philosophy or had 
been profoundly affected by its ideas’ (p. 2); yet, ultimately, each had also ‘embraced the belief 
that [...] they could not meaningfully guide their lives with reference solely to the visible world’ 
(p. 4).  In so doing, they were able to back away from what they perceived as the nineteenth 
century’s deadening, intermittently nihilistic, materialism. 
 Tyndall, too, had a route of egress, one likewise achieved via faith in an invisible 
world.  But it was a world of intrinsically natural, not supernatural, specification, an unseen 
reality of molecules and atoms and all their marvelous and varied interactions, not spiritual-
ism, nor other modish elaboration of antiquated belief.   Moreover, as Barton has noted, he, 
‘like Huxley, Hermann von Helmholtz, and [Frederick] Lange, advocated materialism as a 
methodology, a program, or a method of scientific research, but not as a general philosophy’ 
(p. 134).  Turner had some years before reached an identical conclusion:  ‘Often within the 
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same lecture or essay the scientific publicists dealt with a matter in two ways – in terms of 
scientific theory and as a philosophical stance’ – the very tension so conspicuous in Joseph 
Worcester’s Dictionary’s 1859 definition for the concept.  ‘In the latter regard, they usually 
backed away from materialism.  Huxley always said that if forced to answer the unanswerable 
question, he would chose idealism over materialism’.  Tyndall, indeed, despite lecturing ‘for 
several years on a materialistic theory of psychology […]’ (‘Carlyle’, p. 340), represented 
perhaps the apotheosis of this class, the individual in whose writings such a bifurcation of 
approach was most unmistakably – and expressively – instantiated.   
He wrote, to give one example of this, of a transcendental tingle apprehended in the 
audience of nature in a letter of 17 April 1862 to Juliet Pollock, wife of William Pollock:5 
 
The part of human nature which came into play under such circumstances is that which puzzles me 
most.  That solemn unison which the soul experiences with nature, and which is a thing essentially 
different from the intellectual appreciation of her operations.  But I will not carry you into a cloudland 
where I have often wandered myself without finding rest for the sole of my foot; and where probably 
man’s spirit may wander till the end of time without being sensibly more instructed.  (p. 1985) 
 
Of course, reluctance to burden his correspondent with such speculations does not imply that 
Tyndall did not juggle them himself, and his frequent wanderings left textual traces through-
out his career:  in his atmospheric perorations, in the poetry he composed (‘I do not know that 
he has ever written poetry’, wrote W. T. Jeans in 1887, ‘but he is certainly a poet in the fire of 
his imagination and in his love for all the forms of natural beauty’ [p. 73]), in the splitting he 
continually emphasised between the pragmatic need to approach science materialistically, but 
never to think that such rational inquiry could – or should – unreservedly gratify private 
desire.  This bifurcation was never more accentuated than in his Belfast Address.  My second 
chapter is an analysis of that address, along with another, ‘Crystals and Molecular Force’, 
delivered in Manchester around six weeks later, though clearly aligned with the earlier oration 
in topic as well as tone; in both, as we shall see, the adamancy of Tyndall’s insistence on the 
prerogative of materialism in discussions and explanations of the physical world’s witnessed 
behaviour contrasts somewhat awkwardly with his avowal of a nebulous inspecificity regarding 
the intrinsic significance of that physical world, or the manner in which its phenomena were to 
be spiritually understood and appreciated. 
                                                
5  He, Queen’s Remembrancer, noted barrister, translator of La Divina Comédia, ‘a man of liberal culture and 
rare social charm’; she, a bonne-vivant and intellectual, favoured, like her husband, with ‘numerous […] friendships 
in the world of letters, science, and art’ (Rigg).  It was Mrs Pollock who brokered the preliminary meeting 
between Tyndall and Tennyson, for instance (LWJT, p. 75). 
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My third chapter is a study in contrasts and similarities between two nineteenth-
century analytical luminaries, whose most celebrated writings stressed a tough-minded or 
algebraic description of nature over the kind of enraptured depiction favoured by Tyndall, 
though that was a rhetorical mode never fully abandoned:  the first, W. K. Clifford; the 
second, another Cantabrigian, James Clerk Maxwell, a scientific visionary whose theories 
concerning electromagnetism and statistical mechanics were to leave the landscape forever 
altered, heralding the arrival of a revolutionary new paradigm, a ‘change in the conception of 
Reality […]’, according to Einstein, that was ‘the most profound and the most fruitful that 
physics has experienced since the time of Newton’ (p. 71).  At this chapter’s heart is a discus-
sion of two contrasting apprehensions of the fundamental nature of material substance, as 
embodied in two divergent conceptualisations of (to mid-Victorian minds) its most elementary 
constituents:  atoms and molecules; related to this are the two men’s speculations on the 
destiny of human consciousness after death.  F. W. H. Myers, in his posthumously published 
textbook, Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death (1903), had his own views on this 
subject (unambiguous in such a choice of title), arising from his ‘third way’ spiritualistic 
convictions.  Clifford and Maxwell, by contrast, exemplified the two other primary possibili-
ties.  The former, like many Victorian positivists, advanced a belief in death’s physical domin-
ion but metaphoric impotence if life has been lived well and nobly, dedicated to the better-
ment of both self and species.  The latter, among peers almost uniquely secure in his Christian 
adherence, was – and this perhaps due to the orthodoxy of that faithfulness – far more muted 
publicly on the subject of the afterlife than either Clifford or Myers, but trumpeted, when the 
opinions of colleagues seemed unworthy of the ‘science’ on which they were allegedly based, 
his disagreement with a comparable vehemence. 
My final two chapters are paired examinations of Tyndall’s ‘cloudland’ wanderings, 
discussions of their impingements on those narratives and texts which, on first appraisal, might 
seem more involved in the first part of his essential dualism:  ‘the intellectual appreciation of 
her [nature’s] operations’.  The fourth is a study of how Tyndall’s materialism was under-
pinned, challenged and revitalised via the writings of Thomas Carlyle.  Particular focus is 
placed on the manner in which, through those writings, Tyndall was able to struggle with the 
conception of being put forth in Carlyle’s prophetic texts, where, contra utilitarian and 
eighteenth-century mechanistic philosophies, readers are impelled towards ‘a more unworldly 
conception of human life’, as the Irish social historian W. H. Lecky explained things, in 1891 
(p. 528).  Tyndall’s phrase in the letter – the one discussing ‘[t]hat solemn unison which the 
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soul experiences with nature’, seemingly almost a verbatim recapitulation of Wordsworthian 
sentiment – suggests the subject of my fifth, in which I discuss how Romanticism (particularly 
English Romanticism), broadly construed, provided a specific framework in which Tyndall 
could articulate his own vision of Carlyle’s ‘natural supernaturalism’.  This, however, was an 
endeavour seemingly founded on irresolvable paradox:  if, following Lecky, Carlyle’s task was 
the estrangement of humanity from the corrosively material, the lauding of otherness, the 
scientist’s own was precisely contrary, in that Tyndall sought to demonstrate humankind’s 
intimate ‘worldliness’, the utter interlinkage of Homo sapiens with the measurable and mun-
dane, while concurrently distancing such beliefs from what he referred to, and derided, as the 
‘practical materialism’ of both contemporary thinkers (like Harriet Martineau and Thomas 
Young), and those Enlightenment mechanists whose pronouncements earlier in the century 
had so affrighted a young Carlyle.   
These were nuances frequently irrelevant to adversaries, however:  the unnamed 
author of one extended critique spoke for many in claiming that, while ‘[i]t may appear the 
difference is great between Miss Martineau’s and Professor Tyndall’s views on the question of 
Materialism […]’, and ‘though as regards actual substance or matter, this is in some degree 
true; yet when the main and most important principles are concerned, the same line of 
thought is plainly manifested […]’ (Materialistic, p. 1).  Tyndall, like other publicists, recognised 
this propensity, and expended considerable energy – often for nought – in contesting such 
unflattering, if schematically accurate, interpretations of his belief. 
 These chapters are therefore studies in ‘redacted materialism’.  My first, by contrast, 
provides more abstract analysis, overviewing the historical context of materialism, the ‘literary’ 
status of popularising language, the possibility of a ‘poeticised’ science, while sketching also 
some nineteenth-century readings and reinterpretations of the unadorned hypothesis.  All of 
these discussions, moreover, are set against more general theological issues presented by the 
ongoing conflict between science and religion.  While Turner is certainly correct in interpret-
ing this as, on one level, a contest for authority between rival professional clans (‘Conflict’, p. 
360), it must never be overlooked that there were real feelings at stake, too; as the Rev. John 
Quarry explained in a sermon published within two weeks of Belfast:  ‘The supposition that 
lifeless matter is the origin of all being, and contains in itself the source of all life and thought, 
cannot fail to give a rude shock to our better feelings, and to deaden all the higher aspirations 
of the human mind’ (p. 3).  His were worries, as we shall see, not entirely foreign to a number 
of mid-Victorian ‘scientific materialism’s’ most ardent and prolific propagandists as well. 




THE PRESENTATIONS (AND REPRESENTATIONS) OF SCIENTIFIC  




I have shown that all the realms of the universe 
Are mortal, and that the substance of the heavens 
Had birth; and I have explained most of those things 
That in the heavens occur and must occur. 
Please listen now to what remains to tell.    
- Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe0 
 
The nineteenth century saw the rise of a sense, and a definition, of ‘literature’ as applying to, 
and demarcating, a body of writings as distinct owing to origin or nominal subject.  Perhaps 
fittingly, it is two science writers who are in the OED credited with innovation (or, at mini-
mum, priority of citation), thus becoming, from a lexicographical point of view, the figures 
associated with these broadenings out of denotated meaning:  Humphry Davy in the first 
instance (1815:  literature as ‘the body of writings produced in a particular country or period’ 
[def. 3a]), and, splendidly, John Tyndall – whose own productions teeter so precariously 
between those three styles of ‘narration’ discussed in my introduction – for the second (1860:  
literature as ‘[t]he body of books and writings that treat of a particular subject’ [def. 3b]).  
Brande and Cox’s definition of literature in the 1865 edition of their Dictionary of Science, 
Literature, & Art managed to capture something of that term in the very throes of semantic 
mitosis: 
 
The word denotes, generally, the entire results of knowledge and fancy preserved in writing; but, in the 
narrower use to which ordinary custom restricts it, we draw a distinction between literature and 
positive science, thus exempting from the province of the former one extensive branch of our studies.  
And, in a still more restricted sense, the word literature is sometimes used as synonymous with polite 
literature, or the French belle-lettres.  (p. 381) 
 
The Victorian fin de siècle, despite the persistence in some quarters of such reservations and 
provisos, saw classificatory amnesty made complete – in 1895 we encounter for the first time 
application of the signifier ‘literature’ to ‘[p]rinted matter of any kind’ (OED, def. 3c) – with 
the admittance of all comers, if only informally, to that hitherto exclusionary realm.  Yet the 
                                                
Epigraph from Lucretius, p. 180; 6.42 - 46.  
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other meanings were never far behind, and a whiff of elitism continued to linger about both 
the word and the concept.  ‘[A] general term which, in default of precise definition, may stand 
for the best expression of the best thought reduced to writing’ – so the entry for ‘literature’ in 
the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica begins (F.-K., p. 783).  This is a designation at once open-
ended (‘best thought’ allows much manoeuvre) and limiting (the banal, witless or poorly 
phrased need not, it seems, apply, as the mere status of ‘information written down’ becomes a 
necessary, though hardly sufficient, criterion for class membership).  A recent academic 
definition keeps such qualifications intact, Robert Scholes saying of literary criticism (and thus 
the object of its inquiry):  ‘It is an art, not a science, […] which means we learn it by studying 
the texts in which the arts of language are most powerfully on display.  We call these texts 
“literature” […]’ (p. C1).   
Over the past thirty-odd years, scholars have come to grant ‘literary’ status to some, 
even most, of the linguistic artefacts of nineteenth-century scientific culture, if perhaps warily.  
William Bartlett, for instance, described his dissertation on Tyndall as ‘a contribution to the 
recent (and rapidly growing) field of science studies’ because of ‘its emphasis on the rhetorical 
analysis of texts that are often placed on the margins of a canon of Victorian literature’ (p. 4).  
Conversely, critics like Gillian Beer, George Levine, Sally Shuttleworth and Jonathan Smith 
have illuminated the fashion in which works central to that canon were influenced by those 
‘technical’ discourses purportedly nearer its outskirts.  What did the scientific writers of that 
century say about the ‘status’ of their own writings, however?  How did they view them?  in 
relation to the literary tradition?  in relation to the philosophical?  What did such authors, not 
ourselves, mean by a ‘poetic’ sensibility or ‘universal’ applicability?  And what did they 
accentuate as most novel about the kinds of discoveries they were seeking to elucidate?  
These issues are paramount in any examination of the coupling of scientific naturalism 
with its literary representations.  This chapter is thus in large part a study of definitions, of 
changing nineteenth-century ideas of materialism, ‘poetic’ science, ‘teleological’ or ‘global’ 
natural philosophy.  It also provides, in its concluding section, analysis – oriented around a 
reading of a twentieth-century poem outlining a trio of possible responses to materialism – of a 
series of re-definitions, a survey of mid- to late-Victorian attempts to humanise that belief-
system by remaking it into something less ethically dismaying or spiritually austere.  These 
queries frame my terms of debate, providing a broader context for those specific responses to 
materialism discussed later in this dissertation.  To start with, the idea of the ‘poetical-ness’ of 
science was one that exercised a variety of thinkers, particularly scientific popularisers.  I will 
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examine two texts which directly addressed themselves to this question.  An anthology by the 
astronomer Richard Proctor argued forcibly in favour of parity between scientific investigation 
and a rousing ‘poetic sense’.  The contrary case, that for disproportion, was made in ‘Prose 
and Verse’, a poem of 1857 by fellow astronomer John Herschel, a piece which also suggests 
something of the ‘new course’ for – and, implicitly, the emergent sense of import associated 
with – scientific theorising in the second half of the nineteenth century, a recalibration of belief 
for which I argue in this chapter’s middle section. 
 
ON THE LIKENESS AND UNLIKENESS OF SCIENCE AND POETRY 
 
In 1881, Richard Proctor published an anthology suggestively entitled The Poetry of Astronomy.  
That’s one designation which would seem to lay bare authorial intention.  Yet just as impor-
tant is Proctor’s subtitle, which clarifies the nature of this proposed ‘poetic’ exploration, a task 
he conceived not so much aesthetically, or linguistically, as ideologically:  A Series of Familiar 
Essays on the Heavenly Bodies, Regarded Less in Their Strictly Scientific Aspect Than as Suggesting Thoughts 
Respecting Infinities of Time and Space, of Variety, of Vitality, and of Development.  This is astronomy, 
then, as (in part) Romantic spectacle, productive of deep thoughts, a correlative to wonder.  
This is astronomy as aid to reflection, a belittling splendour willingly sought; astronomy as 
teaching tool abetting personal reflection and the necessary reconceptualisation of the role and 
relation of self to universe (or, in terminology less solipsistic, species to same).  F. Scott Fitz-
gerald was to write in the 1920s of the panorama of Long Island Sound that greeted European 
pioneers, of the ‘fresh, green breast of the new world’, describing it as inadvertent encounter, 
unplanned revelation:  it suggested the bewilderment of early modern man ‘compelled into an 
æsthetic contemplation he neither understood nor desired, face to face for the last time in 
history with something commensurate to his capacity for wonder’ (p. 189).  On earth, perhaps, 
was this, if debatably, the case, though other vistas remained, other New Worlds presenting 
like possibilities of discovery, self- and otherwise.  Views directed outwards towards space or 
backwards in time (geological, evolutionary), examinations oriented inwards towards the sub-
molecular, or downwards towards the psyche (psychological meditations on the effluvium of 
consciousness itself), these were similarly to transfix the Victorian observer, perhaps an indi-
vidual sufficiently secure in material terms or adequately ensconced in worldview that he or 
she deliberately courted destabilisation and conceptual rebooting, craving the narcotic rush of 
novel perspective.  Proctor celebrated this dual movement.   
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Figure 1 -  ‘The Transit of Venus, – December 9, 1874’, Punch’s Almanack for 1875.
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He defended a conception of science allowing its impact on our ‘poetic’ sense, even as 
our ‘poetic’ sense told us better where to look, why to look, and, indeed, what to bother 
looking for:  
 
Many think that science cannot truly be called science if clothed in poetic garb, and, on the other 
hand, others seem to fear that a glory must depart from the face of nature if science scrutinise her 
mysteries too closely.  I believe both these fears to be unfounded – that science need not be less exact 
though poetry underlie its teachings; while, beautiful and glorious though the ordinary aspect of nature 
may be, a deeper poetry, a more solemn significance, a greater beauty, and a nobler glory can be 
recognised in the aspect of nature when science lifts the veil which hides it from the unaided vision.   
 (p. v)  
 
Proctor’s slightly confused, and confusedly sexed, scheme of anthropomorphisation is telling, 
indicating something of the complexity of his metaphor.  Nature is feminised, something to be 
uncovered, or stripped bare, blushing if necessary.  Yet a ‘poetic’ sense is likewise figured as a 
sort of ‘garb’, a concealing garment draped atop nature, like a throw shrouding a classical 
sculpture.  Such dressing, then, is done not so much to preserve modesty as to facilitate 
admittance to, and passage through, polite society.  It is science (and scientists), in other words, 
that unclothe nature, before sending nature out of the house wearing something more suitable.  
And it is science (and scientists) that can be trusted to behold, unblanchingly if with some 
delight, things in their unadorned state; it (and its practitioners) that can persist comparatively 
unfazed by prospects, precipitously discovered, of ‘unearthly’ beauty.  (9 December 1874 
witnessed a transit of the planet Venus, an event epitomised in a Punch cartoon as a procession 
of beauties, a Venus each, from across the globe, from all historical epochs.  They move in 
orderly fashion, as if themselves governed by ‘beautiful’ inexorable law, passing above the 
leering lenses of enraptured scientists – though an obvious pun, this joke, like Proctor’s expla-
nation, suggests something of the gendered nature of Victorian scientific conceits [fig. 1].)  
Beyond the figurative, Proctor’s language evokes other associations as well:  ‘lifts the veil’, for 
instance, looks backwards towards In Memoriam and ‘The Lifted Veil’ (1859), George Eliot’s 
famed short story, towards canonical variations on that fragment fixed in discourse. 
The Poetry of Astronomy, however, though citing passages from several ancient and Ren-
aissance poets (particularly revealing is one mid-chapter excursus integrating discussion of The 
Iliad, the recent naming of the two moons of Mars, Phobos and Deimos, and astronomically 
based speculation on the date of the Trojan War [pp. 305 - 08]), makes scarce direct mention of 
mid-Victorian verse reflecting scientific engagement:  that of Tennyson, that of Myers, that of 
Swinburne or Browning.  It focuses still less on potentially poetic (‘poetic’ here meaning 
‘conventionally literary’, a ‘surface’ phenomenon:  ‘poetic’ as stereotypically conceived) aspects 
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of, or flourishes within, the technical and popular writings of mid-nineteenth-century scientists 
and science writers themselves.  The distinction, to him, seems a prepositional one, a valuation 
of the poetry in science above the poetry of science.   
Proctor, in effect, fixated on ‘first-order’ experience, the shiver of poetic feeling precipi-
tated by direct (or nearly direct, as it is mediated via the astronomer’s own aesthetic proclivi-
ties) contact with nature.  But sometimes a ‘second-order’ production can replicate something 
of that immediacy, sometimes poetry can communicate the hackneyed ‘wonder of science’ – 
unimpeded by equations or Latin nomenclature – with the force, if not always the knowledge-
content, of science as purportedly ‘felt’ by the initiated.  There are, of course, certain topics 
more obviously prone to such literary appropriation-hence-appreciation.  As Maurice Riordan 
and Jon Turney observe in their introduction to A Quark for Mister Mark (2000), an anthology 
(prejudiced towards the twentieth century) collecting verses and verse-fragments influenced by 
the methods, results and opinions of science:  
 
We did find, though, that poets’ curiosity has its blind spots.  Or perhaps only certain kinds of news 
from science can get through clearly.  The scale and age of the universe impress plenty of poets, and 
one could make a sizable, but repetitive, collection just featuring awe-struck or morose meditations on 
star-gazing.  The struggle to understand evolution is another, nineteenth-century, theme which 
continues to thrive, perhaps because it builds on a traditional poetic concern with natural history. 
 (p. xiii) 
 
This was the case, not infrequently, in Victorian intellectual life as well.  Then, as now, certain 
frontiers – in scale (the very large, the very small) as much as subject – perennially intrigue, 
appearing more seductive to the curious.  Not coincidentally do the themes which Riordan 
and Turney identify find semi-mythic origin in the period covered by this study.  The giddy 
wheel of cosmic perspective (brought to popular awareness by mid-Victorian explorations and 
quantifications of the vastness of the heavens and related speculations regarding the plurality 
of worlds); the plummet of recognition felt in acknowledgement of simian ancestry, of deep 
geological time:  these were, and remain, invitations to thought and self-questioning, like the 
tableaux of the Stations of the Cross.  Yet, as often as not, they are productive of sometimes 
contrary emotions, feelings of terror and unease alongside awed humility or wonder.   
 Proctor’s definition of poetry as applied to science, then, has little to do with manner of 
expression, still less with caesuras and end-rhyme.  It is more an index of common humanity, 
of shared affections, a register harkening back to Burkean concepts of the sublime (as Burke 
wrote:  ‘Infinity has a tendency to fill the mind with that sort of delightful horror, which is the 
most genuine effect and truest test of the sublime’ [p. 101]); accordingly, the ‘poetry’ he 
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identifies in astronomy venerates the intangible, the power of glorious spectacle, even as it 
recalls more current notions of Romantic beauty, that recognition of – and those meditations 
upon – the overlooked or picturesque.  Like Proctor, many Victorian scientific publicists were 
capable of discerning within, and publicly investing, the routine – even the prosaic or ‘house-
hold’ – with a semblance of inspirational grandeur:  Huxley lectured on a piece of chalk; 
Tyndall, on the colour of the sky; Faraday, on the chemical history of a candle, to name only 
three of the most renowned of many such discourses.1 
 In these talks, each scientist sought, after a fashion, to poeticise the commonplace, 
yoking rational comprehension with imagination and fancy, and joining to that an unmistak-
able sense of immanent or transcendent meaning, like Keats with his urn, or Wordsworth, his 
daffodils.  Such works upon publication, like Proctor’s own text, typically attained at least the 
minimum standards set forth in a definition of literature given, nearly contemporaneously, by 
Craik in his pioneering A Compendious History of English Literature, and of the English Language, from 
the Norman Conquest (1864).  This was a work which, by its very nature, busied itself distinguish-
ing between ‘what was in’ and ‘what was out’, delimiting categories: 
 
As for literature, it is not the synonyme [sic] even of written language.  It is not coextensive with 
that, or limited to that.  For want of a better term, we call artistic composition in words, or thought 
artistically so expressed, literature; but, on the one hand, there is abundance of writing, and of printing 
too, which is not literature in this proper sense, and, on the other, it is not a necessity of artistic 
composition that it should be in a written form.  (1: 22) 
 
Huxley, for instance, in an unpublished manuscript (available electronically), once opined: 
 
 But there is a portion of scientific work which seems to me to have an indisputable claim to the title 
of literature – I mean the work of the popular expositor – of the man who being a well qualified 
interpreter of nature translates that interpretation out of the hieratic language of the experts into the 
demotic vulgar tongue of all the world. 
I call this literature – for it seems to me to be the essence of literature – that it embodies great emo-
tions and great thoughts in such form that they touch the hearts and reach the apprehensions not 
merely of the select few but of all mankind.  (‘Literary’) 
 
The latter paragraph effectively restates definitions of poetry given earlier in the century, 
particularly in the specific issues raised:  that of ‘translation’ from a lofty to a ‘demotic tongue’; 
the Romantic conceit revivified to extend to science, conveying, like verse, ‘great thoughts’ 
and ‘great emotions’.  (‘Hieratic’ is even a Shelleyan word, bringing to mind his noble defence 
of poetry’s art and function.)  
Huxley here made claims for the literary worth of science writing (though mainly that 
                                                
1  Huxley, ‘Chalk’; FoS, pp. 245 - 87; Faraday, Chemical. 
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of the ‘popular expositor’); Proctor, in The Poetry of Astronomy, for the subject’s spiritual profun-
dity, or ‘poetry-like’ appeal.  Not all scientists, of course, were interested in these issues.  Nor, 
among those that were, was confidence absolute in comparable equivalencies.  For instance, 
the following, written in 1857, seems a manifesto impelling the era’s science away from dry or 
workmanlike inquiry, towards poetry, a request that science commence itself to addressing the 
grandest sorts of philosophical conundrums.  This is not to suggest that there isn’t a feeling of 
palpable affection for the subject intermixed with an overtone of broader humanistic dissatis-
faction pervading ‘Prose and Verse’, a poem by Sir John Herschel, professional astronomer, 
enthusiastic amateur musician, son of Sir William Herschel (himself an astronomer of re-
nown).  In it, science and poetry are addressed, not so much as wife and lover, but rather as 
two muses, or infidelities:  one, science, now regarded affectionately though with perhaps 
diminishing ardour (he writes to her in apology:  ‘And if from thy clear path my foot have 
strayed, / Truant awhile, – ’twas but to turn / With warm and cheerful haste; while thou didst 
not upbraid, / Nor change thy guise, nor veil thy beauteous form […]’ [p. 538]); the other, 
poetic art, praised passionately, if chastely, exuberantly, if clandestinely, like a teenager’s 
crush.  Thus Herschel’s poem reads as a double ode, to cloying and coy mistresses, respec-
tively.  Science feels to him clear-headed, but a bit dull, enlightening but distant, a presence at 
once unapproachable and drearily unreproachable.   
Poetry to him seems, by contrast, a ‘breathy’ seductress holding him wholly in thrall, a 
feminine principle similarly unattainable, yet for whom his desire is never slaked; she is 
epitomised as a dark lady leading him away from science’s day-lit paths, into the night, 
towards private pleasures, ‘cell[s]’ and ‘haunted grove[s]’.  His second stanza enacts this 
turning away from public obeisance, beginning in a tone of (faint) praise for science, segueing 
into an encomium for his other joy: 
 
High truths, and prospect clear, and ample store 
 Of lofty thoughts are thine!  Yet love I well 
That loftier far, but more mysterious lore, 
 More dark of import, and yet not less real, 
 Which poetry reveals; what time with spell 
High-wrought, the Muse, soft-plumed, and whisperingly 
 Nightly descends, and beckoning leads to cell 
Or haunted grove; where all inspiringly 
She breathes her dirge of woe, or swells my heart with glee. (p. 538) 
 
This seems a bit unfair, as astronomy was often perceived in a similar light, felt as a subject 
conveying grand or mystifying emotions, at times ‘whisperingly’.  The aspirations underlying, 
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and communicated by, the essays in The Poetry of Astronomy; the scope and vision endemic to 
Tennyson’s late verse; the solemn sense of personal transcendence, of ‘loftier far, but more 
mysterious lore’, implicit in those hyperbolic blazons to celestial beauty spouted by Swithun St 
Cleeve in Hardy’s Two on a Tower (1882):  these were all markers of a contrary estimation.  
Perhaps Herschel – raised in Observatory House in Slough, in the shadow of its forty-foot 
reflector – had just grown too inured to astronomy’s charms (his phrasing would certainly 
seem to indicate just that) from long acquaintance.   
However, for such a soul – apotheosis of Walt Whitman’s ‘learn’d astronomer’:  do-
mesticating the heavens, divesting the darkness of its wonder – in poetry, not parallax, might 
be found escape and cosmic perspective.  The third stanza of the poem makes explicit this 
aesthetic transference, telling how verse-forms create within Herschel an alternative space, 
how they manage to occasion analogous ‘cosmological’ or ego-rattling shocks.  In it, he 
describes the capacity of poetry to construct for him a linguistic continuum truly self-contained 
yet possessed of kindred witchery, and, in so doing, to facilitate a kind of psychological mo-
ment commensurate with that afforded to others by confrontation with belittling astrophysical 
spectacle, by jarring encounter – zippy teleportation from Surrey to Sagittarius, or from 
Herefordshire to eternity – with what must have seemed to almost everyone else the incom-
prehensibly vast and timelessly existent:  
 
Oh! rosy fetters of sweet-linked Rhyme, 
 Which charm while ye detain, and hold me drowned 
In rich o’er-powering rapture!  Space and Time 
 Forgot, I linger in the mazy round 
 Of loveliest combination.  […] (p. 538) 
 
There is one sense, though, in which Herschel’s criticisms might be justified.  The title of the 
piece – and as G. K. Chesterton once noted with characteristic sagacity:  ‘titles are sometimes 
neglected even when books are studied’ (p. 1042) – is at once surprising and easy to overlook.  
It is not, as might be expected, ‘Science and Verse’, but rather ‘Prose and Verse’.  Nonethe-
less, the work begins with a dedication (‘To thee, fair science, long and early loved’), and ends 
with a vision of reconciliation between two rival temptresses.   
Could, however, this invocation of ‘prose’ say something about the variety of science be-
ing critiqued?  If not for Herschel, then for others who might have felt some sympathy with 
such a stance, with its inchoate ‘anti’-reductionism, its aura of vague aesthetic and moral 
dissatisfaction?  Does he, in other words, indict or censure prosy-science because prosaic-
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science?  In the July 1859 Westminster Review, Herbert Spencer, towards the conclusion of an 
essay offering spirited defence of the nation’s need for a universalised scientific curriculum, 
formalised a revealing distinction.  He in so doing made explicit what many among his peers 
had for long years presumed.  Speaking with fervour of the superior wisdom and discernment 
of ‘the sincere man of science’, he immediately qualified that term with a parenthetical:  ‘(and 
by this title we do not mean the mere calculator of distances, or analyser of compounds, or 
labeller of species; but him who through lower truths seeks higher, and eventually the highest) 
[…]’ (‘What’, p. 39).  Mere classificatory knowledge, in other words, the stereotypical, drudg-
ing labour of vicar naturalists and amateur geologists, the unexamined production by scientific 
professionals of cross-checked tabulations of latent heat, or taxonomies and chemical charts, 
does not qualify.  Nor, indeed, does abstract analysis, airy mathematical fantasias at an 
unimaginable remove from lived reality.   
A different sort of endeavour is here affirmed, an endeavour more akin to that poetic 
affliction lamented by Herschel.  This variety of science, it seems, could whisper.  It could 
breathe a ‘dirge of woe’, or utter such words as would ‘swell the heart with glee’.  Though 
whether the former or the latter – that is, whether mournful dirge or gleeful proclamation – 
would more often than not be determined, not by some quality inherent in theories or facts 
themselves, but rather by who was listening and what he or she expected to hear, by senses 
(and sensibilities) conditioned by temperament or through theological predisposition.   
Coleridge, writing in 1822, gave aphoristic expression to one enduring antagonism, 
perceived or actual:  ‘Poetry is not the proper antithesis to prose, but to science […].  The 
proper and immediate object of science is the acquirement, or communication, of truth; the 
proper and immediate object of poetry is the communication of immediate pleasure’ (‘Defini-
tion’, p. 7).  (This judgment was at the time considered to be so authoritative that it was often 
cited in lieu of – or given as supplement to – both definition and argument in a surprising 
number of mid-Victorian reference texts:  for instance, the definition of poetry in Latham’s 
Dictionary [1866].)  A half-century later, Henry Drummond, in his polemical study Natural Law 
in the Spiritual World (1883), offered an appraisal diametrically opposed:  ‘True poetry is only 
science in another form’, he wrote (p. 274).  These are extreme positions, of course, and 
heavily qualified.  Drummond was a noted Christian evangelist, a ‘hybridised’ explorer-
scientist of some distinction (he authored works on anthropology as well as on the flora and 
fauna of tropical Africa), not to mention a lifelong campaigner for a rapprochement between 
science and religion.  For him, therefore, ‘[t]rue poetry’ was, unsurprisingly, the source text of 
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Revealed Faith, the Christian Bible, above all else.  Equally, Coleridge’s position, perhaps 
semi-flippant at bottom, appears similarly suspect.  It hardly seems a quibble to inquire:  
cannot poetry serve as a conduit for truth (of some sort)?  Or, conversely, cannot science be the 
source of ‘immediate pleasure’?  Now it would be disingenuous to argue that the period 
between Coleridge’s assessment and Drummond’s own witnessed a wholesale conversion, 
from everyone siding with the former to everyone assenting to the latter.  Most people in 1822 
or 1883 – that is, at either endpoint – if they had opinions on the subject at all, probably held 
opinions that were admixture.  It would likewise be absurd to insist that a change in the 
character of science was the sole reason for its increased ‘poetic’ acceptability over the years.2  
The rise of technology, science’s sibling – the telegraph, the railroad, later the telephone – 
abetted the process, as did the increase in cultural audiences for science (itself the consequence 
of the rise of Mechanic’s Institutes, among other ever-ongoing processes of social and educa-
tional transformation). 
I would nonetheless suggest that more people agreed with Coleridge earlier in the cen-
tury; more with Drummond towards its close.  In addition, as I will argue (and Drummond 
himself made this connection, as did most of the major figures addressed in this dissertation, if 
sometimes more hesitantly), a transformation in the aspirations of science, a shift in the quality 
of the claims it made, over the period separating the two had an inevitably profound effect on 
popular perception.  Herschel’s poem, composed in 1857, provides documentation of that 
transformation’s early stages, and also its general tendency.  What, however, was the nature of 
this change?  What was it about this ‘new science’, beyond Darwinism, that could prove so 
enthralling to some, but menacing, even existentially paralysing, to others?  And what exactly 
did the ‘sincere man of science’, in his questing after those higher – and highest – truths 
ostentatiously valorised by Spencer, discover (and, as crucially, communicate) about the 
nature of the physical world?  And, not always implicitly – and at times with grim or forebod-
ing insistence – about the metaphysical one as well?   
 
TELEOLOGICAL CLAIMS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
In his 1986 study James Clerk Maxwell and the Electromagnetic Field, John Hendry concocts, in part, 
a narrative of synthesis, an heroic tale of stubborn contraries reunited through the agency of a 
                                                
2  The term ‘science’ itself shifted and narrowed its sense over this period, Coleridge’s usage encompassing 
‘all systematic knowledge’, not merely results of laboratory empiricism (Engell, p. 69). 
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‘great man’.  He identifies two trains of thought – the mechanistic and the dynamistic – in the 
epistemology of early nineteenth-century physics.  These he characterises, on one level, as 
effective binaries, antithetical tendencies, if not diametrically opposed then, prior to the 
diplomatic labours of Maxwell and various ‘Maxwellian’ successors, only imperfectly or 
inadvertently reconciled.  On another, he suggests that each of these concepts presupposes the 
other, requires the other; that each was less the embodiment of a clear-cut cultural or intellec-
tual movement, a reaction to specific and local circumstance, and more the manifestation of 
inherent psychological and philosophical bias, predispositions culturally influenced and 
affirmed, certainly, but really transcending any individual moment or context.  A few histori-
ans of science have since faulted Hendry for having taken what they believe an inappropri-
ately reductive approach, despite the nuances implicit in such an interpretive bifurcation; they 
have found fault, or improper oversimplification, in his orienting of discussion between two 
such idealised contraries, whether conceived as unities or mixture.  Yet as Robert Purrington 
has written:  ‘If we resist the temptation to label each individual a dynamist or a mechanist but 
recognize those terms as two poles on a continuum and acknowledge that there are other 
dimensions to this graphical representation of philosophical inclination, then more good than 
harm may result from it’ (p. 20).   
The same can, of course, be said usefully not just of nineteenth-century scientists but a 
range of nineteenth-century scientific theories as well.  Of these, perhaps the most founda-
tional, wide-ranging and (in time) revolutionary was the so-called ‘analytical theory of heat’.  It 
was derived from Joseph Fourier’s totemic Théorie analytique de la chaleur, first published in 1822, 
finally making its way into full English translation in 1878.  In the meantime, however, it was 
to exert a profound influence on a generation of natural philosophers, in Britain and else-
where.  William Thomson, the man later to be known as Lord Kelvin, and in whose honour 
the modern metric unit of absolute temperature is named, was one; James Clerk Maxwell, 
another.  The former, indeed, according to Purrington, built ‘his entire career […] upon 
Fourier’s work and its implications’ (p. 85).  It is often taken to be a paradigmatic example of a 
dynamical theory, unwilling to be too specific about the basic nature of the concepts involved, 
content with numerical description, with establishment of algebraic relations capturing known 
behaviour.  In this, it was uniquely successful:  Maxwell praised the text as ‘one of the very few 
scientific works which can never be rendered antiquated by the progress of science’ (‘Extract’).  
This was in large part owing to its reticence about ultimate natures, true causes.  Its author 
made such a focus clear from the onset:  in a philosophically oriented ‘Preliminary Discourse’, 
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he began with clear assertion of a dynamicist’s – or, if more loosely, a positivist’s – apparently 
unanswerable scepticism:  ‘PRIMARY causes are unknown to us; but are subject to simple and 
constant laws, which may be discovered by observation, the study of them being the object of 
natural philosophy’.3  He then elaborated on this, going on to make plain his deep-seated 
aversion to unjustifiable inference or ontological speculation, his desire to craft a theory 
mathematically accurate, one in accord with known facts, adequately epitomising and sys-
tematising those facts, but never attempting, in effect, to derive phenomena from ‘the bottom 
up’, nor speculating on (potentially fallacious) intrinsic realities:  ‘The object of our work is to 
set forth the mathematical laws which this element [heat] obeys’ (p. 1) – ‘element’ here means 
‘aspect of experience’, not ‘real thing’, not heat as chemical or material substance, but rather 
as it is known via thermometry, through the tabulated register of instrument-readings and 
sense-impressions.   
Such philosophical caginess was understandable, perhaps even prudent.  The nature of 
heat was, after all, one of the most radically (and frequently) redefined concepts in the whole 
of physical science, one destined forever to remain to some minds a bit mysterious or 
misunderstood.  Michael Guillen, in a modern popularising work, has charted no fewer than 
five competing theories of heat – starting with that of the ancient world; progressing via the 
caloric theory (dominant in the latter eighteenth century, pioneered by Joseph Black); ending 
with the molecular, with heat (in the famous phrase) as a ‘mode of motion’, a theory which 
was in the ascendant by the middle of the nineteenth – each new conception seeming less like 
a refinement of the previous than a wholesale re-imagining (pp. 182 - 99).  Yet few doubted 
heat’s ubiquity, nor its significance.  Fourier himself likened it to the force of gravitation, 
omnipresent and inescapable.  He wrote:  ‘Heat, like gravity, penetrates every substance of the 
universe, its rays’ – like those enmeshing vectors interlinking body with body implicit through-
out classical mechanics – ‘occupy all parts of space’ (p. 1).  But with a difference:  Newton’s 
gravity is time-independent, eternal, unsullied, the planets processing unimpeded through an 
ethereal emptiness.  Newton’s Law, as paradigmatically understood, describes a clockwork 
cosmos, a perfect, perpetual engine.   
That abstraction tackled by Fourier, by contrast, imposes a definite arrow to time, a 
clear – and inarguable – directionality.  It tells tales not of effective stasis, nor celestial perfec-
tion, but rather decay, irreparable rupture, the corruption of the world, the bleeding of heat.  
                                                
3  Auguste Comte, for instance, found much to admire in the arguments of Joseph Fourier (Hendry, p. 
37n91). 
- 31 - 
The world, it insists, of the past differed from that of today; the world of today will differ from 
that of tomorrow, perhaps unrecognisably.  As noted by Stephen Brush in his important study 
The Kind of Motion We Call Heat (1976), many nineteenth-century debates on the irreversibility 
of physical transformation turned on recognition of theoretic incompatibility, pointing ‘out 
that in Newton’s second law,   
! 
F = ma , the substitution of -t for t leaves the right-hand side 
invariant, whereas this is certainly not the case with Fourier’s heat conduction equation […]’ 
(p. 556). 
In Fourier’s model, in other words, could be discerned the spectre of entropy (a notion 
formally quantified nearly three decades later by Clausius and others).  Its rules describing the 
flow and ablation of sensible heat in solid objects function only in a ‘forward’ direction une-
quivocally; to try to use them to extrapolate indefinitely backward, an application so congenial 
to Newton’s time-symmetric law, produces in the case of heat-exchange gibberish, not discrete 
solution nor plainly intelligible response.  The oracle, it seems, works one way only.   Tellingly, 
Clifford wrote of this analytical asymmetry in a fashion bringing to mind, among other things, 
story and storytelling:  ‘suppose you try to go backwards, in time […]’, soon enough, Fourier’s 
equation, which previously had seemed so straightforward in its prophesising, ‘[begins] to talk 
nonsense’, as he commented in his article ‘The First and Last Catastrophe’ (pp. 478 - 79). 
Maxwell, in his textbook Theory of Heat (1871), likewise made explicit this failing – or 
maybe collapse – of theory, pointing to it as yet another harbinger of entropic decay, yet 
another signpost differentiating future from past, a glimpse in algebra of thermodynamic 
convulsion: 
 
The negative value of t [for time], for which the series becomes divergent, indicates a certain date in 
past time such that the present state of things cannot be deduced from any distribution of temperature 
occurring previously to that date […]. 
This is only one of the cases in which a consideration of the dissipation of energy leads to the de-
termination of a superior limit to the antiquity of the observed order of things.  (pp. 244 - 45) 
 
So, here we encounter a key implication derived from thermodynamic theory:  the failure of 
prediction, nineteenth-century science’s discovery, or unearthing, of a limit to prognostication.  
Many Victorian physicists, grasping only too well the likely cosmological implication of such 
domestic behaviour – ‘Your coffee grows cold on the kitchen table, / Therefore the universe is 
dying’, in the words of twentieth-century poet Neil Rollinson – came also to believe that the 
universe had a long-term teleology, that it was progressing (or, less prejudicially, implacably 
transforming) from its unknowable beginnings towards termination in ‘heat death’, the ther-
modynamic equilibration of all physical things.  Convinced of the predictive power of entropy, 
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a few of the more outspoken among them started publicly to contend that the universe of 
distant futurity – uncountable eons hence, to be sure – would be a corpse sans potential, 
becoming a place finally (though fatally) at rest:  physically static, biologically sterile, chemi-
cally inert. 
Such a process might begin with local morbidity.  ‘Prophets’, Greg Myers observes 
snappily in an outstanding article, ‘through the ages [had] predicted the end of the earth’, but 
it was to be Thomson who, in the 1850s, was to become the first among them to offer mathe-
matically precise formulae for dispassionate computation of ‘its final temperature’ (‘Nine-
teenth’, p. 46).  Ultimately, however, entropy – ‘heat death’ – would insure a more compre-
hensive extinction.4  As put in Geschichte des Materialismus (History of Materialism; 1865), a work 
of philosophical genealogy – by Frederick Lange, the prolific neo-Kantian – which was to 
prove revelatory in certain mid-Victorian quarters:  ‘Finally, there seems to result also, as a 
simple consequence of the mechanical theory of heat, the destruction of all life in the whole 
universe’ (3: 11).  Lange’s seems a phrase at once coolly understated and curiously disbeliev-
ing, the deadpan utterance of a gentleman absolutely certain that he was fated to perish from 
unstanchable blood-loss subsequent to the most trifling of cuts.  Nor was he alone among 
Victorians in knowing how the bouncing would stop, the unchanging fate of the dropped and 
unmolested ball of children at play.  Thomas Pynchon suggested this analogy in The Crying of 
Lot 49, a twentieth-century novel itself entropy-obsessed (and, as Gillian Beer has explained, 
the text responsible for introducing her, along with so many ‘others of her literary generation 
[…]’, to the ideas and particulars of nineteenth-century thermodynamic dispute [OF, p. 29]); 
of a deceased ex-lover Oedipa Maas, Pynchon’s harried protagonist, at one point reminisces:  
‘“Keep it bouncing,” he’d told her once, “that’s all the secret, keep it bouncing.”  He must 
have known, writing the will, facing the spectre, how the bouncing would stop’ (p. 68). 
 The Second Law of Thermodynamics, that edict stipulating a global entropy increase 
over any given time, foredooming Oedipa’s bouncing ball, was, famously, derived from (at 
minimum) three directions, finding theoretical justification within the bounds of putatively 
contrary tendencies in thought.  Firstly, it can be inferred from measured inefficiencies in 
industrial machinery, becoming a guiding principle of engineering.  This was hinted at in Sadi 
                                                
4  Perhaps the most famous declaration of this belief was made by the Prussian Rudolf Clausius; its phrasing, 
moreover, in a translation from the German well known to British and American physical science, was far from 
euphemistic:  ‘supposing this condition’ – that is, the final maximisation of cosmological entropy – ‘to be at last 
completely attained, no further change could evermore take place, and the universe would be in a state of 
unchanging death’ (p. 419). 
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Carnot’s slim volume of 1824 – unnoticed for decades – Réflexions sur la puissance motrice du feu 
(Reflections on the Motive Power of Fire).  Secondly, it can be viewed as a consequence of the 
equations of Fourier, elegant dynamical descriptions capturing and quantifying the amount 
and direction of heat transference from hot to cold regions.  (An approach that, in early days, 
led to confusion; as the Hungarian physicist C. Szily observed, in 1872, one rationale for the 
slow professional acceptance of the Second Law lay in the fact that it ‘did not find in [post-
Newtonian analytic] mechanics any correlative principle so generally known as the [F]irst 
[Law] did […]’ [p. 339].)   
Thirdly, it can be derived from theories proposing a specific character to the ‘element’ 
(heat) being shuffled about (this was established by Ludwig Boltzmann in 1877), from an 
actual material philosophy predicated on the definition of heat as ‘mode of motion’, one 
presupposing jiggling atoms and vibrating molecules as unobservable, though basic, entities.  
These, then, would be neither proxies for reality, nor models of reality, but the really there stuff 
constituting reality.  In other words, as with a variety of physical precepts of the mid-
nineteenth century, in retrospect the ‘entropy law’ would seem irredeemably materialistic, but 
many philosophers and scientists at the time could conceive otherwise, insisting that as an in 
part dynamical rule (or, perhaps, merely pragmatic statement of Victorian technological 
limitation), it could be surreptitiously reintegrated into a less reductive – and pessimistic? – 
world-picture.   
For the publicists, however, for men like Huxley, Tyndall and Clifford, the laws of 
thermodynamics were essential parts of an explanatory synthesis.  The conservation of energy, 
the First Law, in particular, which Tyndall referred to as one of science’s ‘great generaliza-
tions’, ‘has been called the most important discovery of the nineteenth century’, as Sharlin has 
noted (p. 37); it underpinned countless declarations by the century’s ‘materialistic’ propagan-
dists in favour of the nebular hypothesis, against the interposition of the miraculous in terres-
trial affairs, against the ideas of spontaneous generation or vitalism in biology, as it bound 
‘nature fast in fate […] to an extent not hitherto recognized, exacting from every antecedent 
its equivalent consequent, from every consequent its equivalent antecedent’, thereby rendering 
universal history, like sentience and organic growth, material phenomena, as Tyndall ex-
plained at Belfast (BA, p. 45).   
Huxley wrote similarly of energy conservation in ‘The Progress of Science’ (1887), re-
flecting on the theoretical accomplishments of five glorious decades with self-evident pride 
(though never quite the awe-struck dizziness of a Tyndall or Clifford): 
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I have said that our epoch can produce achievements in physical science of greater moment than 
any other has to show, advisedly; and I think that there are three great products of our time which 
justify the assertion. One of these is that doctrine concerning the constitution of matter which, for want 
of a better name, I will call “molecular;” the second is the doctrine of the conservation of energy; the 
third is the doctrine of evolution.  Each of these was foreshadowed, more or less distinctly, in former 
periods of the history of science; and, so far is either from being the outcome of purely inductive 
reasoning, that it would be hard to overrate the influence of metaphysical, and even of theological, 
considerations upon the development of all three.  The peculiar merit of our epoch is that it has shown 
how these hypotheses connect a vast number of seemingly independent partial generalisations; that it 
has given them that precision of expression which is necessary for their exact verification; and that it 
has practically proved their value as guides to the discovery of new truth.  All three doctrines are 
intimately connected, and each is applicable to the whole physical cosmos.  (p. 66) 
 
These three represent the very pillars of scientific naturalism as outlined by Turner, the 
‘doctrinal’ trinity of that intellectual denomination.  Yet, as mentioned in my introduction, few 
(including Huxley himself) subscribed to outright philosophical materialism without some 
dilutions or reservations, for all the evidence – that motion from ‘foreshadowed’ belief to likely 
hypothesis – suggesting veracity, much of which had been unavailable prior to mid-century.  
In that, however, such figures were merely continuing a practice of reflexive denial which had 
for centuries characterised the genealogy of materialism, a stance many deem coeval with that 
of ‘philosophy’ as an identifiable discipline in the West.  Bertrand Russell, in an introduction 
to Lange (itself, fittingly, penned even as quantum mechanics and special relativity posited 
their own novel twentieth-century challenges to materialistic allegiance), once remarked that 
‘[m]aterialism as a theory of the universe has had a curious history.  Arising almost at the 
beginning of Greek philosophy, it has persisted down to our own time, in spite of the fact that 
very few eminent philosophers have advocated it’.   
Likewise, many scientists – even those active during periods when materialism as a pol-
icy or presupposition might have appeared virtually ‘synonymous with the scientific outlook’ 
(p. v) – have been similarly dismissive (or half-hearted).  Perhaps mid-Victorian materialism’s 
most fraught contention, however, one prone to rattling even the most fixed of adherences, 
was that of psychophysical parallelism, the connecting of mind with matter.  Lange, always 
wary of mental reductionism, ridiculed eighteenth-century expostulations – he spoke of a time 
when ‘the childishly naïve conception could still be put forward with the pretension of a 
scientific hypothesis, that every idea has its particular fibre in the brain, and that the vibration 
of these fibres constitutes consciousness’ (2: 11) – but then hinted that even its more subtle or 
sophisticated nineteenth-century variants might be of equal indefensibility.  Similarly, Herbert 
Spencer, so bullish about evolutionary insight, nevertheless classified among the Unknowable 
knowledge of the sort increasingly claimed by fellow publicists, asserting that, in matters of 
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physiological psychology, as elsewhere, ‘the Materialist and Spiritualist controversy is a mere 
war of words; the disputants being equally absurd – each believing he understands that which 
it is impossible […] to understand’ (‘Progress’, p. 485).  Spencer’s comments are from an 
article of 1857, two years pre-Origin; Lange’s, from a text of six years post-.   
Both men were often accused of, or slandered for, ‘materialistic’ leanings – and justi-
fiably, too.  But in neither case – as with so many such sympathisers, throughout the centuries 
– was conviction absolute.   
 
VICTORIAN ‘MATERIALISM(S)’:  QUESTIONS OF CLADISTICS AND NOMENCLATURE 
 
Croll, writing in 1872, had identified as a primary goal of the scientific theorist:  ‘We try to 
induce a unity amongst the multifarious facts of the senses by bringing as many of them under 
a certain conception as will be rationally connected by it’ (p. 1).  Such a statement, while 
epistemologically accurate, should not, however, be misconstrued as equivalent to signifying 
that all nineteenth-century scientific unifications took place within a robustly materialistic 
paradigm.  Some principles of heat exchange, as discussed, could be accepted without com-
mitment to ontological hypotheses, as could many aspects of contemporary chemical theory 
(Purrington, p. 132).  Interpretive double-ness could even be suggested by the period’s nomen-
clature:  the nineteenth century’s paradigmatic theory of heat, for example, was often labelled 
the ‘dynamical theory’ as it had vanquished the idea of a caloric fluid:  ‘Till the latter part of 
the last century’, Hamblin Smith summarised in a popular undergraduate textbook, ‘heat was 
generally regarded as a material substance, an invisible weightless fluid […]’.  Now, however, 
‘[i]t has been conclusively proved that heat is not matter, but that the application of heat to a 
body causes a vibration to the minute particles composing that body; that this vibration 
increases in intensity as the body receives more heat; and that what in our sensation is heat is in 
the body nothing but motion’ (p. 1).   
As a descriptive term, then, ‘materialism’ might seem inadequate, even useless, en-
compassing more than two millennia of philosophical speculation, only a fraction of which can 
be made conveniently to seem, or interpreted as, ‘genuinely’ or rigorously ‘materialistic’ – by 
our own contemporary standards, at least.  By the appearance of the 1911 Encyclopædia Britan-
nica the seeming unity of subject implicit in its 1860 definition (‘MATERIALISM is the name 
given to that speculative theory which resolves all existence into a modification of matter’) had 
been superseded by an awareness of diversity, a recognition of the different ends and origins of 
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materialistic philosophising.  Totalising ‘cosmological materialism’, it is argued, had as its impetus 
the aesthetic desire for a pleasing, all-encompassing system; ‘medical materialism’, by contrast, 
found pragmatic, ‘local’ and limited justification in an awareness that certain forms of treat-
ment and disease prevention had better outcomes than certain others forms of treatment and 
disease prevention.  ‘[A]nti-religious materialism’ was entrenched in a reactionary resistance to 
received dogma and existential belief, a stance having far less to do with physics than social 
politics; ‘naïve materialism’, on the other hand, is somewhat condescendingly attributed not to 
any coherent intellectual commitment, but rather a sort of unexamined credulity, and the 
author of the article found it both in, say, ancient Greek animistic hylozoism and such pre-
Socratics as Thales (who famously believed that in the different manifestations of water could 
be discovered all the forms and variety of the experiential world), and also in the considerably 
more contemporary writings of T. H. Huxley and the German embryologist Ernst Haeckel 
(both of whom should have known better, as argued implicitly by this scheme of classification 
and critique).  Above all these in the hierarchy, indicating, perhaps, where our encyclopae-
dist’s sympathies lie (it is, we are told, materialism’s ‘highest form’), is the methodology of 
‘scientific materialism’, that ‘doctrine so commonly adopted by the physicist, zoologist and 
biologist’. 
Such a fin de siècle fracturing in terms of ideology and implementation should hardly 
surprise, however – nor was it solely the consequence of Victorian scientific and philosophical 
dispute.  Materialism’s genesis as articulated system, a fact acknowledged since mid-century by 
commentators, could be traced amid the conjectures of Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus; 
indeed, the Roman atomist Lucretius, essentially overlooked for more than a millennium, was 
in the 1870s ‘thrust […] into the mainstream of contemporary polemics over science, religion, 
and philosophy […]’ by Tyndall’s Address at Belfast.  Though some found ancient concep-
tions of ‘falling atoms’ – of collocations of matter wrought by oddly domestic forces (love, hate, 
and so forth) – quaint, others recognised in them legitimate precursors to certain aspects of 
scientific naturalism’s rapacious worldview.  Lucretius, more than the rest, came to seem 
prophetic, having argued ‘that nothing can come from nothing, that the universe is orderly, 
and that atoms alone are the constituent elements of nature’ (Turner, ‘Ancient’, p. 336).   
Philosophical materialism, after centuries in desuetude, had first made an impression 
in Britain, becoming a serious – and, more often than not, antagonistic – alternative to con-
ventional systems of metaphysical belief, in near lockstep with the inception and progress of 
the Enlightenment, with the publications of Newton on gravitation and Laplace and Lagrange 
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on mechanics and de la Mettrie on physiological function.  The arrival of the nineteenth 
century, however, saw empiricism catch up with conjecture:  atoms, formerly mental abstrac-
tions, became (to some) actual, weighable entities; physiological correlations between thought 
and electric currents became manifest, if scarcely uncontroversial.5  Materialism, put another 
way, by mid-century came at last to seem something potentially falsifiable, a scientific belief in 
the Popperian sense.  (Either the world had, or had not, the properties of ‘atoms’; either 
‘energy’ was, or was not, the sole currency of its phenomenal interchange.)  At the same time, 
it became cognizant of its own past.  Practitioners and advocates laboured to find proof, and 
found solace in the continuity of belief.  Much of this activity took place on the Continent, 
Ludwig Büchner’s Kraft und Stoff (Force and Matter; 1855) becoming, like Lange’s Geschichte, a 
reference document on the functioning and significance of materialism even as Laplace’s 
Mécanique Céleste (Celestial Mechanics; 1799 - 1825) began to seem one of the proudest monu-
ments to its thorough implementation.   
A complex of factors – the length and richness of its history, the polyglot nature of dis-
semination – contributed enormously to the profusion of ‘materialisms’ in mid- to late-
Victorian intellectual life, causing the term itself to become semantically pliant, a linguistic 
marker having endless gradations of meaning and, in many instances, tremendous cultural 
and individual specificity.  Roger Smith has argued this point as well, noting that, throughout 
the latter decades of the nineteenth century (and in a formidable range of discursive contexts), 
the noun ‘materialism’, like the noun ‘materialist’, seemed a designation – and a disparage-
ment – at once ‘notably common and notably undefined’ (p. 85).    
This is not, however, to insist that such terminologies and labellings are wholly point-
less or misleading.  Rather, they have modal functions, significations that are malleable, 
though not indefinitely so.  Take ‘modernity’:  as an abstract concept or ontological mode it 
has a certain understood genealogy, consensually accepted, a conventional tang of significance 
in talks about architecture, a different one in talks about social welfare or literature or art 
history.  So, too, with classicism, rationalism, Romanticism – and scientific materialism or 
naturalism.  Contemporary ‘evolution’, for instance, is multifaceted, accommodating not only 
the strict neo-Darwinian synthesis as found in the works of Richard Dawkins, but also the 
‘methodological evolution’ of Steven J. Gould, even (some would argue) the decidedly more 
benign ‘[t]heistic evolution […] borne most forcefully in moderate to liberal Protestantism and 
                                                
5  This paragraph draws heavily on George Stack’s entry on ‘materialism’ in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy. 
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in mainstream Catholic thought’ (Witham, p. 47).  Diachronic mutability further enriches 
such synchronic pluralism:  the term ‘scientist’ meant one thing in 1850, something again in 
1950, nothing at all in 1800.  Burdens of meaning change with context, with locale, within 
social groups.  In the nineteenth century, publicists like Tyndall and Clifford used a range of 
classificatory or philosophical terms generically (not unfailingly, but often enough), as did 
critics and commentators.  To reduce Wordsworth to sentiments expressed (or understood to 
have been expressed) in ‘Tintern Abbey’, or Pope to those adduced from An Essay on Man, is 
grossly unfair; it also seems not altogether removed from how many at the time – particularly 
those outwith the literary tradition – genuinely perceived things.  To reduce Darwin(ism) to 
‘survival of the fittest’ is equally unjust, yet was itself a commonplace.  Victorians returned to 
the same texts, cited the same lines, distilled the same ‘essences’ of meaning and implication, 
from both literary works and scientific theorems. 
Generalisation, like periodisation, is therefore, I believe, nearly unavoidable, though 
hardly excuse for critical sloppiness.  Such a point follows on from Purrington’s observations 
concerning Hendry’s perhaps too schematised deployment of ideological categories like 
‘mechanist’ and ‘dynamist’ in his study of Maxwell’s electromagnetism.  Many thinkers of the 
nineteenth century likewise broke the world – and history – into pieces, writing as if the 
severance between rationalism and Romanticism was as absolute as a line of longitude (once 
defined, then accepted).  To give one example:  William James, in an essay of posthumous 
appreciation, said of Myers’s work (his output consisted primarily of studies of border states of 
consciousness, mesmeric and schizoid trances, liminal personality profiles) that it was rather as 
if Myers had gothicised the rationalistic garden of thought, adding picturesque architectural 
follies and patches of untended growth (‘Nature’, James concluded, ‘is everywhere gothic, not 
classic.  She forms a real jungle […]’ [‘Frederic’, p. 22]), in the process making an interdisci-
plinary analogy that calls to mind also the changes in the background of Stoppard’s Arcadia.  
Scientists themselves, particularly those under the sway of positive doctrine, were often wholly 
conscious of the sunderings implied, or invidiously imposed, by such deep-seated tendencies 
towards intellectual compartmentalisation.  Comte identified three stages in moral evolution, 
charting – or projecting – in society a path from the theistic to the metaphysical to the positiv-
istic; these were progressive and clearly differentiable, like the evolving forms of a butterfly.  
1859 was, for many Victorian thinkers even uninfluenced by positivism, the occasion of a like 
disjuncture, rendering an irretrievable ‘before’, an uncertain ‘after’.  Frequently, there was a 
trajectory foreseen – or hoped for.  Was this, however, one for the better?   
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Alternatively, one could conceptualise terms like ‘Romanticism’ and ‘rationalism’ not 
as incompatible allegiances but rather as an axis (or axes) in (or atop) a coordinate system, just 
as one can rethink evolution, or scientific materialism, not as the product of one moment, but 
as a historical tendency, a conceptual space, not geometric point.  Doing so might suggest 
intriguing interconnections.  Hendry himself links the dynamicist tendency in natural philoso-
phy with the Romanticism of Wordsworth and Constable (p. 4), even as Gillian Beer suggests 
a punning, if suggestive, interplay between theories of deconstruction in the human sciences 
and that of plate tectonics (‘with its emphasis on un-grounding’ [OF, p. 194]) in the geological 
ones.   
Such junctures constantly vitalise nineteenth-century scientific writing, especially that 
of the publicists, figures poised ‘between the secular implications of scientific naturalism and 
the theological underpinnings of the culture.  In a culture hostile to materialism’, as Barbara 
Gates comments in an essay on the pedagogic role of scientific popularisation, ‘they helped 
initiate the acceptance of science by reconfiguring its message’ (p. 182).  The remainder of this 
chapter provides an outline of several of the reconfigurations proffered, siting them within the 
context of three primal reactions (acceptance, rejection, compromise) to those various – and, 
to some, profoundly ‘antagonising’ – orthodoxies of mid- to late-Victorian naturalistic belief.  
 
THE VARIETIES OF MATERIAL EXPERIENCE; OR, 
THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT A BLACKBOARD 
 
In an essay entitled ‘Cosmic Emotion’, W. K. Clifford observed that knowledge, here referring 
specifically to scientific knowledge, knowledge about the world ‘as it is’, 
  
must have been in men’s possession for a long time before it has acquired the certainty, the precision, 
the familiarity, the wide diffusion and comprehension which make it fit to rouse feelings strong enough 
and general enough for true poetic expression.  For the true poetry is that which expresses our feelings, 
and not my feelings only – that which appeals to the universal in the heart of each one of us.  So it has 
come about that the world of the poet, the world in its emotional aspect, always lags a little behind the 
world of science […].  (p. 412) 
 
If this, then, be the case then that is perhaps one among several reasons why a poem like 
‘Meaning’, written late in the twentieth century by the octogenarian Polish Nobel laureate 
Czeslaw Milosz, feels nonetheless startlingly ‘late Victorian’, calling to mind, thematically, 
among other pieces, Thomas Hardy’s ‘New Year’s Eve’ (1906).  Its imagery likewise suggests 
that poet’s ‘The Darkling Thrush’ (1900), where, over a desolate, meaningless, ‘material’ 
landscape, an ‘aged thrush, frail, gaunt and small / In blast be-ruffled plume, / Had chosen to 
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fling his soul / Upon the growing gloom’.  In fact, a number of figures addressed in this 
dissertation found such an emblem – bird on branch, flittering from Matthew 10: 29, but also 
Hamlet (V.ii.219 - 20) – of a heartrending poignancy, if never (quite) Hardy’s desolation.  It 
seemed so iconic at once of mortality and aspiration.  ‘[W]e will second every word’, Frederic 
Harrison said pointedly of positivists in 1877, ‘of those who cry out that civilisation is in 
danger if the workings of the human spirit are to become questions of physiology, and if death 
is the end of a man, as it is the end of a sparrow’, his dread of materialism shading into reflex 
antagonism (‘Soul’, p. 630).  A phrase equally epigrammatic, of comparable cinematography, 
yet markedly different in both implications and mood, was scribbled a decade or so later by 
Richard Jefferies, the nature writer and social activist.  Eschewing both the melancholy and 
vituperation of Hardy, and Harrison’s negative polemic, it sublimates instead into something 
near transcendence, a private reverie likewise occasioned by a series of musings on the existen-
tial ramifications of materialistic psychology:  ‘Bird on tree – expressing an idea I do not 
understand.  They are beyond’ (‘Notebook’, p. 166).   
Nonetheless, for all the indisputable diversity in their rhetorics, metaphysically minded 
thinkers of the nineteenth century, like their twentieth- and twenty-first-century counterparts, 
in confronting the implications of a potentially ‘meaningless’ universe, ultimately had to align 
themselves with one of three interpretive frameworks.  Each is adumbrated with admirable 
acuity and forthrightness in a stanza from Milosz’s postmodern codification: 
 
  MEANING 
 
– When I die, I will see the lining of the world. 
The other side, beyond bird, mountain, sunset. 
The true meaning, ready to be decoded. 
What never added up will add up, 
What was incomprehensible will be comprehended. 
 
– And if there is no lining to the world? 
If a thrush on a branch is not a sign, 
But just a thrush on the branch?  If night and day 
Make no sense following each other? 
And on this earth there is nothing except this earth? 
 
– Even if that is so, there will remain 
A word wakened by lips that perish, 
A tireless messenger who runs and runs 
Through interstellar fields, through the revolving galaxies, 
And calls out, screams, protests. 
 
Either an order beyond the visible, inaccessible to experiment, or nothing ‘on this earth […] 
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except this earth’.  Either a bright and numinous realm ‘beyond bird, mountain, sunset’ in 
which a deductive explanation is ready to hand for that which we must presently take on faith 
(a world in which, in short, ‘What was never added up will add up’), or – to the detriment of 
religion and metaphysics – one in which the arbitrary is doomed to remain ever as such, even 
after death, in which ‘a thrush on a branch is not a sign, / But just a thrush on the branch’.   
 Such a poem, like many of the disturbances occasioning it, would have made perfect 
sense to any of mid-Victorian England’s scientific publicists.  Even Milosz’s language seems 
backward-looking and curiously nineteenth-century (his conceit of the universe as book-
keeper’s ledger, for instance, or natural philosophy as a generalised form of accountancy), as 
are his examples meant to show the unsettling and irreducible contingency of most observed 
natural phenomena.  Questioning the causal necessity of sunrise and sunset was, indeed, not 
merely a Victorian commonplace, but a Humean – if not Biblical – one.  The second option 
sketched by Milosz’s ‘Meaning’, of course, encapsulates the perspective of materialism (the 
perspective, as Jefferies put it in a manuscript of the mid-1880s, that ‘[t]here neither is, nor has 
been, nor will be any chair, or table, or picture, or quern in the cosmos’, that interpolated 
suggestions of design in nature are chimerical [Old, p. 51]); the first, that of most traditional 
approaches to metaphysics, whether neo-Platonic, theistic or otherwise.  Needless to say, 
viewpoints of this latter sort perforce require an essential splitting of focus, an ontological 
doubling, one nicely captured in a remark by T. H. Huxley:  adherents to such forms of belief, 
he explains, insist that ‘beyond the natura naturata, mirrored or made by the natural operations 
of the human mind, there is a natura naturans, sufficient knowledge of which is attainable only 
through the channel of revelation’ (‘Modern’, p. 537).  
For this reason, a suggestive and readily transportable phrase (excerpted from the cele-
brated fifty-sixth canto of In Memoriam) like Tennyson’s gnomic ‘[b]ehind the veil, behind the 
veil’, the gist of which seems to argue in favour of just this sort of cosmological dualism, came 
to have an almost iconic importance to those who sought solace in the idea of a natura naturans, 
and it was repeated and re-echoed in their writings time and time again – and, as ever, in a 
striking variety of (frequently clashing) philosophical and scientific contexts.6  For many 
                                                
6  Deprived of God, deprived of faith (Tennyson’s enigmatic ‘O for thy voice to soothe and bless!’, of course, 
refers as much to his dead friend Hallam as it does to the Word of God as ‘spoken’ in Holy Scripture), the poet 
wonders despairingly:  ‘O life as futile, then, as frail! / O for thy voice to soothe and bless! / What hope of 
answer, or redress? / Behind the veil, behind the veil’ (p. 912; LVI.25 - 28).  Whether such a declamatory closing 
couplet suggests that a spiritual accommodation has been reached or merely the persistence in Tennyson’s 
conflicted heart of some species of hope (or lingering faithfulness) remains at this juncture tantalisingly unre-
solved. 
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opponents of materialism it served in effect as a rallying cry.  It appears, for instance, as a 
motto near the conclusion of Balfour Stewart and P. G. Tait’s The Unseen Universe; or, Physical 
Speculations on a Future State (1875; p. 155), where its presence would seem to suggest that ‘the 
veil is the material world, and behind it we find angels in the form of energy’ (G. Myers, 
‘Nineteenth’, p. 55).  Other Victorian malcontents found for it different interpretations and 
wildly divergent significations.  Some merely used it as an ideal way of silencing or foreshort-
ening debate and analysis, a rhetorical gambit to which (they thought) there could be neither 
answer nor apt rebuke.  As Harrison, perhaps the foremost positivist in England at the time, 
observed in his article ‘The Soul and Future Life’, many such individuals ‘assume the question 
[of materialism’s insufficiency] closed, when they have murmured triumphantly, “Behind the 
veil, behind the veil”’ (p. 623).   
Clifford, among others, took note of this, writing:  ‘To some minds there is hope and 
renewing of youth in the sense that the last word is not yet spoken, that greater mysteries yet 
lie behind the veil’ (‘Cosmic’, p. 412).  Nonetheless, the number and specification of potential 
denizens in such blessedly (or, in the arguments of Stewart and Tait, ‘scientifically’) revealed 
or unveiled ‘other worlds’, such natura naturans, as Clifford rightly points out – the varieties and 
specifics of these much sought-after special revelations – cannot be limited to those mentioned 
in Christian Scripture.  Accommodation, he explains (in a fine reductio ad absurdum of dualist 
logic), need not only be found for the Holy Trinity, nor even, perhaps, the ‘ethereal angels’ 
described in The Unseen Universe, but also the ‘goddess Kali, with her obscene rites and human 
sacrifices, or for any intermediate between these.  Here is the clay; make your images to your 
heart’s desire’ (‘Unseen’, p. 792).   
Yet materialism by itself represents an arduous path to follow.  Belief in some further, 
more perfect ordering to things, as suggested by ‘Meaning’, provides inbuilt justification for 
the endless tribulations of quotidian experience.  Indeed, Milosz’s first stanza hints at just the 
kind of soothingly satisfying frisson of coherence and tidy completeness – one enabled in large 
part by thoroughgoing acceptance of a Janus-faced metaphysic – with which death will then 
imbue a life lived and lost on earth.  The second, that stanza setting forth unornamented 
materialism, requires additional resolution, however; it is phrased as a series of conditionals, 
anxious enquiries about the state of things, each apparently more apprehensive than the last.  
Reductive philosophy presents not an answer, it seems, but rather a series of disquieting 
secondary questions.  The third, hence, manages to evince a grimace of stoicism or defiance in 
the face of such truths, harsh realities about our cosmos revealed or implicated by the tenets of 
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modern (or nineteenth-century) science.   
‘Even if that is so’, even if, as his argument goes, there is no world beyond this world, 
‘there will remain / A word wakened by lips that perish’.  That word, of course, is, in a sense, 
the poem itself, a plea which ‘calls out, screams, protests’, carrying the staccato syntax of its 
concluding lines (whose halting rhythms seem jarringly removed from the bardic confidence of 
Milosz’s opening) forward to future generations via the printed page, or disseminating out-
ward at the speed of light, through the ether, across the void.  Again, such sentiments find 
countless analogues amid the ideological tumult of the latter nineteenth century.  (Quite 
literally, too:  Stewart and Tait, in The Unseen Universe, as discussed in more detail in my third 
chapter, used conservation principles suggested by thermodynamics to argue that the human 
soul after death would be preserved eternally within a sort of ‘second ether’, like a standing 
wave bounding and rebounding forever between distant stars.)  In other words, remarkably 
few – then, as now – could accept the facts of an unmitigated materialism, one bereft of 
supplement or balm to assuage us in our grief, though yet we realise, howsoever reluctantly, 
that customary Western perspectives on nature, ‘taken as the production of the Creator’s will, 
can never be made to harmonize with the blind force of cellular tissues sprouting by accident 
into all the phenomena of life’ (Darwinian, p. 5).  (So one Cantabrigian observed with sober 
clear-headedness in an anonymous study of 1867.)  There were also, of course, temporal and 
earthly consequences to such naturalistic belief, not just eternal and heavenly ones.  These, 
too, have long been acknowledged – and lamented.   
W. H. Mallock, the mid-Victorian satirist and cultural critic, published an essay, ‘Is 
Life Worth Living?’, late in the 1870s, in The Nineteenth Century.  He prefaced it with an obser-
vation bridging the recondite and the day-to-day, in the process irrevocably associating 
sociological, even moral, inquiry with the sort commonly deemed scientific and, as such, 
‘dispassionate’: 
 
My aim is a far humbler one.  It is simply to awake others, and enable them to pass judgment for 
themselves.  It is my aim to make them see what in these days we are really debating […] and to show 
them that it is not only first causes, and natural selection, and the condition of the universe millions of 
years ago [presently under discussion]; but the tone and character of our human existence now – our 
hopes, our fears, our affections, even our amusements […].  (2: 252 - 53) 
 
Yet such revelations were hardly so singular as Mallock pretends, particularly among the 
intelligentsia, though they also had a currency amid any number of constituencies far distant 
from that serial’s well-educated (and -heeled) readership.   
Many were moved to response and action, fearful of the projected spiritual and cul-
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tural impact which material science’s dismissal of those great truths – about human exception-
ality, or centrality to Creation – would have upon the contemporary psyche, repelled by that 
adrift-at-sea emptiness associated with suspicion that their lives were suddenly less ‘meaning-
ful’ or profound than they had previously been.  As Dale has explained:  ‘By the late 1870s 
there began to emerge a distinctly negative reading of the meaning of science for the future of 
man.  […]  Advances in biology, genetics, heat theory, and astronomy all worked relentlessly 
towards the dehumanization of the world picture’ (pp. 221 - 22).  Though, as Dale contends, 
spiritual pessimism among practicing scientists was never the majority view, revolutionary 
scientific developments still managed to convey to many non-professional audiences in Victo-
rian Britain a range of discomforting or troublesome possibilities.  Punch, in a poem of 12 
December 1874, ‘The Fine Old Atom-Molecule’ – featuring such kowtowing couplets as 
‘Then bow down, Mind, to Matter; from brain-fibre, Will, withdraw; / Fall Man’s heart to 
cell Ascidian, sink Man’s hand to Monkey’s paw’ – gave six stanzas of despondent interpreta-
tion, all the while effectively dismissing any induced gloominess though the easiness and 
whimsy of its touch.   
Few were quite as adept as Mr Punch at maintaining such a demeanour of unflappable 
geniality.  In a well-remembered account of George Eliot, Frederic Myers recalled her once 
declaiming the interpersonal obligations of humankind, the need for each member of society 
to strive for the betterment of others; they had been on a walk one rainy evening through the 
Fellows’ Garden of Trinity College, Cambridge (J. Beer, p. 134).  ‘Never, perhaps’, he wrote 
in 1883 of these pronouncements, ‘have sterner accents affirmed the sovereignty of impersonal 
and unrecompensing Law’ (‘Eliot’, p. 269).   
Grimmer still, however, were those disembodied injunctions – heard as an ‘inward 
Voice’ – made by science, edicts, as he wrote in ‘An Autobiographical Fragment’, which had 
led him in the late 1860s to ‘an agnosticism or virtual materialism which was sometimes a dull 
pain borne with joyless doggedness, sometimes […] a horror of reality that made the world 
spin before one’s eyes’ (pp. 12 - 13).  Though written after the passing of that malaise, his 
poem of 1877, ‘A Cosmic History’, encodes perhaps the most ‘dehumanising’ version of the 
contemporary naturalistic hypothesis, unspooling a tale of nebular condensation and arbitrary 
vertebrate evolution, culminating in the loveless equilibration of thermodynamic ‘heat death’:  
 
Come then, poor worm at war with Fate, – 
 (What inward Voice spake so stern and low?) 
Come, paltry Life importunate, 
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 Enough of truth thou too shalt know; 
Since man’s self-stirred out-reaching thought 
 Hath seen in visions sights of awe; 
Hath from a darker Sinai brought 
 Damnations of a vaster Law. 
 
From dust, they told thee, man was born? – 
 The Cosmos’ self from dust began, […] 
 
 [………………………………………] 
 No Mind creating watched alone, 
  Nor bade the emergent minds begin; 
 To weltering waters, senseless stone, 
  The seeds of Life had entered in. 
 
 [………………………………………] 
 Then all in silence; all in one 
  The exhausted orbs have crashed and sped;  
 Cold to the core is every sun,  
  And every heart that loved is dead.  (pp. 187 - 88) 
 
This is darkly Miltonic, in a way.  A new Exodus, in which the oppressed are liberated at the 
cost of hope.  A new Genesis, in which the Saturnalian disordering of things, of primordial 
chaos – ‘The womb of Nature, and perhaps her grave, / Of neither sea, nor shore, nor air, 
nor fire, / But all these in their pregnant causes mixed / Confusedly […]’ (Milton, p. 163; 
2.911 - 14) – is shown in the universal scheme to have had effective hegemony all along, 
despite our momentary respite on a sunlit world, in a civil society.   
 ‘Chaos, Cosmos!  Cosmos, Chaos!  who can tell how all will end?’, the venerable Poet 
Laureate had asked in 1886, the balance between opposites so delicately poised (‘Locksley’, p. 
1363).  Myers, however, had by then known his generation’s answer to Tennyson’s riddle – 
and with dreadful certainty – for decades.  Those Ten Commandments of Mosaic Law are 
accordingly supplanted, if not reduced to triviality or a sort of self-deluding archaism, in 
Myers’s ‘A Cosmic History’ by the revelations of a ‘vaster Law’:  a material rule encompassing 
energy conservation, entropic decay; a principle suggesting the futility of life, the absurdity of 
sentience.  Tennyson, too, struggled in ‘Vastness’ (1885) with a comparable sense of kaleido-
scopic disorientation, of a race – a species – ‘Swallowed in Vastness, lost in Silence, drown’d / 
in the deeps of a meaningless Past […]’ (p. 1348), before ending that poem in a brief coda 
suggestive of existential accord.  ‘A Cosmic History’, by contrast, allows no harmonious 
resolution.  Its implications seemed especially resonant in an age like that of the Victorians, 
one in which science seemed to proclaim (to audiences of theists, agnostics, positivists, atheists 
of varying stripes), that the sum of all society’s, of all science’s, painstakingly acquired knowl-
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edge about the cosmos and its generalised laws, when looked at on any grand enough scale, 
amounted, in effect, to little more than an epitaph, or, at least, the initial drafting of one – a 
prescription of death, if not final notification.   
‘[A]ll we know’, Clifford explains with brave and stark simplicity towards the end of 
‘The First and Last Catastrophe’, ‘is that the sun is going out’ (p. 483).  And with it, ‘not only 
the earth itself, and all the beautiful face of nature we see, but also the living things upon it, 
and all the consciousness of men, and the ideas of society, which have grown up upon the 
surface, must come to an end’ (p. 484).  Two decades later, H. G. Wells, formerly a pupil of 
Huxley’s at Kensington’s Normal School of Science, was to recapitulate these very cadences in 
the famous concluding chapters of The Time Machine (1895), his most influential single work 
(perhaps inadvertently confirming in the process Clifford’s observations about the time-lag 
between the scientific expression of an idea and its literary elucidation).  The Time Traveller, 
going millennia beyond the etiolated earth of 802,701 with its population of effete Eloi and 
savage Morlocks, comes at last to a world in ruins, its dying sun hanging vast and incarnadine 
in a cheerless sky:  ‘It would’, he tells us, ‘be hard to convey the stillness of it [that world].  All 
the sounds of man, the bleating of sheep, the cries of birds, the hum of insects, the stir that 
makes the background of our lives – all that was over’ (p. 65).   
Wells here, however, was merely giving fictive form to a haunting prophecy of univer-
sal thermodynamic doom known by then to most among the literate (if not always accepted, 
either blithely or unconditionally), a fate decrypted initially from fussy equations describing 
the internal working of heat-engines, from Fourier’s dynamic models, from the mechanistic 
understanding of heat as ‘mode of motion’, then extrapolated to govern a cosmos, before 
ultimately being given popular expression in the writings of Clifford, Proctor, William Thom-
son and others.  Indeed, the modern physicist Paul Davies, in a popular guide to scientific 
apocalypse, The Last Three Minutes:  Conjectures about the Ultimate Fate of the Universe (1994), has 
described the nineteenth century’s discovery of the truth that the universe as a whole was 
condemned, like a clock running down, to an inevitable (and ignoble) ‘heat death’ as ‘probably 
the most depressing prediction in the history of science’, one which was to have ‘a profoundly 
depressing effect on generations of scientists and philosophers’ (pp. 9, 12); and it was an all but 
irrefutable one, too, ‘an inexorable consequence of the laws of thermodynamics […]’ (p. 12) – 
the precise laws that allowed steam engines to chug and milling machines to press, that 
enabled Britannia to rule the waves along with much of the wider world:  militarily, politically, 
economically.   
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Gillian Beer summarised the effect that this funereal state of affairs was to have on the 
Victorian mindset – abetted, of course, by Darwin’s, Huxley’s (and, almost subliminally, 
Tennyson’s) speculations on species extinction – in her ‘“The Death of the Sun”:  Victorian 
Solar Physics and Solar Myth’:  ‘The expanding of individual death into the idea of the death 
of a whole species […] as well as the idea of the ebbing of the sun’s energy, make for an 
undertow of sadness in Victorian thought’ (OF, p. 213).   
‘God is light’, Milton had declared in Paradise Lost (p. 167; 3.3).  For many intellectuals, 
however, by the latter years of the nineteenth century that god-function had been usurped by 
the sun, both literally (‘The sun is the great sustainer of our life’, as the Irishman W. Goff 
remarked in an 1891 scientific paper [p. 195]), and, for a smaller group, metaphorically as 
well (‘The sun is our lord and god, sublime, serene’, in the opening words of one late Swin-
burne lyric [‘Lake’, p. 1122]).  At the same time, the era’s science recognised that the sun, like 
the earth itself, was mortal, having birth, facing death.  There is, for instance, a certain alarm-
ist tone pervading Thomson’s pronouncements on the implications for human life of the twin 
laws of thermodynamic theory:  ‘Within a finite period of time past, the earth must have been, 
and within a finite period of time to come the earth must again be, unfit for the habitation of 
man as at present constituted […]’ (p. 514).  This seemed deeply unsatisfying to many of the 
period’s atheistic and agnostic commentators.  Even a few Christians were unnerved:  Ed-
mund Beckett gave his opinion of materialistic presumptions of solar obsolescence in Astronomy 
Without Mathematics, first published 1865, a volume of both overarching, if prominently ac-
knowledged, theistic suppositions and (more often than not) unimpeachable astrophysical 
scholarship (the high-minded Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge was its English 
sponsor); such beliefs, he explained, ‘must be perfectly satisfactory and convincing to those 
who will believe anything except a Creator’ (p. 118). 
 But in that ‘anything believed’ there was enormous diversity.  The sun’s senescence 
was only one among several problematic issues raised by naturalistic belief.  Psychophysical 
parallelism and the apparent banishment of the supernatural or divine from both natural 
phenomena and mental life seemed likewise to diminish, or render pointless, humanity’s 
existence.  Each of the figures addressed in this dissertation had his own scheme of rejoinder to 
these challenges, however.  Each had, as it were, an idiosyncratic vocabulary, in Milosz’s 
vernacular, for ‘call[ing] out, scream[ing], protest[ing]’ – for responding to (or raging against) 
the cruelty perceived or assumed to lurk within a cosmos rendered ominously inhospitable to 
both humanity itself and humanity’s freight of moral and theological concerns.  A few even 
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questioned the entire validity of such interpretive assumptions:  ‘When we hear it said […]’, 
Ernst Haeckel countered in The Evolution of Man:  A Popular Exposition of the Principal Points of 
Human Ontogeny and Phylogeny (1874), that materialism would ‘cause a retrogression in the 
intellectual and moral development of man […], I cannot withhold my conviction, that the 
very opposite will be the true, that by it the progressive development of the human spirit will 
be advanced in an unusual degree’ (2: 458).  His unyielding defence of pure rationalism, not 
unlike Clifford’s (discussed in my third chapter), directly contradicts Mallock’s contention in ‘Is 
Life Worth Living?’.  Meanwhile, a further grouping – among those I have mentioned thus 
far:  Jefferies and Myers, Tyndall after a fashion – looked to science to redefine the religious 
sense, moving it beyond strict naturalism, beyond pedantic piety, hoping to navigate Odys-
seus-like those tempestuous ideological seas lurking between nineteenth-century science and 
nineteenth-century religion.  
And thus, while Clifford may have felt that poetry was an expression of the universal – 
he was, after all, reasonably emphatic in his insistence that ‘true poetry is that which expresses 
our feelings, and not my feelings only’ (‘Cosmic’, p. 412) – clearly it was the issues he and 
colleagues were addressing, not the conflicted solutions proffered, that were truly communal.  
Their predicament was self-evident.  Rev. Robert Watson, author of scholarly glosses for the 
Books of Ruth, Numbers, Job and Judges, phrased things succinctly in Gospels of Yesterday 
(1888), saying of the intellectual scramble by his generation’s agnostics and materialists: 
 
Attempt after attempt has been made of late to extract from the ordinary course of things a rule for the 
guidance of mankind, a religion not altogether wanting in fervour, and having at least an air of wisdom 
and impressiveness.  It is plain that the world cannot go on without something of the sort, for, however 
much we have outstripped our forefathers in mechanism and sanitation, we remain much like them in 
our need of comfort, stimulus, and hope.  (p. 181) 
 
Many nineteenth-century scientific publicists partook of these attempts, notably Tyndall. 
The author of Extra Physics, and the Mystery of Creation (1878), a book-length critique of 
materialist and reductionist physical paradigms, reiterated one popular perception of that 
scientist in his own analysis, the governing metaphor evangelical: 
 
more than any of his contemporaries, [Tyndall] stands for Physical Truth.  Other men may be greater 
in their special departments, but as the High Priest of Physical Truth, interpreting, as with a wave of 
light, its deepest dynamics, and dispensing with radiant beneficence its subtlest gifts, – as the inspired 
Seer of Molecular Activities, summoned by an expectant universe to strike, with the tuning-fork of 
science, the keynote of all practical wisdom, and proclaim with authority the possibilities and limits of 
the human intellect, he stands alone.  (p. 13)  
 
Nonetheless, even Tyndall, as we shall see, science’s celebrated ‘High Priest’, was in various 
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and subtle ways a malcontent, hesitant to accept the burden of his own radical conclusions, 
unsure about the nature of the world he wished to ‘materialistically’ encapsulate. 
Thus, while theoretical entities (vortex atoms, gear-like current flows) bounding about, 
unseen though not unremarked upon, in the laboratories and lecture theatres of the nine-
teenth century rarely survived to trouble the researchers of the next, Milosz’s ‘Meaning’ – a 
modern restatement of one contemporary puzzle (its like universality confirmed by the en-
compassing reach of its title) – serves as a strangely affecting reminder that some Victorian 
concerns linger in the air of the physical laboratory even to this day, long after many other 
items of ‘scientific’ import, for all intents and purposes, have been utterly forsaken.7 
                                                
7  Or, perhaps more properly, they linger in the study of the kind of ersatz ‘natural philosopher’ (or interested 
amateur) still busy pondering such problems, for what practicing, results-oriented empiricist has the time to spare! 




TYNDALL’S CREPUSCULAR MATERIALISM:  ORATIONS AT 




It is probably part of the great change in the manners of this country 
that such an Address as that of the President of the British Association 
will now give but little offence, and encounter little contradiction, even 
in most religious circles.  
- ‘Professor Tyndall’s Address’, The Times, 24 August 1874 
 
At the time of its publication, the notice appended to the 13 August 1874 edition of Nature, an 
announcement of a much anticipated annual scientific conference, must have seemed unre-
markable enough:  ‘As usual this season […] congresses are coming thick upon us.  The 
British Association commences its sittings next Wednesday at Belfast, when Prof. Tyndall will 
give his presidential address’ (‘Notes’, p. 293).  
 That Address, however – like the fracas that greeted its delivery – was to prove any-
thing but unremarkable.  Lange, in the second volume of a revised edition of his Geschichte des 
Materialismus, said of its religious and scientific significance: 
 
Tyndall’s address is, as it were, the official announcement of a new era for England, which plays so 
important a part in the History of Materialism.  The old hollow truce between natural science and 
theology, which Huxley, and recently Darwin, had seriously shaken, is now broken, and men of science 
demand their right to follow out in all directions, undisturbed by any subsisting traditions, the conse-
quences of their theory of the world.  (3: 363) 
 
Such a message was as unpopular as it was uncompromising.  Even Tyndall’s close friends, in 
its wake, ‘thought he had gone too far in straying into the murky swamps of metaphysics in 
defence of scientific materialism.  For weeks he was denounced […] and pamphlets attacking 
the “Belfast Address” continued to appear for years afterward’ (Burchfield, p. 7).  Indeed, as 
Frank Turner notes, this exhortation of little more than an hour and three-quarters in length 
(according to a contemporary account of it in The Times [‘BA’, p. 5]), ‘succeeded in sparking 
perhaps the most intensive debate of the Victorian conflict of science and religion.  It aroused 
far more controversy than the Huxley-Wilberforce encounter […]’ – perhaps surprising given 
the amount that that dispute has figured in popular imagination of the cultural foment of the 
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time – as the Belfast Address ‘more clearly illustrated the social and intellectual issues at stake’ 
(‘Tyndall’, p. 170).  Subsequent to it, the scientist found himself assailed for, quite literally, a 
multitude of sins.  Lightman, in ‘Scientists as Materialists in the Periodical Press’, a study of 
the Address’s aftermath as reflected in contemporary journalism, observes that Tyndall was 
accused of plagiarism (in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine), paganism (in the Edinburgh Review, 
Irish Review, Dublin Review, and elsewhere), atheism (in Fraser’s Magazine); he was likewise slated 
for his overriding dependence on Darwinism (in the Month and Catholic Review), his slippery use 
of rhetoric (in The Contemporary Review), and, more or less universally, inexcusable lapses in logic 
and general professional, not to forget philosophical, presumptuousness.  He was frequently 
tarred as well with the charge of being an unrepentant or unscrupulous materialist, an accusa-
tion which, in the 1870s, ‘was a serious one.  It grouped Tyndall together with lower-class 
atheists, casting aspersions on his status as a member of the intellectual elite’.  Lightman even 
goes so far as to suggest that Belfast signalled a volte-face in the intelligentsia’s entire disposition 
towards the man; before it, he explains, ‘[…] Tyndall was usually cast in a positive light in the 
periodical press, albeit with some reservations, and he was not labeled as a materialist.  But 
after the Belfast Address he was portrayed as an aggressive, dishonest, devious and distinctly 
un-British materialist’ (p. 202). 
This chapter is an examination of the rhetoric, and philosophy, of that Address.  En-
gaging also with a number of issues relating to the oration’s instant notoriety (for good or ill) in 
mid-Victorian society, it provides analysis of a few of those themes elaborated within it des-
tined to cause such a shifting in the popular perception of both the scientist and the nature of 
the ‘materialism’ he so earnestly advanced.  Its first section incorporates, alongside commen-
tary on the Belfast Address itself, a reading of ‘Crystals and Molecular Force’, an address given 
in Manchester two months after the 1874 Inaugural, one which both responded to some of the 
criticisms levied at its more famous predecessor while effectively reiterating the same overall 
argument, in miniature but with equal forcefulness.  The steadfastness of such conviction, 
despite all controversy, as evidenced in this follow-up lecture is mirrored, as we shall see, in the 
obstinacy Tyndall demonstrated in revision of the text of the Belfast Address proper – particu-
larly one divisive assertion on the ‘promise’ and ‘potency’ of matter – through a range of 
editions over the several years following its delivery.  Later sections focus on the seeming 
‘asymmetry’ of Tyndall’s Belfast worldview (a bias in exposition central to my final two 
chapters), and the nature of scientific analogy in the structure of his argument, before an 
epilogue discussing the cultural fate of both Tyndall and his ‘truce-breaking’ pronouncement. 
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The major scientific publicists and agnostics, Lightman argues, ‘never formed an orga-
nized school or net, but they regarded each other as friends and shared a common circle of 
acquaintances, quoted one another with approval in their writings, and lent support, both 
moral and financial, in times of need’ (Origins, p. 93).  For that group, the Belfast Address 
served as the locus classicus for discussions and reassessments of the centrality of materialism to 
physical investigation, as it provided the clearest, most thorough and memorable, exposition of 
a naturalistic ideology.  Maxwell summarised its central message – and that of mid-Victorian 
materialism as a whole – in a single couplet, where it is phrased as a modernisation of De-
mocritean atomism:  ‘From nothing comes nothing, they told us, nothing happens by chance, 
but by fate; / There is nothing but atoms and void, all else is mere whims out of date!’ (‘Brit-
ish’, p. 639).   
Subsequent chapters will observe how Maxwell (and several others) reacted against the 
metaphysical contentions of such belief, how Clifford reaffirmed them with marked zeal, and 
how Tyndall (so often thought of as materialism’s ‘high priest’) attempted to mitigate any 
potentially ‘debasing’ or ‘demoralising’ aspects of that mid-Victorian interpretive methodology 
through deliberate invocation of literary or ‘non-materialistic’ language. 
 
‘ATOM, THE ARCHITECT’ 
 
‘Crystals and Molecular Force’ commenced, so far as one can judge from a ‘corrected edition’ 
of the lecture’s text, with something of a parable.  Several years before, Tyndall explains, he 
had been asked by the headmaster of a local school to address a group of students; he had 
agreed on the condition that he be permitted to instruct a class of ‘the youngest boys’, a group, 
on the whole, unfettered by notions of how the world was to be divvied up and parcelled, who 
would never refuse to see beauty inhering in the humblest of substances. These children, 
Tyndall remarks, ‘had no notion that the thing they had been crunching and sucking all their 
lives [crystallised sugar-candy] embraced so many hidden points of beauty […].  [A]nd when 
they found that in certain directions it could be split into thin laminæ with shining surfaces of 
cleavage, their joy was at its height’.  It seems in matters of learning, as in matters of devotion, 
children – particularly young children – are by far the most amenable to proceeding solely on 
‘faith’:  these ‘young philosophers’, the scientist tells us, spent the whole hour ‘listen[ing] to me 
with the most eager interest’ (p. 69).  
 Tyndall followed such a personable introduction with a fine specimen of mythologised 
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historiography, a synoptic literary mode with which he had become increasingly linked.  This 
provided, as elsewhere in his addresses and writings, a cultural narrative fixating not on battles 
nor parliaments, but rather the process – through trial and error, induction and experiment, 
over the course of millennia – which had ‘rendered physical science almost as stable as the 
system of nature it professes to describe’ (p. 71).  Beginning in prehistory, related in telegraphic 
jumps, Tyndall’s account skipped from revelation to revelation, from the rudiments of experi-
ence to the fullness of a formalised and mathematicised theory of universal gravitation:  ‘In the 
drawing of a bow, the darting of a javelin, the throwing of a stone, in the lifting of burdens, 
and in personal combats, even savage man became acquainted with the operation of force’ (p. 
70).  As man, according to Tyndall, became ever more adept at such rudimentary tasks, he 
found he had at his disposal additional ‘time to look about him, and become an observer and 
inquirer’, discovering through experience first the phenomena of magnetic attraction (and 
repulsion), then quantifying that experience – rendering it expressible in language, in terms of 
pushes and pulls – through ‘a kind of poetic transfer’, a process of analogy in which human 
activities (pushing and pulling) were seen to have clear analogues in inorganic behaviour (pp. 
70, 71).  From there, in the Tyndallic worldview, it is but the tiniest of intellectual leaps to 
Newton’s G and Kepler’s three famed laws:  ‘Having started with the savage and his sensa-
tions of molecular force, we pass on to the observation of force exerted between a magnet and 
rubbed amber, and the bodies which they attract, and rise by an unbroken growth of ideas to 
a conception of the force by which sun and planets are held together’ (p. 72).  Syntax recapitu-
lates scientific history:  each comma elides centuries of ‘inactivity’ (from the speaker’s perspec-
tive), each phrase enacting conceptual revolution.  The accumulation of physical knowledge is 
figured as organic, ‘unbroken’:  worldly ‘[e]xperience […] furnishes the soil for plants of 
higher growth’, that is, abstract theories themselves, which, suitably nurtured, ‘grow out of the 
fruitful soil of observation’ (pp. 71, 72).  But not through induction alone.  Imagination is also 
vital:  ‘you imagine where you cannot experiment’, the scientist implores (p. 74). 
 Discussion of the actual geometric intricacies of crystallisation – the ‘hard science’ of 
such a scientific lecture – occupies a comparatively small proportion of it textually.  Even this 
‘hard science’ is couched in spiritual imagery and language, however.  The dialectical rigour 
of Baconian method – hypothesis, experiment, revised hypothesis, subsequent experiment – is 
re-figured as quasi-religious rite or catechism, a call-and-response between the scientist and 
the irresistible ‘voice’ of externality:  ‘Looking at these beautiful edifices and their internal 
structure, the pondering mind has forced upon it the question, How have these crystals been 
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built up?  What is the origin of this crystalline architecture?’ (p. 79).  Again, the suitably 
prepared ‘pondering mind’ is obligated to look beyond the superficially diverse phenomena of 
crystalline structure (readily apparent even to those inquisitive schoolchildren), and to search 
assiduously for some ordering principle beyond the visible, inaccessible to experiment, one 
perhaps arising from magnetism, a known microscopic cause with macroscopic consequences.  
He elaborated, saying that the mid-Victorian physical theoretician was 
 
compelled by bias towards unity of principle to transcend experience, and endow the atoms and 
molecules of which these crystals are made with definite poles, whence issue attractions and repulsions 
for other poles.  In virtue of these attractions and repulsions some poles are drawn together, some 
retreat from each other; atom is thus added to atom, and molecule to molecule, not boisterously or 
fortuitously, but silently and symmetrically, and in accordance with laws more rigid than those which 
guide a human builder when he places his bricks and stones together.  (p. 79)  
 
He here has recourse to an explanatory trick widespread in popularised descriptions of mo-
lecular phenomena, then as now.  ‘In the specimens hitherto placed before you’, Tyndall told 
his audience in Manchester’s Free Trade Hall, ‘the work of the atomic architect has been 
completed; but’, he promised, soon enough – in a sequence of demonstrations he was prepar-
ing to begin – ‘you shall see him at work’ (pp. 79 - 80). 
This fastidious ‘atomic architect’ thus took its place alongside Maxwell’s demon, an-
other wee beastie first ‘discovered’ in 1867, becoming one in a growing family of minuscule 
anthropoid creatures animating a deterministic, even homely, atomic or molecular world (in 
much the same way that Schrödinger’s cat became a garden-variety macroscopic creature 
illuminating something unfamiliar – or alarmingly inhuman – about the non-deterministic, 
sub-atomic world of twentieth-century quantum mechanics).1  Tyndall, in a critique of James 
Mozley’s Eight Lectures on Miracles (1865), had once reflected that the ‘concerns’ of pre-
Copernican cosmology – like its scale and temporal scope – were ‘vastly more commensurate 
with man […] than those of the universe science now reveals to us’ (FoS, p. 445).  Equally, 
though, such ‘disproportioning’ awareness, in a curiously palpable way, even while it aug-
mented in a literal sense, also contracted in a more symbolic one the gap between nature and 
individual.  Two examples:  ‘[t]he lightning flash’, as Tyndall observed in a journal entry for 
15 May 1848, ‘is but an enlargement of the electric spark and the cracking of [?this] machine 
a microscopic thunderpeal’ (p. 289).  He was to replicate many such scale-bridging phenom-
                                                
1  Maxwell’s demon ‘behaves like a pianoforte player, endowed with extreme molecular smallness and an 
enviable dexterity, but, despite all this, he is to be considered in no way supernatural’, as described in Nature in a 
brief article of 1879 ‘The Sorting Demon of Maxwell’. 
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ena in his popular lectures, particularly at the RI.  From the 1850s to the early 1890s, in 
dozens of darkened auditoria (on Albemarle Street as across the British Isles), he spectacularly 
produced ‘artificial skies’ and lights ‘almost as brilliant as […] the sun’, to quote his own self-
publicity (FoS, pp. 148, 79).  He was always to insist, moreover, that the truly inquisitive need 
never content themselves with simulacra, with mere reproductions of such ‘tangible’ things.  
The earth, as noted in another of his addresses (given before graduands at University College, 
London), ‘is illuminated by a sun which, though nearly a hundred millions of miles distant, 
can be brought virtually into our closets and there subjected to examination’ (p. 101).  The 
grandest spectacles in nature, in other words – the sky’s tint, noontime’s blinding glare – could 
be not merely recreated, but constrained, held captive, in the comfortable confines of a 
Victorian domestic space, there to be analysed at will.2  ‘This bed thy centre is, these walls, thy 
sphere’, Donne had said of the sun in 1633, describing the ‘contracted’ world of enraptured 
lovers (p. 107).  Bunsen’s spectroscopic science had, however, made this metaphysical conceit 
physically descriptive, even as ‘modern’ atomic theory, as elaborated by Tyndall, transformed 
the exigencies of inorganic crystallisation into the doings of a gentlemanly professional:  the 
former, shrinking the cosmos; the latter, expanding it, making it (analogically) as big as life. 
Tyndall’s notion of an ‘atomic architect’ became something of a sensation.   Punch, in 
particular, had for some time delighted in satirising the scientist, not so much for his Irishness 
(though that was a target, too), as for his earnestness, a naïve – if infectious – enthusiasm for 
the natural world which sought continuously, as Paradis puts it (in a phrase at once figurative 
and literally true, given the scientist’s atmospheric investigations and vibrant lecture perform-
ances), ‘to coin deeply mystical significance out of thin air’ (p. 156).  But, on 7 November 
1874, a poem entitled ‘Atom, the Architect’ featured in the pages of the serial.  It did not, 
however, lampoon the Manchester oration’s sometimes syrupy lyricism.  On the contrary, Mr 
Punch’s intended target was far more specific:  Tyndall’s seemingly outrageous claim that the 
structure of the universe was not ordained on high but rather, as it were, on ‘low’, in that 
microscopic realm of atoms and molecules – in that realm, in short, of ‘atomic architects’.   
The first of four quatrains went as follows: 
                                                
2  It can sometimes seem a gendered space as well:  the smoking room, rarely the kitchen.  Tyndall’s lan-
guage hinted as much in an aside (innocent perhaps) in ‘On the Scientific Use of the Imagination’.  There, in a 
digression on the infinitesimal amount of ‘sky-matter’ present in the atmosphere – matter which, by reflection 
and absorption, brings into being the full splendour of a ‘deep blue firmament’ – Tyndall wondered:  ‘What is its 
probable amount?  I have sometimes thought that a lady’s portmanteau would contain it all.  I have thought that 
even a gentleman’s portmanteau – possibly his snuff-box – might take it in’ (FoS, p. 152).  
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THESE ‘Architectural Atoms!’  O ’tis fine 
 To see humanity so sadly dwindle! 
Let MICHAEL ANGELO and WREN resign; 
 Atoms can build Cathedrals – so says TYNDALL. 
 
Typical Punch, it would seem:  take a debatable assertion; follow it through to some (logically 
questionable) conclusion.  But there is beneath any frivolity a pummelling sanctimoniousness 
which refuses to allow the popular magazine’s satire to be as light-hearted as it hopes.  Note 
that the artist-architects who have, so to speak, been ‘made redundant’ are both best known 
for ecclesiastical commissions.  Moreover, the first three quatrains – all of them, on the whole, 
fair jest – end with the refrain ‘so says TYNDALL’.  Not so the fourth, where Punch’s undis-
guised polemic seems particularly mean-spirited: 
 
Shallow Professor!  the eternal Fates 
 Sit silently and turn the fearful spindle; 
And that great wheel of doom the moment waits 
 To crush the sceptic silliness of TYNDALL. 
 
Tyndall was not slow to react to this further assault.  He was quick as well to recognise that 
such ‘satire’ arose, not from careful consideration of the complete text of his lecture, but rather 
glib perusal of a few of its juiciest assertions.  ‘Punch’, he commented, ‘has been my friend for 
more than thirty years.  Here, I grieve to say, he has followed the multitude who commit the 
evil of condemning what they have never read’ (BA [2], p. 68).  Such a sin is one of which he 
often accused the more immoderate among detractors of his writings on scientific materialism 
in general (and the Belfast Address in particular) of having perpetrated as well.  As he once 
said of the arguments put forward in ‘“Materialism” and Its Opponents’ (an essay intended – 
somewhat tellingly – as ‘an introduction to a forthcoming edition of the “Fragments of Sci-
ence” […]’, but which made its first appearance in the pages of The Fortnightly Review):  ‘To the 
judgement of thoughtful men I now commit them:  the unthoughtful and the unfair will not 
read them, though they will continue to abuse them’ (p. 579). 
 Tyndall’s penchant for elliptical or unsophisticated philosophising was a forensic habit 
much criticised by colleagues:  Oliver Lodge, for instance, in 1902, quipped that the scientist 
‘never failed to elaborate the simple’ (‘Tyndall’, p. 517), while another contemporary, Henry 
Wace, in a survey article of 1878, ‘Scientific Lectures – their Use and Abuse’, reprimanded 
him for intruding his ‘speculations into regions which are far beyond those which are properly 
[his] province […]’ (p. 38); it was a tendency at Manchester perhaps most pronounced in 
some discursive asides on crystallisation.  After almost wistfully lamenting the possibility that 
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there might not be a Higher Power in the universe – that is to say, that the ‘atomic architect’ 
might be the sole architect of consequence – John Tyndall, vehement materialist, nonetheless 
still found comfort in a surprisingly dualistic account of the scheme of things.  This encom-
passed not just physical substance but also ‘stereotypically’ omniscient god-figure (rather 
weakly described as some ‘power, being, or thing’).  The impetus of theistic (or, at minimum, 
deistic) concern so evident in these concluding paragraphs was, of course, conveniently 
overlooked by the parodists at Punch.   ‘The mechanism’, he explained, of crystallisation 
 
is rendered intelligible by the picture of atomic poles; but is there nothing but mechanism here?  There 
is something, in my opinion, which the mind of man has never yet seized; but which, so far as research 
has penetrated, is found indissolubly joined with matter.  I have seen these things hundreds of times, 
but I never look at them without wonder.  And […] I would say that when standing at spring-time and 
looking upon the sprouting foliage, the lilies of the field, and sharing the general joy of opening life; I 
have often asked myself whether there is no power, being, or thing in the universe whose knowledge of 
that which I am so ignorant is greater than mine.  I have said to myself, Can it be possible that man’s 
knowledge is the greatest knowledge – that man’s life is the highest life?  (pp. 81 - 82) 
   
There is much to enjoy in this passage, but grounds for mistrust as well:  the displaced sexual-
ity of Tyndall’s evocation of ‘sprouting […] opening life’; his legalistic wording (perhaps 
designed to insure that no conception of the divine was prematurely debarred); the Whitman-
esque solipsism implicit in the scientist’s lonely dialogue with nature.   
Most crucially, however, Tyndall used his Manchester platform to correct, or admon-
ish, critics and clarify – but hardly qualify or enfeeble – the bold assertions he had made not 
long before at Belfast.  Many in the audience were awaiting such a rapprochement – or, at 
least, brief acknowledgement of ideological wrongdoing.  Tyndall, pointedly, made no such 
apology.  Such resolve (or pigheadedness, to the minds of some) also characterised the various 
revisions he made to the text of the Belfast Address over the years.  Its editorial constancy 
through a half-decade period of republication and hullabaloo is perhaps best illustrated by 
examining, in five distinct variants, a few of the (very minor) modifications Tyndall made in 
the phrasing of one of its most divisive assertions.  Each text is a snapshot in time.  The first 
under consideration is the transcript of the Address taken from the London Times of 20 August 
1874, the day after its delivery (it had been diligently telegraphed overnight); the second, the 
initial Longmans, Green, and Co. printing of 1874 (which incorporated some additions and 
elaborations; as Tyndall explained:  ‘It was [originally] written under some disadvantages this 
year in the Alps […].  When read subsequently, it proved too long for its purpose, and several 
of its passages were accordingly struck out.  Some of them are here restored’ [BA, p. v]); the 
third, that publisher’s ‘seventh thousand’ edition, likewise of 1874.  The lattermost edition also 
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featured, alongside a revised peroration, a thoughtful (and lengthy) preamble – ‘I take advan-
tage’, he explained at its start, ‘of a pause in the issue of this Address to add a few prefatory 
words to those already printed’ (BA [2], p. v) – discussing, among other things, a range of the 
most damaging and unfair slanders levelled either at the substance of Tyndall’s argument or 
the person of its author.  One gains a sense of the rapidity of all this – surely, the Address must 
have been among the literary sensations of its day – when one notes that the two Longmans 
volumes were published in the space of a few months.3  In copies held by the University 
Library, Cambridge, for instance, stamped imprints give acquisition dates of 20 October 1874 
and 26 January 1875, respectively.  For comparison, I have selected variants that appeared in 
1876 and 1879.  Both were included in that ‘authorised’ compendium of Tyndallic thought, 
Fragments of Science for Unscientific People, an anthology – which was so fantastically popular that it 
required a second edition within a fortnight of its initial publication – written, in its author’s 
own words, out of a ‘desire […] to extend sympathy for science beyond the limits of the 
scientific public’ (FoS, p. ix).  
The Address’s most inflammatory contention by far – one that ‘trace[d] back all exist-
ing things, both mental and physical, to the interaction of the forces, affinities and motions of 
the ultimate particles of matter’, as ably summarised by John Quarry, Rector of Donough-
more and Canon of Cloyne Cathedral (p. 4) – provided a materialistic genealogy of con-
sciousness, one overlooking animating agency or divine being in favour of the cooling and 
coalescing of insensate atoms in the pre-planetary nebula.  This is how it appeared in The 
Times:  ‘Abandoning all disguise, the confession that I feel bound to make before you is that I 
prolong the vision backward across the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in 
that Matter, which we in our ignorance, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its 
Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of every form and 
quality of life’ (‘BA’, p. 4).  Of its reception Tyndall commented:  ‘to call it a “chorus of 
dissent,” […] is a mild way of describing the storm of opprobrium with which this statement 
has been assailed’ (FoS [5], p. 546).  Bernard Lightman notes that clear references to – even 
verbatim citations of – such a (perhaps too readily) quotable manifesto were made in an 
astonishing number of contemporary periodicals:  the Dublin Review, the Irish Monthly, The 
                                                
3  I should also mention that there were, in the same period, a number of additional reproductions of (or 
excepts from) the Address in Nature, local and regional papers, popular serials, and so forth, not to overlook its 
appearance as centrepiece to the cumbersome (if encompassing) volume, Report of the Forty-Fourth Meeting of the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science; Held at Belfast in August 1874, overseen by the BAAS itself. 
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Spectator, The Graphic, Fraser’s Magazine, even the Athenaeum, among others (‘Scientists’, p. 210).   
The textual evolution of the sentence through those four subsequent editions, though, 
demonstrates how little public censure caused the scientist to either downplay his message or 
weaken its phrasing.  ‘By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of the experimental 
evidence, and discern in that Matter which we, in our ignorance of its latent powers, and 
notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with oppro-
brium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial Life’ (BA, p. 55):  the most evident alterations 
between The Times transcription and this, the first supervised revision, include removal of a 
prefatory transitional phrase (less necessary in a printed, rather than spoken, context), and 
clarification of ‘our ignorance’ in terms of our ‘ignorance of its [matter’s] latent powers’.  The 
ideas of ‘latency’ and ‘power’ are, of course, volatile ones in the rhetoric of Tyndall, someone 
well aware of the fantastically broad reach of the thermodynamic principle of energy conser-
vation.  Moreover, the new wording – which perhaps also preserves a modicum of uniqueness 
for man via the added modifier ‘terrestrial’ – strengthens Tyndall’s reasons for ‘cross[ing] the 
boundary’:  in the original, this inductive leap is something he feels compelled to ‘confess’; not 
so in the revision, where he justifies it in terms of a mandate, an ‘intellectual necessity’.  A few 
reviewers remarked on this subtle shifting in emphasis.  John Tulloch, for one, writing in 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, observed that, ‘[i]n his Address, as revised and published by 
himself, Dr. Tyndall has slightly modified the expressions of this significant passage […]’, in so 
doing managing to impute its phrases with far ‘more the semblance of reasoning, and less the 
air of a devotee eager to proclaim his gospel […]’ (p. 533).   
The ‘seventh thousand’ republication left this autocratic claim in wording identical to 
that of the first Longmans edition, as did the 1876 variant.  The latter text, however, incorpo-
rated a footnote making the extremely pertinent point that ‘cross[ing] the boundary of the 
experimental evidence’, though marginally non-Baconian, was by no means an interpretive or 
investigative technique only recently ‘invented in Belfast’ (FoS [5], p. 524n1).  Such an observa-
tion, of course, ties in with another of the scientist’s constant themes:  the need for imagination 
in both entheorisation and experiment (also inescapable in ‘Crystals and Molecular Force’).  
Or, as phrased elsewhere in the Address:  ‘physical theories’ – he cites as representative two of 
the most profound:  Darwinian evolution and Newtonian gravitation – ‘which lie beyond 
experience are derived by a process of abstraction from experience’ (BA, p. 52).  The 1879 text 
further emphasises this point, replacing that initial phrase (‘[b]y an intellectual necessity’) with 
the considerably more defensive and temperate ‘[b]y a necessity engendered and justified by 
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science’ (FoS [6], 2: 193); such an emendation implies communal sanction, while also situating 
its exponent – a maverick no longer – within a vital and productive analytic tradition. 
That was not the only statement from Belfast destined for popular disrepute.  One 
nearly as infamous (and referenced) – and which likewise maintained a threatening semantic 
constancy throughout the course of several published variants – set out the militancy and 
imperialism of mid-Victorian scientific naturalism’s emergent disciplinary orthodoxy.  Here is 
the statement as reprinted in The Times, and it seems (particularly out of context, as so often 
encountered in contemporary journal articles and sermons) to be one leaving little room for 
either barter or arbitration:  ‘The impregnable position of science may be described in a few 
words.  All religious theories, schemes, and systems, which embrace notions of cosmogony, or 
which otherwise reach into its domain, must in so far as they do this submit to the control of 
science, and relinquish all thought of controlling it’ (‘BA’, p. 5).   
That this sentence – like the materialistic proclamation it allegedly epitomised – did 
nonetheless still leave considerable room for both will be the subject of my next two sections. 
 
IS THE WORLDLY NOT ENOUGH?:  TYNDALL’S BELFAST ADDRESS 
 
Satirists certainly thought they knew what Tyndall’s Address was about. 
 In William Mallock’s The New Paul and Virginia, a work of 1878, pugnacious Prof. 
Darnley spouts an amalgamation of the received ‘wisdom’ of his day to a pliant shipboard 
audience.  ‘Men of science’, he lectures, ‘can only see theology in a ridiculous light, therefore 
theology has no side which is not ridiculous.  He [Darnley] then told them [the passengers] a 
few of the names that enlightened thinkers had applied to the Christian deity – how Professor 
Tyndall had called him an “atom-manufacturer,” and Professor Huxley, “a pedantic drill-
sergeant”’ (p. 17).  (Darnley himself seems more archaeological dig than discrete individual:  
excavate a bit and you encounter layer upon layer of scientific propaganda and pseudo-
scholarly detritus, the flotsam and jetsam of agnostic, positivistic and materialistic debate from 
countless issues of the period’s magazines and newspapers.  Of such a figure I can think of no 
more barbed description than Mallock’s own:  ‘His mind was like the sea, into which the other 
great minds of the age discharged themselves […]’ [p. 9].)  The author’s earlier The New 
Republic (1877), a serialised satire which likewise caricatured many contemporary thinkers 
(albeit in the form of a far more blatant roman à clef), explored similar subject matter; in it, one 
woman, a Miss Merton, responds to one of Mr Stockton’s (Tyndall’s) scientific diatribes by 
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declaiming:  ‘But […] there is nothing religious in a gas.  I don’t see how anything religious 
can come out of it’ (2: 62) – Stockton, moments earlier, had been holding forth on the essential 
sublimity, even religiosity, of the nebular hypothesis.  A more reductionist and fearsome 
interpretation still of Stockton’s views is offered by Mr Saunders (a clear stand-in for W. K. 
Clifford):  ‘“Yes, yes, yes,” cried Mr Saunders, recovering himself, his voice tremulous with 
excitement, “I know all that.  I know that in their last analysis a pig and a martyr, a prayer 
and a beef-steak, are just the same – atoms and atomic movement”’ (p. 220).  Saunders has 
little patience, or enthusiasm, for Stockton’s rhapsodies on the interpenetration (and indivisi-
bility) of physics and poetry and philosophy, fixating instead only on the subtext, on the bit of 
Stockton’s argument insisting that the world, that external nature, is to be interpreted and 
explained only in terms of paradigms irreducibly materialistic. 
 Saunders’s take on the Tyndallic (or Stocktonian) worldview seems to be what many 
Victorians got out of the Belfast Address.  And Punch, perhaps unsurprisingly, frequently chose 
to parody the sort of uncompromising scientific-cum-spiritual belief apparently advocated 
therein.  To give two contrasting examples:  a poem of 12 December 1874 (cited in my 
previous chapter), ‘The Fine Old Atom-Molecule’ (to be sung to the tune of ‘The Fine Old 
English Gentleman’), ends with the ironic, if suitably jocular, injunction:  ‘And our Lord be 
the Atom-Molecule, / Of the young World’s proto-prime!’.  ‘Democritus at Belfast’, however, 
published 29 August of that same year – in other words, little more than a week after the 
Address’s delivery – encodes in its final quatrain a far grimmer sense of both moral and 
theological dethronement: 
 
If TYNDALL’s last word be indeed the last – 
 Of Hope and Faith hence with each rag and tatter! 
A black cloud crowds out future as our past; 
 Matter, the wise man’s God:  the Crowd’s – no Matter! 
 
Needless to say, Tyndall’s position – as seen already in ‘Crystals and Molecular Force’ – was 
rarely so schematised as such charges suggest.   
 In truth, the Belfast Address, like its Mancunian successor, displays nearly to perfection 
each and every one of Tyndall’s oratorical hallmarks.  There are a cornucopia of allusions to 
the writings and doctrines of Carlyle, Wordsworth and Goethe; the requisite number of 
rhetorical questions.  There are not one, but several, interpolated ‘histories’:  of evolutionary 
thought, of atomism, of philosophical and scientific materialism.  And each of these historical 
narratives carries with it its own associated saints and sinners as well; Tyndall enumerates 
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them with an admirable multiculturalism:  ‘During the [scientific] drought of the Middle 
Ages’, he explains, ‘the Arabian intellect, as forcibly shown by Draper, was active’.4  Thus, 
Tyndall’s history of atomism includes not only Greek and Roman metaphysicians but also 
Alhazen, an Arab who was ‘the first to correct the Platonic notion that rays of light are emitted 
by the eye’ (BA, p. 16).  Moreover, just as the scientist’s ‘Crystals and Molecular Force’ con-
cluded with something of a headfirst dive (hardly unanticipated) into the turgid waters of 
metaphysical and theological conjecture, so, too, did his Belfast Address.  Arthur Eddington, 
musing on the perspective afforded the 1920s by his own generation’s novel theoretical 
conceptualisations, once wrote:  ‘The recent tendencies of science do, I believe, take us to an 
eminence from which we can look down into the deep waters of philosophy; and if I rashly 
plunge into them, it is not because I have confidence in my powers of swimming, but to try to 
show that the water is really deep’ (p. 266). 
Tyndall’s justification would have been similar, though his stance never so secular.  In-
deed, he actively courted engagement with a variety of sacred concerns.  During the 1840s 
and ’50s, an anxious Tyndall, like many, had been ‘looking for a replacement for traditional 
Christianity […]’; but by the 1870s, he was talking ‘confidently of the survival of religion’ –
albeit redacted, made relevant (Lightman, ‘Robert’, pp. 296, 300).  In that, Tyndall thought 
he and fellow publicists had a prophetic role.  As a reviewer of the 6th edition of Fragments 
observed, many of its chapters set out, without reservation or apology, ‘to investigate the 
higher questions connected with phenomena of life in which the border lands of science and 
religion are thought by some people to overlap, if not to come into antagonism’ (‘Science’ 
[1879], p. 604).  Such an investigative predilection – never more accentuated than at Belfast, 
where it attracted the fiercest condemnation – was, however, one to which preachers and 
pundits reflexively attributed a degree of immorality or scandalousness.  What many of them 
failed to recognise – or, perhaps, simply refused to see – was that the Address, in the words of 
modern critic Ruth Barton, was merely ‘the culmination of a series of essays and addresses 
that argued for a qualified materialism’ (p. 132).  This materialism, in the words of Tyndall 
himself (from the initial preface), insisted that, for Homo sapiens – a creature as much of heart as 
head – ‘[t]he facts of religious feeling are […] as certain as the facts of physics’ (BA, p. vi).  As 
such (this remarkable clarification comes from the ‘seventh thousand’ edition revision of the 
peroration, in which Tyndall amplified on the non-deductive compunctions of human aware-
                                                
4  Tyndall, throughout his Address, makes quite explicit his indebtedness to such intellectual historians as 
Hume, Draper and, especially, Lange (whom he pointedly describes as ‘a non-materialist’ [BA, p. 3]). 
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ness, even while leaving the general methodological implications of his Address unaltered),  
 
There are such things woven into the texture of man as the feeling of Awe, Reverence, Wonder – and 
not alone the sexual love just referred to, but the love of the beautiful, physical, and moral, in Nature, 
Poetry, and Art.  There is also that deep-set feeling which, since the earliest dawn of history, and 
probably for ages prior to all history, incorporated itself in the Religions of the world.  You who have 
escaped from these religions into the high-and-dry light of the intellect may deride them; but, in so 
doing you deride accidents of form only, and fail to touch the immovable basis of the religious senti-
ment in the nature of man.  To yield this sentiment reasonable satisfaction is the problem of problems 
of the present hour.  (BA [2], p. 60) 
 
In pleasing parallel, just as primeval man was forced by innate biology into the systematisation 
of the things and processes of the external world, so, too, was he drawn into the creation, 
interpretation and admiration of things having little (practical) to do with that world as such:  
literature and philosophy, painting, theology, sculpture, music.  Tyndall put it eloquently 
towards the close of the updated peroration:  ‘The world embraces not only a Newton, but a 
Shakespeare – not only a Boyle, but a Raphael – not only a Kant, but a Beethoven – not only 
a Darwin, but a Carlyle.  Not in each of these, but in all, is human nature whole’ (p. 65).  
Exiling the ‘immovable basis of the religious sentiment in […] man’ is therefore, for Tyndall, 
as quixotic – or, even, inconceivable – a task as somehow banishing that of the intellectual.   
He eschews ‘high-and-dry light’ – a flattening, glaring illumination redolent of out-
moded, dehumanising or overly ‘rational’ schemes of philosophising:  the severity of Mill’s 
Utilitarianism, say, or Laplace’s mechanistic determinism – in favour of a crepuscular materi-
alism.  His science embraces the incorrigible plurality of lived experience, the world in its 
fecundity and fullness, the entrancing spectacles of the sun’s rising and setting, not merely the 
well-lit vistas of the geologist’s microscope or anatomist’s bench.  Such a cosmos requires 
more, and messier, description than the eternally pristine mathematics of a Keplerian ellipse; 
it is one trembling with irreducible interconnections, resounding with melodies less metro-
nomic, and more cacophonous, than the ticking of celestial clockwork.  It demands spiritual 
appreciation as well as algebraic synthesis.   
Tyndall’s metaphors in this passage point towards two of the traditions through which 
he was best able to encapsulate, or articulate, this ‘qualified materialism’, and which will serve 
as subjects for my fourth and fifth chapters.  His description of the ‘woven-ness’ of man’s 
nature suggests Sartor Resartus’s symbology of transcendental conviction, in which Carlyle, ‘via 
his clothes philosopher Teufelsdröck, uses the weaving of cloth, or the sewing of a suit of 
clothes, to represent the process of authoring beliefs and institutions.  His [Carlyle’s] emphasis 
on clothing as woven textile plays on the root of the word text – texere, to weave’ (Vanden 
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Bossche, p. 43).  Similarly, Tyndall’s recognition of a necessary diachronic mutability within 
those satisfactions for the ‘religious sentiment’ deemed allowable, and pertinent, for the latter 
nineteenth century brings to mind the literary and philosophical labours of some of its earliest 
writers, particularly the visionary behind ‘Tintern Abbey’.  Tyndall had concluded the first 
British edition of the Belfast Address with approving citation of a dozen or so lines from that 
poem (in second and subsequent editions, these lines were moved to the start, where they serve 
as an epigraph).  Myers, in his study Wordsworth (1880), captured the significance of the 
author’s achievement for many Victorian thinkers wobbling in their faith.  Disillusioned with 
Christianity – if retaining his undergraduate Hellenism – he explained that Wordsworth was 
the first to endow a spiritually impoverished century with its own native sense of surrogate 
divinity.  Citing the four causes (prophecy, prayer, artistry and human love) enumerated by 
Plato as tending to make man ‘percipient of an intelligence other and larger than his own’, 
Myers contended that Wordsworth, to this list, ‘has made an important addition.  He has 
shown by his example and writings that the contemplation of Nature may become a stimulus 
as inspiring as these; may enable us “to see into the life of things” – as far, perhaps, as beatific 
vision or prophetic rapture can attain’ (p. 128).   
Unmistakable traces of Carlylean transcendentalism, of Wordsworthian natural piety, 
these certainly seem, as Tyndall phrased things in his second introduction, attributes of a 
‘“materialism” vastly different from what you suppose […]’ (BA [2], p. 56).  Why, then, were 
they so easy to overlook?  Why was it predominately the materialistic sentiments in his phi-
losophy which drew public attention, and ridicule, in the 1870s and beyond?  Even Barton, 
who dedicates most of ‘John Tyndall, Pantheist’ to advocating that the scientist’s materialism 
was really little more than a disguised crypto-pantheism, concedes that ‘in the context of the 
Belfast Address, Tyndall’s conclusion about the limitations of materialism as a philosophy of 
life occupied a comparatively small place’ (p. 121).  This is, of course, entirely correct.  (Oliver 
Lodge was not being disingenuous in proclaiming, in a volume of reminiscences, Tyndall’s 
Inaugural ‘the chief pronouncement of the materialism of the nineteenth century’ [Advancing, 
p. 35].)  The fittest explanation for this partiality – an asymmetry in the ‘philosophy of life’ 
limned by Tyndall – is simply that, in his Address, he was concerned primarily with Victorian 
science, and materialism, for him, was the proper framework in which to discuss the subject, a 
philosophy sufficient for interpreting all the myriad phenomena and processes of the physical 
world.  Theology, so often an impediment to scientific advance, was to have no input.  But, on 
a deeper level, behind any ‘antireligious dogmatism’ (in Theodore Porter’s phrase [p. 116]), 
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was that Manchester dualism:  a cleavage, ever-present in Tyndall’s thought, between cultures 
of intellect and emotion.  He, in the Address, before ‘embattled’ peers, was attempting to stress 
the disjunction, even as he hinted – blue-sky thinking? – at a future settlement:  ‘They are not 
opposed, but supplementary – not mutually exclusive, but reconcilable’ (BA [2], p. 65).  
Unfortunately, however, just as The New Republic’s Mr Saunders was able to hear in William 
Mallock’s ersatz Tyndall (Mr Stockton) only the claims of atheism, and Miss Merton only the 
counterclaims of theology (matter as antithesis of spirit), so also was the wider Victorian public 
predisposed to hear in the Belfast Address only what it wanted – or expected – to hear.  The 
irony is that Mallock, amid such a rollicking satire as The New Republic, was therefore being far 
more sensitive to the richness of Tyndall’s position than any number of that scientist’s ‘genu-
ine’ contemporary critics were ever disposed to be, many of whom were outraged by the 
hubris of an Address, given under the imprimatur of one of Britain’s most influential organisa-
tions, ‘which reviewed a wide selection of recent scientific developments and then concluded 
that these developments represented the highest level of human knowledge’ (Basalla, Coleman 
and Kargon, p. 440).   
It is perhaps, then, not altogether surprising that in August 1875, John Hawkshaw, in-
coming President of the BAAS, with the trauma of the previous twelve months clearly in 
mind, commented in his own Inaugural:  ‘Past Presidents have already discoursed on many 
subjects, on things organic and inorganic, on the mind and on things perhaps beyond the 
reach of the mind; and I have arrived at the conclusion that humbler themes will not be out of 
place on this occasion’ (p. lxviii).  So he prefaced a well-footnoted history of civil engineering 
through the ages, moving ‘science’ – at least publicly – back to territory less ideologically 
contentious, though hardly silencing the furore of debate. 
In an intriguing instance, however, at least one specifically ‘Tyndallic’ dispute has had 
a peculiar afterlife, maintaining a vestigial presence into modernity.  A recent opinion column 
in The Daily Telegraph penned by Alexander – fortunate son of Auberon, fortunate grandson of 
Evelyn – Waugh in praise of nepotism trumpeted those advantages which he (and his grand-
sires) have enjoyed:  ‘[…] I am sure that my genealogy of nepotism stretches way beyond 
[immediate history], even unto the first protoplasmal primordial atomic globule among my 
ancestors […]’; his allusion is, of course, to a hammy recitative in Gilbert and Sullivan’s The 
Mikado (1885) in which haughty Pooh-Bah sneers:  ‘I can trace my ancestry back to a proto-
plasmal primordial atomic globule.  Consequently, my family pride is something inconceiv-
able’ (Sullivan, p. 8).  Hubert Yockey has asserted that the librettist’s ungainly phrase found 
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Figure 2 - ‘Matter!’, Punch, or the London Charivari. 
Figure 3 - ‘Odium Theologicum’, Punch, or the London Charivari. 
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origination in Ernst Haeckel’s discussions in the 1860s of life’s beginnings amid ‘primordial 
albuminous combinations […]’, but I think a more likely site – the word ‘atomic’ seems 
decisive – a marvelous cartoon (fig. 2) published in Punch around a fortnight after Belfast (3 
October 1874).  Entitled ‘Matter!’, it shows a ‘Portly Old Swell’ (with torso nearly globular in 
scope), dressed in an overstuffed waistcoat and standing in a formal drawing room of some 
description; he is shown, a look of utter shock and disbelief plainly evident on his face, ex-
claiming to no one in particular:  ‘Dear me!  Is it poss’ble!  Most ’xtr’ord’nary! – (throws down 
the Review) – that I should have been originally a “Primordial Atomic Globule”!!’. 
 
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF METAPHOR 
 
Tyndall, not alone among his colleagues, was always one to choose his words carefully, 
selecting metaphors, not merely for explanatory efficacy, but for persuasive or cumulative 
force.  At Belfast, he described primitive organic lifeforms in terms unabashedly inorganic:  
‘We come at length to those organisms which I have compared to drops of oil suspended in a 
mixture of alcohol and water’ (BA, p. 55).  He spoke of man’s artistic instincts in terms of 
neural pathways and electrochemical interactions.  He joked – not without ulterior motive – of 
his friend, Herbert Spencer, saying of the noted psychologist’s elegant prose-style:  ‘it is to be 
inferred’, based on such evidence, ‘that the ganglia of this Apostle of Understanding are 
sometimes the seat of a nascent poetic thrill’ (p. 49).  He also provided examples of an impos-
ing diversity of evolutionary processes:  the gradual development of differentiated tissues from 
the lowest to the highest of organisms (‘So of the other senses; they are special differentiations 
of a tissue that was originally sensitive all over’ [p. 48]); the slow augmentation of intellectual 
capacity (‘Thus it happens’ – Tyndall is here quoting Spencer directly – ‘that out of savages 
unable to count to the number of their fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns 
and verbs, arise at length our Newtons and Shakespeares’ [qtd., p. 52]).  He emphasised as 
well the historical pedigree of evolutionary thought:  ‘Thus more than 2,000 years ago the 
doctrine of the “survival of the fittest,” which in our day, not on the basis of vague conjecture, 
but of positive knowledge, has been raised to such extraordinary significance, had received at 
all events partial enunciation’ (p. 5).   
This move from ‘vague conjecture’ to ‘positive knowledge’ is a maturative one in Tyn-
dallic science, and a number of the interpolated narratives in his Address are structured along 
those lines, each showing an analogy’s progress from the realm of the academic to that of the 
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scientific, two of three dissimilar types of persuasive comparison analysed by Alan Gross in his 
valuable study The Rhetoric of Science (1996).   
Both academic and scientific analogies are not only demonstrative – that is to say, they 
do not just illustrate or objectify abstract concepts – they, if cannily chosen, become simpler, 
more malleable substitutes for those concepts.  Unlike academic analogy, however, scientific 
analogy finds additional support in the more or less agreed-upon apparatus of a time-tested 
scientific method, that ‘complex of quantitative methodologies shared by scientists and central 
to their verification procedures’ (p. 30).  Early believers in the atomic theory of matter, for 
instance – Democritus, Epicurus, Empedocles, Lucretius – were engaged, Tyndall suggests, in 
an academic dispute; modern believers like Loschmidt, Stoney and Thomson, a scientific one.  
Ancient materialists, perhaps reasoning from the wear and tear of everyday objects (rings 
becoming thinner, clothes drying in the sun, and so forth), hypothesised that ‘[n]ature acts 
through invisible particles’ (BA, p. 9).  By contrast, Victorian physical scientists, convinced of 
the reality of such particles, sought, using the newest techniques and mechanisms of experi-
mental investigation, ‘to determine the sizes of the atoms, or rather to fix the limits between 
which their sizes lie […]’ (p. 26).  In these comparisons, Tyndall traced the fortunes of the 
‘atomic analogy’ from the vagaries of pre-Christian philosophical dispute to the near-
certainties (within well-understood limits) of the nineteenth-century physical laboratory.  And 
he saw in that development a clear progression from the academic to the scientific, from the 
postulated to the inferred – and from the inferred, in time, to the known.  His enthusiasm for 
historical parallelism was such that a number of contemporary critics believed he had merely 
rehabilitated a series of discredited or ramshackle hypotheses.  This became so commonplace 
a contention that Clifford, in an article of 1875, felt compelled to intervene on Tyndall’s 
behalf to protect him – and inter alia the basis of materialistic science – from further attack:  
‘the difference between the two [atomic theories] is mainly this:  the atomic theory of De-
mocritus was a guess, and no more than a guess’, while that ‘held by scientific men in the 
present day is not a guess at all’ (‘First’, p. 466).   
 Tyndall’s rhetorical strategies, moreover, instructed as they historicised.  Analogies 
equating creativity with cerebral ganglia – or single-celled creatures with droplets of oil – 
conditioned the listener (or reader) to accept his eventual declarations about the inseparability 
of mind and brain.  Likewise, analogies demonstrating the ubiquity of evolutionary transfor-
mations prepared the listener (or reader) for that startling induction to come, an imaginative 
leap enabling the scientist to discern life’s – and intelligence’s – origins in lifeless matter.  Or, 
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as he phrased it elsewhere in his Address:  the ‘strength of the doctrine of evolution’ – upon 
which he based that induction – ‘consists, not in any experimental demonstration (for the 
subject is hardly accessible to this mode of proof), but in its general harmony with scientific 
thought’ (p. 58).  Nonetheless, Tyndall was willing to concede that in his philosophy there 
were any number of difficulties which remained to be surmounted – perhaps which were never 
to be surmounted:  most notably, that of the transition between neurochemistry and personal 
consciousness.  In his commentary on such present, or potential, unknowability, however, he 
never (quite) shaded into the assertion of a metaphysically Unknowable à la Herbert Spencer.   
Spencer, according to Lightman, thought the Unknowable akin to a spiritual reservoir, 
a kind of transmogrified Providence, guaranteeing that ‘beneath the seeming waste of the 
evolutionary process’ – which he believed in wholeheartedly – ‘lay an economy, order, pur-
pose and harmony’ (Origins, p. 89).  Tyndall, by contrast, felt the likely unknowability of 
certain mental or physical processes an epistemological problem, not a metaphysical escape 
route:  something that might not be comprehended by materialistic scientists must still, he 
argued, be governed by materialistic principles, as complex or unimaginable as they may be.  
Note in his remarks on the predicament posed by psychophysical parallelism the iterated 
fantasias on incompleteness and radical unattainability; note as well the vague but ineradica-
ble frisson implicit in them of both a professional and endearingly personal species of explana-
tory anxiety (this passage is from the revised peroration to his Belfast Address): 
 
We can trace the development of a nervous system, and correlate with it the parallel phenomena of 
sensation and thought.  But we try to soar in a vacuum the moment we seek to comprehend the 
connexion between them.  An Archimedean fulcrum is here required which the human mind cannot 
command; and the effort to solve the problem, to borrow a comparison from an illustrious friend of 
mine, is like the effort of a man trying to lift himself by his own waistband.  (BA [2], p. 59) 
 
And here, too, from the preface to that updated text:  ‘While fearlessly accepting the facts of 
materialism dwelt upon in these pages, I bow my head in the dust before that mystery of mind, 
which has hitherto defied its own penetrative power, and which may ultimately resolve itself 
into a demonstrable impossibility of self-penetration’ (p. xxx).  There were, of course, quite a 
few nineteenth-century observers who remarked on Tyndall’s uncharacteristically pessimistic 
stance – tantamount to an admission of science’s probable failure – on a subject of such 
pivotal importance to any proselytising materialist.  A commentator at The Times found in the 
classical past an apt precedent for Tyndall in this regard:  ‘The aspiring Professor lifts his 
voice, elevates his tone, searches the sky, and strides as did the Sibyl when she led the hero to 
the realm of prophecy, but he cannot go beyond this’ (‘Professor’, 20 August 1874). 
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 Gross discusses a third type of analogy as well – the political, a variety that invites ‘an 
emotional reaction to a crisis’ (p. 24) – and uses as his prime example Roosevelt’s Inaugural 
Address of 4 March 1933, a speech animated by the President’s memorably inflammatory 
comparison between the Depression and the actions of an invading army.  Post-Origin, scien-
tists (perhaps sensing the weakness of an exhausted and increasingly desperate opponent) 
frequently resorted to argumentative tactics of this sort.  Andrew Dickson White, for one, 
president of Cornell University, published in 1876 a series of lectures under the revealing title 
The Warfare of Science; Tyndall provided White’s volume with an enthusiastic introduction.  
Indeed, Tyndall himself – despite the comparative ‘pacifism’ (considering its fiery reputation) 
of his Belfast oration – was not averse to resorting from time to time to the use of language 
nearly as belligerent; in ‘On the Scientific Use of the Imagination’, he said of creationism:  
‘You may, however, rest secure in the belief that the hypothesis just sketched [the creationist] 
can never be stormed, and that it is sure, if it yield at all, to yield to a prolonged siege.  To gain 
new territory modern argument requires more time than modern arms, though both of them 
move with greater rapidity than of yore’ (FoS, p. 163).  All the same, Roosevelt’s Inaugural was 
governed by two distinct analogies:  the Depression was an occupying force; the President, 
commander of an insurgency.  Tyndall’s own scheme of blatant ‘political’ analogy had, by 
contrast, a sharply changed architecture.  Certainly, the armies of science were on one side; 
those of obstreperous or unenlightened religion, the other; but Tyndall hardly positioned 
himself as in any way a general, ready and eager to take command.  On the contrary, he went 
to tremendous lengths to allow nature herself to assume that role.  Her call, as suggested so 
stirringly at Manchester, is irresistible; her seductions, innumerable; her rewards, at once 
religiously fulfilling and aesthetically compensatory.  The Belfast Address, accordingly, began 
by emphasising the historical or anthropological continuity of investigative enterprise:  ‘An 
impulse inherent in primeval man turned his thoughts and questionings betimes towards the 
sources of natural phenomena.  The same impulse, inherited and intensified, is the spur of 
scientific action to-day’ (BA, p. 1). 
In a sense, then, Tyndall was engaged in his own ritual self-annihilation.  Even as the 
narratives within his Address emphasised the odd stability of physical thought (nineteenth-
century atomists as heirs to Lucretius, and so forth); the Address itself biologised – made 
‘inherent’ – the particular attitude towards scientific inquest Tyndall himself was trying to 
espouse.  Science needs no general, he says:  nature provides leadership enough.  Thus, at its 
conclusion, he could justly, in front of an audience of fellow combatants in an ongoing strug-
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gle, rhapsodise about the day when ‘you and I, like streaks of morning cloud, shall have 
melted into the infinite azure of the past’ (‘BA’, p. 5).  Tyndall’s language here alludes to 
Prospero’s dissolution of the nuptial masque in Shakespeare’s The Tempest.  Even more sugges-
tively, it parallels that describing Teufelsdröck’s attainment in Sartor Resartus, after arduous, 
occasionally debilitating struggle, of the ‘[…] EVERLASTING YEA, wherein all contradiction is 
solved, wherein whoso walks and works, it is well with him’.  Carlyle’s description of such a 
euphoric, bodiless state nonetheless presaged Tyndall’s own rhetoric at Belfast forty years 
later:  ‘On the roaring billows of Time, thou are not engulphed, but borne aloft into the azure 
of Eternity’ (p. 146).5  Such redemptive anonymity was, however, something that, subsequent 
to Belfast, both Britain’s mainstream press and established churches were in the short term 
loath to grant.   
So a reluctant Tyndall was, for a brief while, forced into stewardship of an ‘army’ he 
believed favoured already with an unimpeachable source of both strategic and moral guid-
ance. 
 
EPILOGUE:  THE TYNDALLIC AFTERLIFE – CAMBRIDGE 2006 
 
   These our actors, 
As I foretold you, were all spirits and 
Are melted into air, into thin air […]  
- The Tempest, IV.i.148 - 50   
 
It is extraordinary how closely linked Tyndall’s and Huxley’s names were in the Victorian 
satiric press.  There were those passages in The New Republic, of course.  A poem (printed early 
in 1875) in Punch like ‘Address to an Atom’, attributed to ‘an Uncomfortably Conscious Auto-
maton’, conspicuously linked memorable lines from Tyndall’s Address (‘dry light’, ‘nascent 
thrills’, ‘promise and potency’) with T. H. Huxley’s own notorious Belfast catchphrase (his 
paper there was ‘On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and Its History’).  Huxley, in 
his obituary for Tyndall, even quipped that there were those among their contemporaries who 
looked upon the famously chummy pair as a ‘a sort of firm’ (‘Professor’, p. 6).  There was one 
                                                
5  On Wednesday, 26 August, Tyndall reiterated this concluding theme – described in Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine as an especially galling example of forced ‘rhetorical pathos’ ([Tulloch], p. 530) – in the remarks with 
which he brought the Belfast meeting to a formal close:  ‘[I]n the struggle for existence between truth and error 
there is the law of order in the universe always to check and control.  I will say no more.  I have no doubt that 
this process of selection will go on, and I shall be justified in the future, in so far as I shall be, to use the closing 
words of the address – “a mere vapour that vanisheth away.”  (Cheers).   I thank you from the bottom of my 
heart for the exceedingly cordial manner in which you have received me’ (qtd. in ‘British’, 27 August 1874). 
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cartoon, entitled ‘Odium Theologicum’ (fig. 3), which appeared in Punch’s 12 June 1875 
number; it implied that the real threats to God-fearing English society were not to be found in 
the doctrines of evolution or atomism or thermodynamics per se, nor even in the teachings of 
those eminent figures closest linked with these discoveries.  On the contrary, they were to be 
discerned in such materialistic propagandists as Huxley and Tyndall themselves.  It depicts a 
pair of gravely dressed ministers returning from a stroll on a cold and (one presumes) blustery 
afternoon: 
 
First Street Preacher.  “On the ’Eath was yer?  How did you get on?” 
Second Ditto.  “O, I warmed up Old Tyndall an’ ’Uxley to-rights, I can tell yer!” 
 
What a difference a century makes.  Today, Huxley is popularly remembered, if at all, as 
‘Darwin’s Bulldog’, while poor Tyndall seems, if anything, even more neglected.6  (In Purring-
ton’s Physics in the Nineteenth Century [1997], he merits one full sentence; that sentence? – ‘In the 
words of Englishman John Tyndall, who succeeded Faraday at the Royal Institution, “in this 
single week he [Faraday] developed the laws of what are called electrodynamics”’ [p. 44].)  
The names of Maxwell and Faraday and Darwin, by contrast, seem more or less untarnished; 
their importance, unforgotten.   
 Gross, in The Rhetoric of Science, comments perceptively:  ‘For scientists […] science has 
no past – or, rather, no past that does not wholly suit its present purposes.  It is this absence, 
then, that nurtures the useful illusion:  for scientists, the results of science depend not on 
science but on nature herself’ (p. 32).  This very self-image, however, the inescapability of this 
‘useful illusion’ in twentieth- and twenty-first-century discourse, testifies in large part to the 
profound success of efforts by men like Huxley and Tyndall to stake out in the nineteenth 
some practically inviolable intellectual ground for future professional inquiry – beyond dis-
pute, above politics, subservient to no other discipline or institution.   
Contemporary science, in other words, believing this episode from its own heritage ef-
fectively superfluous, nowadays simply has no use for a Tyndall anymore.  And so, truly, he 
has at last faded (as he himself foretold), like a streak ‘of morning cloud’, into that ‘infinite 
azure of the past’ of which he at Belfast spoke so rapturously – and so prophetically as well. 
                                                
6  Such wholesale historical effacement is not merely a modern phenomenon, however.  Even as early as the 
mid-1890s, it was acknowledged – in certain circles, at least – that Tyndall’s star was already incontestably on the 
wane.  ‘It seems curious that the death of Professor Tyndall should have made so little stir in the world of science.  
How different’, one obituarist conjectured in early 1894, ‘it would have been twenty years ago!  Captivated, 
perhaps, by the boldness of his thought and the confidence of his style, his admirers allowed their zeal to outrun 
their discretion.  The inevitable swing of the pendulum has [now] carried the reaction too far’ (D., p. 27). 




MATERIALISM’S AFTERLIFE IN THE POETRY AND THOUGHT OF  




pale despair and cold tranquillity, 
Nature’s vast frame, the web of human things, 
Birth and the grave, that are not as they were.  
- Shelley, ‘Alastor; or, The Spirit of Solitude’, 18160 
 
F. W. H. Myers began his Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death with a forthright 
challenge to his generation’s science: 
 
In the long story of man’s endeavours to understand his own environment and to govern his own fates, 
there is one gap or omission so singular that, however we may afterwards contrive to explain the fact, 
its simple statement has the air of a paradox.  Yet it is strictly true to say that man has never yet applied 
to the [problem] which most profoundly concern[s] him those methods of inquiry which in attacking 
all other problems he has found the most efficacious […] – whether or no his personality involves any 
element which can survive bodily death.  (1: 1) 
 
He was right, on one level, and the spiritualised psychology he advocated (along with others 
like Arthur Sedgwick and Edmund Gurney) represented an attempt to interrogate seriously 
such a seeming lack.  But, on another, his question sidesteps the ‘paradox-producing’ fact that 
late Victorian inductive science’s mandate was primarily with analysis of the objective, the 
measured, the seen (howsoever:  microscopically, telescopically, spectroscopically), not what 
remained, despite partisan claims for the lab-bench verifiability of paranormal phenomena, 
the subjective, unseen and immeasurable.  For all that, however, a fascinating array of con-
temporary thinkers were still far from mute on the topic.  It was just that they, more often than 
not, put forth solutions which neither Myers nor his ‘spiritualistic’ colleagues preferred to hear. 
 This chapter is devoted to a pair of such responses, giving, firstly, an analysis of the 
ways in which two theoreticians, popularly known scientific visionaries differently committed 
to dissemination of what might outwardly appear an outlook of ‘materialism’, dealt with such 
theistic perplexities as personal immortality and the nature of a spiritual afterlife.  Secondly, 
and closely integrated with this discussion, is more wide-ranging commentary on the specific 
                                                
Epigraph from Shelley, ‘Alastor’, p. 30; ll. 718 - 20.  
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utility of poetry – and, more generally, a ‘poet’s’ sensibility – for a scientist engaged in the 
workaday business of mid-nineteenth-century physical investigation, particularly in attempts at 
elucidation or wider popularisation of research. 
 One of the most charismatic individuals involved in that business – by the late 1870s 
he was, so Dawson tells us, ‘the nation’s best-known scientific firebrand’ (p. 263) – and the 
central figure here addressed, is W. K. Clifford.  A mathematician, he was, as noted in my 
introduction, notorious both for a trenchantly unmollified espousal of the trinity of doctrines 
associated with materialistic thinking (atomism, energy conservation, evolutionism), and the 
persistent, public advocacy as well of a type of petulantly ‘noisy atheism’ (qtd. in Reid, p. 266). 
 My account focuses both on the manner in which a ‘poetic apprehension of the world’ 
provided Clifford with a variety of novel metaphors and models for communicating his ideas 
to audiences of specialists and non-specialists alike, and also on the fashion in which allusion 
to, and citation from, the literary tradition enabled him to buttress his more contentious 
philosophical and anthropological assertions by associating them with a storied heritage of 
past – and, if more controversially, present – verbal brilliance.   
 The second main scientist engaged with is Maxwell, a figure always prone to reference 
assumptions derived from natural theology and creationism, stances seemingly at odds with his 
continued analytical emphasis on mechanical modelling and the probabilistic underpinnings 
of thermodynamic behaviour.  Indeed, as evidenced with particular clarity in privately circu-
lated manuscripts and re-printings of his popular lectures, he founded his scientific and 
personal philosophy on belief in a benevolent God and the notion of a parallel imprinting:  
upon the soul of humanity, ‘the divine image’ (like the stamping on a coin of a sovereign’s 
silhouette); upon natural phenomena, intelligible and immutable law.  Together, these paired 
Paleyan conceits became, for the scientist, a providential guarantee, vouchsafing all at once 
‘the comprehensibility, unity, and relative autonomy of the world’ (Kaiser, p. 294).  His dislike 
of a reflex attribution of the label ‘materialistic’ to emergent theories, particularly his own, was 
acute, and, as Schaffer has noted, much of the scientist’s ‘public work of the late 1860s and 
early 1870s’ – those years in which he was so busy promulgating his statistical theory of gasses 
and unifying the forces of electricity and magnetism – ‘was designed to counter the materialist 
implications of Tyndall’s molecular physics and Huxley’s evolutionism’ (p. 464).   
He composed a rambunctious ballad – submitted by a friend (with Maxwell’s approval) 
for publication in Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine – in response to Tyndall’s Address at Belfast, 
in which that (self-consciously) portentous retelling of civilisation’s development from material-
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ism’s ‘perspective’ is condensed, and artfully caricatured, in a series of galloping, rhymed 
octameter couplets.  The legalese of the source, for instance – ‘They also fell back on experi-
ence, but with this difference – that the particular experiences which furnished the weft and 
woof of their theories were drawn, not from the study of nature, but from what lay much 
closer to them, the observation of men’ (BA, p. 1) – is, in the Maxwellian burlesque, trans-
formed into the most anticlimactic of asides:  ‘In the very beginnings of science, the parsons, 
who managed things then, / Being handy with hammer and chisel, made gods in the likeness 
of men’.   
The parody’s treatment of Tyndall’s enshrinement of molecular self-organisation, with 
its interpolated commentary on the scientist’s penchant for sometimes risible magniloquence, 
takes on a comparable pitch, seeming at once flippant and affectionate: 
 
So treading a path all untrod, the poet-philosopher sings 
Of the seeds of the mighty world – the first-beginnings of things; 
How freely he scatters his atoms before the beginning of years; 
How he clothes them with force as a garment, those small incompressible spheres! 
  (p. 639) 
 
Outside such works, however, Maxwell was rarely as boisterous as Clifford in setting out 
beliefs.  This was in large part a consequence of temperament; as Basil Mahon has observed in 
a recent biography The Man Who Changed Everything:  The Life of James Clerk Maxwell (2003), 
though the scientist’s faith was simply ‘too deeply rooted to be shaken […]’, ‘his probing mind 
would not allow any possible fissures between God and science to remain unexplored; they 
had to be surveyed and bridged.  This was an intensely personal process, to be re-examined in 
the light of each new scientific discovery, whether his own or someone else’s’ (p. 37).   
This was the impetus, and character, too – though the ‘faith’ which craved integration 
was wholly antithetical to Maxwell’s, and the endeavour far less hushed – of Clifford’s own 
poetic and rhetorical explorations of the troubled intersections of materialistic science with 
personal creed. 
 Accordingly, half this chapter is devoted to focused analysis of a number of ‘private’ or 
occasional texts written by Clifford and Maxwell in which scrutiny is directed as much at the 
assumptions of ‘their’ science as at the foundations, or ideological nuances, of their ‘supple-
mental’ systems of guiding doctrine:  a journal entry and a pair of verse fragments by the 
former; several extended poems by the latter, notably ‘To Hermann Stoffkraft, Ph.D., the 
Hero of a recent work called “Paradoxical Philosophy”’.  More often than not, as I shall 
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argue, works such as these were composed in attempts to ‘flesh out’, humanise or otherwise 
elaborate and make more palatable the idiosyncratic worldviews each was trying to articulate.  
As such, they form, not accidentally, a sort of ‘parallel text’ for – or, more aptly, an authorised 
commentary upon – the more technical and precise, less sentimental or frivolous, sorts of 
writings with which the two men were throughout their lives more stereotypically associated. 
 However, despite an overriding assuredness (Maxwell in his Scottish Protestantism, 
Clifford in his agnostic humanism, both in the explanatory acumen of nineteenth-century 
science), these texts, more often than not, seem to have been composed more for personal 
comfort, or spiritual satisfaction and reassurance, than for that of any audience, real or 
foreseen.  Such ameliorative labours seemed to many at the time a necessary exercise, how-
ever, though for some – souls perhaps not blessed with either scientist’s convictions, working 
inside or outside or alongside the professional scientific community – the need was even more 
importunate.  The science of the era, as discussed in my first chapter, seemed to be groping 
towards a conclusion – which many then resisted, through a sometimes dazzling variety of 
strategies and metaphysical evasions – memorably encapsulated by Myers in his ‘Autobio-
graphical Fragment’, where he characterised the later 1860s and early 1870s ‘as the very 
flood-tide of materialism, agnosticism – the mechanical theory of the Universe, the reduction 
of spiritual facts to physiological phenomena’ (p. 14).   
 But there were collateral moral consequences to such physical – and, consequently, 
religious – belief, and these, to some, could seem particularly galling.  ‘To believe’, as Rev. 
Martineau pointed out in 1877, ‘in an ever-living and perfect Mind, supreme over the uni-
verse, is to invest moral distinctions with immensity and eternity, and lift them from the 
provincial stage of human society to the imperishable theatre of all being’ (p. 343).   
 Victorian materialism thus precipitated an act of banishment, an existential relegation.  
Taking place in an age when ‘the question of man’s soul-less descent from the apes was the 
center of intellectual controversy’ (S. Smith, p. xxii), such a further workaday affront could 
simply prove too hideous for some to endure.  This monologue is from Tennyson’s ‘Despair’: 
 
Oh we poor orphans of nothing – alone on that lonely shore –  
Born of the brainless Nature who knew not that which she bore! 
Trusting no longer that earthly flower would be heavenly fruit –  
Come from the brute, poor souls – no souls – and to die with the brute – 
(p. 1301; ll. 33 - 36) 
 
So a saved man cries out to the minister who had pulled him from the sea, where he and his 
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wife had attempted to drown themselves (ironically, he does so in the same metre as Maxwell’s 
Tyndallic satire, another, more optimistic take on the period’s ‘materialism’, a work firmly 
anchored in the scientist’s unshaken trust in heavenly dominion). 
 Here is Myers – despite periodic bouts of melancholy, he was never one to cow like 
Tennyson’s histrionic survivor – commenting of the debris left behind by materialism’s ‘flood-
tide’: 
 
It was a time when not the intellect only, but the moral ideals of men seemed to have passed into the 
camp of negation.  We were all in the first flush of triumphant Darwinism, when terrene evolution had 
explained so much that men hardly cared to look beyond.  Among my own group, W. K. Clifford was 
putting forth his series of triumphant proclamations of the nothingness of God, the divinity of man.  
Swinburne, too, […] had given passionate voice to the same conception.   
 (‘Autobiographical’, pp. 14 - 15) 
 
Then, as now, such ‘negating’ sentiments aroused passionate counter-feelings, and the finding 
of something else at the bottom of things, a light in those dark places, was more than a par-
lour-game to those, like Myers and Tyndall, either closest to, or most threatened by, such 
unforgiving physical and evolutionary insights:  spiritually pallid, epistemologically unyielding.  
Clifford – one of materialism’s most voluble, impassioned and ‘triumphant’ advocates – felt 
this concern no less keenly.   
 His response, though, as hinted at in Myers’s ‘Fragment’, could scarcely have been 
more dissimilar, as he overpraised neither the spirit (like the former), nor nature (like the 
latter), but joined rather the poet Swinburne in exulting, to the trepidation of many, a heretic’s 
Te Deum:   ‘Glory to Man in the highest!  for Man is the master of things’ (‘Hymn’, p. 764).  
 
POETRY AS AID TO EXPLANATION:  W. K. CLIFFORD’S ‘STREAM OF CONSCIOUSNESS’ 
 
‘It was early in his school career’, wrote J. J. Thomson in a centenary appreciation of the life 
and works of James Clerk Maxwell, ‘that he began to write verses, a practice which he kept up 
all his life, to the great delight of his friends’ (p. 5).  He was, of course, not alone among 
Victorian scientists in so doing:  Herschel (as noted in my first chapter) tried his hand at it, as 
did Tyndall – earlier in his life Tyndall had even submitted a few verses (preserved in the RI) 
to local papers and magazines under odd pseudonyms like Wat Ripton, Wat Ripton Snooks, 
or simply ‘W. S.’ – as did Clifford, too.   
Though the existence of these works, mainly unpublished, a few circulated privately, 
would perhaps have been greeted by some controversialists among the London literati with a 
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snort of surprise, shading into perfunctory dismissal, such an uncharitable response would 
hardly have been global.  Frederick Pollock, in a (borderline hagiographic) biographical 
assessment prefacing the first volume of Clifford’s collected Lectures and Essays (1879), was not 
alone among contemporaries in realising – despite his half-joking assertion at the start – that 
 
It is an open secret to the few who know it, but a mystery and a stumbling-block to the many, that 
Science and Poetry are own sisters; insomuch that in those branches of scientific inquiry which are 
most remote from the grasp of the ordinary sensible imagination, a higher power of imagination akin 
to the creative insight of the poet is most needed and most fruitful of lasting work.  (p. 1) 
 
(Incidentally, Frederick Pollock, a legal scholar, was the son of Juliet Pollock, Tyndall’s friend 
and frequent correspondent.)  It is, of course, the remoteness of much abstract physical 
knowledge that concerns Pollock the most here, its removal from the commonsensical world of 
medium-sized dry goods (in twentieth-century philosopher of science J. L. Austin’s memorable 
turn of phrase).  The ‘higher power’ of scientific comprehension – a mental process figured as 
at once difficult and a murky ‘mystery’, certainly not something for the ordinary man on the 
street – peers into the world of the microscopically small or the cosmologically great and, 
through the agency of a strongly poetic ‘creative insight’, grasps truths that had been hereto-
fore occluded.  This was hardly original.  The image of scientist as priest or seer privy to 
wisdom unknown, or grasping connections invisible, to us duller, more blinkered folk (a trope 
encoded in the connotations of one telling professional designation even by then – the late 
1870s – still not wholly superseded:  ‘natural philosopher’) was – and remains to this day – at 
once potent and familiar.   
Maxwell, for instance, was renowned for his modelling of electromagnetic dynamics, in 
which he raided the depots of the railway engineer, blithely borrowing saw-tooth gears and 
idle wheels, in his quest for an enlightening, if grimy, correspondence (‘How ingenious, both 
electrically and mechanically!’, Sharlin says of this particular scheme of analogy [p. 95]), while 
Clifford, whose toils were largely confined to the incorruptible realms of pure analysis, was 
similarly praised for his trademark habit of initiating even the most multi-dimensional of 
mathematical excursions from within the home ground of a commonsense or ‘geometrical 
view of numbers’ (SSC, p. 159). 
What is more interesting is the manner in which Pollock next begins to concentrate not 
merely on the inspirational or analogic function of such an underlying poetic sensibility, but 
also on its vital explanatory role.  When it ‘is joined’, he explains, ‘with quick perception and 
delicate sympathies, it can work the miracle of piercing the barrier that separates one mind 
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from another, and becomes a personal charm’ (p. 1).  The ‘miracle’, then, is not merely in the 
discovery, but in the communication (to scientific peers and, vitally, other cultural groupings 
as well) of formalised natural law, or particular interpretations of that law.  Sometimes this 
could be achieved by linking the strange with the comforting, ordinary, or, perhaps, reassur-
ingly banal.  Clifford once explained the relative proportion of hydrogen to oxygen in a 
molecule of water subsequent to electrolytic disassociation by recourse to one of the homeliest 
metaphors imaginable (given his audience):  ‘[I]t is clear that each of those 50 molecules of 
hydrogen must have been divided into two [in the hundred molecules of water], because you 
cannot put 50 horses into 100 stables, so that there shall be exactly the same amount of horse 
in each stable; but you can divide 50 pairs of horses among 100 stables’ (‘Atoms’, p. 188).  
Here, in a telling conjunction, electrochemistry meets country life.  Later, in the same talk, a 
popular lecture first delivered 7 January 1872 before an approving (and predominately 
genteel) crowd as part of a Sunday afternoon series, Clifford referenced a similarly bucolic 
simile suggested by William Thomson:  ‘He expresses the result in this way – that if you were 
to magnify a drop of water to the size of the earth, then the coarseness of the graining [be-
tween molecules] […] would be that of something between cricket-balls and small shot’ (p. 
189).  The scales remain staggering, but a point of purchase is found.   
A hint of scandal or romance could be intimated as well.  In an essay on ‘The First and 
Last Catastrophe’, Clifford escorts the states of matter into the salons of polite society, describ-
ing molecules in a gas dancing the ‘Sir Roger de Coverly’; those in liquid, ‘the grand chain in 
Lancers’; while those in a solid, where each particle has ‘a place which it keeps […]’ (p. 467), 
are nonetheless still found to be fidgeting with the incessant twitter of thermodynamic agita-
tion.  Are the lattermost, one must wonder, eager to rejoin more ‘energetic’ comrades on the 
microcosmic dancefloor? 
Such a gift for poetic metaphor and model was not the only one that was useful to the 
scientist anxious to make his ideas better understood, whether to a duly attentive audience at a 
well-publicised RI lecture series or, perhaps, some interested, though necessarily anonymous, 
reader poring over one of the era’s great generalist journals, venues in which the ‘verbal and 
conceptual interconnectedness of the sciences, politics, theology, and literature were both 
sustained and revealed by their juxtaposition in periodical articles’ (Dawson, Noakes and 
Topham, p. 30).  It was equally true that an often quite literal poetic sensibility had a wide-
ranging and highly pedagogic utility in the performance of this task as well, particularly if 
coupled with a suitably synthesising awareness of the nineteenth-century literary tradition.  
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Dozens of works situated within that tradition, after all, were routinely mined by the scientists 
of the era in search of seemly quotations and tropes, even as the great poets themselves, figures 
like Milton and Shakespeare and Tennyson, were – often quite unwittingly, to be sure (though 
a man like Tennyson well knew his function in this regard) – conscripted into the grand and 
noble endeavour of relentless scientific advance, foot-soldiers alongside their platoon mates in 
the lab.  As Pollock says of Clifford:  ‘He had a fair general knowledge of English literature (by 
which I mean considerably more than is yet supposed necessary for an Englishman’s educa-
tion), with a preference for modern’ – a mid-Victorian codeword for ‘radical’ – ‘poetry […]’.  
Clifford was, moreover, one always to reserve – again, rather pragmatically – particular 
admiration for individual works and authors such ‘as gave expression to his own ideas’ (p. 8).  
(The same could, of course, be said of a range of Clifford’s colleagues as well, themselves alive 
to potentialities and registers of meaning secreted in verse beyond those deemed merely 
illustrative – though each, needless to say, had his own personal pantheon of poetic favourites 
from which to draw both inspiration and support.) 
It is, for instance, entirely possible that no substantive allusion was meant to King Lear 
in the following phrase, one lifted from a lengthy critical essay of 1875 (partly a scathing 
appraisal of Stewart and Tait’s The Unseen Universe; or, Physical Speculations on a Future State) 
authored by Clifford for The Fortnightly Review.  Speaking of the manner in which the sane 
mind, housed in a body infused with the full vigour of youth and health, ‘rebels once [and] for 
all against its own final and complete destruction’, Clifford goes on to add:  ‘And forasmuch as 
so many and so mighty generations have in time past ended in death their noble and brave 
battle with the elements, that we also and our brethren can in nowise hope to escape their fate, 
therefore we are solely driven to find some way in which at least the image of that ending shall 
be avoided and set aside’ (‘Unseen’, pp. 778 - 79).  Clifford’s concluding clause echoes, faintly 
if unmistakably, an image in Act V of Shakespeare’s apocalyptic tragedy.  Lear is near mad-
ness, despairing at the sight of Cordelia’s corpse, yet clinging simultaneously to the hope that 
some life still remained in her; he asks therefore of an attendant, possibly Kent or Edgar: 
     
        Lend me a looking-glass; 
 If that her breath will mist or stain the stone, 
 Why then she lives. 
 KENT        Is this the promis’d end?   
 EDGAR Or image of that horror? (V.iii.261 - 64) 
 
Perhaps such a fleeting congruence was wholly accidental, so pervasively was Shakespearean 
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language and imagery by then interwoven with contemporary metaphor, idiom and cliché.   
However the earlier text coheres too well with Clifford’s argument for this to be fully 
convincing:  we flee, not merely death itself, but also its apparitions and reminders, ‘image[s] 
of that ending’.  We seek, like grieving Lear over his daughter’s lifeless body, a measure of 
solace instead, so Clifford explains it, in our identification with something greater than our-
selves while still alive (a faith, an army, a creed) or, perhaps, in a fervent, though unfounded, 
belief in some sort of life subsequent to this one (a prospect dismissed by Clifford as ‘not 
orderly, not natural, not healthy, but monstrous or supernatural […]’ [‘Unseen’, p. 779]).  
Edgar’s eschatological visions elide with Clifford’s of our own necessary extinction.  The 
allusion, though sly, is metaphysically apt.  And, atop it, cadences, diction – and an undis-
guised chivalric subtext – indebted to, if not worthy of, Le Morte d’Arthur provide a further, 
likewise antiquarian, flourish.  Redolent of a hazily recalled Golden Age, such an implicit 
parallelism summons to mind a double triumph:  that of ‘traditional’ English character (Does 
not the death of that king represent one of the most rousing archetypes in Western literature of 
‘noble and brave’, if foredoomed, ‘battle with the elements’?), and that of ‘traditional’ Anglo-
Saxon prosody (manifested at its most plainspoken and ‘muscular’ in Mallory’s late medieval 
romance). 
In another – less clandestine – illustration, from later in the same appraisal, of Clif-
ford’s use of literary intertextuality in the service of his politicised philosophical ends, we note 
the scientist this time making profound poetic indebtednesses at once more explicit and more 
precise.  Excerpted lines are indented, italicised, set off from the main body of a mid-Victorian 
text in a manner consonant with the fashion in which a significant equation might be high-
lighted in a modern one.  He, in the course of an argument, deploys a couplet (unattributed) 
from Swinburne, always one of his favourites.  (Is it any wonder that the irrepressible Clifford 
found so much to admire in the verse of that intriguing figure, perceived by all as something of 
an artistic libertine, one well known for his interest in ideas and subjects on the very border-
lines of social propriety?  By contrast, most of Clifford’s fellow publicists, nervous about the 
potential professional repercussions of such immoderate literary affiliations, or by nature more 
conservative politically and aesthetically, ‘tended to ally themselves with older more respect-
able poets’ [Dawson, p. 266].1)  Clifford is here writing of the intractable, and indissoluble, 
                                                
1  Another of those ‘modern’ poets prominent in Clifford’s writings is Walt Whitman (in ‘Cosmic Emotion’, 
he editorialises on a passage from Song of Myself:  ‘So sings one whom great poets revere as a poet, but to whom 
writers of excellent prose, and even of leading articles, refuse the name […]’ [p. 420]).  In that preference, too, 
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bond between mind and matter, relating the idea of the ‘stream’ of personal consciousness – a 
metaphor nowadays often reflexively associated with the 1890 appearance of William James’s 
epochal text, The Principles of Psychology – with the flow of water molecules constituting a river:  
‘Consciousness is not a simple thing’, the scientist explains, ‘but a complex; it is the combina-
tion of feelings into a stream.  It exists at the same time as the combination of nerve-messages 
into a stream’ (‘Unseen’, p. 790).   
Clifford’s split emphasis – on the stream-like nature of the recognisable contents of 
consciousness (i.e., thought) as well as on the uninterrupted nature of the manifold sensory and 
other stimuli goading such awareness – anticipates the psychologist’s later definition.  In it, 
emphasis is likewise placed on the continuity and intermingling of those different currents – ‘a 
teeming multiplicity of objects and relations […]’ (1: 219) – which, upon merger, collectively 
contribute to a unitary and interpretable mental state, that singularly enabling illusion.  These 
diverse inputs, as James writes in a famous chapter, can be unnoticed or acknowledged, 
circumstantial or willed.  Asserting first that consciousness, though integrating effortlessly such 
a manifold of competing input-sources, ‘is nothing joined; it flows’, he emphatically concludes:  
‘A “river” or a “stream” are the metaphors by which it [consciousness] is most naturally 
described.  In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life’ 
(1: 233). 
Though Clifford’s usage of such an ‘aquatic’ metaphor is here basically phenomenol-
ogical, behind it is the same sense, as Owen Flannigan has phrased it, present in James’s fin de 
siècle conception of the ‘stream’ of personal or subjective consciousness, a thing ‘continuous, 
forward-moving and in constant change’: 
 
Consider a mountain rill.  It runs down in the sunshine, and its water evaporates; yet it is fed by 
thousands of tiny tributaries, and the stream flows on.  The water may be changed again and again, yet 
still there is the same stream.  It widens over plains, or is prisoned and fouled by towns; always the 
same stream; but at last    
    ‘even the weariest river 
   Winds somewhere safe to sea.’  
When that happens no drop of the water is lost, but the stream is dead.  (‘Unseen’, pp. 790 - 91) 
 
Such a concept of the ‘flowing stream’ provides Clifford with an extensible and pliant model 
to expound his own ideas of consciousness, a process, he insists, shaped both by incident (‘It 
widens over plains, or is prisoned and fouled by towns […]’) and the inexorable ‘downward’ 
                                                                                                                                                   
was Clifford remarkably progressive for his time and place, an individual, it seems, as forward-thinking in 
aesthetic sensibilities as he was in his own – practically unmatchable – mathematical, evolutionary and sociologi-
cal ones. 
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passage of remorseless time (in the ‘forgetting’ of evaporation, or the ‘acquisition’ of both 
shaping experiences and new competencies through the trickling contribution of effectively 
innumerable ‘tiny tributaries’).  The Heraclitean truism – ‘[…] all things are in motion and 
nothing at rest; he [Heraclitus] compares them to the stream of a river, and says that you 
cannot step into the same river twice’, in Jowett’s 1871 translation of Plato’s Cratylus (p. 673) – 
is also implicit, recoded as ‘never the same person twice’, an acknowledgment of the irrefraga-
ble flux of temporal being, that perpetual evolution and metamorphosis of character amid the 
hurly-burly of personal circumstance.   
The citation from Swinburne’s ‘The Garden of Proserpine’ thus, on one level, merely 
completes the scientist’s figurative identification between watercourse and mind.  In a materi-
alistic philosophy of consciousness, the stream lost in the sea – and yet not lost, for the consti-
tutive, albeit ‘lifeless’, water molecules persist – is equivalent in a metaphysical sense to a 
human personality extinguished by death.2  The process is irrevocable; the personality (like the 
totality of the stream itself), irretrievable.  The principle, it seems, of matter conservation (so 
integral to mid-Victorian physical science) restricts significantly the sorts of afterlives material 
bodies may experience – for Clifford, at least.3 
But the use of Swinburne’s ‘Proserpine’ couplet provides a further context, too.  It is, in 
other words, not merely illustrative, or argumentative, or a way of phrasing parsimoniously – 
while, at the same time, memorably – a concept or critique which would otherwise sprawl 
over several uneconomical or, perhaps, graceless lines of prose.  Nor is it merely a way of 
capping a metaphoric arc with a canonically poetic keystone.  Rather, it serves also to cohere 
nicely with the scientist’s own thoughts (elaborated more fully elsewhere, in such writings as 
‘Cosmic Emotion’ and ‘The Influence upon Morality of a Decline in Religious Belief’) on the 
role of mankind in a world in which theology is discredited, in which the prospect of an 
eternity to be spent in either heaven or hell offers up to us neither promise nor fear.  As he 
                                                
2  The philosopher of mind Barry Dainton remarks in his study The Stream of Consciousness:  Unity and Continuity 
in Conscious Experience (2000) that ‘in some respects streams of consciousness are more like their liquid counterparts 
than some enthusiasts for such comparisons have recognized’ (p. 237).   
If this is so, it raises the question:  for a materialist, what happens to the ‘water’ (memories, learned skills, and 
the like) after death?  Clifford’s theory of ‘mind-stuff’, discussed later in this chapter, provides one possible 
answer:  consciousness, having arisen from an ocean of itself, merely disperses back into that ocean, the dissipa-
tion of like into like, as a river into the sea.  
3  Stewart and Tait, extrapolating from their own understandings of the same precept, found for it a radically 
divergent signification (examined in more detail in the next section).  Explicated cogently in The Unseen Universe – 
and, as noted, hatcheted mercilessly, by Clifford, in The Fortnightly – it held that ‘we are supposed to follow 
universal physical laws [like mass conservation] to a belief in the immortality of the soul’ (G. Myers, ‘Nineteenth’, 
p. 62). 
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explains in ‘The First and the Last Catastrophe’, those who hold such beliefs, who deny the 
continuity of spiritual essences or the rewards and privations of an afterlife, 
 
must just face the fact [of mortality] and make the best of it; and I think we are helped in this by the 
words of that Jew philosopher, who was himself a worthy crown to the splendid achievements of his 
race in the cause of progress in the Middle Ages, Benedict Spinoza.  He said:  “The freeman thinks of 
nothing so little as of death, and his contemplation is not of death but of life.”  Our interest, it seems to 
me, lies with so much of the past as may serve to guide our actions in the present, and to intensify our 
pious allegiance to the fathers who have gone before us, and the brethren who are with us; and our 
interest lies with so much of the future as we may hope will be reasonably effected by our good actions 
now.  (p. 484) 
 
Clifford’s vocabulary is decidedly ecclesiastical (our ‘fathers’, our ‘brethren’, ‘our pious alle-
giance’), though his message seems anything but.  ‘Do I seem to say’, he adds a little further 
on, ‘“Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die?”  Far from it; on the contrary, I say, “Let us 
take hands and help, for this day we are alive together”’ (p. 484).  So he ends a popular science 
article on the nebular hypothesis and the end decreed by thermodynamics for all life upon this 
earth.  Like such positivistic thinkers as his contemporary Frederic Harrison (a good friend 
[SSC, p. 87]) and, more notoriously, the Parisian social theoretician Auguste Comte, Clifford 
believed that the end of each and every life of achievement and sacrifice served to auger the 
establishment of a true ‘kingdom of Man’ upon this earth, and that, consequently, every man’s 
death was a martyr’s death if his life had been lived conscientiously, devoted equally to the 
service of others and the betterment of self.4   
Unlike some of those thinkers, however – Harrison, in an essay of 1877, decried the 
‘corrupting doctrine’ telling ‘us that devotion is a molecular change in this and that convolu-
tion of grey pulp […]’ (‘Soul’, p. 630) – the scientist expressed little remorse about the funda-
mental nature of the world as he had come to understand it.  For Clifford, then, our mortality, 
even our materiality, becomes a blessing, a fortunate fate, not something to be feared by the 
right-thinking man; it compels us towards action, towards cooperation (‘band-work’, he termed 
it, viscerally anglicising a word which still then seemed something of an obtruding Latinism 
[‘Cosmic’, p. 250; see OF, p. 209]), towards achievement, away from sloth and idleness.  The 
Swinburne he chose for citation in his review comes from a stanza which also makes clear this 
point: 
                                                
4  Passages presaging the arrival of a benevolent ‘Republic’ or ‘kingdom of Man’ are common throughout 
Clifford’s non-mathematical work – for instance, this line, from the essay ‘Cosmic Emotion’, provides as corollary 
the scientist’s unambiguous renunciation of the Christian covenant (cf. Mark 1: 15):  ‘Much patient practice of 
comradeship is necessary before society will be qualified to organise itself in accordance with reason.  But those 
who can read the signs of the times read in them that the kingdom of Man is at hand’ (p. 429). 
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From too much love of living,  
 From hope and fear set free, 
We thank with brief thanksgiving 
 Whatever gods may be 
That no life lives for ever; 
That dead men rise up never; 
That even the weariest river 
 Winds somewhere safe to sea. (‘Garden’, p. 171) 
 
Clifford’s neurophysiology finds its counterpart in Swinburne’s metaphor of the ‘weariest 
river’ slouching homewards, even as his ‘positivism’ finds support in the poet’s celebration of 
mortality, or, perhaps more to the point, his shrinking from an etiolated immortality.  Swin-
burne was one who habitually used the sea as a metaphor for death and dissolution.   
So did Clifford, and elsewhere in the article he found in another maritime phenome-
non a singularly apt memento mori, an emblem of, and an analogue for, human finitude.  No 
man, Donne tells us in Meditation XVII, may be an island, but could he perhaps be a wave? 
‘But for you’, Clifford proclaims, ‘noble and great ones, who have loved and laboured 
yourselves not for yourselves but for the universal folk, in your time not for your time only but 
for the coming generations, for you there shall be life as broad and far-reaching as your love, 
for you life-giving action to the utmost reach of the great wave whose crest you sometime 
were’ (‘Unseen’, p. 780).  Such an outlook, of course, represents in part a philosophy of 
negation (‘in your time not for your time’, ‘yourselves not for yourselves’); it encodes a refusal, 
renunciation of despair, a denial of Thanatos.  It provides an alternative to heaven (the 
smugness associated with knowing that we live on in our progeny), even as it offers a different 
take on the difficult concept of immortality (not an infinite vista of deathless-ness, but rather 
the prospect, mildly comforting, of an ever-more-advanced and ever-more-humane human 
future).  Elsewhere, he wrote of the sea’s height:  ‘it increases and decreases, and increases and 
decreases again at definite intervals’; if you mark a point by putting ‘a cork upon [the sea’s] 
surface, you will find that the cork will rise up and down; that is to say, there will be a change 
or displacement of the cork’s position, which is periodic in time […]’ (‘First’, p. 468).  So, 
Clifford suggests, like a cork upon the sea we are borne up briefly from stillness, teeter upon 
the crest (maturity), and then fall gently again to rest – the wave coursing resolutely on, 
oblivious to our, to any, absence.  The imagery, like the language and the seductive sonority of 
the prose, feels familiarly Swinburnian, having parallels in ‘The Garden of Proserpine’ and 
elsewhere (perhaps most evocatively in one late work, ‘The Lake of Gaube’); the message, 
though, suffused with its odd blend of resignation alongside a defiant sociological optimism, 
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seems singularly indebted to positivism.  Its publicists, not coincidentally, likewise had a 
penchant for watery metaphor; as Harrison demonstrates:5  ‘[I]n some infinitesimal degree, 
the humblest life that ever turned a sod sends a wave – no, more than a wave, a life – through 
the ever-growing harmony of human society’ (‘Soul’, p. 837).   
The novelty in Clifford’s employment of such symbology arises from the fluency of his 
comparisons, that concourse within his writings of a range of discourses, coupled with the fact 
that, in terms of ‘his’ materialism’s psychology (with its idea of consciousness itself as flowing, as 
having a ‘stream-like’ quality), these comparisons become more than merely poetic or descrip-
tive, but phenomenologically precise. 
The chance or glancing allusion, the direct citation, the echo of mood or metaphor, 
these techniques provided Clifford with further methods of propagandising his own ‘scientific’ 
agenda.  Such a poetic awareness or affinity, as Pollock remarked in his introduction to 
Clifford’s Lectures and Essays, such an openness to the literary resources of analogy and refer-
ence, allowed that scientist simultaneously to describe the world in what would have seemed to 
him an accurate enough manner even as it granted him license to, in a sense, remake it 
wholesale, refashioning it, at once subtly and idiosyncratically, into a shape and hue of his own 
devising.  Pollock put it thusly:  ‘This living and constructive energy’ – one defining character-
istic of the naturally gifted science-writer, he insists – ‘projects itself out into the world at the 
same time that it assimilates the world to itself’ (p. 1).  Hence, many such author-figures as 
Clifford were, in a sense, cosmogonists as well, fabricating whole universes, self-made worlds 
malleable and internally consistent in which their contentions (whether scientific or not) made 
sense.  Each of these private ‘universes’ was, in the main, peculiar and distinct, if not in every 
instance altogether unique:  Clifford’s borrowed more than a little from Tyndall’s, even as 
Huxley’s elaborated – ambivalently, here; uncompromisingly, there – on Darwin’s beatific 
vision, limned (limbed?) in The Origin, of the ‘great Tree of Life, which fills with its dead and 
broken branches the crust of the earth, and covers the surface with its ever branching and 
beautiful ramifications’ (p. 107).  Moreover, Clifford, like many colleagues and competitors, 
availed himself fully of the common currency provided by household works of poetry, fiction 
and theology.  By and large, even as members of the Victorian public were better acquainted 
with the science of their era than seems the case in postmodernity, so, too, were they more 
                                                
5  That is, when they were not advancing tuneful substitutes – bringing to mind George Eliot’s ‘choir invisi-
ble’, whose ‘music is the gladness of the world’ (‘Choir’, p. 50) – in its stead, as Harrison does towards the end of 
this quotation. 
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conversant with many aspects of both its then-present and its more ancient humanistic heri-
tage.  Clifford’s readership likely knew, if only by reputation, the licentiousness of a Swin-
burne, the Romanticism of a Wordsworth or Shelley; they recognised, for the most part, the 
cadences of the King James Bible or the metre of an In Memoriam stanza.  For some this 
competence was gained through close, full reading of the source text; for others, recollection of 
fragments from school or sermon, or perusal of, say, a popular anthology of cherished verse 
extracts (Palgrave’s Golden Treasury was first published in 1861), unregulated manners of 
acquisition rendering the ‘poetic’ lines at once context-free and more amenable to recapitula-
tion and cunning redeployment.  
And, to be sure, some scientific propagandists even today make use of like techniques, 
if perhaps more subtly.6  Richard Dawkins, in his recent neo-Darwinian synthesis River Out of 
Eden (1996), after cheerfully dismissing the entire prospect of either a teleology behind, or a 
purpose hidden somewhere within, the cosmos’s multitudinous affairs – ‘the universe’, he tells 
us, matter-of-factly and without hope of appeal or reprieve, ‘we observe has precisely the 
properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, 
nothing but blind pitiless indifference’ – then concludes a chapter entitled ‘God’s Utility 
Function’ by quoting a fragment of verse, co-opting its lines in a fashion which can only be 
described as Cliffordian:7 
 
As that unhappy poet A. E. Housman put it:    
 For Nature, heartless, witless, Nature 
 Will neither care nor know  
DNA neither cares nor knows.  DNA just is.  And we dance to its music.  (p. 155) 
                                                
6  ‘Serious’ scientists do occasionally use the same as well.  A 2005 article in the Journal of High Energy Physics, 
discussing spacetime topological deformations wrought by closed string tachyons, ends with full citation of Yeats’s 
‘The Second Coming’, a poem put forth as ‘anticipating’ the authors’ thesis; they even gloss its opening with their 
own strophic updating.  ‘TURNING and turning in the widening gyre / The falcon cannot hear the falconer; / 
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold […]’ (Yeats, pp. 210 - 11) becomes, for instance, ‘Vortex-induced / causal 
disconnection / follows tachyon condensation […]’ (Adams et al., p. 31).  Their tone, though, remains aloof and wry, 
acknowledging the absurdity of such Yeatsian precognition, and the primacy (or, at best, separateness) of science.  
The appendix in which it occurs, ‘Towards a transformative hermeneutics of off-shell string theory’, even evokes 
that egg-on-face pillorying of ill-judged interdisciplinarity, Alan Sokal’s ‘Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics 
of Quantum Gravity’. 
7  Dawkins, though, subtly misrepresents – the kind of mistake committed (or, less charitably, the sort of wil-
ful deception perpetrated) at best infrequently by Clifford – the overriding theme of that ‘unhappy poet’ in his 
chosen usage of the Housman.  The lines selected are taken from a piece which, if anything, attacks the pathetic 
fallacy alone, the belief that there is an ineradicable correspondence (ubiquitous in Romanticism, of course) 
between human feelings and the ‘emotional states’ of an inappropriately anthropomorphised external world.  
Here is the excerpted stanza in full:  ‘For nature, heartless, witless nature, / Will neither care nor know / What 
stranger’s feet may find the meadow / And trespass there and go, / Nor ask the dews of morning / If they are 
mine or no’.  Hence, it is human arrogance, not natural cruelty or indifference per se, that seems to have been 
the poet’s – and poem’s – intended target. 
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As it had for so many predecessors of more than a century previous, the epigrammatic yet 
oddly encompassing scope of the aptly chosen poetic quotation provides Dawkins with a 
temporary, if superficial, respite from the nihilism encroaching stealthily beneath the surface 
of his own evolutionary narrative, a fleeting glimpse of beauty and coherence in a world 
denuded of meaning.  And thus in the very ambivalence and inscrutability of biology is 
Dawkins able to find a new music, a new meaning, even as Clifford was able to discover a 
compelling sublimity and a tantalising exuberance in the vastness and comprehensibility of his 
own era’s vision of a nature rendered ‘heartless, witless’.   
‘We are all to be swept away’, Clifford wrote, ‘in the final ruin of the earth.  The 
thought of that ending is a sad thought; there is no use in trying to deny this.  But it has 
nothing to do with right or wrong; it belongs to another subject.  Like All-Father Odin, we 
must ride out gaily to do battle with the wolf of doom even if there be no Balder to come back 
and continue our work’ (‘Modern’, p. 356).  Such a course of action, he insists, is neither 
suicidal nor pointless.  Not for Clifford the paralysis of Myers’s ‘Would God It Were Evening’, 
a morose sonnet in which, in the era’s newly ‘material’ cosmos, even the promises of Keatsian 
Romanticism are quashed:  ‘Alas! a melancholy peace to win / With all their notes the night-
ingales complain, / And I such music as is mine begin, / Awake for nothing, and alive in 
vain’.  There is, for him, too much yet to live for.  Humanity’s future, hence, elides with Norse 
mythology, not Christian theology; with Ragnarök, not John’s Apocalypse.8  Clifford’s eschato-
logical visions, his ‘image[s] of that horror’, evince, accordingly, a grand and triumphal burst 
of glory before the ultimate conflagration, even though he, of all people, knew only too well 
the manner in which all cosmologically scaled thermodynamic processes must inevitably play 
out – and in that conflagration, truly, he’d say, we would meet the absolute and inescapable 
ending of all ponderable things. 
 In the meantime, what joy could be found, beyond duty, in Clifford’s philosophy was 
provided by ‘cosmic emotion’ (Henry Sidgwick’s coinage), ‘an emotion which is felt in regard 
to the universe or sum of things, viewed as a cosmos or order.  There are two kinds of cosmic 
emotion – one having reference to the Macrocosm or universe surrounding and containing us, 
the other relating to the Microcosm or universe of our own souls’ (‘Cosmic’, p. 411).  Clifford, 
                                                
8  Clifford was not alone among Victorians in his deliberate evocation of this mythology.  Carlyle, as Gillian 
Beer points out, gave in 1841 ‘a synopsis of the Balder legend in Heroes and Hero-worship […]’; moreover, Matthew 
Arnold, in ‘Balder Dead’, an epic-length poem of 1853, provided his readers with a characteristic ‘[…] Christian-
izing of the myth in which Balder is identified with Christ’ (OF, p. 227n19). 
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in an essay on this queer concept, suggests a ‘star-full’ sky as one spectacle ideally suited to 
produce ‘cosmic emotion of the first kind’; exultant contemplation of man’s ‘moral faculty’, 
perfect to incite the second (pp. 411, 412).  These were, however, compensatory comforts 
which seemed paltry to many.  Mallock, in The New Paul and Virginia, tartly punctured the 
narcissistic solemnity of such a doubly focused ‘sensitive’ atheism (Darnley’s ‘bosom swelled 
violently, and he cried aloud, his eyes still fixed on the firmament, “Oh, important All!  oh, 
important Me!”’ [p. 37]), while in ‘Is Life Worth Living?’, a meditative essay of 1877, he went 
even further, mocking the absurd presumptuousness of all naturalistic guides to conduct, 
saying of their advocates:9  ‘But the knowledge which has qualified them to destroy religion, 
has no bearing whatsoever on the knowledge that will qualify them to replace it’ (2: 271).   
More pessimistic still was the appraisal put forth in Rev. Watson’s Gospels of Yesterday.  
Peering into the depths of Clifford’s oceanic metaphor, having skimmed off pretty rhetoric 
and all the humanistic froth, he discerned beneath those ‘waves’ an unquenchable emptiness, 
the abysmal unendurability of any cosmological system denying the agency of Christ: 
 
And there is no remedy.  For men, for societies, for the whole human race, one law holds in the vast 
dominion of force.  The mightiest nation is but a wave in the weltering ocean which beats from cosmic 
shore to cosmic shore, unceasingly active, eternally impotent.  What is it to a man that the wave of 
which he forms a part will have its flashing crest for a moment as it rolls in on some resounding beach?  
He is nothing; the ceaseless movement is all.  (p. 177) 
 
Was a conciliation to be found?   
One scientist who could seemingly manage to reconcile a viable accounting of the natu-
ral world with the Revelation denied by Clifford was Maxwell.  He, like many among the 
polemicists’ fraternity, appealed frequently to the tenets of molecular physics, though derived 
from them antithetical conclusions, ‘that neither the kinetic theory of gasses nor the laws of 
thermodynamics implied materialism’ (Harman, p. 202).  The manner in which he was able to 
do so will be the focus of my next section.  
 
THERMODYNAMICS AS ALLEGORY:  MAXWELL’S CRITIQUE OF THE UNSEEN UNIVERSE 
 
John Herschel said of the infallibility and instantaneity of atoms, in 1865:  ‘Their movements, 
their interchanges, their “hates and loves,” their “attractions and repulsions,” their “correla-
tions,” their what not, are all determined on the very instant.  There is no hesitation, no 
                                                
9  These issues (anti-materialism, anti-positivism) truly energised Mallock.  He later expanded ‘Is Life Worth 
Living?’, already formidable, to book-length.  Verdict? – tentatively affirmative, after 247 pages.   
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blundering, no trial and error’ (‘Atoms’, p. 84).  Maxwell, echoing Herschel, and stirred 
simultaneously by Christian faith and the grandeur of nineteenth-century scientific concep-
tions of the phenomenal world, famously believed that at least one among several conceptual 
entities – specifically, molecules – deployed in the paradigms of contemporary theoretical 
physics provided evidence, as it were, of the ‘flawless’-hence-‘manufactured’ beginnings of 
physical substance.  Molecules, he wrote (in a celebrated article of that name), ‘continue this 
day as the day they were created – perfect in number and measure and weight […]’; their 
perfection, in a sense, mirrors the perfection of God, as ‘they are essential constituents of the 
image of Him who in the beginning created, not only the heaven and the earth, but the 
materials of which heaven and earth consist’.  One wonders, having heard this, what of the 
Second Law?  What of its decree, wholly unanswerable, that all order – including molecular 
order – must in the end dissolve?   
Maxwell, predictably, had thoughts on this as well.  ‘Natural causes’, he enthused,10 
 
as we know, are at work, which tend to modify, if they do not at length destroy, all the arrangements 
and dimensions of the earth and the whole solar system.  But though in the course of ages catastrophes 
have occurred and may yet occur in the heavens, though ancient systems may be dissolved and new 
systems evolved out of their ruins, the molecules out of which these systems are built – the foundation 
stones of the material universe – remain unbroken and unworn.  (p. 154) 
 
Immutable, eternal, ‘steadfast’, exempt from the ravages of entropy, molecules must have 
seemed to provide Maxwell with palpable confirmation of his faith, proof positive of his long-
held contention that the elements of structuring, in sublime ensemble with all the voices of our 
experiential world (indeed, with a perhaps unique expressiveness), ‘Tell the same unending 
story – / “We are Truth in Form arrayed”’.  So he had rejoiced in his undergraduate compo-
sition ‘A Student’s Evening Hymn’ (p. 595).   
In other words, for Maxwell, the study of molecules opened wide a window on the 
numinous.  But that should not be confused with the belief that they – that worldly things 
themselves – constitute the numinous.  In a speculative essay submitted to the Cambridge 
Apostles, Maxwell had two decades prior to ‘Molecules’ cautioned against this line of argu-
ment, against slippage from recognition of potential signs of cosmic design to assertion of 
metaphysical certainties (about, for instance, corporeal, or spiritual, or ethereal, afterlife) based 
on those signs.  Such a prejudicing ‘hope’ – a debilitating urge to find scientific evidence for 
that which necessarily lies, or so he insisted, beyond the reach of scientific evidence – ‘has 
                                                
10  Tyndall, in his Address, found room to comment on the ‘ethic glow’ and ‘very noble strain of eloquence’ 
so unmistakable in these lines, while nonetheless critiquing their theistic implications (BA, p. 26). 
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prompted many speculations of natural historians, who would be ashamed to put it into 
words’ (‘What’, p. 226).   
Peter Guthrie Tait, Maxwell’s untiring correspondent, apparently felt few such scru-
ples.  Though J. D. North’s entry for Tait in the Dictionary of Scientific Biography makes no 
mention of it – yet another instance of the selective amnesia of the scientific community – he 
and his friend, Balfour Stewart, were perhaps best known in the 1870s for two popular works.  
They were The Unseen Universe (that so tempting target for Clifford’s invective), and its sequel, 
Paradoxical Philosophy (1878).  Both deployed concepts from physics – energy conservation, the 
permeability of the ether – in defence of some, to modern sensibilities, curious speculations 
concerning the perfect and eternal ‘durability’ of the human soul.  The scope of such inquiries, 
as explained in Paradoxical Philosophy, was justified on the grounds that ‘the only result of 
drawing a hard and fast line between the natural and the revealed has been to divide us into 
two separate and seemingly hostile camps, the one under the banner of science and the other 
under that of religion’ (p. 33).   
The Unseen Universe, in particular, despite its potentially impervious subject matter, was 
to prove a sensation, going through numerous re-printings (fourteen editions in thirteen years 
[G. Myers, ‘Nineteenth’, p. 55]), as nervous Victorians found solace in its vision of harmony 
between personal immortality and the transience decreed by atomistic and thermodynamic 
science.  The authors aspired for more, however, beyond comfort-giving; as P. M. Heimann 
has observed:  ‘Though the Unseen Universe can be regarded as a popularization of science for 
an ideological purpose, it was intended as a contribution to the philosophy of nature’ (p. 73). 
In fact, an assortment of contemporary thinkers attempted an array of comparable 
projects, at once psychologically resuscitative and theoretically aware.  Like The Unseen Uni-
verse’s authors – searching amid entropic ruin, amid the waste of lives and worlds, for spiritual 
redemption – each typically discovered at least redemption’s vague promise, a hope cheering 
if equivocal.  A few even undertook multiple such ‘quests’, returning diverse travelogues:  not 
least, Tait himself.  He, fifteen years prior, had co-authored, with William Thomson, an article 
on thermodynamics for Good Words.  A text far more explicitly Christian than The Unseen 
Universe, it was unambiguous in making apparent to a theologically and culturally conservative 
readership the ‘synergism’ between cosmological narrative and Biblical apocalypse, directly 
relating guttering ‘heat death’ to the cleansing of Genesis’s primordial flood.  The dead 
cosmos of distant futurity, as the authors dutifully explain, is doomed to endless mouldering in 
‘chaos and darkness as “in the beginning.”  But before this consummation can be attained, in 
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the matter of our solar system, there must be tremendous throes and convulsions, destroying 
every now existing form’ (p. 606).   
Transcendental geometer C. H. Hinton, in his extraordinary allegory ‘The Persian 
King’ (1886), likewise found in the thermodynamic arrow of time an unwavering pointer to 
celestial Providence.  The tale provides a convoluted parable in which an invisible, magnani-
mous and (effectively) omnipotent monarch is able to goad his unwitting subjects from inactiv-
ity by making certain actions ‘feel’ more pleasurable than certain other actions.  To it is 
appended Hinton’s moral – and inductive – justification:  ‘They [the subjects] might have 
reasoned. […]  [The] universal condition of anything happening must be the cause.  Energy 
goes from a higher to a lower level.  That which causes the difference of level is the cause, and 
the cause of the difference of level must be that which accompanies such a transference of 
energy from a higher to a lower level’ (p. 126).  Thus is God, Mover of Aquinian scholasticism, 
discovered.  He is found in the day-to-day, peeking out from – and furiously pulling levers 
behind – the now-translucent ‘curtain’ of thermodynamic directionality.  He seems a material-
ist’s Wizard of Oz. 
If anything, though, The Unseen Universe’s synthesis, the era’s most valiant and persua-
sive attempt at salvaging a fiction of meaning from otherwise implacable physical precepts, 
went further than either Tait and Thomson’s article or Hinton’s entropic fable, dragooning 
poetry along with religious prophecy in support.  (Few peers had unmitigated sympathy with 
this approach, but it seemed ‘correct enough’ to many.)  In the course of just the epigraphs for 
seven chapters, Stewart and Tait quote The Tempest (Prospero’s ubiquitous soliloquy on ‘[…] 
this insubstantial pageant, faded, / Leav[ing] not a rack behind’ [IV.i.155 - 56]), Thomas 
Campbell’s ‘The Last Man’, Virgil, Milton’s Paradise Lost, Pascal, Plato’s Phaedo, Tennyson (In 
Memoriam, more than once), Pope’s Essay on Man, St Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, Macbeth, and 
– for purposes, one imagines, of a kind of spiritual compendiousness – that codification of 
ancient Judaic oral tradition known as the Mishna, Pirke Abot.  This is in addition to all the inset 
quotations and allusions evident in the text proper, which – alongside scores of explicit Scrip-
tural references and metaphoric parallelisms – include citation of further works by such major, 
and heterodox, figures as Byron, Lucretius, Matthew Arnold, John Stuart Mill, Pope again 
(‘The Dying Christian to his Soul’), Plato again (the Gorgias).  And, bestrewn among all these, a 
variety of more ephemeral – or, perhaps, more ‘irremediably Victorian’ – personages:  Henry 
Baker and James Montgomery, James Martineau and the Rev. Charles Parsons Reichel, B.D.  
Pilgrim’s Progress makes an appearance on the verso of the title page, right beneath a few lines 
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from Hadrian.   
As ‘science’, the text – subtitled Physical Speculations on a Future State – feels at once accu-
rate and wilfully misleading, an appraisal not exclusively modern.   
Inside, official-sounding phrases, communal terminologies, and a hotchpotch of both 
overtly and subliminally ‘Christian’ sayings and literary extracts are intermixed.  This is done 
in a manner which would, among other things, have appealed to prejudices, post-Belfast 
Address – Scots algebraist Alex Macfarlane deadpanned, in a 1901 lecture:  ‘[I]t is certainly 
remarkable to find in the same book a discussion of Carnot’s heat-engine and extensive 
quotations from the apostles and prophets’ (p. 90).  The authors piggyback on the writings of 
such ‘precursors’, borrowing cachet, assimilating presumptions.  They reject ‘any attempt to 
separate the natural from the miraculous’ (Heimann, p. 75), and assign to the ‘unseen’ a role 
not incongruous with that of the Holy Spirit (the existence of such an underhanded corre-
spondence was one of Clifford’s chief complaints).  The materialists’ presupposition of conti-
nuity of energy and law becomes rather a statement, for them, of the continuity of intelligence, 
of human personality liberated from the corpse-coffin of matter, made undulatory, and set 
adrift amid waves of ether.  So is that individual rendered, for practical purposes, undying.     
The Unseen Universe, accordingly, ends with an accounting of jovial congruence, the 
overlapping of thermodynamic with New Testament revelation: 
 
If then we regard the universe from this point of view we are led to a scientific conception of it 
which is […] strikingly analogous to that system with which we are presented in the Christian religion.  
For not only are the nebulous beginning and fiery termination of the present visible universe indicated 
in the Christian records, but a constitution and power are assigned to the Unseen Universe strikingly 
analogous to those at which we may arrive by a legitimate scientific process.  (p. 210) 
 
Entropy, in such a reckoning, becomes a means to both an end, and an ending, a gateway 
rather than gallows; thermodynamics, a way of at once ordering the visible universe and 
stocking Stewart and Tait’s purported invisible one.  ‘In other words’, they explain, ‘the 
tendency of heat is towards equalisation; heat is par excellence the communist of our universe, 
and it will no doubt ultimately bring the system to an end’ (pp. 90 - 91).  As Greg Myers has 
observed, the ‘reference to a communist, four years after the fall of the Paris commune, would 
have carried a specific meaning for Stewart’s and Tait’s readers.  The social order and the 
cosmic, the end of the universe and the end of capitalism, are conflated’ (‘Nineteenth’, p. 57).  
Yet this collapsing of merged economic and physical organisations ushers in the emergence 
not of nothingness, nor of chaos, but instead a better organisation, one reified in the ether, 
made incontrovertibly eternal yet somehow preserving the priceless ‘currency’ of ontological 
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distinctiveness.  
Though The Guardian, for one, had described The Unseen Universe as ‘a perfectly sober 
inquiry, on scientific grounds, into the possibilities of a future existence’ (qtd. in ‘Macmillan’, 
p. 17), Maxwell himself remained rather less convinced.  He frequently chastened his col-
league, in both epistolary and an assortment of discursive contexts, for holding such unsup-
portable – and, to his mind, irresponsible – beliefs.  He ended the otherwise laudatory verse 
ode ‘Report on Tait’s Lecture’ with a joke playing on Tait’s assertions about the destiny of 
matter:  ‘While you, brave Tait! who know so well the way / Forces to scatter, / Calmly await 
the slow but sure decay, / Even of matter’ (p. 648).  Of course, Maxwell, convinced of its 
absolute permanence, believed atomic matter altogether incapable of any sort of decay.  On 7 
September 1878, upon hearing news of the planned publication of Paradoxical Philosophy, a 
collection of further ‘hymns’ to a posthumous ethereal existence, Maxwell wrote a letter to 
Tait.  In it, he commented (riffing on The Unseen Universe’s concept of ‘spiritual evolution’) that 
it ‘is said in Nature that UU is germinating into some higher form.  If you think of extending 
the collection of hymns given in the original work, do not forget to insert “How happy could I 
be with ether”’.  (‘How happy could I be with either’ – melody:  ‘Have you heard of a frolicsome 
ditty’ – is a philander’s lament sung by Macheath in Gay’s Beggar’s Opera [p. 53; II.xiii], perhaps 
Maxwell’s comment on Tait attempting to ‘have it both ways’ with a ‘scientised’ Christianity.)   
In a subsequent review of the book for Nature, he observed, in tones imbued with the 
full weight of the serial’s editorial voice:  ‘On opening this book, the general appearance of the 
pages, and some of the phrases on which we happened to light made us somewhat doubtful 
whether it lay within our jurisdiction, as it is not the practice of NATURE to review either 
novels or theological works’ (‘Paradoxical’, p. 141).  He was to dedicate the remainder of the 
article, unsurprisingly, to analysis of the scientific non sequiturs and lapses in logic present in 
many, perhaps most, of Paradoxical Philosophy’s conceptually misguided, if unquestionably 
earnest, crypto-pagan imprecations.  Maxwell, however, could hardly resist using the platform 
of a formal review in Nature (especially given its topic) to elaborate on his own beliefs about 
what ‘science has to say about the soul’:  ‘The progress of science […]’, he concluded, ‘has 
added nothing of importance to what has always been known about the physical consequences 
of death, but has tended rather to deepen the distinction between the visible part, which 
perishes before our eyes, and that which we are […]’ (p. 143).  In effect, Maxwell suggests 
looking inward, towards Revelation and the boggling perplexities of self-consciousness, rather 
than outward, at the relative mundanity (in all its senses) of entropic convulsion and energy 
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conservation; for, in so doing, we might find authentic guarantees – avatars, even – of post-
mortem continuance.   
As Theodore Porter has noted, in Maxwell’s view, ‘[b]oth science and religion […] 
needed to be protected from mistaken claims of their incompatibility’ (p. 79); evidently, 
though, they required also vigilant defending from hyper-unificationism, epitomised in Tait 
and Stewart. 
 Hermann Stoffkraft (such a surname conjoining the two halves of Büchner’s – and 
nineteenth-century scientific naturalism’s – cosmology:  Stoff, ‘matter’; Kraft, ‘energy’) is the 
pivotal character in Paradoxical Philosophy, a Teutonic rationalist embodying the doctrines of 
materialism, and who, appropriately, voices a litany of objections to the metaphysical argu-
ments offered therein.  Yet, as Maxwell chides in his review, he ‘makes it his chief care to 
brandish his materialistic weapons as not to hurt the feelings of his friends […]’ (‘Paradoxical’, 
p. 141).  Indeed, Stoffkraft’s defence of materialism is so attenuated that, by book’s end, he has 
fully embraced the peculiar beliefs about immortality held by the several members of the so-
called Paradoxical Society.  To him Maxwell dedicated his poem ‘To Hermann Stoffkraft, 
Ph.D., the Hero of a recent work called “Paradoxical Philosophy”’.  Maxwell’s decision to, as 
it were, ‘redistribute’ responsibility for the work’s content – a move suggested by the poem’s 
title – from its two authors to Stoffkraft himself can perhaps be explained by a letter, ostensibly 
written by the fictitious character, which appeared in Nature not long after the volume’s 
publication.  ‘There are […] strong scientific analogies’, the missive’s ‘Hermann Stoffcraft’ insists, 
‘which lead us [the members of the Paradoxical?] to believe that the thinkable antecedent of 
the present [cosmological] system was a spiritual unseen, which not only developed but which 
now sustains the present order’.11 
Maxwell’s ‘To Hermann Stoffkraft’ opens with an evocation of a human soul envi-
sioned in terms of entangled atomic vortices, Maxwell’s preferred model for atomic structure, 
derived from Helmholtz and Thomson, a model in which mysterious forces need not be 
introduced to account for emission and absorption spectra, the apparent profusion of chemical 
elements, the interlinking of atoms into molecules and compounds, and so forth.  The ‘vortex 
atom’, he explained elsewhere, is ‘qualitatively permanent, as regards its volume and its 
strength, – two independent quantities.  It is also qualitatively permanent as regards its degree 
                                                
11  Incidentally, though ‘Stoffkraft’s’ communiqué could have been penned by Tait or Stewart, it seems so 
deliriously narcissistic – sample argument:  ‘Is it therefore necessary that I should in like manner help to sustain 
some inferior universe?’ – that I am fairly sure it was submitted by some satirist, perhaps Maxwell himself. 
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of implication, whether “knottedness” on itself or “linkedness” with other vortex rings’ 
(‘Atom’, p. 202).  (Clifford liked the concept too, praising such atoms as, ‘if […] not the 
foundation of the final theory of matter, […] at least imperishable stones in the tower of 
dynamical science’ [‘Unseen’, p. 784].)  ‘My soul is an entangled knot, / Upon a liquid vortex 
wrought / By Intellect, in the Unseen residing’, ‘To Hermann Stoffkraft’ begins (pp. 649 - 50), 
rehearsing, in vortex vernacular, just the sort of description ubiquitous throughout Paradoxical 
Philosophy and, earlier, The Unseen Universe. 
Such lines hint at the element in the speculations of Stewart and Tait to which their 
author took the gravest exception.  Maxwell, a rational empiricist, presumed the ether to be 
an entity comprehensible to science, potentially a quantifiable substance obeying discoverable 
rules, knowable if not yet fully known.  ‘If aether is molecules’, he reasoned in manuscript 




1000  or   
! 
1
1000000  [in size] of those of hydrogen, the aether is a gas 
tending to equality of temperature with other bodies […]’ (‘Notes’).  For Maxwell, the ether 
was a thing, and, as a thing, the ether was of this world.  And, as something of this world, it 
seemed a dreadfully unsuitable destination for the human soul, something Maxwell believed 
profoundly immaterial, intrinsically unworldly.  We are thus meant to interpret the following 
lines of his ode with suspicion: 
 
Till in the twilight of the gods, 
When sun and earth are frozen clods, 
When, all its energy degraded, 
Matter to æther shall have faded; 
We, that is, all the work we’ve done, 
As waves in æther shall forever run 
 In ever-widening spheres through heavens beyond the sun. (p. 650) 
 
Now, it is evident that Maxwell did not really mean any of this – such a rhapsody, in effect, 
merely describes the Götterdämmerung of Stewart and Tait’s post-conversion Stoffkraft.  Max-
well, with his well-documented ardour for the principle of molecular incorruptibility, thought 
the idea of matter degrading to ether – of matter, in truth, degrading to anything, given his 
generation’s unfamiliarity with radioactive decay – ludicrous, borderline nonsensical.  His 
unshakeable insistence that the physical world was incapable of ‘assembling’ the human soul – 
‘atoms’, he once quipped, ‘are a very tough lot, and can stand a great deal of knocking about, 
and it is strange to find a number of them combining to form a man of feeling’ (qtd. in LJCM, 
p. 391) – has as its logical corollary the contrary supposition:  that the same physical world 
(irrespective of ‘paradoxical’ properties) is equally incompetent to effect the soul’s disassembly, 
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facilitating individual personality’s energetic preservation.   
 Many years after its drafting, Maxwell affixed an alternative title, ‘Does the existence 
of Causal Chains prove an Astral Entity or a Cosmothetic Idealism?’, to his undergraduate 
piece ‘What is the Nature of Evidence of Design?’ (LJCM, p. 226n1).  This alteration points 
once more to Maxwell’s continued concern with unjustified inference from tokens of continu-
ity in the universe – the conservation of force, and so on – to a belief that, consequently, 
human spirit itself is regulated by analytical laws, demonstrating corresponding complexities.  
The final stanza of ‘To Hermann Stoffkraft’ – understood as dramatic monologue, rather than 
Maxwellian volte-face – is written from the perspective of an individual altogether secure in 
such a fallacious hypothesis.  It is, however, a hypothesis which would be called immediately 
into doubt by any evidence suggesting that causality isn’t inviolate, that energy isn’t conserved.  
And, thus, Maxwell (or, more accurately, his poetic alter-ego, a stand-in for Stoffkraft or, 
perhaps, some ordinary member of the Paradoxical) implores:  ‘Oh never may direct Creation 
/ Break in upon my contemplation; / Still may thy causal chain, ascending, / Appear unbro-
ken and unending’ (p. 651).   
There is a bit of truth in these lines for anyone, of course:  sceptic or spiritualist, 
Hermann Helmholtz or Hermann Stoffkraft.  A scientist like Maxwell depended – perhaps 
even more so than those characters in Paradoxical Philosophy – upon causality, upon regularities 
in natural law, upon inviolable conservation principles.  But, for him, such considerations 
provided not evidence for posthumous continuation (in any sort of strange or ethereal form, 
like resonances in Stewart and Tait’s ‘unseen’), but rather further confirmation of his long-
held belief that, as he wrote in a buoyant little ditty, the ‘end that we live for is single /’ – the 
glorification of God – ‘But we labour not therefore alone, / For together we feel how by wheel 
within wheel, / We are helped by a force not our own’ (‘Tune’, p. 697).   
The entirety of ‘To Hermann Stoffkraft’, in other words, is parodic, written in mock 
celebration of another theoretician’s personal beliefs, beliefs with which Maxwell passionately 
disagreed.  It was perhaps the fact that the ‘other theoretician’ in question was his treasured 
friend P. G. Tait that caused the scientist to soften, even mask, the exuberance of the work’s 
satire, though, it must be said, Maxwell’s humour was frequently at once both subtle and self-
effacing, and many of his poems (not merely this one) disguise beneath their superficial placid-
ity a kicking wit.  Tait himself would later note as much.  In an overview of Maxwell’s publica-
tions and research interests (published in Nature not long after the scientist’s death), he found 
room to comment, if hyperbolically, both on the felicity of Maxwell’s poetic skills and the 
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ferocity of his satiric ones.  ‘No living man’, he explained, ‘has shown a greater power of 
condensing the whole marrow of a question into a few clear and compact sentences than 
Maxwell shows in these verses.  Always having a definite object, they often veiled the keenest 
satire under an air of charming innocence and naïve admiration’ (‘Clerk-Maxwell’s’, p. 321). 
 
IN DEFENCE OF ‘SCIENTIFIC’ POETRY 
 
In his preface to The Oxford Book of Victorian Verse (1912), the ubiquitous ‘Q’, Arthur Quiller-
Couch, ever mindful of his formidable responsibilities as a selector and arbiter of popular 
taste, remarked that there were some among his contemporaries who believed that ‘the 
anthologist does his best service in recapturing fugitive, half-forgotten poems – frail things that 
by one chance or another cheated of their day have passed down to Limbo’ (p. vii).  He, 
however, never found such an occupation profitable.  Instead, Quiller-Couch insisted that 
intrinsic worth (as he judged it!) should be the sole criterion for a given work’s inclusion.   
Few indeed of the ‘scientific’ or occasional poems addressed in this dissertation would 
have survived – or even risked – passage through such an uncompromising sieve.  Yet many of 
them provide intriguing documentation of a wide range of cultural anxieties, both in the 
scientific sphere and in that of mid-Victorian society at large.  This being granted, it would, of 
course, be disingenuous to argue that these verses, considered as a group, constitute a signifi-
cant artistic achievement in the same sense that, say, those of Tennyson constitute a significant 
artistic achievement; at the same time, it would also be to do them a tremendous disservice not 
to concede that several of their number, if not indisputably high art, must nonetheless be 
considered of high merit.  It is, however, merit of a peculiar sort, as it often seems to arise less 
from conventional literariness and more from each individual poem’s curious cultural location 
somewhere between lecture and literature, scientific explanation and (perhaps dubious) moral, 
aesthetic or philosophical expostulation.  
 James Najarian, querying the idea of ‘minorness’ in Victorian verse, wonders:  ‘[W]hy 
[minor] poets access the modes they do – what were these poets reading, and how were they 
reading in order to form their subjectivities and express them in that most literary of forms, 
poetry, in ways that were (deliberately?) outwardly lacking originality?’ (p. 573).  These issues 
are central, whether analysing William McGonagall’s verse or James Clerk Maxwell’s.   
 But ‘scientific’ poems pose scientific questions too, and must be interrogated as both 
informing and, concurrently, being informed by non-literary arenas.  Certainly, they must be 
- 99 - 
read with the milieu of the mid-century in mind, a space of lectures and laboratories, profes-
sional alliances and scandalously public disputes.  But they must also be read in the context of 
normal paradigms, and a scientist’s own theories and suppositions about the nature, govern-
ance and description of the physical world.  (Sometimes in the context, too, of the unfamiliar 
or challenging minutiae of those theories and suppositions.)  Maxwell’s ‘To the Committee of 
the Cayley Portrait Fund’, for instance, addressed to certain Fellows of Trinity College, 
Cambridge, presupposes a range of specialist literacies.  An encomium in form and flavour, its 
author animates conceptual entities associated with Arthur Cayley, a pure mathematician who 
during the course of his career both formalised matrix algebra and elaborated the theory of 
quarternions (though always one to remain sceptical about their practical benefit, he eventu-
ally contributed an analytical chapter to the 3rd [1890] edition of Tait’s Elementary Treatise on 
Quarternions).  Accordingly, phalanxes of noughts and ones, and some stranger numbers, are 
marshalled by Maxwell in homage, arrayed into the ranks and files of rectilinear algebraic 
matrices:  ‘First, ye Determinants!  In ordered row / And massive column ranged, before him 
go’.   Next, the poet commands, ‘Ye powers of the nth roots of -1! / Around his head in cease-
less cycles run, / As unembodied spirits of direction’.  The final reference is at once punning 
and arcane:  the (imaginary) roots of negative one not only form the basis of complex analysis, 
but also its mid-century generalisation, quarternion algebra; in that ‘hypercomplex’ system, 
the non-real components of each quaternion 4-tuple – as suggested by the curious phrase 
‘unembodied spirits of direction’ (‘unembodied’ since imaginary) – are deemed to represent 
three-dimensional extension.  Moreover, delightfully, iterated powers of the square root of 
negative one do in fact ‘in ceaseless cycles run’ – the scientist’s playful literalisation of a tricky 
mathematical concept – as every fourth power of i is taken to equal itself:    
! 
in = i ( n+4 ).   
The vitality of such connectedness, such tight enmeshing of poetic word with personal 
world, in textual artefacts of this sort must be kept constantly in mind if one is to avoid the sort 
of honest misreading proffered for ‘To Hermann Stoffkraft’ – admittedly one of Maxwell’s 
more cryptic efforts – by twentieth-century physicist J. J. Thomson.  Of that poem’s conclud-
ing stanza Thomson wrote:  ‘It has some lines which are a remarkable anticipation of the 
speculations which are now [circa 1931] so common about the destiny of matter and energy’ 
(p. 5). 
These rhapsodic ‘speculations’ of Maxwell, however, are only to be taken seriously, as 
I have argued, in so much as they predict the condition of the universe in the far downstream: 
without potential, paralysed by entropy.  They say nothing, except by indirection, of Max-
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well’s own beliefs about the ‘fate’ of molecules condemned eternally to wander such a sepul-
chral domain.  As with In Memoriam’s prescient ‘evolutionism’, then, the seemingly ‘forward-
thinking’ aspects singled out by Thomson in ‘To Hermann Stoffkraft’ are actually responses to 
– even critiques of – pre-existing theory, not prophecy at all. 
 Of such ‘poetic’ works by mid-Victorian scientific thinkers some are, of course, 
ephemeral.  Others, even in view of the most blindly charitable of critical appraisals, of an at 
best debatable degree of either literary or socio-historical merit.  A very small number indeed 
are both these things.  Take this ‘inverted doxology’ proposed by Clifford; it is preserved in 
Edward Carpenter’s My Days and Dreams (1914), a curmudgeonly memoir.  In a description of 
his days at Cambridge, Carpenter, later a fully ordained minister but then an idealistic young 
curate nonetheless far from averse to mixing with a crowd of freethinkers often less than 
sympathetic towards his chosen vocation, recalls that Clifford would preside over gatherings of 
an informal colloquium devoted to discussion of literature, theology (or, as was more likely, its 
immediate, wholesale abolition), sexual and domestic politics, and other topics of pressing 
intellectual interest.  Clifford, he tells us, ‘was a kind of Socratic presiding genius at these 
meetings – with his Satyr-like face, tender heart, wonderfully suggestive, paradoxical manner 
of conversation, and blasphemous treatment of the existing gods’ (p. 60), a man who appar-
ently delighted in his own self-consciously scandalous declarations of radical religious unbelief: 
 
O Father, Son and Holy Ghost – 
We wonder which we hate the most. 
Be Hell, which they prepared before, 
Their dwelling now and evermore! (qtd. in Carpenter, p. 60) 
 
This is crude, of course – indeed its generic baseness was part of its design, composed as it was 
to shock and startle a Cambridge which only in 1871 relaxed its statues concerning religious 
affiliation and the taking of Holy Orders by Senior Members, mocking the seeming simplicity 
of officially mandated spiritual declarations by the making of an equally facile counterclaim.  
However, aside from a brief glimpse into the author’s iconoclastic personality proffered by the 
daring novelty of its form, the piece adds little to our knowledge of either Clifford the man or 
the sort of scientific rationality he represented. 
 He was, after all, in no one’s estimation a closet atheist.  In that extended review, for 
instance, of The Unseen Universe, he addresses the work’s authors as deluded, if not yet quite 
beyond redemption, comrades in science, even while denigrating their juvenile and, he hints, 
unwholesomely atavistic hankering after an effectively repugnant system of Christian belief:  
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‘That which you keep in your hearts, my brothers’, he explains, ‘is the slender remnant of a 
system which has made its red mark on history, and which still lives to threaten mankind’.  
(This was a radical tactic:  contrast the extremity of Clifford’s stance with Tyndall’s respectful 
re-channelling and reworking, rather than comprehensive renunciation, of those same drives 
in the bulk of his own philosophy.)  A few sentences earlier Clifford had gone so far as to 
characterise the theological predisposition seemingly inherent in humankind as little more 
than the ‘sickly dreams of hysterical women and half-starved men […]’ (‘Unseen’, p. 793). 
Adrian Desmond points out, in his biography of T. H. Huxley, that even John Morley, liberal 
editor of The Fortnightly and redoubtable advocate for many authors of unconventional or 
unpopular stripe, had more than once had ‘his fingers burnt’ over his – and his serial’s – 
continued advocacy of W. K. Clifford (p. 466).  Not all Victorians, it seems, were eager to 
tolerate the scientist’s habitually wild-eyed diatribes against both organised religion in general 
and Protestant Christianity in particular.  (That’s not to say that some didn’t find such anti-
theological diatribes endearing – or energising, for that matter.  ‘[M]y great social success of 
the period [the mid-1870s], not now to be sniffed at, was gained by outdoing poor Clifford in 
a contest of schoolboy blasphemy’, so Robert Louis Stevenson once reminisced of his years of 
literary apprenticeship among the radicals and positivists of London [qtd. in Reid, p. 266].) 
By contrast, a poem Clifford addressed to Lucy – his wife, and a woman who was, af-
ter his early death, to become a prominent author in her own right, though one sometimes 
prone to decidedly ‘un-Cliffordian’ bursts of sentiment – seems at once to provide humanising 
biographical insight while simultaneously deepening our appreciation for the thoroughness of the 
scientist’s materialism. 
It begins with a familiar motif, a likening of death to the end of summer:  ‘The summer 
dies out, sun by sun; / The lily droops to the ground and dies; / Dies, but the root in the 
ground lives on. / That shall one day rise’ (qtd. in SSC, pp. 36 - 37).  The manoeuvre is 
Whitman-esque, even as it describes with admirable rectitude the processes of organic degen-
eration and biological rejuvenation.  His prophecy of resurrection, however, is wholly natural, 
not theological, and, as extended in the following lines, becomes a metaphor associating his 
own mortality with his ‘deified’ wife, perceived as transcendent, but in an earthly way: 
 
Is it thus with me, O sun of my days? 
Shall death lay hold on me, after you, 
Till you shine again, and the fresh warm rays 
Revive me too? 
The old tales tell of a soul of things, 
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How earth and sky are made of his breath, 
How in one man’s flesh he folded his wings 
And died the death. (qtd. in SSC, p. 37) 
 
The Christian narrative (one of those ‘old tales’) is referenced (the Incarnation figured as a 
stilling of divine motility, a ‘fold[ing] of wings’), and then dismissed.  Clifford, in its place, 
substitutes a seventeenth-century conceit, with his whole mental world (and its phenomenal 
manifestations of externality) attributed to a personal and loving monism:  ‘All my world is of 
one love made; / Earth and sky are the limbs thereof; / Life and death are its life and shade, / 
And the soul is love’.  This seems a far more considered and ‘positive’ paganism than that 
encountered in the quatrain preserved by Carpenter, though, of course, it remains equally 
dismissive of theological conviction.12   
Similarly, we gain a far more substantive insight into the social ideology of the scientist 
through an entry in one of his later Cambridge notebooks.  Though not in verse, it apes the 
form’s density, seeming a quasi-Swinburnian paean to scientific – and, implicitly, political – 
revolution, a song to a rationalistic sunrise.  (Pollock, with evident disdain, dubbed the affair 
‘half-poetical’ [p. 37]).  Within, we encounter Clifford grappling with issues raised by the 
spectre of materialism; we note as well the atheistic bluster of his public pronouncements (and 
persona) muted, even as we observe both an explanation of, and a justification for, his vision of 
a post-theological, empirically based humanism, one seemingly at once far more rigorous and 
far more reasoned than most of the kindred lines of argument lurking elsewhere among his 
published essays and reviews.  All by way of a lengthy prose meditation on that celebrated – 
and widely circulated, in a dizzying variety of Victorian literary and cultural contexts – 
injunction prefacing William Blake’s ‘Auguries of Innocence’:  ‘To see a world in a grain of 
sand / And a heaven in a wild flower, / Hold infinity in the palm of your hand / And eternity 
in an hour’ (p. 589; ll. 1 - 4).  Clifford’s opening sentence seems a masterpiece of pragmatic 
understatement (language or bicycle), just the kind of thing we might expect to hear from such 
a practically minded individual; thereafter, though, we are exposed to something new: 
 
Whosoever has learnt either a language or the bicycle can testify to the wonderful sudden step from 
troublesome acquirement to the mastery of new powers, whose mere exercise is delightful, while it 
multiples at once the intensity and objects of our pleasures.  This, I say, is especially and exceptionally 
true of the pleasures of perception.  Every time that analysis strips from nature the gilding that we 
                                                
12  It is fascinating to compare Clifford’s effort with an (equally touching) poem Maxwell dedicated to his 
own wife; his work, however, makes embodied love entirely subservient, and approximate, to divine blessing:  
‘Strengthen our love, O Lord, that we / May in Thine own great love believe / And, opening all our soul to 
Thee, / May Thy free gift receive’ ([‘Wife’], p. 609).  
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prized, she is forging thereout a new picture more glorious than before, to be suddenly revealed by the 
advent of a new sense whereby we see it – a new creation, at sight of which the sons of God shall have 
cause to shout for joy. 
 What now shall I say of this new-grown perception of Law, which finds the infinite in a speck of 
dust, and the acts of eternity in every second of time?  Why, that it kills our sense of the beautiful, and 
takes all the romance out of nature.  And moreover that it is nothing more than a combining and re-
organizing of our old experiences, never can give us anything really new, must progress in the same 
monotonous way for ever.  But wait a moment.  What if this combining and organizing is first to 
become habitual, then organic and unconscious, so that the sense of law becomes a direct perception?  
Shall we not then be really seeing something new?  Shall there not be a new revelation of a great and 
more perfect cosmos, a universe fresh-born, a new heaven and a new earth?  Mors janua vitæ; by death 
to this world we enter upon a new life in the next.  A new Elysium opens to our eager feet, through 
whose wide fields we shall run with glee, stopping only to stare with delight and cry, “See there, how 
beautiful!” […].  (qtd. in Pollock, pp. 36 - 37) 
 
Mors janua vitæ:  ‘Death is the door to life’.   
But not bodily death, of course – death rather to preconceived notions of natural or-
der, the abandonment of worthless, though bedazzling, gilding formerly prized or deemed in 
some fashion precious to us.  As in ‘The Unseen Universe’, Clifford’s language is again 
grounded in that of the King James Version, as he proposes a secular sacredness to both 
painstaking experimentation and subsequent entheorisation, processes, in his worldview, often 
profoundly, irreversibly transformative of souls and civilisations alike.  Compare, for example, 
the celestial city, the New Jerusalem, so vividly prophesised in the final chapter of the Book of 
Revelation:  ‘And he [the angel] showed me a pure river of water of life, clear as crystal, 
proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb.  In the midst of the street of it, and on 
either side of the river, was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded 
her fruit every month:  and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of nations’ (22: 1 - 2).  It is 
science, however, Clifford intimates, not theology, that promises to make real, in a manner of 
speaking, St John’s extraordinary vision, that will provide us with entry into a ‘great[er] and 
more perfect cosmos, a universe fresh-born, a new heaven and a new earth’, even as it will be 
the texts of that science (Darwin’s Origin, Spencer’s First Principles, Maxwell’s Treatise, along 
with countless other germinal works as yet unwritten, though dimly foreseen) that will be as 
sacred documents heralding liberation, the books – written by several authors and on sundry 
topics – of a scientific, secularised and defiantly humanised ‘Newer Testament’.  It will be they 
that will provide duly faithful and open-minded readers with tantalising glimpses of better 
worlds still to come, of ‘new revelation[s]’ as yet unimagined (and as yet unimaginable, as we 
are not yet endowed with cognitive faculties adequate to their perception); it will be they that 
will serve to unlock for us – or the Victorians – the gates to paradises renewed and revivified. 
 But while the Christian heaven is a markedly static place, a Tennysonian lotus-land, 
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free of struggle and strife and (reciprocally, it must be remembered) either mental attainment 
or any teleology of ethical or personal progression, where the Blessed for all eternity content 
themselves in the glorification and sight of the Lord, William Kingdon Clifford’s is most 
assuredly not.  St John in Revelation 22 figuratively brings the Bible full-circle, back once 
more to Genesis, to verdant, luxurious Eden with its blossoming ‘tree of life’.  Clifford’s 
revelation, by contrast, his own characteristic depiction of a utopian future for ennobled and 
enlightened man, is pro-, not retrogressive, and from it further revelations can – and must – be 
achieved.  Moreover, it is entirely of this life, not the next; entirely of this earth, not some 
further realm, at once unattainable and logically incomprehensible.  Carlyle, too, had earlier 
in the century secularised this forceful conceit; of a sudden spiritual resurgence Teufelsdröckh, 
repurposing Revelation 21: 1, declaims:  ‘[T]he heavy dreams rolled gradually away, and I 
awoke to a new Heaven and a new Earth’ (Sartor, p. 142).  Likewise is Clifford’s paradise a 
local one, at least potentially, not situated somewhere paradoxically beyond space or the 
grasping reach of time.   
Presaging Kuhnian epistemology’s notorious notion of a ‘paradigm shift’ – in conse-
quence of which it ‘is rather as if the professional [scientific] community had been suddenly 
transported to another planet where familiar objects are seen in a different light and are joined 
by unfamiliar ones as well’ (Kuhn, p. 111) – Clifford’s ecstatic vision of novel worlds without 
end would seem also to suggest that each would appear effectively incommensurable to those 
that dwelt in the previous, like ‘a new picture more glorious than before, to be suddenly 
revealed by the advent of a new sense whereby we see it’.  And as the Bible’s New Jerusalem 
brings about ‘the healing of nations’, so, also, will science’s, Clifford explains, if coupled with a 
braveness and a stoicism in the face of mortality, echoing the ethical stance advocated by 
positivism.  Self-sacrifice will be necessary too, to maintain such a paradise, another point of 
agreement:  ‘He [Clifford] would not gauge the worth of human life […] by its degree of 
happiness, but with a touch of the ascetic bade men forego happiness as their goal in favour of 
tribal efficiency’, as James Sully wrote in ‘Scientific Optimism’, an article of 1881 (p. 579).  
(Harrison, in 1877, proclaimed a positive ‘religion, of which the creed shall be science; of 
which the Faith, Hope, Charity, shall be real, not transcendental, earthly, not heavenly – a 
religion, in a word, which is entirely human, in its evidences, in its purposes, in its sanctions 
and appeals’ [‘Modern’, p. 346].) 
Christianity is quietist, even selfish – ‘failings’ noted as much by Clifford as by 
Harrison (or, near contemporaneously, Friedrich Nietzsche).  As such, the scientist would have 
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humanity bound by terms set forth in one of the most atypical of all Wordsworthian odes, that 
to ‘Duty’, an allusive and at times despondent work in which the compunctions of that un-
compromising virtue are heard to resound in the poet’s consciousness as if echoing the very 
Voice of God: 
 
STERN Daughter of the Voice of God! 
O Duty! if that name thou love 
Who art a light to guide, a rod 
To check the erring, and reprove; 
Thou, who art victory and law 
When empty terrors overawe; 
From vain temptations dost set free; 
And calm’st the weary strife of frail humanity! (p. 385; ll. 1 - 8) 
 
Clifford quoted these lines in the early portions of his own elaborate ode to moral and human-
istic duty, the essay ‘Cosmic Emotion’ (p. 411).  And they suggest the dark side to his vision of 
distant, green lands revealed under the light of fresh-risen suns, of brave, new worlds ‘at sight 
of which the sons of God shall have cause to shout for joy’ (qtd. in Pollock, p. 36).  Nature (as 
much human as external), the poet observes in the opening stanza of his emphatic ‘Ode’, 
reveals to us – ‘weary’ representatives of a suddenly ‘frail humanity’ – ‘empty terrors’ which 
‘overawe’.  Later, in the same work, a troubled and doubting Wordsworth implores, asking 
humbly of ‘duty’ herself, that stern, though often mastering (for the mindful, it is ‘a rod / To 
check the erring’), personification of positivistic virtue:  ‘Give unto me, made lowly wise, / The 
spirit of self-sacrifice; / The confidence of reason give; / And in the light of truth thy Bond-
man let me live!’ (p. 386; ll. 53 - 56). 
 Such terrors, apprehensions and hopes are implicit in Clifford as well, and his meta-
physics vacillate, in mood and effect, between darkness and illumination, between a world 
‘progress[ing] in the same monotonous way for ever’, in which science ‘kills our sense of the 
beautiful, and takes all the romance out of nature’ (suggested as one possibility in the passage 
discussed above), and one in which an epiphanic, liberatory, ‘moralised’ science provides an 
ever-hopeful human race with a succession of cheering and alluring ‘new creation[s]’ of its 
various till-then benighted world-pictures, each one, he intimates, ‘more glorious than before’ 
(suggested as another – and, for the moment, favoured [qtd. in Pollock, pp. 37, 36]).  
But, surely, it would seem to be darkness, in the end, that predominates, as implicit in 
Clifford’s account of successive revelations is a belief as well in successive trying, even brutal, 
skirmishes to achieve them.  And his Ragnarök, the final thermodynamic doom prophesied in 
‘The First and Last Catastrophe’, remains unimaginably far ahead, with, as he would reso-
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lutely insist, no consummating assumption into Valhalla of the bold, the weary – or even the 
worthy – in its wake.  (Clifford, in bald précis, had ‘one very simple message – […] no God, 
no soul, no future life’, as W. H. Mallock put it [‘Late’, p. 487].)  There will be, in other words, 
no real, tangible reward for anyone, regardless of stature or the part for good or ill he or she 
may have played, in its terrible aftermath, as, by definition, ‘heat death’ – Clifford’s ‘last 
catastrophe’ – can have no aftermath.  In the meantime, then, the ‘final battle’ rages on, with 
momentary respites, perhaps, but those the exception, not the norm.  Such an eschatological 
scheme could hardly be more out of step with those posited by most Western faith-traditions. 
 For his, at base, is a nominally Darwinian view of things, in which struggle and ad-
vance represent the natural state of affairs – intellectually, socially, ethically, scientifically – 
and such a presumption, he insists, is one hardly to be contested.13  Cliffordian society, it 
seems, cannot afford to rest upon its laurels, though at least it, unlike the apparently aleatoric 
affairs of lower species, has a teleology – provided by science and tending, for now, towards 
the better.14  Nevertheless, as is made equally clear, even this general progressive tendency 
could, he fears, be countermanded by the stultifying demands of unreasoning piety.  ‘Take 
heed’, he wrote in his lengthy review of The Unseen Universe, warning his readers – by way of a 
confused horticultural analogy – against allowing in their own time any resurgence of sacerdo-
tal Christianity (‘that awful plague’) or, for that matter, some other equally debased form of 
‘non-scientific’ worship, ‘lest you give soil and shelter to the seed of that awful plague which 
has destroyed two civilisations, and but barely failed to slay such promise of good as is now 
struggling to live among men’ (p. 793).   
What, however, was the nature of the materialism – and the ‘Darwinism’ – he ranged 
against faith?  And was it in fact as ‘un-coddled’ as he liked to think?  
 
CLIFFORD’S ‘MIND-STUFF’:  THE IDEAL MATERIALISM? 
 
Clifford’s materialism was at once hard-headed and tender-hearted.  He was, as many have 
noted, an impassioned advocate of Darwinism – indeed, his initial departure from High 
                                                
13  As a sympathetic columnist at The Times observed, the fierceness of such conviction, coupled with sincere 
pedagogic aspirations, forbid Clifford from ‘rest[ing] content until he had made us taste with him the philosophy, 
the polity, the morality, and even the poetry of the new era [post-Origin of Species, post-Belfast Address, post-Songs 
Before Sunrise, post-First Principles, etc.]’ (‘Professor’, 22 October 1879). 
14  ‘[S]cientific thought’, Clifford (towing the positivistic line) told the assembled membership of the BAAS at 
Brighton late in the summer of 1872, ‘is not an accompaniment or condition of human progress, but human 
progress itself’ (‘Aims’, p. 512). 
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Church orthodoxy had come under the influence of The Origin and those writings of its earliest 
hermeneuticists.  Always a passionate evangelist for the causes of science, before his death 
from tuberculosis at thirty three he had plotted to recast his writings for the periodical press 
into a volume to be entitled The Creed of Science (Pollock, p. 71).   
 The appearance to him of evolutionary doctrine, in particular, had, as he described it, 
the radiance of an emergent revolutionary paradigm, a transfixing, even solar, providentiality 
about it; it represented, or so he argued, a disciplinary moment so singular as to justify what 
might have seemed to some of his contemporaries professional over-infatuation with the idea:  
‘When the sun is rising, we pay special attention to him and admire his glories […]’ (‘Cosmic’, 
p. 423).  Furthermore, ‘[h]e belonged’, Lightman explains in The Origins of Agnosticism, ‘to a 
circle of young men […] who looked to evolution for a new system of ethics which would 
combine the precision of the utilitarian with the poetical ideals of the transcendentalist’ (p. 
159).  Clifford’s natural philosophy had its quirks, too, evincing an analogous double focus, 
seeming at once unyielding and agnostic.  He, for instance, with an empiricist’s skepticism 
overruling a mathematician’s innate inclination towards abstraction and idealisation, always 
remained decidedly dubious about the validity of assertions concerning actions taking place 
‘forever’, ‘though all space’, ‘unchangeably’, ‘with exact precision’.  Similarly, he was never 
one to trust that lines in, say, absorption spectra were absolutely coincident from atom to 
atom; that each molecule of a given substance was, following on from Maxwell, not only 
experimentally, but actually, indistinguishable; that the laws of physics and chemistry were 
universally or eternally applicable.   
 These had been foundational precepts of the species of naturalism expounded by 
Tyndall, Huxley and others, where they had the status of dogma, almost beyond proof.  (F. W. 
H. Myers remarked in ‘Modern Poetry and the Meaning of Life’ – a spiritualistic shimmy 
becoming drolly apparent in his concluding prepositional phrase – that such overriding 
theoretical assumptions, ‘even if as yet but dimly and narrowly understood, may conceivably 
be valid for the whole universe, on all possible planes of being’ [p. 93].)  Clifford, by contrast, 
while granting local and limited validity to such concepts (atoms seem identical, or near 
enough; matched spectral lines can be reasonably assumed to possess equivalent frequencies; 
generalised physical laws can be used with broad certainty of correctness) – after all, Clifford 
knew, how else could science prosper and progress? – he found for them a pragmatic utility.  
In his periodical contributions, in defence of such a tendency towards epistemological conser-
vatism, he deployed arguments – and phrasings – of a jurisprudential circumspection.  Witness 
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this tiptoeing disclaimer, from ‘The Unseen Universe’:  ‘[T]he laws of motion and the conser-
vation of energy are very general propositions which are as nearly true as we can make out for 
gross bodies, and which, being tentatively applied to certain motions of molecules and the 
ether, are found to fit’ (p. 789). 
 ‘The figure of speech or of thought’, Maxwell pronounced in one presidential address, 
‘by which we transfer the language and ideas of a familiar science to one with which we are 
less acquainted may be called scientific metaphor’ (‘Section’, p. 422).  Clifford’s justification of 
psychophysical parallelism – in which he cites as evidence the linguistic theorisations of Müller 
and the physiological researches of Helmholtz – is based on a sense of equivalent complexity, 
suggesting (by way of one such metaphor) that  
 
A spoken sentence and the same sentence written are two utterly unlike things, but each of them 
consists of elements […].  Now the relation between the spoken sentence and its elements is very nearly 
the same as the relation between the written sentence and its elements.  There is a correspondence of 
element to element; although an elementary sound is quite a different thing from a letter of the 
alphabet […].  (‘Nature’, p. 61)  
 
So, too, he suggests, is there a mapping from consciousness ‘ejective’ to neural perturbation, 
linking cognitive functioning not only with the higher processes of language, but with verbal 
ghostings of self-awareness, utterances like ‘I am’.  Responding to those who, daunted by such 
prospects of material imbrication, fall back onto theological orthodoxy, denying any credibility 
to scientific theories enveloping thought in convolutions of neurobiology, he seems more 
exasperated than anything else:  ‘To say:  “Up to this point science can explain; here the soul 
steps in,” is not to say what is untrue, but to talk nonsense’, he insists (p. 60).   
 Moreover, he follows Tyndall in refusing subjectively, even invidiously, to demarcate 
vitality, or to stipulate absolute criteria for sentience; he writes of the precepts implicit in ‘his’ 
theory of mental evolution:  ‘For if that doctrine be true, we shall have along the line of the 
human pedigree a series of imperceptible steps connecting inorganic matter with ourselves.  
To the later members of that series we must undoubtedly ascribe consciousness, although it 
must, of course, have been simpler than our own.  But where are we to stop?’ (p. 64).  His 
question is rhetorical.  So he continues his investigation, discerning in base matter not only 
Tyndall’s ‘promise’ of terrestrial life, but, with greater force, its potency – even its kinship – 
too, discerning a glimmering, or the germ, of sentience, of higher Mind itself, all the way 
down.  In his article ‘On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves’, he heads the final section 
‘Mind-stuff is the reality which we perceive as Matter’, asserting in its second sentence that a ‘moving 
molecule of inorganic matter does not possess mind, or consciousness; but it possesses a small 
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Figure 4 - George Romanes, Mental Evolution:  A Lecture, p. 5. 
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piece of mind-stuff’ (p. 65).  Turner has noted that ‘Clifford’s mind-stuff was essentially an 
idealistic monism’ (‘Victorian’, p. 340); it provided an explanatory mechanism sidestepping all 
at once the mind-body problem, the question of the origin of awareness and vitality, and the 
paradox presented by the fact that matter (in the brain) can fabricate some conception of itself.  
As William James commented in Principles, Clifford’s insight had the deep virtue of allowing 
him to insist that, in his universe, ‘no new natures, no factors not present at the beginning, are 
introduced at any later stage’ (1: 149).   
 A more modern thinker like Arthur Eddington, in The Nature of the Physical World (1928), 
used the label ‘mind-stuff’ to assert a perceptive necessity:  ‘by “mind” I do not here exactly 
mean mind, and by “stuff” I do not at all mean stuff’, as he qualified his declaration ‘the stuff 
of the world is mind-stuff’ (p. 266).  For Clifford, however, who believed exactly that, such a 
statement suggested something true and precise about ontology, something genuinely mind-like 
about cosmological matter.  
 Tess Cosslett has charted how, developing in parallel with, but separate from, theories 
of organic evolution – a discontinuity which became in time the source of marked discomfiture 
– were theories dealing with the progression of intelligence (pp. 32 - 38).  In a popular lecture 
of 1880, George Romanes, eminent Darwinian and close academic colleague of Clifford in 
London, suggested that the ‘problem’ of intellectual development was a ‘subject […] second to 
none that has ever occupied the attention of our race’ (p. 3).  His talk focused on a ‘somewhat 
formidable-looking diagram’ (fig. 4) presenting ‘the whole course of mental evolution […]’ (p. 
6).  With a taxonomist’s zeal, he identified thirty-seven levels of physical development (embryo 
to adult Englishman), psychological sophistication (reflex ‘pugnacity’ to Sidgwick’s ‘cosmic 
emotion’), and mental refinement (from none, via fetishism and monotheism, to scientific 
awareness).  He also represented cultural attainment diagrammatically – the ‘low savage’, for 
instance, having, at best, the intellect of an English toddler (p. 5).   
 But Clifford, through advocacy of ‘mind-stuff’, blurs such gradations, refusing absolut-
ism while recognising difference – and shirking in the process that Victorian propensity for 
category and easy ranking.  This was in him so ingrained a tendency that it coloured his 
judgment on non-biological matters as well.  In his physics, even his nothings become a 
something, prospectively – indeed, as he hints in pleasingly Parmenidean fashion, maybe even 
the same something.  His most audacious speculation in ‘The Unseen Universe’ concerns the 
most extreme of all possible monisms, a viewpoint linking not only the inorganic with the 
organic, not only the insentient with the sentient, but his generation’s proxy for nothing or 
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emptiness (ether) with its something-surrogate (matter):  ‘Until, therefore, it is absolutely 
disproved it must remain the simplest and most probable assumption that they are finally 
made of the same stuff, – that the material molecule is some kind of knot or coagulation of 
ether’ (p. 784).  Space, matter, life, thought:  all become congruent, even coincident, in an 
insight so radical, so ahead-of-its-time, that it might, as Clifford biographer Monty Chisholm 
dreamily speculates (in a chapter co-written with her husband, a mathematician working on 
Clifford algebras), ‘provide a future clue to a “Grand Unified Theory”’ (p. 165). 
 And there are, the scientist avows, moral consolations, and consequences, of such 
materialistic beliefs as well.  Evolution, for one, though it may seem to unmoor some of the old 
certainties – ‘the loss of the immutable and eternal verities […]’ of both traditional and even 
Paleyan theology – provides, or so he conjectures in ‘Cosmic Emotion’, as unforeseen benefit a 
scientifically calibrated ‘conception of a good action, in a wider sense than the ethical one’ (p. 
423).  For him, a ‘good action’ is one which augments our organicity, his chosen barometer of 
race advancement, elevating us ‘up’ the ladder – the geometric conceit at once biologically 
conventional and an analogue for theistic damnation or salvation – away from insensate in-
organicity.  Becoming, for Clifford, trumps being:  ‘In this way the human race embodies in 
itself all the ages of organic action that have gone to its evolution.  The nature of organic 
action […] is to personify itself, and it has personified itself most in the human race’ (p. 424).   
 ‘We more and more need a religion that can deal with this world’, Frederic Harrison 
wrote in The Present and the Future:  A Positivist Address (1880), ‘which has something to say to the 
intellectual and social problems of our age, which can show us how to live on earth, not how 
to prepare for heaven’ (p. 35).  He here makes explicit the role of positivism as bespoke faith, 
as culturally contingent a belief-network as fin de siècle spiritualism, oriented towards Victorian 
problems, satisfying (albeit, for some, only temporarily or inadequately) Victorian aspirations 
and wants.  ‘Positivism’, as the modern political theorist John Gray has delineated it, ‘is a 
doctrine of redemption in the guise of a theory of history’ (p. 105), a displacement of the 
Christian hope for individual salvation onto that of the species as a whole.  Clifford’s concep-
tion of evolutionism becomes the biological co-conspirator of positivism’s moral imperative; 
his ‘natural selection’, a surrogate god, or all-Mother.   
 He quotes a ‘splendid hymn’ of ‘Mr. Swinburne’s’ as if in evidentiary support of this 
hypothesis: 
  
 MOTHER of man’s time-travelling generations, 
 Breath of his nostrils, heartblood of his heart, 
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 God above all Gods worshipped in all nations, 
 Light above light, law beyond law, thou art. (‘Triumphalis’, p. 804) 
 
These lines are from ‘Mater Triumphalis’, a panegyric to democratic upheaval, to the dreams 
of those French revolutionaries, with the ‘mother triumphant’ a personification of liberty, 
justice, fraternity:  a secular idol – and ideal.  Clifford, in ‘Cosmic Emotion’, deploys them in 
support of his judgments about evolution, that womanly apotheosis of Swinburne’s republican 
ode becoming, by insinuation, a biogenetic as well as a socio-political Marianne (pp. 424 - 25).   
As this essay was first published in the tolerant Nineteenth Century, he felt boldly able to 
cite the name of his preferred muse – in ‘The Unseen Universe’ he had, by contrast, left the 
couplet from ‘The Garden of Proserpine’ to reverberate anonymously – at a time when 
Swinburne was usually referred to in the periodical press, if at all, by indeterminate epithet (‘a 
singer’, ‘a living English poet’); this decision, Gowan Dawson tells us, ‘seems to have provoked 
little attention at the time, but it would soon become a central issue in the [typically negative] 
portrayal of Clifford immediately after death’ (p. 265).  The implicit coupling would have been 
unmistakable to educated readers, however:  the social forces of political rebellion and cultural 
progression are inextricably yoked to the processes of biological evolution and morphological 
transformation, processes which, in Clifford’s worldview, are predominately directed ‘up-
wards’.  (‘If I have evolved myself out of something like an amphioxus [a primitive fish], […] I 
have become better by the change; […] I have become more organic’, he explains in ‘Cosmic 
Emotion’, arguing for just the sort of undisguised progressivism certain to quail the present-
day evolutionist [p. 423].)  This, though an alliance foreign, even wrongheaded, in most 
twentieth- and twenty-first-century construals of ‘true’ Darwinian insight, was nonetheless a 
supposition not out of character with its period; as Dale confirms:  ‘[George] Lewes, Spencer, 
[Leslie] Stephen, Clifford, Tyndall, Darwin himself, and many others all tried to turn evolu-
tionism to good account’ (p. 205).  Clifford, in ‘On the Scientific Basis of Morals’, a study in 
evolutionary ethics, even found the justification for social altruism in an individual’s sense of 
duty to tribe, ‘one of the primary units on which natural selection works in homo sapiens […]’, 
from his perspective (Dale, p. 182).   
For Clifford, then, an imperative towards novelty and incessant improvement impels 
both nature and human nature; that Swinburnian mother, enemy of the ancien regime, friend to 
insurrectionists, wrecks all old orders, nurturing or giving birth to new and better ones.  Such 
a line of metaphor returns us to Clifford’s notebook entry, which likewise celebrates the 
stripping away of those gilded monuments associated with religious (and crypto-religious) 
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iconography:  ‘The temples and the towers of time though breakest, / His thoughts and words 
and works, to make them new’, Swinburne says of his exultant mother (‘Triumphalis’, p. 804).  
So, too, Clifford suggests, does evolution refine and perfect physiology.  Though this might 
suggest the meliorism of someone like Henry Drummond – who proclaims of nature in The 
Ascent of Man (1894):  ‘Evolution, development, progress are not only on her programme, these 
are her programme’ (p. 435) – Clifford never forgot, or ceased to fear, the possibilities of 
degeneration:  spiritual, cultural, intellectual, social, even biological.  He was hardly alone 
among Victorians in doing so, however.  His muse Swinburne had already in own writings 
documented comparable worries of recidivism, particularly in moral and political spheres.  
‘Mater Triumphalis’, accordingly, finds its glum counterpart in another, less optimistic piece 
in the collection Songs Before Sunrise – ‘Mater Dolorosa’:  ‘mother of sorrows’, an appellation 
applied since the Middle Ages to the bereaved Mary, Mother of Jesus – a title, and a conjunc-
tion, making the poet’s (and, by association, the scientist’s) usurpation of the theological by the 
secular and humane utterly unmistakable.  ‘This is she for whose sake being fallen, for whose 
abject sake, / Earth groans in the blackness of darkness, and men’s hearts break’ (p. 800):  this 
couplet describes the pitiful state of Swinburne’s sorrowful mother before the firebrand of 
populist revolution is lit – or wherever, and whenever, it has been prematurely extinguished.15   
But, for Clifford, the linguistic parallelism, and punning, between mater and ‘matter’ 
serves further to insist that this revolt is as much against a retrogressive ‘in-organicity’ – those 
tableaux of bestial, primitive anthropoid history (which haunt also Tennyson’s ‘The Dawn’:  
‘Red of the Dawn! / Is it turning a fainter red? so be it, but when shall we lay / The Ghost of 
the Brute that is walking and haunting us yet, and be free?’ [p. 1453; ll. 21 - 23]) – as it is 
against the oppressive features of the modern patriarchal state, and those equally suffocating 
strictures imposed by the tenets of Revealed Religion.16 
 
REPENTANCE, REDEMPTION AND HUMAN FALLIBILITY:   
THE CASE OF JAMES CLERK MAXWELL’S GEORGE HERBERT 
 
Clifford championed Swinburne, that up-to-the-moment bard of godlessness.  Is it not apt, 
                                                
15  Comte’s symbolic Flag of Positivism was to depict a ‘young mother, carrying her infant son […]’, thus 
rendering positivism the heir of Catholicism – the ‘Virgin coming to be regarded as the personification of 
Humanity’ (Willey, p. 199). 
16  Tyndall also accentuated such a phonetic parallelism:  Giordano Bruno, he reminds us, always insisted 
that ‘[m]atter is not the mere naked, empty capacity which philosophers have pictured her to be, but the universal 
mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her own womb’ (BA, p. 20).    
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therefore, that the poetry of Maxwell seems to find its model in the more devout Metaphysi-
cals:  Donne, to an extent, but especially Herbert?  On his deathbed, in fact, a witness testified, 
beyond the conventional pieties, to the scientist reciting ‘the morning after an unusually bad 
night, the five stanzas of [Herbert’s] “Aaron” without a mistake’ (qtd. in LJCM, p. 415). 
In the poetry of Herbert, a spiritual cycle – sin, suffering, death and heavenly resurrec-
tion – is brought to completion through the agency of Christ.  That same cycle is in ‘Aaron’ 
given a modulated, even mildly dissonant, tonality, however:  though a conversion poem, it 
seems one having at its nucleus, as Helen Vendler has phrased it, ‘a fever of self-obliteration’ 
(p. 120), not merely the rational, ‘reasoned through’ obviation of a niggling spiritual doubt.  
Aaron himself was Moses’s brother, yet another instance of the sort of typology which confers 
upon the poet a theological as well as a metaphoric richness.  He serves as an archetype for 
the figure of the priest, more specifically, the vaguely mystical priest, the Old Testament cleric-
conjurer, a wrathful emissary of the divine more than capable of duelling with Pharaoh’s court 
magicians.  He seems a preternatural figure (one, needless to say, at a great remove from any 
dottering village vicar), a sort of Moses for the recently deceased, ‘raising the dead / To lead 
them unto life and rest’ (ll. 4 - 5).  Herbert contrasts such an idealised priest with his own 
spiritual self-perception, figuring himself a poor Aaron indeed, predestined by his own inade-
quacies to spend eternity in that place where there ‘is no rest’ (line 9).  But then he remembers 
Christ, ‘(who is not dead, / But lives in me while I do rest)’, a spiritual intercessor unknown to 
ancient Aaron (ll. 23 - 24).  In Christ, he imagines, he could have rest, rest of the peace that 
passeth understanding sort; in Him, he could be reborn, ‘That to the old man’ – himself, an 
imperfect servant of God – ‘I may rest, / And be in him [Christ] new drest’ (ll. 19 - 20).   
Similar play between these multiple senses of ‘rest’ – rest, repose; rest, death; rest, res-
pite; rest, relaxation – first strikes the reader of Maxwell’s poem ‘On St. David’s Day’.  In its 
final stanza, the Lord, we’re told, will grant sinners ‘Rest of Life and not of death, / Rest in 
Love and Hope and Faith, / Till the God who gives their breath, / Calls them to rest from 
living’ (p. 599).  This feels nearly as packed as the Herbert, while seeming similar in its archi-
tecture:  Maxwell’s ‘rest of life’ recalling Herbert’s realm of ‘life and rest’; Maxwell’s gratitude 
for divinely bestowed ‘rest from living’ echoing Herbert’s praise for a Christ, ‘Without whom I 
could have no rest’ (line 14).  
 Maxwell’s is a devotional poem, of course, not a ‘scientific’ one, but it suggests also a 
more general hierarchy of allusion and symbol, while indicating something of the depth of his 
religiosity.  However, if perceived first and foremost as a recasting of ‘Aaron’, it must, at least 
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in part, be considered a failure – and yet a failure remarkably consonant with the cultural 
sensibilities of its time.  Vendler has written of the nineteenth-century spiritual climate that 
would have compelled one contemporary adapter of ‘Aaron’ for choral singing to excise many 
of the work’s grimmer undercurrents, its harbingers of damnation and requiem.   
This represents no superficial change, however, altering, to Vendler’s mind, the very 
essence of the poem, producing something 
 
certainly not like Herbert, who is far more primitive, saying there is a hell, there are the dead, sins 
threaten an eternity of no rest, the priest has the supernatural power to raise the dead, and the priest 
should take care not to be himself one of the dead.  These thoughts, rather archaic for the nineteenth-
century “enlightened” mind, are silently passed over […].  [T]he priest emerges not as a sacred 
intermediary possessing supernatural power, but rather as a helpful minister – sound, harmonious, 
pure, engaged in finding rest for the sinful.  (pp. 117 - 18) 
 
How, though, was a figure like Maxwell able to maintain a kindred complacency?  It might 
seem uncanny that a scientist whose name remains so associated with theories suggesting a 
godless materialism – thermodynamics, electromagnetism, statistical mechanics – managed 
nonetheless to maintain throughout his life such an unstrained, even cheerful, relationship 
with theological orthodoxy.  But that is precisely what Maxwell did, and he espouses – in his 
versification, in particular – a piety that seems to embrace both the Christian Trinity and 
aspects of that materialistic one identified by T. H. Huxley, except, of course, where aspects of 
the latter conflicted with the former:  in any insistence on the banishment of the soul, the 
indifference of a Creator, or the silence of a world with no Word to sustain it.  For instance, 
his poem, ‘A Vision.  Of a Wrangler, of a University, of Pedantry, and of Philosophy’, composed while 
a student at Trinity College, Cambridge, gives details of one particularly vivid hallucination, 
telling of a crisis of faith expeditiously averted (one finding origin, ultimately, in the precepts of 
a ‘too mechanistic’ epistemology).   
It tells how Maxwell, wearied by long hours of revision, sat half-asleep in a chair.  His 
mind, however – endlessly active and as yet uneasy – contrived to insure that any dozing 
would be at best sporadic, conjuring up for him a gallery of grotesques, nightmare-figures 
embodying the university itself:  ‘Fathers there, of every college / Led the glorious ranks of 
knowledge’ (p. 614).  These, in turn, fade into the shadows, supplanted by a hideous, nomi-
nally feminine, apparition – a Frankenstein monster for the obdurate materialist, bereft of 
spirit, animated by malice and machinery:  ‘Angular in form and feature’, ‘Hair of pens and 
skin of paper; / Breath, not breath, but chemic vapour’, ‘Eyes of glass, with optic axes / 
Twisting rays of light as flax is’.  Through such eyes, he imagines, ‘all Nature / Seems reduced 
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to meaner stature. / If you had them you would hate your / Symbolising sense of sight’ (p. 
615).  Though Maxwell here concedes the body’s role in perception (‘symbolising […] sight’), 
he clearly considers this by itself insufficient.  For him, any existence would be unendurable in 
which spirit did not supplement the meagre data provided by such brusquely ‘analytic’ organs.   
The creature then addresses Maxwell directly, admonishing him for his lack of focus, 
advancing the ‘cause’ of pedantry and ignorance: 
  
 “Of the [natural] Philosophic Spirit 
 Richly may my son inherit; 
 As for Poetry, inter it 
  With the myths of other days. 
 “Cut the thing entirely, lest yon 
 College Don should put the question, 
 Why not stick to what you’re best on? 
 Mathematics always pays.”  (p. 616) 
 
Soon, a second figure enters the dream (this time, a decidedly beatific one), eclipsing that first 
monstrosity – for surely it is Maxwell’s demon:  his truest nemesis, the corporealisation of all 
those loathed tenets of psychological materialism – and banishing it to the shadows.  This new 
vision’s appearance serves to remind Maxwell (who, again, never really seemed to doubt such 
an assertion) ‘that creation / Bears the test of calculation, / But that Man forgets his station / 
If he stops when that is done’.  Men of science, he insists, must, in consort with the vast and 
unscientific majority, ‘Learn’ – or, if necessary, be reminded how – ‘to worship as we ought’ 
(p. 617).  George Herbert, in ‘Vanity [I]’, had two centuries prior expressed a not dissimilar 
conviction.  The ‘fleet astronomer’ of that era, he had suggested, too easily ‘thread[s] the 
spheres with his quick-piercing mind’ (ll. 1 - 2).  Maxwell’s modern spectre is likewise capable 
of ‘Seeing planets in their courses / Thick beset with arrowy “forces”’ (p. 615).  (Note as well 
the incidental critique of Newtonian ‘action at a distance’.)  Herbert’s ‘subtle chemic can 
devest / And strip the creature naked […]’ – in other words, he can reduce man to the thing 
itself, the very condition of soulless mechanism – ‘till he find / The callow principles within 
their nest’ (ll. 15 - 17).  Maxwell, in ‘A Vision’, confronts just such an abomination (obvious 
archaisms emphasising his literary indebtedness:  that first visitation had ‘Breath, not breath, 
but chemic vapour’).   
In a sense, the scientist, with Herbert, asks in chorus of the uncontemplative investiga-
tor:  ‘What hath not man sought out and found / But his dear God? […]’ (‘Vanity’, ll. 22 - 
23).  His natural philosophy, in other words, often seems an extension into the ‘materialistic’ 
mid-century of a paradigm associated with the natural theology of its earlier half, even of 
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Herbert’s Christian humanism.  It would seem, then, that what differentiates the scientifically 
inspired verse of Tennyson (and other such thinkers distressed about the horrors or implica-
tions of materialism) from the scientifically inspired verse of Maxwell (a professional investiga-
tor labouring methodologically within an apparently materialistic paradigm) is, at its heart, a 
matter of trust:  in Maxwell – a believer never wavering in his conviction concerning the 
essential truth of, say, Psalm 19: 1:  ‘The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament 
sheweth his handywork’ – there is no authentic doubt about the relationship between science 
and the precepts of faith; that doubt is reserved instead for the relationship between scientists 
and the precepts of faith.  He, through his writings, affirms a kind of partitioned worldview:  
the universe, sometimes to be understood as if it were material, is never perceived as solely 
that, rarely described as solely that.   
As Kaiser has observed, for Maxwell ‘the laws of [human] mind and the laws of nature 
were both aspects of reality created by God, but only partial aspects.  One could, therefore, 
arrive at a view of reality entailing either freedom or determinism depending on how one 
focused the instruments of observation and analysis on the events involved’ (p. 295).  For these 
same reasons, some of Maxwell’s theories can seem ‘materialistic’; others, dynamistic; still 
others, not comfortably reducible to either overarching paradigm.  
Despite this necessary partiality, however, the world remained for him a blessed spec-
tacle, with scientific inquiry ‘a divine vocation’, as Schaffer has characterised it (p. 460).  In ‘A 
Student’s Evening Hymn’, Maxwell refers to God as ‘Thou that fill’st our waiting eyes / With 
the food of contemplation’ (p. 594).  And it is through such enlightened contemplation that 
Victorians, scientists or not, can know Him, themselves and their world – and in such a way 
deemed harmonious with the particular talents (gifts themselves of God, surely) of their own 
era.  Thus, the poetry, and thought, of James Clerk Maxwell provides an intriguing counter-
part to that of W. K. Clifford, indicating how two totally irreconcilable worldviews – and two 
radically contrasting matrices of allusion and reference – can coexist, and can, at the same 
time, both perform, and contribute to, the discovery, and promulgation, of excellent science. 
 




HEATED EXCHANGES:  JOHN TYNDALL, THOMAS CARLYLE,  




We were told lately that a great scientific man, in his best hours, when 
he looked at the boundless universe as far as it was revealed to his 
power of observation, could not but have forced upon his mind the be-
lief that there was some Mind far greater, and Power more powerful 
than any human mind, before which all these truths which he was fee-
bly groping after were clear and plain.  
- The Archbishop of Canterbury, 20 November 18740 
 
Many Victorian intellectuals were excited by Tyndall’s invitation at Belfast, stirred to action, 
reaction, delineation or redefinition.  C. H. Hinton, author of ‘The Persian King’, was one.  
‘We are bidden […]’, he wrote in ‘Professor Tyndall and the Religious Emotions’, published 
four months subsequent to Tyndall’s Address in The Contemporary Review, his phrasing seeming 
that of the apprentice – or acolyte:  ‘We are bidden to seek some thought respecting the 
Universe and our relationship to it that shall do two things:  in the first place, shall satisfy the 
religious Emotions, and, in the second, shall not contradict the results of the exploration of the 
universe by our senses and our intellect’ (p. 94). 
 He proposes a solution, a reconciliation, a synthesis of matter and heart.  It seems, in 
retrospect, a hollow one, wholly unsatisfactory, at once un-filling and unfulfilling, a rhetori-
cian’s gambit leaving urgent spiritual hungers unsated, while doing few favours, if little out-
right damage, to the causes and crusades of science (or scientism) itself.  All the same, it is 
striking that Hinton, like so many others in the century’s latter half (secularists and atheists as 
much as spiritualists and divines), felt challenged enough to make it.  His own technique 
involves confrontation with the facts of materialism head-on, the wholesale redefinition of 
concepts:  the dumb processes of physical causation, of one thing (‘a’) leading inexorably to 
another (‘b’), for instance, are by him re-inscribed in a variety of Judeo-Christian sacrificial 
meta-lingo, becoming ‘the visible image of the giving up of one’s life for another’s being’ (p. 
97), of a rock falling so that the thump might be heard, that the ground might be shaken and 
                                                
Epigraph from [A. Tait], p. 94. 
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warmed.  As Huxley once remarked in a well-known letter of 23 September 1860 to Charles 
Kingsley, novelist and Chaplain to Queen Victoria:  ‘Whoso clearly appreciates all that is 
implied in the falling of a stone can have no difficulty about any doctrine simply on account of 
its marvellousness’ (p. 217).  Huxley boggles at the perfection and comprehensibility of physi-
cal transformation, apprehending it as a wonder far surpassing any of the unsubstantiated 
claims of Protestant theology.   
Hinton goes one better, finding in thermodynamic metamorphosis itself a proxy for 
such refuted and ‘inadequate’ belief-systems.  For him, the conservation of matter, of force, 
becomes a kind of metempsychosis of energy, a passing on of ‘volition’, a higher-level phe-
nomenon not unworthy of his vision of a redacted and improved materialism nonetheless 
denying simple mechanism:  a ‘heartless’ supposition he believed both metaphysically naïve 
and scientifically simplistic.  Hinton’s chosen language is that of exhortation, of the preacher 
(or the mountebank).  His sentences – in the main, short, declarative, straightforward in their 
diction; each pressing the message clearly onwards, scarcely pausing, or allowing room, for 
‘extraneous’ clauses of evidence or counterargument – are suffused with the vehemence of a 
proselytising missionary, and their contents, likewise, seem intended to soothe, cajole – and, 
ultimately, one supposes, convert.   
 In the Belfast Address, there seems, by contrast, an asymmetricality, a sort of sketchy, 
self-conscious minimalism, to Tyndall’s worldview (as there presented), an incompleteness in 
his own attempts at promulgating a fortifying ‘materialism plus’ for the considered use, or 
edification, of the latter Victorian age.  This, in part, was the subject of a preceding chapter, 
where a number of rationales for such lopsidedness – the predicament of a personal philoso-
phy celebrating the complementary nature, the necessarily complementary nature, of scientific 
reasoning and ‘the religious Emotions’, which nonetheless appears frustratingly reticent about 
fully one-half of that psychological equation – were put forward:  Tyndall’s conviction that 
contemporary science, unlike contemporary religion, was a public matter, a magisterium in 
which broad consensus was both attainable and, within limits, to be desired, coupled with the 
predominance in popular discussion, in prior cultural history, of a view antagonistic to this, 
diametrically so; his own (shaky) adherence to the remit of a President’s Address before the 
BAAS; the uncertain politics of response, those ex post facto interactions between the expecta-
tions of figures in attendance, outside commentators (religious or not), and that vastly greater 
audience, less policeable and infinitely heterogeneous:  the broadly literate population of 
Great Britain, circa August 1874.  And yet, as also discussed, there were even in the Belfast 
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Address vantages provided, glimpses of Tyndall’s spiritual topographies, of private accommo-
dations achieved between those conflicted, conflicting domains of scientific agnosticism and 
theistic belief.  
Some individuals, blessed with restraint or liberal tolerance, were prepared to listen 
without undue prejudice.  So, too, were certain organisations – The Times, for instance:  
‘Professor Tyndall’s Address’, an editorial which appeared 20 August 1874 (that is, within 
twenty-four hours of the Address’s delivery), insisted, with an enlightened equanimity:  
‘[T]here is no theological reason for recoiling from the conclusion to which Professor 
TYNDALL would conduct us […].  His analysis of the world’s history leaves out one half of 
man, and he finds it impossible to deny to this other side of man’s nature a reality as absolute 
as that which he claims for his physical faculties and for his understanding’.  Even Archibald 
Tait, then Archbishop of Canterbury, in acknowledging such a noteworthy lack (in the quota-
tion used as this chapter’s epigraph), believed it admirable, rather than blasphemous, while his 
own incisive allusion to the consternation shown by a ‘great scientific man’ demonstrates as 
well both the imaginative penetration of the Address’s argument and the social notoriety of its 
deliverer. 
 Both Tyndall and Hinton used rhetoric and the manifold resources of language to 
their own ends, of course.  How could they not?  Tyndall’s counter-engagements, his rebuttals 
and re-brandings of ‘sterile’ naturalism, are, throughout his Address, secreted in plain sight, by 
meshes of literary referral and poetic invocation.  Hinton’s in that article – objections arising 
out of his own affinities for ‘higher-dimensional’ analysis, his familiarity with the sorts of 
transcendental conundrums posed by the ‘scientised’ spiritualisms then becoming popular (if 
geometry can be conceptualised in spaces beyond the Euclidean, why not matter in planes 
beyond the reductively material?) – seem, conversely, more stated than implicit, more surface 
than depth, confident and conspicuous rather than camouflaged or qualified.   
Both, moreover, in confronting, or counterbalancing, the implications of contempo-
rary scientific naturalism, found their own sources of spiritual comfort and moral affirmation, 
although in wildly different arenas.  (Each conjured, in effect, a patchwork and provisional 
‘faith’.)  Hinton (as exuberantly expressed in ‘Professor Tyndall and the Religious Emotions’) 
immersed himself in the conjectures of ‘frontier’ mathematics, in the untapped possibilities of 
spirit and mind.  Tyndall, by contrast (sounding far more muted in his Belfast Address), 
looked, not to extreme scientific speculation, but rather the softer consolations of literature.  
He discovered there – in the vernaculars of poets and the tropes of the past, in its writers and 
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writings, its triumphs and traditions – a compensatory solace equal to, yet aesthetically dissimi-
lar from, that achieved by his ‘admirer’. 
This chapter, like the next, is an examination of how, and why, he went about doing so.  
It is also a study of the effects Tyndall achieved, how they interacted with, commented upon, 
or strained against those great under-mentioned over-themes outlined in my first chapter:  the 
conservation of energy, and the cosmic teleology implicit in those laws and suppositions 
associated with the ‘new’ physical science.  As Gillian Beer has written:  ‘Deepest habits of 
mind often leave only slight traces on the surfaces of writing’ (OF, p. 228).  This is a tracing of 
those traces – an archaeology in one individual of ‘deepest habits’ of thermodynamic reason-
ing and materialistic rationalisation – examining the fashion (following on from my discussion 
in chapter two) in which Tyndall’s choices of language and metaphor tend to channel, imply, 
distort or amplify manifest meaning, shaping perception, colouring interpretation and final 
response.  The central theme here examined – for such linguistic practices are only interesting 
in terms of concrete instances – is the metaphoric persistence, clearly underpinned by those 
mental habits, throughout Tyndall’s thought of a kind of ‘solar’ deification of human 
achievement, with primeval man imagined as fire-worker, as tool-shaper, first and foremost.  
And Thomas Carlyle and, though to a lesser extent, Tennyson – living contemporaries and, 
later in life, cherished friends of the scientist – are the dominant figures here engaged with. 
  ‘[T]he image of fire runs like a bright thread through everything he wrote’, so John 
Holloway observed of the former, in his unreprovable The Victorian Sage (1962; p. 28).  I would 
argue that a like stitching binds Tyndall’s own arguments together as well, at once knitting 
divergent genres and literary traditions into a cohesive whole, and patching them to, or with, 
both the textured vernaculars of Carlylean rhetoric and the vestures of Carlyle’s ‘outmoded’ 
transcendental beliefs.  For Tyndall, like his mentor, seized upon the suggestive, even arche-
typal, power of a certain complex of incandescent images – fire-worshippers, labouring 
blacksmiths, the polymorphic manifestations on this earth of solar warmth – in his varied 
characterisations, not merely of brute physical processes (like the conservation of energy), but 
also intellectual fecundity and prowess.  The sun provides radiant heat; the sage, spiritual 
illumination.  And so, similarly, Tyndall argues, do their strange energies circulate.  Moreover, 
such parallels – given the intellectual climate of mid-Victorian England – with fire, light and 
heat necessarily had for many at the time, not just Tyndall, resonances beyond the literal.  
This chapter looks at a few of these as well, particularly with reference to their function in 
defining their author’s relationship with, on the one hand, the material, that stuff making up 
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our day-to-day world, and, on the other, the intellectual, poetic and literary, those unique 
products, seemingly without broader purpose, of the conscious, self-aware mind.   
The questions at this chapter’s core, in other words, are those very ones posed, with an 
unmistakable yearning, in a suggestive passage from Tyndall’s popular study of 1872, The 
Forms of Water in Clouds & Rivers, Ice & Glaciers:  ‘But what is the sun?  We know its size and its 
weight.  We also know that it is a globe of fire far hotter than any fire on the earth.  But we 
have to learn definitely what is the meaning of solar light and solar heat […]’ (p. 8; my italics). 
 
JOHN TYNDALL, SUN-WORSHIPPER 
 
John Tyndall, towards the end of a series of lectures at the RI on the public life and scientific 
achievements of Michael Faraday (later collected and published in book-form under the title 
of Faraday as a Discoverer [1868]), provided a strange, even startling, analogue for the intellec-
tual character of his departed friend:  ‘Thus his fire was that of a solid combustible, not that of 
a gas, which blazes suddenly, and dies as suddenly away’ (p. 179).  Elsewhere, he wrote in 
similarly incandescent terms of Faraday’s affection for his wife, Sarah Barnard, over the 
course of their nearly half-century of marriage:  ‘Never, I believe, existed a manlier, purer, 
steadier love.  Like a burning diamond it continued to shed, for six-and-forty years, its white 
and smokeless glow’ (FoS, p. 355). 
 Tyndall, of course, was well known – and sometimes gently chided – for his popular 
laboratory demonstrations involving ‘singing’ flames and fluorescing gasses.1  He, however, 
enlivened both his prose, whether alpine or scientific, and his public lectures with not dissimi-
lar pyrotechnics as well, the analogic as much as the rhetorical.  Both comparisons above, for 
instance, represent a kind of anti-anthropomorphisation or de-personification; they remake 
the sentient into the elemental, phenomenal and inert; they encode, seemingly, the total 
materialising of the spirit, the deepest loss of will.  At the same time, however, they revivify the 
                                                
1  Maxwell, for one, seemed to view some of Tyndall’s achievements as unnecessarily showy, even unseemly, 
in particular his laboratory demonstrations on the composition and colour of the sky.  These performances are 
restaged in one poem, dryly subtitled ‘A Tyndallic Ode’, as quasi-vaudevillian, as scientific snake-charming:  ‘The 
atoms clash, the spectra flash, / Projected on the screen, / The Double D, magnesium b, / And Thallium’s living 
green’; or, later:  ‘I shout, I whistle, clap my hands, / And stamp upon the platform, / The flame responds to my 
commands, / In this form and in that form’ (‘Chief’, p. 634).   
Indeed, in the highly idiosyncratic correspondence between P. G. Tait and Maxwell – a correspondence 
characterised by both a cryptographic compactness and a constantly punning linguistic allusiveness (here, for 
example, the technical nomenclature of the tensor calculus is gleefully plundered) – Tyndall figured as ‘  
! 
" " T  
because   
! 
" " T  represents a tensor of the second rank’ (Goldman, p. 96). 
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commonplace.  We pass over without undue reflection cant attributions of idealised or ever-
lasting love, but linger for a moment on such amatory phrasings as these, similes oddly involv-
ing immolated allotropes and incandescing gasses.  They, by comparison, seem innovatory, 
conceptually jarring, though their intents and effects remain largely cliché.  Beyond this, when 
examined in the overall context of the scientist’s thoughts and writings, the presence of such 
allusions to fire, and warmth, and flame enact more than literary novelty; they highlight 
concerns and preoccupations, underscoring Tyndall’s obsessions with the manifold signifying 
properties afforded by the concepts of thermodynamics.  For, like planets orbiting a central 
star (or, more glumly, disconsolate mourners encircling a pyre), clustered around the emblems 
and ideas of heat, of heat’s circulation, renewal and final dissipation, lurk in Tyndall’s rhetoric 
a range of looming matters:  the inviolability of causality, the potentialities of life, the strictures 
of energy conservation, the pre-eminence of the material in the physical world and, within 
that world, the capacity of mind, of unyoked thought, to transcend ‘materialistic’ limitations, 
allowing the scientist to re-envision matter, not as dull clod, but rather something rich, poetic 
and re-invigoratingly strange. 
It was through heat and its metaphors that Tyndall was able to explore and interrogate 
the seeming paradox central to his thought, what William Irvine described as the scientist’s 
admission that ‘there was as yet no bridge between consciousness on the one hand and mo-
lecular activity on the other’, while nonetheless still insisting that insensate matter, ‘properly 
understood’, remained the ‘magic substance by which all mysteries would be penetrated and 
all contradictions resolved – the very principle and symbol of progress, uniting invisible 
atomicity with invisible intelligence and both with infinite possibility beyond’ (p. 344).   
A claim symptomatic of this difficulty, Tyndall closed his response essay of 1875, ‘“Ma-
terialism” and Its Opponents’, with a line that seems prima facie absurd, one foretelling, with 
due solemnity, a paradisiacal future in which ‘purer and mightier’ minds than ours strive to 
attain a ‘deeper knowledge of matter […]’, while evincing a ‘more faithful conformity to its 
laws’ (p. 599).  Mallock lampooned these desiderata via The New Paul and Virginia’s overbearing 
Prof. Darnley.   
Here, the professor, a celebrity aboard the good steamship Australasian, expounds the 
unpalatable truths of nineteenth-century materialistic science to fellow passengers – an audi-
ence, minute by minute, increasingly demoralised.  (It is, by any standards, a bravura diatribe.)   
 
‘However,’ he [Darnley] proceeded, ‘of one thing we can be quite certain:  all that is, is matter; the 
laws of matter are eternal, and we cannot act or think without conforming to them; and if,’ he said, ‘we 
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would be solemn and high, and happy and heroic, and saintly, we have but to strive and struggle to do 
what we cannot for an instant avoid doing.  Yes’, he exclaimed, ‘as the sublime Tyndall tells us, let us 
struggle to attain a deeper knowledge of matter, and a more faithful conformity to its laws!’.  (p. 18) 
 
As implicit in Mallock’s account, this could seem a lunatic’s imprecation.   
Earlier in the article Tyndall had declared, with analogous evangelical sweep:  ‘Matter 
I define as that mysterious thing by which all this is accomplished’ (‘Materialism’, p. 598) – the 
magisterial relative clause (with its encompassing subject, ‘all this’) subsuming every facet of 
reality, both experienced and conjectured.  Nevertheless, while, on one level, this represents a 
fully adequate declaration of materialism’s central belief, on another, it appears frustratingly 
incomplete, as it apparently leaves out agency, slighting thereby one player in a vital partner-
ship:  for it is, after all, the interaction of matter, not matter itself, that ‘makes’ structural accom-
plishing.  To the mid-Victorian scientific naturalist, force and matter, in all their protean 
manifestations, were closed systems, subject to conservation laws, neither created nor de-
stroyed (Einstein, however, with his iconic mass-energy relation,   
! 
E = mc2 , would in 1905 link 
them in a more elementary monism), but, equally, the first without the second would have 
been inefficacious (having nothing on which to act), and the second without the first, without 
form and void.  Even Faraday, never one to classify himself as one of those ‘high and piercing 
intellects’ transgressing beyond science’s ‘exalted’ theoretical frontiers (he classified himself, 
rather self-deprecatingly, as one of its ‘persevering labourers’ instead), was moved by the 
formalisation, and increasing importance within all research, of the First Law to a series of 
more grandiose pronouncements:  ‘for we know matter only by its forces […]’, he asserted on 
27 February 1857 in ‘On the Conservation of Force’, an RI Friday Evening Discourse (p. 1). 
Four years previously, in another such evening discourse, Tyndall had made an 
equivalent assertion, exemplifying that aspect of the naturalistic hypothesis about which those 
two proclamations from ‘“Materialism” and Its Opponents’ (both eminently quotable, but 
effectively doomed to caricature and misprision when excised from any argumentative con-
text) had seemingly been silent:  ‘There are no two words with which we are more familiar 
than matter and force.  The system of the universe embraces two things, – an object acted upon, 
and an agent by which it is acted upon; – the object we call matter, and the agent we call 
force’ (‘Influence’, p. 1). 
Needless to say, it is force that effects the Biblical transformation, that sketched in 
Genesis, through its (to naïvely, if Tyndallically, anthropomorphise) ‘beckonings’ and com-
mands, decrees made in accordance with nano-Lilliputian taskmasters.  (These were the 
‘atomic architects’:  unseen, infallible and autocratic.)  Maxwell, in a more jolly metaphor, 
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here turning elemental cohesions into panting courtship, wrote of those ‘microscopic spaces / 
Where molecules with fierce desires / Shiver in warm embraces’ (‘Chief’, p. 634); his final line 
represents a fine scientific pun, encompassing, in the two senses of ‘shiver’ (‘to vibrate’ and ‘to 
break apart’), both the oscillation of matter due to intrinsic heat and the sundering of chemical 
bonds in the formation of new compounds.   
‘Architecturally’ arrayed?  or ‘romantically’ compelled?  Either way, over billions of 
years, the ultimate consequences of such molecular behaviour – or, perhaps, molecular 
misbehaviour – for the cosmos as a whole are unquestionably Miltonian:   
 
order from disorder sprung. 
Swift to their several quarters hasted then 
The cumbrous elements, earth, flood, air, fire; 
And this ethereal quintessence of Heaven 
Flew upward, spirited with various forms, 
That roll’d orbicular, and turned to stars (Milton, p. 185; 3.713 - 18) 
 
Beyond their science, Maxwell had his faith; Tyndall, despite the challenges of agnosticism, his 
belief in the ‘mysteriousness’ and vibrancy of all substance.  Both described a scientific cos-
mology, but in neither formulation does it appear automatically a hateful or nihilistic one.   
Myers, by contrast, writing in the tradition of unmediated materialism (that is, materi-
alism as it was often stereotypically perceived), supplanted Milton’s divine fiat with a new ‘One 
Law’ – a prescription not heavenly, but horrifically, degradingly material – in ‘A Cosmic 
History’, that poem introduced in my first chapter.  In its account of celestial ordering, one at 
once paralleling, and mocking the anthropic presumptuousness of, say, Paradise Lost’s sublime 
and humanistic vision, we encounter a dour and rationalistic updating of this ancient trope, 
one likewise relating how the stars were ‘roll’d orbicular’ (and – now aimlessly – patterned into 
reassuring constellations), but enacted this time in a thoroughly ‘modern’, de-theologised 
universe of energy conservation and impersonal molecular impingements: 
 
 Then lone in space the comet hung; 
  Then waxed the whorls of cloudy glow; 
 Then each on other swept and swung 
  Enormous eddies, formless flow; 
 One Law, one Force, and Manifold, 
  Bestrewed high heaven with sparkling fire, 
Burned in Orion’s belt of gold, 
  And lit the dragon and the Lyre. (p. 187) 
 
Gravitation leads to nebular compaction; compaction to heating; heating to stellar ignition 
and subsequent fluorescence:  this is all true; but it would be hubris itself, the poet insists, to 
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consider such a firmamental spectacle one forged for man’s contentment and delight. 
Tyndall’s cosmology is, on the whole, congruent with that of ‘A Cosmic History’, but 
rarely interpreted, or described, so gloomily.  His treatment of solar hegemony is typical.  Like 
many Victorians, Tyndall, goaded by the tenets of his science, had a veneration for, and a 
fascination with, the sun.  And, alongside Clifford (and many other thinkers, both scientific 
and otherwise), he followed John Herschel – he quoted these lines from Herschel’s Outlines of 
Astronomy (1833) towards the close of his own textbook on Heat (1863) – in observing that ‘[t]he 
sun’s rays are the ultimate source of almost every motion that takes place on the surface of the 
earth’ (p. 237; qtd., p. 526).  Life, ultimately, for Tyndall, was one of those motions; its growth 
and maintenance, like geology, like climatology, a consequence of heat-driven metamorphosis.  
‘In this sense’, he explains in his address on ‘Matter and Force’, ‘we are all “souls of fire and 
children of the sun”’ (FoS, p. 92).   
The allusion, slightly obscure, is likely to the first line of a couplet cited in the Ameri-
can John Prescott’s History of the Conquest of Peru (1847), then a work of considerable renown.  
Prescott had used it in a description of Incan tribal retributivism (p. 153).  Such feral contexts 
are excised in Tyndall’s materialistic re-inscription, though one perhaps persists.  Prescott had 
remarked of Incan belief:  ‘The deity whose worship they especially inculcated, and which 
they never failed to establish wherever their banners were known to penetrate, was the sun.  It 
was he who, in a particular manner, presided over the destinies of man; gave light and warmth 
to the nations, and life to the vegetable world’ (p. 39).  Similarly, in a postscript Tyndall affixed 
to a discursive account he had written of his 1863 ascent of the Jungfrau – one interlaced with 
speculations on the sun’s omnipotence, on the earthly authority of solar radiation – he 
quipped:  ‘Eight years ago I was evidently a sun-worshipper; nor have I yet lost the conviction 
of his ability to do all here ascribed to him. – J. T., 1871’ (Hours, p. 191n).   
Such language is liturgical, an ascription of the potency of Christian divinity to a mate-
rial object:  he is thus, or so it is implied, putting forth a creed at once recidivistic and up-to-
the-moment.  Accordingly, the first half-dozen or so pages of his The Forms of Water (published 
as the premier volume in the International Scientific Series, a selection of texts ‘embodying the 
results of the latest investigations in the various departments of Science at present most 
prominently before the world’ [‘Catalogue’, p. 31], such an honorific or endorsement hinting 
at the importance popularly ascribed to Tyndall’s inquiries), trace a droplet of moisture from 
the ocean to its nominal source, a discussion comparable to that referenced by Clifford in 
Swinburne’s ‘Garden of Persephone’.  But this progress ends neither in morose thanatophilia, 
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nor aquatic dissolution of individual identity, but rather triumphant reconfirmation of the 
sun’s dominion and a concurrent affirmation of the interpretive power of nineteenth-century 
science:  ‘Thus, by tracing backward, without any break in the chain of occurrences, our river 
from its end to its real beginnings [in rain, in glaciers], we come at length to the sun’ (Forms, p. 
6).   
If there is a subtext in Tyndall’s prose, it is an awed solarism akin to this, a leitmotif re-
sounding throughout an astonishing range of compositional contexts and circumstances.  
Nevertheless, even this most purportedly unassailable of doctrines remains a conjecture about 
which he does – from time to time – articulate a fugitive unease, though without ever truly 
shading either scientifically into doubt, or morally into the nihilism of Myers’s cosmic halluci-
nation.  So is it more generally with the scientist and his naturalistic preoccupations.   
In their excellent analyses, both Steven Kim and Ruth Barton try to fix a label to Tyn-
dall’s philosophical stance circa Belfast:  he suggests ‘transcendental materialism’; she, ‘panthe-
ism’.  Both likewise note the admixture within it (with components deemed less ‘idealistic’ 
dominating as 1874 drew close) of antithetical trends:  German Romanticism, Lucretian 
atomism, and so forth.  This is correct, but practically to miss the point.  I suggest that far 
more significant than any interpolated trajectory is the back-and-forthness – the play – of 
Tyndall’s argumentation.  For in many of his writings we encounter precisely that:  internal 
dialogue and debate, an attempt at the working out of contraries, a struggle enacted both 
rhetorically (in the substance and structure of arguments) and linguistically (in the author’s – 
or, sometimes, orator’s – selection and manipulation of allusive contexts and explanatory 
vernaculars).  Hence, I argue that one of the most striking things about most any work by 
Tyndall is its curiously fractal nature, the fashion in which it enacts, in miniature or elabora-
tion, via the embellishment of a peroration or in the studied sobriety of an explanation of 
laboratory procedure, concerns which inform the whole of his oeuvre – as we saw in those 
‘twinned’ addresses at Belfast and Manchester.  Each seems self-similar, in its own peculiar 
way, with the collective, evincing a kind of ‘interchangeability’, encapsulating within its 
paragraphs a lifetime of arguments, concerns, personal prejudices.  Thus, also, the remarkable 
ideological and metaphoric coherence and continuity evident in so much of his writing.   
As pronounced in the Biographical Review of Prominent Men and Women of the Day (an 
American production of 1888, published in Chicago, indicating something of the esteem in 
which Tyndall was held on both sides of the Atlantic):  ‘In a life of the duration of nearly three 
score years and ten, this able man has wielded his pen in the cause of science with a steadiness 
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of purpose and a persistency of will that is worthy of praise and emulation’ (Herringshaw, p. 
408).   
Over that same period this ‘steadiness of purpose’ was coupled, too, with a consistency 
and striking unity of idiosyncratic worldview; and beneath this consistency, we can discern 
always the same roil of discontents, thus discovering another kind of continuity, a topic to be 
addressed at some length in this dissertation’s concluding chapter. 
 
ON THE BEACH:  TYNDALL AS MID-VICTORIAN POET-SCIENTIST 
 
On 28 June 1856, Tyndall was on the South Coast, preparing for an excursion the next day to 
the Isle of Wight, site of geological and ecological interest, home to Tennyson, a retreat from 
the bustle of London life, and, especially after the Queen selected it in the 1840s as the site for 
the construction of her vacation home, a favoured holiday spot for well-to-do and middle-class 
Victorians, men and women who thronged to ports such as Lymington, Bournemouth and 
Portsmouth (themselves already congested with merchants and fishermen) to book passage on 
the many steamers and sailboats which regularly made their brief crossings over The Solent, a 
narrow, salt-water strait separating the island from the mainland.  He had been feeling poorly 
for nearly a week.  It was, moreover, a malaise which seemed, despite all best efforts, unshake-
able – his journal entry for 24 June reports one of several futile attempts at self-repair:  ‘[V]ery 
unwell all day, spent some hours in Kensington Gardens, thence took an omnibus to Wimble-
don, walked round through Wandsworth and home by train[.]  Still felt ill’.  He resolved, 
accordingly, to make a pilgrimage to Wight, what one mid-Victorian guidebook euphorically 
dubbed the ‘Madeira of England, – a sanatorium of the highest repute, and of daily growing 
acceptance to the valetudinarian’ ([Nelson et al.], p. 6).  Tyndall – like many of his compatri-
ots, well aware of the salutary effects of a brief stay on the island, far from the tumult and 
pollution of urban life, and at a remove from the drudgery of professional and personal 
routine – sought also ‘spiritual’ benedictions, the medicine of enlarging landscape, a curative 
beyond those ‘materialistically’ derived from physical exertion or the benefits of Wight’s 
‘climate softer and drier than any in England […]’ (p. 5).   
Lounging adjacent to The Solent he wrote that afternoon a brief note to his friend, 
Mrs Pollock.  In it, we encounter a line of reasoning so compressed, wide-ranging and tele-
graphic – it seems a History of the World in   
! 
10 12  Clauses – that it verges on self-parody:  the 
‘scene setting’ at its onset, a phrase or two of dolorous natural description, a sudden shifting of 
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register from the particular to the great, as his missive swerves, or blunders, unapologetically 
into issues of design, mechanism, the role claimed by science (and, if in unstated opposition, 
philosophy and literature) in the training of an individual’s imagination.  There’s a citation of 
his beloved mentor, a digression into the biological ramifications of physical ordering, a glance 
at the evolution (future and past) of sentience, even an otherworldly peroration – suitably 
‘elevated’, likewise fashioned in perfect miniature – which, as with that at Belfast, evaporates 
into mellifluous literary quotation.  From country pleasantries to cosmic destinies, with a 
dollop of edification in the middle.  (He must have been a maddening correspondent.)  And 
over it all presides the ‘original grand engineer’, that source, ultimately, of terrestrial life and 
light – the sun, whereof all this is accomplished: 
 
Mudeford near Christ Church 
28th. June 1856. 
 
My dear Mrs Pollock, 
 
 Miss Herries’s note, but not her book, has reached me this morning.  I shall be in London on 
Wednesday next, and my first act after I return will be to attend to her request.  I am trying to be idle 
here for a week, and thus to permit my brain and muscles to regain their normal toughness.  At my 
feet is the sea, splashing and booming and causing the pebbles to rattle up and down along the beach.  
Right opposite are the white cliffs of Alum Bay [on Wight], it seems that I could swim to them with 
ease, and yet I am told they are eight miles off.  What glorious weather this is, the central day is hot, 
but the morning and evening are delicious; the deep quiet, and the perfume of the honeysuckle and 
beanflowers are a slight improvement upon the growls and gully holes of London.  I wonder does 
science really injure a man’s imagination?  Sometimes when looking at the sprouting flowers I endeav-
our to follow the mechanical action of the sunbeams upon the atoms of matter whereby they are 
caused to arrange themselves into these beautiful structures, and to die their petals in these splendid 
colours.  You remember Mr. Faraday’s experiment with the iron filings which you liked so much.  
These iron filings when acted on by a magnet, moved towards each other and clung together in a 
peculiar manner.  The sunbeams appear to act in a somewhat similar manner:  they shake up the 
particles of matter and cause them to arrange according to certain laws, and the result being the 
formation of grass, gooseberries, and flowers.  We eat the gooseberries; but the grass is too much for us 
and so we cunningly submit it first to the digestive apparatus of the ox and sheep; but the sun is still the 
original grand engineer to whom we owe the architecture of our bodies.  Behind these of course are 
the questions which beset us now, but which are perhaps to be answered by a race of beings bearing 
the same relation to us that we do to the tadpole and [?].  The vision which is rudimentary in us may 
in them be developed into perfect day:  and thus 
 
 “The something in this world amiss 
 May be unravelled by and by” 
 
I will not afflict you longer – goodbye[.] 
 
    Yours ever sincerely, 
     John Tyndall 
 
Those ‘questions which beset us now’ are, of course, the very ones set forth in the finale at 
Belfast, and to which Hinton made his own fervent reply. 
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The ‘particles of matter’ shaken by sunlight, set to molecular jiggling by the imparting 
of heat (a mode of motion inducing motion); the rhetorical evasion of ‘somewhat similar’ 
(magnetic flux dispersing and reorienting ‘iron filings’ along lines of force:  a coldly ‘mechani-
cal’ affair, as most would consent.  But can the same be said, without quibble, of the actions of 
radiant light, of solar energy, on those germ-stuffs yielding ‘grass, gooseberries, and flowers’?); 
the inspecificity of ‘certain laws’ (they exist, he insists, but remain pragmatically unsketched); 
the evocation of a Jovian over-presence for the sun, God-like in ‘his’ ability to draft and 
animate mammalian ‘architecture’, to shape organic existence:  these are recurrent themes 
and phrasings, the rhetorical-cum-argumentative atoms comprising Tyndall’s own structures of 
explanation.   
And they are, as ever, set in an overall narrative of change, of death and life and death 
again, of long darkness followed by rapturous dawning:  of literal light, of metaphoric enlight-
enment.  Tyndall’s letter becomes an evolutionary progress, morphing amoebas into humans, 
exalting humans into bafflingly unknown – or, ominously, superseding them by wholly alien – 
species or races of superior intelligence.  These, too, were among his (and materialism’s) 
emblematic themes; as said by Mallock of one of Darnley’s speeches:  ‘He showed them how 
viewed by modern science, all existence is a chain, with a gas at one end and no one knows 
what at the other; and how Humanity is a link somewhere; but – holy and awful thought! – we 
can none of us tell where’ (Paul, pp. 17 - 18).  Similarly, Tyndall’s slight, and partial, misquota-
tion of Tennyson’s ‘The Miller’s Daughter’ – the original reads:  ‘There’s somewhat in this 
world amiss / Shall be unriddled by and by. / There’s somewhat flows to us in life, / But 
more is taken quite away’ (p. 373), lines which associate human existence with irretrievable 
loss, with the transience of earthly adoration – emphasises, by contrast, the speculating 
scientist’s underlying hopefulness (he looks forward to a time when a problem is solved, not a 
truth painfully learnt), even as his accidental emendation (‘unravelled’ for ‘unriddled’) subtly 
entangles this discourse amidst the warp and woof of Carlylean ‘weaving’ metaphors. 
Three days later, Tyndall, returned from Wight with health fully restored, added a 
brief (and atypically buoyant) entry to his daily journal; it read, in part:  ‘Walked to Bourne-
mouth:  spreading plaid on the pebbles and lay there for nearly two hours watching the 
roaring waves, and writing the above […].  Felt unusually strong’ (Journal, 1 July 1856). 
He was referring to a chronicle he had written of his trip, an account in the form of 
several hundred lines of (reasonably) accomplished blank verse, much of which had evidently 
been subjected to extensive revision.  Interesting for a number of reasons, most compelling is 
- 131 - 
the focus it places on the role, if any, to be played by abstract literary imagination in the 
framing, and popular elaboration, of his evolving system of ‘scientifically derived’ aesthetics, 
an approach to perceiving and understanding the phenomena of the physical world which 
Tyndall thought non-theological, though hardly non-spiritual, in terms of its essential pre-
sumptions.   
Such an antithesis merely restates Huxley’s perspicacious verdict on Sartor Resartus:  a 
work which had abetted his own realisation that ‘a deep sense of religion was compatible with 
the entire absence of theology’ (Letter, p. 220).  ‘My friend’, he later noted of Tyndall’s 
relationship with the author of that volume, ‘was disposed to regard Carlyle as a great teacher; 
I was rather disposed to take him as a great tonic; as a source of intellectual invigoration and 
moral stimulus and refreshment, rather than of theoretical or practical guidance’ (‘Professor’, 
p. 3) – as we shall see, however, Tyndall was in fact prone to regard Carlyle as a bit of both 
simultaneously, prophetic instructor as well as instructing prophet. 
 There have been, since the mid-1800s, a wide range of studies and appreciations of 
Tyndall, a figure who was, after all, a ‘personality’ of so many interests, a media-darling before 
there even was such a concept, profligate in both publications and the friendships he culti-
vated.  Mid-Victorian pamphleteers and journalists attacked him as an unrepentant material-
ist; Jeans approached him as a propagandist for science and electrical engineer; Huxley, as a 
confidante and comrade-in-arms.  He merited two obituaries in The Alpine Journal:  one on his 
function as scientist (by ‘H. D.’); another, on his achievements as a mountaineer (by C. E. 
Mathews).  Eve and Creasey – co-authors of the biography The Life and Works of John Tyndall 
(1945), a project of several decades’ gestation partly overseen by the scientist’s widow – 
described him with the respectful caution, and nostalgia, of the eulogiser.  Modern academics 
have tended to study the man as cultural phenomenon first and foremost, perhaps inadver-
tently perpetuating the unkind appraisal put forth by Oliver Lodge in the 10th edition of the 
Encyclopædia Britannica.  (This, though, was considerably softened – by the editors – in time for 
the mighty 11th.)  Tyndall’s ‘scientific achievements were none of them of the very first 
magnitude’, he averred, ‘it was not so much what he did as who he was that is of permanent 
interest […]’ (p. 520). 
 Inevitably, a subtly ‘different’ Tyndall to such synoptic summations becomes apparent 
in the ‘journal entry’, the final drafting of which, posted to Mrs Pollock, was dated 18 July 
1856.  For above all else, this account composed, revised, and diligently recopied, of a journey 
to Wight on 30 June 1856 accentuates ordinariness, depicting a ‘nice enough’ fellow trying to 
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pursue his interests amid a bustle of others all trying to pursue theirs.  (Paul Sawyer’s pleasing 
contention is thus provided with fascinating – and generous – support:  ‘In so many ways 
[was] Tyndall […] a Victorian, often to a platitudinous degree’, he wrote in ‘Ruskin and 
Tyndall’ [p. 228].)  Though hardly a dense poem, it seems a deep one, a superficial placidity 
of surface texture – and a degree of critical translucency – allowing clear apprehension of 
elaborate, submerged matrices of social and literary convention.  We note, for instance, 
behind its pages, and often only barely overwritten (or suppressed?), ancillary texts, literary 
and otherwise, documenting diverse mid-nineteenth-century traditions and norms:  geological 
primers and Thomas Cook’s illustrated travel brochures; Sartor Resartus and paddle-steamer 
timetables; well-thumbed accounts of Helmholtz’s scientific lectures and leather-bound 
editions of Keats’s collected verse.  It is similarly, and with like inevitability, a palimpsest of its 
author’s considerable erudition, particularly in literature.  Always one ‘keenly alive to the 
influence of poetry […]’, as Eve and Creasey tell us, he ‘loved to learn long pieces which he 
used to recite to himself when walking and of which he used to speak “as a stimulant much 
better than wine”’ (p. 286).   
 A telling précis of a few of his favourite authors was provided by Louisa Charlotte 
Hamilton Tyndall, the scientist’s widow, in notes prepared for Jonathan Hutchinson not long 
after her husband’s tragic death:  ‘Shelley, Byron, Keats, Wordsworth, Cowper, Campbell, 
Burns, were all laid under contribution – to say nothing of the German poets [particularly 
Goethe], in whom he took great delight.  But perhaps the bits most frequently quoted [by 
him], and serving as a perpetual source of inspiration, were passages from Tennyson and the 
American poet Emerson’ (qtd. in LWJT, p. 286).  Several of these influences are recognisable 
in this lively, magpieing account. 
 A sense of its vibrancy as cultural document – and a demonstration of Tyndall’s uneasy 
‘fitted-ness’ in proletarian society – can be gleaned from its telling of the frenzied first few 
minutes of his stay.  Full of anarchic or improbable incident, overloaded with a wealth of 
evocative and clearly seen descriptive detail, this section of narrative seems also to provide 
ample evidence of sociological disjunction (is Tyndall’s tone one of bemusement or, as I 
suspect, palpable distress?), showing a man unmoored from mundanity, caterwauling at the 
intransigency or indifference to ‘lofty’ naturalism of ordinary folk.  Having disembarked, he 
tells us, the scientist busied himself inspecting the geological curiosities presented by the rock 
formations ringing Alum Bay:  ‘the courses of the flint, / Running contorted through the 
massive chalk, / Which too had suffered through the mighty jerk / That set the neighbouring 
- 133 - 
sandstone cliffs on edge’.  Intrigued next by the prospect of a sea-hollowed cave, he rushed 
within, trustingly abandoning his scarf near its entryway – and unwisely so:  it is quickly 
pilfered by ‘two yellow boys / Yellow with dirt and tan […]’ (‘DP’, p. [4]).  Having retrieved 
his scarf – the youths, variously described by Tyndall (equivocating diplomatically about the 
innateness of criminality) as ‘varlets’ and ‘urchins’, on whose faces ‘the natural law or evil use 
/ Had written foul expression […]’ (p. [5]), were surprised by the scientist’s ranging gait – he 
and his companions entered the grotto, only to be roused from duly sedulous contemplation of 
its semi-aquatic flora by the sound of ‘lower-class’ mockery (these are lines excised from the 
manuscript sent to Mrs Pollock):  ‘Two stranger maids were near us at the time; / One 
stooped and raised a leaf and holding high / The dripping shred, exclaimed in accents coarse 
/ “What can she [Mrs Wright] want with rubbish such as this”?’ (‘DP’ [1], p. [5]).  By turns 
flirtatious, naïve, prejudiced, ingenious, arrogant, quixotic, enraptured and awesomely stub-
born, keenly aware of both the nuances of his own personality and his own at times exceed-
ingly specialised desires, often wilfully oblivious to those of the dozens (and, on several in-
stances, hundreds) of others around him, fellow travellers – or tourists, a differentiation then 
becoming semantically charged (Buzard, p. 1) – and local residents alike, this lengthy work 
reveals the man in delightful complexity, showing Tyndall away from the podium, outwith the 
comforting chumminess of his London circle. 
 For the Isle was decidedly no annex to the RI’s cloistered laboratories, though rather 
too frequently it seems as if Tyndall tried to treat it as such, and it is this disparity, this jarring 
incongruity between actions and surround, which gives rise to a good deal of the comedy 
present in the poem.  Of these episodes the majority seem frivolous and warm-hearted.   
 In a description of one young beauty, Tyndall quips, his rhyming couplet ranging in its 
diction from sub-Pyramus and Thisbee to strict Newtonian proportionality:  ‘Oh Light!  oh 
Sound!  Oh Beauty rich and rare, / Diminishing inversely as the Square’ (‘DP’, p. [11]).  But 
some feel of more dissonant pitch, tinged with desperation, veering towards pathos or mono-
mania.   
 After an account of souring banter with an attractive barmaid – he repeatedly fixates 
on her ‘creamy’ or ‘milky’ complexion – Tyndall falls to whimsical lamentations on the 
weighty lot of the harried scientific professional, envying the ‘simpler state’ of a local porter 
sitting nearby.  Yet, even in so doing, his phrasing remains that of the materialist on holiday.  
He dissects a public house into Euclidean planes and foci, figures the glow of a woman’s face 
in terms of optic wavelengths:  
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athwart the tavern bar  
 I see a bagman puffing a cigar. 
 Oh! jolly Day – like you to linger here 
 I’d give up chemistry and take to beer, 
 Banish la lampe electrique from my sight. 
 To make experiments on other light;  
 And hold the red end of the spectrum low, 
 If placed in competition with the glow 
 Of cream and coral, now concentered where 
 The plane of the first lobby cuts the stair.  (‘DP’, p. [11]) 
 
All things considered, it would seem that if the Victorian naturalist was – to some minds – the 
apotheosis of his society, he was also, at times, its antithesis, too, lonely and misunderstood.   
 Beyond such instances of sociological suggestiveness, far more telling (for the purposes 
of this study) is the additional light which Tyndall’s verse-narrative sheds on the sometimes 
contradictory impulses defining the intellectual range of his own personal ideology.  For in it, 
we are offered glimpses – though hardly a cipher, unwilling or incapable of voicing his own 
discontents and influences, these seem even by his standards particularly unimpeded – of his 
abiding affection for Romanticism; of the epistemological bases underlying a number of his 
most earnest rationalisations for the love-hate nature of his relationship with stringent scien-
tific materialism; of the close, albeit volatile, affiliations (at times alternating almost willy-nilly 
in tone between the contentious and the cordial) he cultivated with – and laboured assiduously 
to maintain, through regular meetings and a voluminous correspondence – several pre-
eminent figures in nineteenth-century letters, and so forth.  He was to count among his 
confidantes Ralph Waldo Emerson and, of course, Tennyson himself.  (At their first meeting, 
Tyndall recalls, the poet was pleased to discover that the scientist did not number among 
‘those who disdain to quote Maud’ [qtd. in LWJT, p. 75].)   
 It is, however, to Tyndall’s relationship with Thomas Carlyle, sage-like theorist of 
historical and social energies and triumphant recipient (at least by proxy, in the person of his 
Prof. Diogenes Teufelsdröckh) of a ‘Spiritual New-birth’ – a sacrament of mystical renewal 
and ethical reconfirmation he called (in a famous, if slightly impenetrable, phrase) a 
‘Bathometric Fire Baptism’ (Sartor, p. 129) – that we now turn.   
 
TWIN PROPHETS OF THE COSMOS AS STEAM-ENGINE? 
 
‘The mistake, not infrequently made’, Tyndall explains near the conclusion of ‘Personal 
Recollections of Thomas Carlyle’, 
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of supposing Carlyle’s mind to be unscientific, may be further glanced at here.  The scientific reader of 
his works must have noticed the surprising accuracy of the metaphors he derived from Science.  
Without sound knowledge such uniform exactitude would not have been possible.  He laid the whole 
body of the sciences under contribution – Astronomy, from the nebular theory onwards; mathematics, 
physics, chemistry, geology, natural history – drawing illustrations from all of them, grinding the 
appropriate parts of each of them into paint for his marvellous pictures.  (NF, p. 385)   
 
Frank Turner, in ‘Victorian Scientific Naturalism and Thomas Carlyle’, concurs with Tyn-
dall’s (perhaps biased, one suspects, by friendship and long familiarity) opinions in this regard:  
‘He [Carlyle]’, Turner explains, ‘was anything but ignorant of physical science […].  He had 
translated encyclopaedia articles on scientific topics and had reviewed scientific books.  His use 
of scientific metaphors was frequent and exact’ (p. 328).   
Tyndall, though anxious to reclaim an often wayward soul for the noble cause of his 
profession, nonetheless still recognised that the fit between materialistic natural philosophy 
and the worldview espoused by Carlyle was far from perfect.  Turner has described Carlyle’s 
attitude to such beliefs as, at the best of times, ‘ambiguous’ (p. 328), while one nineteenth-
century commentator went so far as to say that ‘[e]verything like [scientific] analysis was 
repugnant to him’ ([Call], p. 486).  Tyndall’s writings, however, demonstrate the lengths to 
which the scientist would go to smooth over such problematic joins.  ‘Yes, Friends’, Carlyle’s 
Teufelsdröckh announces in Sartor Resartus, ‘not our Logical, Mensurative faculty, but our 
Imaginative one is King over us […]’ (pp. 167 - 68).   
These are lines which Tyndall passes over with the observation that it was not the 
methods and (duly qualified) assertions of mid-Victorian natural history and natural philoso-
phy in and of themselves to which their author objected (one common interpretation); rather, 
‘[i]t was the illegitimate science which, in its claims, overstepped its warrant – professing to 
explain everything, and to sweep the universe clear of mystery – that was really repugnant to 
Carlyle’ (NF, p. 388).   
Moreover, how could Carlyle be deemed unscientific, reasoned Tyndall, if he, in a 
sense, could be given the ‘credit of poetically, but accurately, foreshadowing the doctrine of 
the Conservation of Energy’ (NF, p. 386)?  That justly famed, globally synthesising physical 
‘doctrine’, an abstract statement of universal principle, encompasses, as discussed in my first 
chapter, in the cold equations of its formalism a range of cosmological (and spiritual) conse-
quences both fundamental and profound; it is a precept which, in any survey of Tyndall’s 
scientific philosophy, must be granted – even over the theory of Darwinian competitive 
evolution – absolute pride of place. 
As a notably conscientious man of science well acquainted with the both long and by 
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no means uncomplicated history of the slow progress and often only reluctant assimilation of 
such novel discoveries into the folds of paradigmatically ‘normal’ thought, Tyndall recognised 
that the philosophical heritage of the First Law could, of course, be traced back quite easily to 
an era predating, not only that of Carlyle, but even that of Francis Bacon himself, who, in The 
Advancement of Learning, had postulated:  ‘Is not the observation, Omnia mutantur, nil interit [every-
thing changes, nothing dies], a contemplation in philosophy thus, that the quantum of energy is 
eternal? […]’ (pp. 84 - 85).  Such an eerily prescient sentiment – particularly in its use of the 
word ‘quantum’, a linguistic talisman almost fetishistically associated by many modern intel-
lectual historians with the sub-atomic theorems of the early and mid-twentieth century – still 
does not, however, ‘make Francis Bacon’, as Greg Myers has joked, ‘the discoverer of conser-
vation of energy, as some of the more eager anglophiles in nineteenth-century priority debates 
claimed’ (‘Nineteenth’, p. 38).  (Nor of quantum mechanics, he might have added.) 
Indeed, in Heat:  A Mode of Motion, Tyndall found the genesis of that basic thermody-
namic precept in ancient Hebraic lore:  ‘This law [of energy conservation] generalises the 
aphorism of Solomon, that there is nothing new under the sun, by teaching us to detect 
everywhere, under its infinite variety of appearances, the same primeval forces’ (p. 503).  
What, however, inspired the scientist to trace its genealogy not merely in rehabilitated Biblical 
commonplaces, nor even the collected papers of Joule and Mayer, but also the ramblings of 
Carlyle’s clothes-addled Teufelsdröckh?   
‘Harking back to 1831’ – a year, Tyndall elaborates a bit further on, in which, for all 
intents and purposes, that pair of pioneering thermodynamic theorists must be considered as 
yet ‘scientifically unborn’ – ‘we find him [Carlyle] at Craigenputtock, drawing this picture 
[…]’ (NF, p. 386):2 
 
As I rode through the Schwarzwald, I said to myself; That little fire which glows star-like across the 
dark-growing […] moor, where the sooty smith bends over his anvil, and thou hopest to replace thy 
lost horse-shoe, – is it a detached, separated speck, cut off from the whole universe; or indissolubly 
joined to the whole?  Thou fool, that smithy-fire was (primarily) kindled at the sun; is fed by air that 
circulates from before Noah’s Deluge, from beyond the Dogstar [Sirius]; therein, with Iron Force, and 
                                                
2  Moreover, it was science – as Tyndall slyly suggests in Heat:  A Mode of Motion – that has been the human 
enterprise that has come closest (in 1792 – a quarter-century, in other words, before Carlyle ever put pen to 
paper) to providing the world with a bone fide Teufelsdröckh, ‘the indefatigable [Count Benjamin] Rumford 
[…]’.  Rumford, however, predicated his studies, not on wildly discursive literary and anthropological specula-
tion, but rather ‘an elaborate series of experiments on the conductivity of the substances used in clothing’ (p. 
217).   
Although I cannot be entirely certain that Tyndall was solely responsible for the preparation of the excellent 
index for this volume, I can only imagine that it was to him a source of great amusement to have this particular 
sub-section referenced under the heading:  ‘Clothes, their philosophy […]’ (p. 507). 
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Coal Force, and far stronger Force of Man, are cunning affinities and battles and victories of Force 
brought about:  it is a little ganglion, or nervous centre, in the great vital system of Immensity.   
(Sartor, pp. 55 - 56) 
 
‘With its parts in “æterne alternation”, Tyndall goes on to say, the whole of ‘the universe 
presented itself to the mind of Carlyle’ (NF, p. 386); he perceived an interconnected world 
inconceivable in its vastness, one of flux, recapitulation and transformation, of ceaselessly 
circulating processes, but never spontaneous caprice or creation.  The cosmic gavotte Carlyle 
envisaged encompassed all scales, from homely (‘that smithy-fire’) to celestial (‘kindled at the 
sun’), even as it ranged fully over both axes of abstract mensuration, temporal (‘from before 
Noah’s Deluge’) as well as spatial (‘from beyond the Dogstar’).   
Tyndall, in his essay, quotes this passage, though only up to the phrase ‘kindled at the 
sun’, just past the interrogative, excising in the process Carlyle’s allusions to air ‘beyond the 
Dogstar’ and ‘Noah’s Deluge’ (see NF, p. 386).  I suspect the reason for his not citing these 
latter two qualifiers – despite the fact that they metaphorically cohere with his own grand 
conceptions of the explanatory scope throughout all space and time of thermodynamic 
calculus – can be in part attributed to the fact that they, from a strictly materialistic perspec-
tive, have only a poetic truth about them.  Tyndall, of course, was no fan of the Bridgewater 
Treatises, those curious attempts, in the 1830s and ’40s, at establishing ‘that Natural Theology 
was itself a science, and that it had a place within Christian Theology’ (Robson, p. 77); let 
alone did he abide more heavy-handed efforts at proving begrudging accommodation be-
tween Revealed historiography and dug-up palaeontology:  thus, no deluge for him, Noachic 
or otherwise.  Nor would he ever have allowed air (the ether, perhaps, but not breathable air) 
to circulate freely through sidereal space – an attenuated vacuum, according to science.   
Nevertheless, while they may have disagreed about specifics, he, like Carlyle, believed 
wholeheartedly in the interconnectedness of phenomena.  Carlyle’s achievement, Tyndall 
suggests, was providing a contemporary literary and philosophical context for a scientific 
understanding of such a ‘primeval’ force’s mutable nature, and, even more significantly, for 
suggesting something of the wholly self-enclosed ‘anatomy’ of our world’s (and, by materialis-
tic extension, our universe’s) network of thermodynamic exchange, of the fact that everything, 
by definition, is inextricably enmeshed, a ‘ganglion’ within ‘the great vital system of Immen-
sity’.  Indeed, such an overarching belief in continuity, Tyndall speculates, is what allowed a 
man like Carlyle, despite his preternatural, even knee-jerk, ‘dislike of anything savouring of 
materialism […]’ (NF, p. 374), to nonetheless concede the rightness of his observations about 
the illogic behind the concept of spontaneous generation; hence, ‘the conclusion to which […] 
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[Tyndall’s] experiments [on spontaneous generation] pointed’, he explains, ‘that life was 
derived from antecedent life, and was not generated from dead matter, fell in with his 
[Carlyle’s] notions of the fitness of things.  Instead therefore of repelling him, the experiments 
gave him pleasure’ (p. 351). 
 In parallel with this process of scientific rehabilitation, Tyndall engages in a spot of 
moral redaction as well.  ‘And now I come to the charge so frequently made against him 
[Carlyle], that he was the apostle of Might’, Tyndall, persisting in the role of impromptu 
apologist, writes in ‘On Unveiling the Statue of Thomas Carlyle’ (NF, p. 396).  Certainly, he 
concedes, martial virtues were prominent in the man’s philosophy – Darwin, for one, could 
fixate on little else; in his Autobiography he recalled that Carlyle’s ‘views on slavery were revolt-
ing.  In his mind might was right’ (p. 67) – but such prominence, Tyndall insists, was the result 
primarily of a sense of cultural pragmatism combined with a keen awareness of history, not 
inherent bellicosity.  More than that, in Carlyle there remained an overriding assumption that, 
on a meta-historical level, strength – military or otherwise – is only efficacious if coupled with 
moral steadfastness and good virtue. 
The scientist dedicated the dozen or so lines concluding his poem ‘A Morning on Alp 
Lusgen’ to making this point, if somewhat oddly (through decidedly martial analogies and a 
sideways glance at Napoleon): 
  
 You [Carlyle] spoke of Might and Right; and many a shaft 
 Barbed with the sneer, ‘He preaches force – brute force,’ 
 Has rattled on your shield.  But well you knew, 
 Might, to be Might, must base itself on Right, 
 Or vanish evanescent as the deeds  
 Of France’s Emperor.  Reflect on this,  
 Ye temporary darlings of the crowd. 
 To-day ye may have peans [sic] in your ears; 
 To-morrow ye lie rotten, if your work 
 Lack that true core which gives to Might and Right 
 One meaning in the end. (NF, p. 500) 
 
Tyndall justifies such a cheering interpretative slant by allusion to an assertion in Carlyle’s 
Chartism (1839), made in the text by another in the author’s pantheon of fictitious interlocutors, 
a ‘Herr Professor Sauerteig’:  ‘Might and Right do differ frightfully from hour to hour; but 
give them centuries to try it in, they are found to be identical’ (pp. 158 - 59; qtd. in NF, p. 
396).  But, ultimately, for Tyndall, it is the precepts of evolutionary theory, not those of 
economic, social or political philosophy, which confirm the propriety of Sauerteig’s/Carlyle’s 
‘melioristic’ historiography:  ‘[A]dvocacy of Might is not, in the abstract, offensive’, he writes, 
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‘for it meant at bottom the assertion that, in the end, that only is mighty which has the “Law 
of the Universe” on its side.  With Carlyle, as with Empedocles, Lucretius, and Darwin, the Fit 
survive’ (NF, p. 396).   
His historical evolution, however, despite Tyndall’s best efforts to reinterpret it other-
wise, seems, if anything, proto-Lamarckian, guided by will and consensus, not aleatoric 
sequences of mutation, accidents of fertility or auspicious circumstance.  Similarly, Carlyle’s 
‘energy’ was not materialism’s.  Nor was his ‘force’, at least not fundamentally.   Rather the 
presence of such terms in, say, Sartor Resartus’s sartorial-aesthetic vocabulary – as Holloway 
observes in The Victorian Sage:  ‘Time and again Carlyle’s images are of some power or force or 
energy, disorderly perhaps, but passionate, violent, irrepressible’ (p. 28) – served to articulate 
Carlyle’s belief in, beyond matter and the measurable, things – essential things – non-material 
and stupendous.  Through constant iteration, like Homeric epithets, words and images such as 
these accumulate significance, becoming refrains and responses, the recruiting slogans for a 
cosmological sect repudiating, on one level, mechanistic interpretations of lived reality, while 
conceding, on another, a local, pragmatic utility for such interpretations; always they function 
to pose the insistent question:  ‘Are we not spirits, shaped into a body, into an Appearance; 
and that fade away’ – Teufelsdröckh’s language here melting into that of The Tempest’s solilo-
quy, itself quoted at the end of ‘Natural Supernaturalism’ (the keystone chapter in Sartor 
Resartus) – ‘again into air, and Indivisibility?’ (p. 200).   
Tyndall’s readings, and handlings, of Carlylean argumentation, in other words, can 
seem selective and incomplete, even dishonest.  Sawyer makes this point as well, asking the 
apposite, if rhetorical, question:  ‘In his readiness to exchange Carlyle’s metaphors for scien-
tific terms – Energy for Force, or the philosophy of Might for the survival of the fittest, or the 
Unity of All for the Conservation of Energy – does Tyndall sacrifice the emotional power of 
the original vision and reduce both science and religion in the process?’ (p. 241). 
Carlyle was inconsolably terrified by the prospect of an ateleological universe (a possi-
bility precipitating ‘The Everlasting “No”’ which had reduced Prof. Teufelsdröckh to dejec-
tion, and near suicide).  He judged such a purposeless world, one beyond the reach of human 
agency and, apparently, malignly oblivious to all common concerns, ‘unendurable’, a ‘perma-
nent Injustice’ visited by ‘an Infinite Power’, and counselled: 
 
If men had lost belief in a God, their only resource against a blind No-God, of Necessity and Mecha-
nism, that held them like a hideous World-Steamengine, like a hideous Phalaris’ Bull [a fabled method 
of torture and execution], imprisoned in its own iron belly, would be, with or without hope, – revolt.  
They could, as Novalis says, by a ‘simultaneous universal act of suicide,’ depart out of the World-
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Steamengine; and end, if not in victory, yet in invincibility, and unsubduable protest that such World-
Steamengine was a failure and a stupidity.  (Chartism, p. 134) 
 
Loss of faith in God is here – a characteristic equation in the writings of Carlyle – a proxy for 
the failure of divine Providence, for modern science’s enervating revelation of a world 
incommensurable with older or more humanistic concerns.  It is, in effect, a shorthand for the 
universe of philosophical materialism, a cosmos of the specification popularly, if in large 
measure misleadingly, associated with the names of John Tyndall and Charles Darwin, 
Herbert Spencer and T. H. Huxley.   
Carlyle, obviously, was never able to respond to Tyndall’s acts – in poetry, and such 
articles as ‘Personal Recollections’ – of posthumous reinterpretation.  If he had, no doubt he 
would have reprimanded Tyndall, perhaps reiterating the reproachful words of 
Teufelsdröckh:  ‘We speak of the Volume of Nature:  and truly a Volume it is, – whose Author 
and Writer is God.  To read it!  Dost thou, does man, so much as well know the Alphabet 
thereof?’ (Sartor, p. 195).  Tyndall, earlier in life, had answered Carlyle’s challenge with a trace 
of triumphalism.  In a journal entry from 1848, he reiterated an explanation he had given his 
students at Queenwood College when asked about his decision to pursue a doctorate at the 
University of Marburg:  ‘[W]hat are sun, stars, science, chemistry, geology, mathematics, but 
pages of a book whose author is God!  I want to know the meaning of this book, to penetrate 
the spirit of this author and if I fail then are my scientific attainments apple rinds without a 
core’ (qtd. in Barton, p. 127).   
Long before the time of his Address at Belfast, however, such hubris had been chas-
tened into something approaching humility, his deistic certainty into winsome nostalgia for 
lost theological consensus; his stance had begun to evince both guardedness about the possibil-
ity of unimpeachable physical knowledge and ceaseless acknowledgement of the human need 
for something more than unimpeachable physical knowledge.   
A letter written 17 April 1859, seven months prior to the first edition of The Origin, that 
hinge of nineteenth-century thought, gives particularly unambiguous voice to these ‘Carlylean’ 
reservations about materialism’s adequacy as guiding doctrine.  Telling of Tyndall’s peregrina-
tions on another restorative holiday, this time in the Lake District, where topographies can 
seem ghosted through with an ineffable aura of transcendentalism, it finishes in a diminutive 
peroration evoking obliquely the ‘spinning’ symbology of Thomas Carlyle.  In his writings, the 
loom, a (too obvious) totem of incipient modernity and material improvement, becomes also, 
and relatedly, an icon, on a corporeal level, of dehumanising industrial machineries.  On a 
- 141 - 
non-corporeal one, cloth, the loom’s output, becomes an agnate – equally loaded – symbol: 
simultaneously, a metaphor for the integrity and deep connectedness of the cosmological 
‘fabric’, and a metonym for the inseparable (if, potentially, hoodwinking) interweaves consti-
tuting the ‘smooth’ manifold of Newtonian 4-D ‘spacetime’.  ‘[Y]our two grand fundamental 
world-enveloping Appearances, SPACE and TIME […]’, Teufelsdröckh says of these homolo-
gies, ‘spun and woven for us from before birth itself, to clothe our celestial ME for dwelling 
here, and yet to blind it, – [which] lie all-embracing, as the universal canvass, or warp and 
woof, whereby all minor Illusions, in this Phantom Existence, weave and paint’ (Sartor, p. 197).   
 ‘[T]here was something in the nature of the light which gave the mountain 
[Helvellyn] a light and unsubstantial appearance’, Tyndall’s Lakeland missive concludes (his 
phrasing once again deliberately evoking both Sartor Resartus and Prospero’s peerless speech), 
‘as if it indeed consisted of ether in a slightly more condensed form […].  There is something 
in this universe different from the spinning of cotton, different also from the investigation of 
mere physical law.  But I wont [sic] moralize’ (Letter, 17 April 1859, pp. 1957 - 58).  
Teufelsdröckh had similarly rebelled, denouncing those who insist, following (among others) 
the reductive materialism of de la Mettrie’s L’Homme machine (1748), that human life – more 
pointedly, that human sentience – was the production of a physiological clockwork; he raged 
against the conjecture that ‘I am a mere Work-Machine, for whom the divine gift of thought 
were no other than the terrestrial gift of Steam is to the steam-engine; a power whereby cotton 
might be spun […]’ (Sartor, p. 196).   
The scientist’s chastened, even flustered ‘apology’ for inadvertently donning mid-letter 
a garment entirely inappropriate for the preening naturalist, those worn vestments – flaunted 
by C. H. Hinton, among countless other contemporary intellectuals – of ‘humanistic’ or 
‘spiritual’ distress, shows that, on occasion, both he and Carlyle/Teufelsdröckh were wont to 
frequent the same tailor. 
 
FIRST MAN AS TYPE OF SMITH 
 
Despite the persistence – and ineradicability – of difference, the scientist was always one to 
idolise Carlyle.  His influence – and that of his writings – is inescapable in Tyndall’s thought.  
As Gillian Beer has noted:  ‘Metaphor, translation, chiasmus, heterogeneity of reference:   
such are the modes by whose means Carlyle translates the reader from the fixed grid of here 
and now’ (OF, p. 207).  These are techniques, particularly evident in less rote or ‘procedural’ 
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specimens of his prose, which Tyndall seems to have internalised as well, presumably in part 
through literary encounters with the Sage of Chelsea.  The Belfast Address, for instance, a 
survey of materialism beginning in pre-history and culminating in that sacred moment of the 
scientist’s oration, invites comparison with Sartor Resartus’s overview of ‘clothes philosophy’, 
incorporating such Carlylean rhetorical devices as an interpolated dialogue between a disciple 
of Lucretius and Bishop Butler, demonstrating a comparable polyglot multiculturalism in its 
resources.   
 In addition, it derives its spiritual and ethical underpinnings, admittedly to subtly 
divergent effect, from the same ‘German Renaissance’ philosophers and thinkers – Fichte, 
Schiller, Goethe – that had been so vital, earlier in the century, in restoring ‘faith’ to a quest-
ing Carlyle.  That faith, theretofore compromised, was ‘in a transcendent spiritual order which 
underlay the apparent world and gave it whatever reality it might possess’ (Le Quesne, p. 18) – 
and it was existentially vital to Tyndall, too, and often equally under threat, even after decades 
of ‘materialistic’ progress.   
Herr Prof. Teufelsdröckh’s lonely walk across a benighted Schwarzwald likewise made 
a tremendous impression on the scientist, as did his apprehension, in the gloaming, of that 
forlorn ‘fire which glows star-like across the dark-growing […] moor, where the sooty smith 
bends over his anvil’ (p. 55).  For, like heat-energy itself (mutable in manifestation, thrown off 
from the smithy and subsumed by the night-time air), kindred thermal allegories circulate and 
re-circulate throughout much of Tyndall’s prose, both expository and descriptive, recuperat-
ing and making literal Carlyle’s own penchant for fiery metaphor.  Far more than sparks fly 
from a blacksmith’s anvil, it seems, and blacksmithery – the tempering and shaping of malle-
able metals, achieved through a carefully mediated commingling of natural agency and 
strenuous effort (at once abstract and intellectual as well as back-breaking and menial) – 
becomes an unmistakably meticulous motif recurring prominently throughout the scientist’s 
symbolic vocabulary. 
 And aptly so, in a world verifiably remade through the joint agency of steel and steam:  
witness its paddle-boats and railways and sewage pumping stations.  (We observe, for instance, 
in Tyndall’s poetic description of his trip to Wight, a document once again casting splendid 
illumination on aspects of common social experience, the rapid onset around mid-century of 
adolescence in the ‘new economy’ founded on mass-tourism, a wide-ranging cultural trans-
formation predicated, in part, on the technological harnessing of heat:  ‘We reached the 
steamer [in Lymington] where with heart of fire / Beside the quay she lay.  A human swarm / 
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Already filled her decks, and we to swell / The throng stepped forward […]’ [‘DP’, p. [2]].)  
Strikingly, Faraday, Tyndall’s immediate predecessor as Professor at the RI, was himself the 
son of a smith, a fact the two men both made much of from time to time.  It is interesting to 
note how he – and this was a passage particularly dear to Tyndall’s own heart; he cited it in 
full in a review of Bence Jones’s The Life and Letters of Faraday (1870) – moved all but effortlessly 
from almost banal celebration of the quaintly picturesque charms of rural life, through a 
meditation on blacksmithery, to an aside which, as his protégé would later suggest, seems to 
embrace nothing less than the universe entire, thereby elevating the modest details of journal-
istic autobiography into something approaching a grand statement on the human condition:   
 
They dry fruits here [Interlaken, in Switzerland, a village in the shadow of the Jungfrau] in the 
sun, as cherries, apples, pears, &c.:  for this purpose they spread them out on boards surrounded by 
little raised ledges.  These boards are blackened, that they may absorb the rays of the sun and become 
hot. 
Clout-nail making goes on here rather considerably, and is a very neat and pretty operation to ob-
serve.  I love a smith’s shop and anything related to smithery.  My father was a smith.   
(qtd. in Jones, 2: 146) 
 
John Tyndall, years later, remarked rather dizzily on what seems an ineffable expansion of 
grammatical and, perhaps, anthropological reference:  ‘This [entry]’, he observes in his 
review, ‘is from his [Faraday’s] journal; but he is unconsciously speaking to someone – per-
haps to the world’ (FoS, p. 367).  That Faraday should from time to time have referenced 
blacksmithing was inevitable; after all, as observed in a recent biography, ‘[w]e do not know 
how much time Faraday had spent with his father in the smithy, but the family had lived over 
the shop for years, and the sounds, sights, smells and conversations were close at hand’ (Ham-
ilton, p. 154).   
By contrast, Tyndall’s own preoccupation, ungrounded in any form of biographical 
detail, was pointedly not so much reflective as ideological and ostentatiously applicable to his 
own understanding of naturalism.  It had its roots in that dualism discussed earlier, that 
necessary wedding, or welding, of action with agent, of Kraft (‘puissance’) with Stoff (‘substance’ 
or ‘material’).  (Stoff, moreover – in a fine, and Carlylean, pun – can be translated as ‘cloth’ or 
‘textile’ as well.)  Like a blacksmith, then, thermodynamic or ‘structural’ force acts with 
‘deliberation’ on the raw molecular resources of the cosmos, shaping things into themselves.  
There was an element of nostalgia, too:  even in the mid-nineteenth century, the solitary 
blacksmith was increasingly a figure of folklore, cultural memory, not daily experience; as 
John Light observes:  ‘When one considers […] that a smith from the late 19th century had 
many tools and machines not available to earlier craftsmen […] then it is not at all fanciful to 
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observe that the general blacksmith of 1800 probably had more in common with his ancestor 
of 1,000 years than he did with his direct descendant of 100 years’ (p. 662).  Sartor Resartus’s 
Schwarzwald artificer thus became, for Tyndall, a fulcrum of continuity, uniting past with 
present, energy with matter, in a hammer-blow. 
 ‘The art of the smith is the most ancient of human handicrafts […]’, so it was charac-
terised in The Smithy and Forge, a technical treatise of 1883 (Crane, p. v).  It is transformed into 
something far more noble than even that, however – becoming an endeavour both interpreted 
and described in a broadly mythological, if not archetypal, fashion – in one memorable 
illustration central to Tyndall’s well-wrought essay on the curious biological principle (thor-
oughly discredited, from his own point of view) of ‘vitality’, or living-force: 
 
To most minds, however, the energy of light and heat presents itself as a thing totally distinct from 
ordinary mechanical energy.  But either of them can be derived from the other.  By the friction of 
wood a savage can raise it to the temperature of ignition; by properly striking a piece of iron a skilful 
blacksmith can cause it to glow, and thus, by the rude agency of his hammer, he generates light and 
heat.  This action, if carried far enough, would produce the light and heat of the sun.  (FoS, p. 437) 
 
His final sentence is revelatory, taking Carlyle’s abstract fable of continuity and showing the 
manner of its literal truth.  Teufelsdröckh’s allegories of perpetual transmutation – ‘with Iron 
Force, and Coal Force, and far stronger Force of Man, are cunning affinities and battles and 
victories of Force brought about’ (Sartor, pp. 55 - 56) – become, in the precise terminology of 
Tyndall’s scientific re-inscription, wholly quantifiable processes of exchange and substitution, 
the sort of dry subject-matter fit for accountants and City clerks, not merely metaphysicians 
and Oxbridge theologians.   
Tyndall was not the first scientist to avail himself of such imagery.  Tait and Thomson, 
in an 1862 article in Good Words, wrote in language probably plagiarised by Tyndall (‘Vitality’ 
first appeared anonymously in The Reader, on 29 October 1864 [Barton, p. 130n55]):  ‘Thus 
the savage who lights his fire by rubbing together pieces of dry wood, expends his muscular 
energy in producing heat.  By mere hammering, a skilful smith can heat a piece of iron to 
redness’ (pp. 603 - 04).  What Tyndall adds is the further step, and it’s a doozy:  to the flames 
of the sun.  (This extrapolation was also, perhaps, influential:  C. William Siemens, in 1882, 
promulgated a theory of ‘fan-like’ solar maintenance based on the ‘action of the heat recu-
perator in the regenerating gas furnace’ [p. 22], a concept culturally appealing, but entropi-
cally verboten.) 
And implicit in Tyndall’s passage we apprehend as well another recurrent theme:  a 
hint that man (on some primal level) is, by his very nature, a type of smith, a maker and 
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manipulator of fire.  F. W. H. Myers, in a stanza from an unpublished poem, captured this 
sentiment adroitly: 
 
I [?learnt] the inheritance of fire 
 From wise Prometheus falls again; – 
A single and a last desire 
 Unites me with primaeval men. ([‘Sometimes’]) 
 
Conversely, the transition from ape (or Australopithecus) to skilled artisan is, in a manner of 
speaking, both correlated with, and occasioned by, blacksmithery, not to forget its many 
associated competencies.  Carlyle put it thusly, his half-rhetorical ponderings closely in line 
with Tyndall’s:  ‘Or was the smith idle, hammering only wartools?  He had learned metal-
lurgy, stithy-work in general; and made ploughshares withal, and adzes and mason-hammers’ 
(Chartism, p. 158).  Some nineteenth-century anthropologists (Max Müller memorably charac-
terised two of their theories as the ‘pooh-pooh’ and ‘bow-wow’ [Lectures, 2: 93]), following on 
from Lord Monboddo’s insights in the eighteenth, attributed the ascent of man to, say, the 
onomatopoeic origination of speech, or an urge towards animal mimicry, or some insuppres-
sible human need for music-making.   
Tyndall, however, would give to fire-starting and steel-tempering and iron-forging that 
role of vital evolutionary boost.  And the fact that, in miniature, Faraday’s personal progress 
(from working-class son of a London smith, to journeyman bookbinder, to pre-eminent 
natural philosopher of his age) paralleled Homo sapiens’ own slow cultural and social advance 
since the time of the last glaciation would, for Tyndall, have added poignancy, and grace, to 
the comparison.3 
Even Tyndall’s lowly savage, we note, holds, potential, in the palm of his hand, the 
transformative flames of the sun – a vast store of heat-energy which is itself re-imagined, in 
any sufficiently rigorous tabulation (such as that mandated by contemporary thermodynamic 
science), as little more than a further line-entry in that cosmic ledger, from which subtractions, 
and to which additions, could be (and are) unfailingly made.  From such a perspective, Tyn-
dall explains, ‘The energy of Nature is a constant quantity, and the utmost man can do in the 
                                                
3  ‘Everyone now knows’, Tyndall wrote at the start of his review (appealing to the necessary and culturally 
affirming myth in skewed or hierarchical societies of the ‘poor boy made good’), ‘the story of the philosopher’s 
[Faraday’s] birth; that his father was a smith; that he was born at Newington Butts in 1791; that he slid along the 
London pavements, a bright-eyed errand boy, with a load of brown curls and a packet of newspapers under his 
arm […]’.  Tyndall’s narrative, indeed, seems almost Dickensian in its sweep, right down to the detail of the 
‘lad’s’ (his term) stern yet understanding taskmaster, ‘a kindly man, who became attached to the little fellow and 
in due time made him an apprentice [bookbinder] without a fee […]’ (FoS, p. 349). 
- 146 - 
pursuit of physical knowledge, is to shift the constituents of the never-varying total, sacrificing 
one if he would produce another’ (Heat, p. 503) – and anyone who thought otherwise might as 
well, as he phrased it in his (frequently ribald) exposé ‘Science and the Spirits’, ‘maintain the 
story of “Jack and the Beanstalk” in the face of all the science in the world’ (FoS, p. 435). 
 Carlyle likewise chafed at those who thought the universe little more than an uncon-
nected assemblage of random occurrences spread haphazardly throughout space and time, 
filled with detritus past use, the tattered end-products of exhausted chemical, biological and 
physical processes.  Instead, such remnants, he insisted, were not worthless debris, destined to 
be no longer considered part of any useful ordering, but rather, when ‘[r]ightly viewed’, 
humble tokens of Being itself: 
 
The drop which thou shakest from thy wet hand, rests not where it falls, but to-morrow thou findest it 
swept away; already, on the wings of the Northwind, it is nearing the Tropic of Cancer.  How came it 
to evaporate, and not lie motionless?  Thinkest thou there is aught motionless; without Force, and 
utterly dead? […]. 
 Detached, separated!  I say there is no such separation; nothing hitherto was ever stranded, cast 
aside; but all, were it only a withered leaf, works together with all; is borne forward on the bottomless, 
shoreless flood of Action, and lives through perpetual metamorphoses.  The withered leaf is not dead 
and lost, there are Forces in it and around it […].  Despise not the rag from which man makes Paper, 
or the litter from which the Earth makes Corn.  Rightly viewed no meanest object is insignificant; all 
objects are as windows, through which the philosophic eye looks into Infinitude itself!   
 (Sartor, pp. 55 - 56) 
 
Although Tyndall, in an analogous passage, replaces Carlyle’s inchoate ‘force’ with the more 
thermodynamically specific concept of heat, he, too, like his predecessor, requests that we 
permit our inner ‘philosophic’ (or, in his terminology, ‘mental’) eye to track its gradual pro-
gress.   
We are then shown a carefully delimited sequence of such ‘perpetual metamorphoses’: 
 
The mental eye can, indeed, follow the emission [of heat] from its source, through the ether as vibra-
tory motion, to the ocean, where it ceases to be vibration, and takes the potential form among the 
molecules of aqueous vapour; to the mountain-top, where the heat absorbed in vaporization is given 
out in condensation, while that expended by the sun in lifting the water to its present elevation is still 
unrestored.  This we find paid back to the last unit by the friction along the river’s bed; at the bottom 
of the cascades where the plunge of the torrent is suddenly arrested; in the warmth of the machinery 
turned by the river; in the spark from the millstone; beneath the crusher of the miner; in the Alpine 
saw-mill; in the milk-churn of the châlet; in the supports of the cradle in which the mountaineer, by 
water power, rocks his baby to sleep.  All the forms of mechanical motion here indicated are simply the 
parcelling out of an amount of calorific motion derived originally from the sun; and at each point at 
which the mechanical motion is destroyed, or diminished, it is the sun’s heat which is restored.   
 (Heat, p. 493) 
 
In short, we have an interplay of literary tropes with armchair Gedankenexperiment, of a nine-
teenth-century scientist’s personal prejudices with nineteenth-century scientism’s impersonal 
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‘truth’.  Observe, for instance, how Tyndall moves, in the course of explanation, from a pair of 
examples drawn from (quintessentially Victorian) heavy industry (‘the warmth of the machin-
ery’, ‘the crusher of the miner’), to another associated mainly with a conventional domestic 
space (‘the milk-churn of the châlet’), and, finally, to one firmly anchored in that most sacro-
sanct and homely domain of them all, the bedroom of a newborn child (‘the supports of the 
cradle in which the mountaineer […] rocks his baby to sleep’) – all by way of telling references 
to millstones grinding iconically away.  Note also the financial vocabulary, the way heat 
becomes a finite, parsimoniously conserved commodity, one that is at first ‘parcell[ed] out’ 
and then, in due time, ‘paid back to the last unit’.   
Even so, as he had done with Carlyle’s teachings on historical change, Tyndall, in at-
tempting to parallel (or buttress) his own convictions regarding the conservation of energy with 
those implicit in ‘Teufelsdröckh’s’ transcendentalism, perpetuates a subtle, perhaps totally 
subconscious, act of misconstrual and faulty transmission.  His conception of cosmic whole-
ness, as noted earlier, was never precisely equivalent to that of the First Law.  (Carlyle had 
written, for instance, in On Heroes and Hero-Worship [1840] of our estrangement as conscious 
beings from the reductively or mechanistically material, not Tyndall’s unity with such things, 
giving as his definition of the universe:  ‘That it is a Force, and thousandfold Complexity of 
Forces; a force which is not we.  That is all; it is not we, it is altogether different from us’ [p. 8].)   
However, though such a wilful misrepresentation on the scientist’s behalf might seem 
uncharitable, it was far from unprecedented.   
Even the aggrieved Carlyle had himself been prone, throughout his career, to commit-
ting a comparable indiscretion.  He, too, from time to time, mangled teachings, vernaculars 
and metaphors derived – or inherited – from his own illustrious spiritual and stylistic ‘progeni-
tors’.  A. L. Le Quesne remarks:   
 
He [Carlyle] repeatedly distorted and coarsened their distinctions and definitions, usually in the 
interest of deriving a simpler moral message from them […].  Carlyle’s habitual method was to seize 
on isolated ideas and phrases from their work – Entsagen (renunciation), Selbsttodtung (self-annihilation), 
Ernst ist das Leben (“Life is earnest”), and so on – lift them out of context, and reinterpret them in ways 
that suited him […].  (p. 31) 
 
Nonetheless, for all their divergences, these were both writers convinced of the beauty of a 
principle that either coheres with – or could be construed as precursor to – the doctrine of 
energy conservation, even if Tyndall conceptualised energy, and energy conservation, far 
more expansively, tracing all present motions, animate and inanimate, back to solar potency. 
Yet the sun itself, as he would have insisted, represents a far from infinite – though, in 
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all fairness, still unimaginably bountiful – reservoir of obtainable warmth.  Tyndall asked, his 
science as yet unable to answer (the radiative emission from, and disaggregation of, uranium 
salts not being discovered till 1896), a question of staggering contemporary import towards the 
close of his textbook Heat.  (‘As soon as it was realised [by scientists] […] that the sun was 
running down, it became important to them to discover the source of its energy’, as Frank 
James has summarised, with little understatement [‘Thermodynamics’, p. 174].) 
 
[H]ow is its [the sun’s] […] [fire] maintained?  How is the perennial loss [of mass through ‘combus-
tion’] made good?  We are apt to overlook the wonderful in the common.  Possibly to many of us – and 
even to some of the most enlightened among us – the sun appears as a fire, differing from our terres-
trial fires only in the magnitude and intensity of its combustion.  But what is the burning matter which 
can thus sustain itself?  (Heat, p. 478) 
 
So, while Tyndall’s science could calculate to the erg the expenditure of energy required to 
raise a climber from the base to the summit of Mont Blanc (equal to that ‘derived from the 
combustion of about two ounces of carbon’ [p. 499]), it could not even begin adequately to 
explain the origin of ‘solar light and heat’, two phenomena, of course, which in consort 
constitute ‘the very mainspring of […] life’ (p. 495).4   
These, presumably, were questions with answers.  Other riddles, however – and this, 
as discussed in chapter two, would be a paramount theme at Belfast as well (though one often 
overlooked by commentators) – require more for ‘resolution’ than mere empiricism or mo-
lecular theory.  ‘As regards knowledge’, Tyndall explains in ‘Vitality’, ‘physical science is 
polar.  In one sense it knows, or is destined to know, everything.  In another sense it knows 
nothing.  Science knows much of this intermediate phase of things that we call nature, of 
which it is the product; but science knows nothing of the origin or destiny of nature’ (FoS, p. 
442).  Hence, science, as he conceived it, is at once omniscient (‘it knows’) and ignorant (it 
‘knows nothing’), though this dualism for Tyndall did not present any intractable paradox, nor 
did it invalidate (or belittle) the unsurpassed progress already made under a materialistic 
banner.  He announces boldly, for instance, in the concluding sub-section of Heat:  A Mode of 
Motion, that, ‘presented rightly to the mind, the discoveries and generalisations of modern 
science constitute a poem more sublime than has ever yet addressed the human imagination.  
The natural philosopher of to-day may dwell amid conceptions which beggar those of Milton’ 
(p. 502) – the key phrase, of course, being Tyndall’s first:  ‘presented rightly to the mind’. 
                                                
4  He once computed that he could ascend a particular peak in the Alps on the energy derived from eating 
nothing more than a single sandwich.  He then did precisely that, just to prove his point.  (This famous anecdote, 
incidentally, is the sole reference to Tyndall in Adam Hart-Davis’s What the Victorians Did for Us [2001; p. 72].) 
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Who, then, given the evident insufficiency of Milton, certainly in an ontological sense 
(with reference to things that are:  a domain now triumphantly annexed by science), could give 
warmth and quasi-religious fullness to what must have seemed to many Victorian minds the 
essential poverty of such a ‘beggaring’ combination of beliefs?5  This was that brew of unre-
lieved Baconianism, ‘Lucretian’ materialism, and the ‘new’ biology and cosmology of mid-
century, so central to Tyndall’s thought – and, increasingly, or so it seemed, to the thought of 
science more generally. 
 
 ‘[A] CELESTIAL COAL FOR EVER BRIGHT’:  THE VICTORIAN SEER AS TYPE OF SUN 
 
Carlyle, for one, seemed to Tyndall, seemed to many, an ideal seer to reveal these emergent 
connections between religion and science.  (‘Professor Tyndall calls him our greatest spiritual 
teacher’, as W. M. W. Call observed in an article of 1881 [p. 486].)  He, on several occasions, 
imagined him a prophet.  Carlyle, for instance, was once the featured speaker at a graduation 
ceremony at the University of Edinburgh, a ceremony at which both Tyndall and T. H. 
Huxley were to receive honorary degrees.  Nonetheless, on the day, Tyndall, though undenia-
bly thrilled by the prospect of personal academic recognition, found himself for a few mo-
ments far more intrigued by the audience’s reactions to Carlyle.  Sitting before ranks of 
graduands, ‘Looking […] at the sea of faces below me – young, eager, expectant, waiting to be 
lifted up by the words of the prophet they had chosen – I [Tyndall]’, as he explains in his essay 
‘Recollections’, ‘forgot all about the degrees [to be conferred]’ (NF, p. 363).   
‘Let the world say what it will regarding Carlyle’, he wrote in a letter of 18 May 1862 
to Juliet Pollock, ‘I am not acquainted with his equal.  Among my acquaintance in the literary 
world which of course is but a small acquaintance he has nothing like an equal – an intellect of 
the very strongest fibre horsed on an imagination of the most fiery quality […]’ (pp. 1992 - 
93).  Such equine imagery is arresting:  reason as stalwart knight astride animal imagination, 
bridled yet impetuous.  He, elsewhere, utilises precisely the same conceit in a portrait of able 
scientific rationality as well, a process in which imagination is understood by him to be investi-
gative endeavour’s absolutely necessary accompaniment.  (This is a theme exemplified in his 
discourse ‘On the Scientific Use of the Imagination’, with, as phrased in the third [1872] 
                                                
5  In a lecture of 1869 at London University, Tyndall strongly cautioned his audience (invoking Milton’s 
manifesto in Paradise Lost 1.26) against those ubiquitous, if scientifically and theologically retrogressive, ‘expound-
ers of the ways of God to men, who offer us intellectual peace at the modest cost of intellectual life’ (FoS, p. 105). 
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edition, its intriguing definition – subtly steeplechasing – of science as ‘a leap of the prepared 
imagination’ [p. 6].)   
In a notebook entry of October 1887, Tyndall explains: 
 
The term imagination has been discredited by the misuse of the faculty.  Pranks have been played with 
it in all ages of the world, and pranks will continue to be played with it to the end of time.  But side by 
side with those who make this illegitimate use of imaginative power, others have existed, and will exist, 
who have taught us, and will continue to teach us, how to use it aright.  Instead of suffering themselves 
to be carried away by it, such men direct and rule <these stronger ones, when they use it govern> the 
force of imagination as a mighty rider controls and guides his charger with bit and rein.  To such 
spirits, adventurous and strong <firm>, we are indebted for our deeper knowledge of the methods by 
which the physical universe is ordered and ruled.  (‘Sky’) 
 
Here, again, Tyndall affirms that the scientist and the poet bring similar aptitudes to bear on 
explicating and categorising phenomena; both use their peculiar talents to frame new ap-
proaches, new languages – literary or mathematical, abstract or representational – which 
gradually enter the wider vernacular. 
But a perhaps more apt analogue for a social prophet like Carlyle – and one which 
likewise appears commonly in Tyndall’s prose – can be found in solar phenomenology, in 
images of the sun.  The sun, after all, he reminds us, a ball of ‘living fire’ seeming far more 
than the site of mere burning, is not simply an example of terrestrial combustion writ large. 
Rather, it is an (in every practical sense) inexhaustible source of vital energy, the source and 
fount of everything.  A popular astronomical work by Richard Proctor, The Sun:  Ruler, Fire, 
Light, and Life of the Planetary System (1871), encapsulates much in its title of the central orb’s 
prominence in the cultural, scientific, literary and, indeed, mythic imaginations of the period 
(and, correspondingly, their multiform discourses as well), providing further confirmation of 
the cultural heliotropism addressed in this dissertation’s opening chapter.  Moreover, Tyndall 
was, if anything, perhaps the most influential (and, surely, the most eloquent) among that 
broad-based fascination’s instigators and exponents in mid- to late-Victorian intellectual life.   
A self-conscious solarism, for instance, informs this description of his initial sighting, on 
the trip to Wight, of Tennyson’s house.  Told that evening by his travelling companion, Mr 
Wright, of its proximity, and with vision constrained by the superstructure of the carriage in 
which he was riding, 
    
   I tried my best 
To see the house, but beech and cedar flung 
Their sheltering arms between the road and house. 
I saw a corner gleaming through the trees, 
It went – a second for a moment came, 
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And that was all, still it was something worth 
To glance upon the corner of a house 
Which holds a poet.  One in whose clear mind 
Burns a celestial coal for ever bright! 
No smoke, no glare, but smoke and glare condensed 
 To living fire which warms the souls of men. (‘DP’, p. [7]) 
 
We note in his description the equivalence between the qualities of the sun as (mis)understood 
by nineteenth-century science (‘a celestial coal for ever bright’) and those of Tennyson’s ‘clear 
mind’.  Its illumination, like that provided by the sun itself, demonstrates neither ‘glare’ nor 
‘smoke’, appurtenances (trochaically emphasised) of terrestrial fires – and, by extension, 
common, muddled apprehensions.  It continues on, rather, serenely undiminished:  a ‘living 
fire which warms the souls of men’.  Indeed, in his dedicatory essay ‘On Unveiling the Statue 
of Thomas Carlyle’, though a much later work, he likewise deployed conspicuously solar 
iconography in posthumous tribute:  ‘A friend and I agreed some time ago to describe him 
[Carlyle] as “dynamic,” not “didactic” – a spiritual force, which warmed, moved and invigo-
rated, but which refused to be clipped into precepts’ (NF, p. 394).  Light and energy from the 
sun, of course – similarly irreducible, equally ‘dynamic’ – share these same animating attrib-
utes.  If man is by nature a type of smith (an image, some decades later, to inform Stephen 
Dedalus’s conception of transcendentally impersonal artistry in Joyce’s Portrait of the Artist as a 
Young Man), then the true seer, it would seem, is a type of sun. 
 Tennyson’s residence, situated along a road from Freshwater to Alum Bay, was 
destined to become (much to its owner’s displeasure) one of the Isle of Wight’s premier tourist 
attractions, though it was still not quite that when Tyndall made this visit in early summer 
1856.  ‘The Poet Laureate […]’, Marianne Lane explains in Piers of the Isle of Wight (1996),   
‘and his family came to live at Farringford, Freshwater in 1853, where they entertained many 
important guests, including H. R. H. Prince Albert, Charles Darwin, Charles Kingsley, 
Edward Lear and celebrated artists such as Holman Hunt, G. F. Watts and Millais […]’ (p. 7).  
Tyndall was himself invited, in 1858, to join such an elite – and deliciously eclectic – group.   
He describes a discussion that evening in an undated letter to Mrs Pollock, presumably 
of May 1862: 
 
After Mrs. Tennyson went away we continued to talk, and after that again I ascended to the upper 
story, into the poet’s own holy place; here he filled a pipe for me, lighted it himself and transferred it to 
my lips, and we smoked and talked for another hour.  We talked of Maud and its critics[,] of peotry 
[sic], of Mr. Buckle’s lecture, which he and [?Jowett] had glanced at and thought empty, of Christian-
ity and the influence of the imagination.  Tennyson does not dazzle, but there is that about him which 
pulled me like the force of gravity – a thorough candour and brotherliness, if I may use the expression, 
an absence of all artificial fences, so that there is no hindrance to the play of natural affinities. 
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Tyndall’s prose again evokes the celestial, if somewhat less exuberantly (a slight change in 
register perhaps a consequence, not merely of the more restrained rhetorical standards of an 
epistolary context, but also the demythologising impulse associated with personal familiarity).  
Tennyson, he suggests, like the all-pervading central force of solar gravitation – that which 
caused the sun and planets to condense out of the primordial nebula in the first place, and 
which has ever since governed them magisterially in their orbits – is naturalised, made an 
irresistible, even universal, phenomenon.6   
And the transference of the lit pipe, replicating (perhaps unintentionally, certainly with 
a degree of whimsy) the Promethean myth, also recapitulates in miniature the actions of our 




 ‘No one can stop us now / !’Cause we are all made of stars’.  
  - Richard Melville Hall [pop star ‘Moby’], 2002 
 
Nonetheless, Tyndall’s cultural historiography, conditioned in large part by his intractably 
materialistic interpretations of mid-century cosmology and evolutionary theory, mandated a 
‘Promethean’ myth with, at its heart, no Prometheus-figure.   
Put another way, in his beginning, his Book of Genesis, there was the nebula, and only 
the nebula.  Everything, literally everything, proceeded from that.  (Modern astrophysicist-
poet Rebecca Elson described creation’s simplicity, and isolation, thus:  ‘Begin with particles 
which could be dust / Or stars, it makes no difference / And put them in a box from which 
they can’t escape’.)  As a natural philosopher, Tyndall conceptualised cosmogenesis from the 
top down, imagining the birth of the world in a ‘fiery cloud’, a cloud governed by the laws of 
gas dynamics, in which basic physical principles such as the conservation of energy held 
ineluctable dominion.  For him, the starting point for extrapolation was not fossils in the 
ground, nor evidence of geological uniformitarianism (both ready-to-hand terrestrial indica-
tions of the earth’s extraordinary antiquity), but rather a set of equations on a blackboard, 
themselves doctrines derived from repeated experiment.  An analysis based on such principles, 
                                                
6  Not only did Tyndall envisage Tennyson in oddly stellar terms, the circumstances of their first meeting, to 
hear him tell it, even had a touch of the Newtonian – if not, maybe, the astrologically preordained – about them 
as well.  Thinking back years later on the event, he observed:  ‘I had often wished to meet the poet, but had never 
made a move towards securing this pleasure.  “It is wonderful,” I remark in my journal, “how things gravitate in 
this world.  Here is a great pleasure and a great privilege come to me without my seeking”’ (‘Glimpse’, p. 471). 
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he wrote, would lead inevitably to the realisation that the planets were once ‘parts of the same 
undislocated mass; that matter in a nebulous form preceded matter in a dense form; that as 
the ages rolled away, heat was wasted, condensation followed, planets were detached, and that 
finally the chief portion of the fiery cloud reached, by self-compression, the magnitude and 
density of the sun’ (FoS, p. 159).   
 Speaking of these conjectures on solar and planetary evolution, he once famously 
posed the question:  ‘For what are the core and essence of this hypothesis?’: 
 
Strip it naked and you stand face to face with the notion that not alone the more ignoble forms of 
animacular or animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse or the lion, not alone the exquisite 
and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself – emotion, intellect, 
will, and all their phenomena – were once latent in a fiery cloud […].  Many who hold it [the nebular 
hypothesis] would probably assent to the position that all our philosophy, all our poetry, all our 
science, and all our art – Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, and Raphael – are potential in the fires of the 
sun.  (pp. 163 - 64) 
 
Tyndall’s smith, in other words, his primordial man, had only nature from which to learn.  
There was no divine ‘tap on the shoulders’ telling him to do this and not that with the sputter-
ing flame he had harnessed.   
And, similarly, Tyndall’s seers – his Tennysons and Carlyles, his Newtons and Darwins 
– had only collocations of matter from which their genius was derived. 
Yet such figures also represent the process coming full-circle, as they themselves (and 
their works) become sites of origin, of potential and boundless intellectual encouragement.  
Generations untold, Tyndall insinuates, will be warmed by – and perceive things more clearly 
because of – their light (an Alfred, Lord Tennyson that ‘does not dazzle’; a Michael Faraday 
whose ‘fire was that of a solid combustible, not that of a gas […]’ [Faraday, p. 179]), shining 
bonfire-like through centuries, across cultures and continents, illuminating diverse interdisci-
plinary cubby-holes.  In a journal entry of 15 May 1847, Tyndall, referring to Carlyle, made 
such an analogy explicit in words at once tritely conventional and wholly his own:  ‘His 
position is sometimes startling – to many he will appear impious […].  I however thank the 
gods for having flung him as a beacon to guide me amid life’s entanglements’ (qtd. in Barton, 
p. 125).   
But this sentiment is itself (at least, in part) neo-Carlylean, like so many other such 
‘Tyndallic’ tropes.  In the first lecture of On Heroes and Hero-Worship, that author had com-
mented on the role of the courageous ‘great man’, even in a dilapidated age like the Victorian:   
 
But I liken common languid Times, with their unbelief, distress, perplexity, with their languid doubting 
characters and embarrassed circumstances, impotently crumbling-down into ever worse distress 
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towards final ruin; – all this I liken to dry dead fuel, waiting for the lightning out of Heaven that shall 
kindle it.  The great man, with his free force direct out of God’s own hand, is the lightning.  His word 
is the wise healing word which all can believe in.  (p. 12) 
 
Fittingly, Tyndall (as W. T. Jeans observed in 1887) was himself destined to become a local 
luminary, one lesser light or flaring nova of brief though piercing radiance:  ‘[B]y his [Tyn-
dall’s] writings he has probably done more than any other man in England to kindle a love of 
science among the masses […]’ (p. 1).   
Such figures brighten beyond their state; they make evident and ennoble; they inspire 
creativity and precipitate endeavour – and, in so doing, they take the place of those supernatu-
ral forces rendered irrelevant, though hardly superfluous, by the dictates of materialism, but so 
often invoked in such inspirational capacities. 
‘In regard to metaphors drawn from science, your father [Tennyson], like Carlyle, 
made sure of their truth’, so Tyndall explains in another posthumous tribute-essay ‘A Glimpse 
of Farringford, 1858; and “The Ancient Sage,” 1885’, a piece commissioned by Hallam, the 
poet’s son, for a volume of memoirs: 
 
To secure accuracy, he [Tennyson] spared no pains.  I found charts in his room of isothermals and 
isobars intended to ensure the exactitude of certain allusions of his to physical science.  In illustration of 
this, the late Lord Houghton, […] once told me that, having composed an exquisite poem upon a 
flower, Tennyson discarded it because of some botanical flaw.  In comparing him with Carlyle, I notice 
that the latter drew his imagery, for the most part, from what we call inorganic nature.  Physics and 
chemistry were well advanced when Carlyle wrote, but modern researches in biology had scarcely 
begun.  These later fell into your father’s hands, and he has made noble use of them from “In Memor-
iam” onwards.  (p. 475) 
 
Here, as he had done for Carlyle, Tyndall is attempting to rehabilitate Tennyson – though, to 
be fair, that poet’s credentials (Fellow of the Royal Society, and so forth) never looked for a 
moment even half as suspect – as ‘friend to science’, or, at worst, regrettably, or intermittently, 
estranged confederate.  Even he, however, has to concede that Tennyson was never entirely 
comfortable with the doctrines of scientific materialism, with those theologically destabilising 
ramifications derived from the nebular hypothesis, natural selection, organic evolution, the 
conservation of energy.  ‘Your father’s interest in science was profound’, he observes in the 
article, ‘but not, I believe, unmingled with a fear of its “materialistic” tendencies.  This, 
however, is to me a point of secondary importance’ (pp. 469 - 70). 
Why should this have been?  Why, in other words, should the poet’s ‘fear’ have re-
mained relatively untroubling to such a committed and outspoken exponent of scientific 
naturalism, particularly one so notoriously prone to proselytising and prejudgement?   
In the preface to the second edition of Fragments (reprinted in most later editions as 
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well), Tyndall gave definition to the shape of his ‘ideal scientist’.  He did the same for that of 
his ‘ideal artist’.  They are identical, hardly surprising given his predilections for poetry and 
the complementary nature of his own intellectual upbringing, with two ersatz fathers, Faraday 
and Carlyle (the first, a quintessentially ‘masculine’ scientist; the second, an equally ‘mascu-
line’ artist-prophet), splitting his affections, each vying, perhaps, for the dominant role.  
(Tyndall’s attitude towards Faraday seemed, as noted by Eve and Creasey, ‘filial rather than 
brotherly’ – arising out of a ‘deep and sincere affection’ [p. 124], despite troubling religious 
differences – while his behaviour towards Carlyle was, by many, identically characterised, T. 
H. Huxley describing it, in an obituary, as evidencing ‘almost filial devotion’ [‘Professor’, p. 
3].) 
 
The problem which presses for solution is, how, amid the wreck of [religious] forms now immi-
nent, to preserve the reverence and loftiness of thought and feeling which in times past found in those 
forms organic expression.  This is not to be done by science only, still less by routine utterances about 
God and the human soul.  From ‘society,’ or from aggregates of men in societies, whether ‘Christian’ 
or otherwise, no voice of guidance as regards this question can possibly come.  But if nature have in 
store a man of the requisite completeness – equivalent, let us say, to Milton and Helmholtz rolled into 
one – such a man, freed by his own volition from ‘society,’ and fed for a time upon the wild honey of 
the wilderness, might be able to detach religious feeling from its accidents, and restore it to us in a form 
not out of keeping with the knowledge of the time.  (FoS, pp. vi - vii) 
 
As in his essay ‘Vitality’, we observe the same know/not-know duality, here extended, how-
ever, to encompass the non-scientific and synthesising alongside the scientific and reductionist.  
(We note also that this preface, dated May 1871, effectively epitomises the argument of his 
Belfast peroration, delivered late August 1874.)  Tyndall, it seems, heard something rather 
cheerier on the shingles near The Solent in June 1856, from Matthew Arnold’s ‘melancholy, 
long, withdrawing road […]’, (‘Dover’, p. 242; line 25) – words published in 1867 but, likely, 
composed in June 1851 (Allott, p. 239).  
His ‘man of the requisite completeness’, though, even he concedes, has an almost 
Zarathustrian aura of realistic unattainability, a prospect of realisation, if ever, only at some 
point in utopic futurity.  In the meantime, then, Tyndall would insist, and irrespective of the 
success or failure of such rehabilitative efforts as those he so often attempts, such ‘solar’ figures 
as Carlyle and Tennyson (or, on the other side of the aisle, Hermann von Helmholtz and 
Michael Faraday), are the nearest approximations which we, or the Victorians, could ever 
hope to find. 




TYNDALL AMONG THE GLACIERS:  THE MID-VICTORIAN 




She wraps man in darkness, and makes him for ever long for light.  
She creates him dependent upon the earth, dull and heavy; and yet 
is always shaking him until he attempts to soar above it.a  
- Goethe, ‘Nature:  Aphorisms’; Huxley’s translation, 1869 
 
An undated, unfinished draft letter found (misplaced?) between the pages of a bound volume 
of notebooks in the Tyndall Archives at the RI (and written in the hasty scrawl of that scientist) 
seems at first an isolated curiosity.  It is tagged with the address of his Alpine holiday home:  
Alp Lusgen, Brieg, Switzerland.  It lacks an addressee or salutation.  Its text amounts to two 
full sentences, neither auspicious:  ‘There is gloom upon the mountains, gloom upon the 
glaciers, while clouds hang dusky fringes downwards from a heaven of gloom.  Our hills are 
left [?with] us desolate, bald and bare, shorn of their herbage, forsaken by their flocks, with no 
sound save the dull hum of the distant torrent which sulkily shakes the air’ (‘Loose’).  This is 
surely too precious (did he realise this?  is that perhaps why it was left incomplete?):  the 
alliteration in every clause; the grammatical and metrical identity between those two object-
phrases taken by the initiating verb; the paired sibilances, both in ‘s’, hissing menacingly, 
sandwiching that dental consonance made by ‘dull hum’ and ‘distant torrent’; and, above 
everything else, the droning, liturgical cadence of it all, iambic and unrelieved.  It seems a 
knowing parody of Romanticism, at once linguistically overwritten and symbolically over-
wrought:  too many gothic portents, too much adolescent ‘literariness’.   
Perhaps, one muses darkly, it was deliberately misplaced, if misplaced it was.   
Nevertheless, more charitably, this brief fragment once again highlights Tyndall’s care 
in composition, while hinting also at a number of the scientist’s own (hardly suppressed) 
literary and philosophical influences. 
By contrast, a Romanticism of a different sort – ideological this time, not just meta-
                                                
Epigraph from Goethe, ‘Nature’, p. 9. 
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phoric, existing beyond the superficial plane of language and figuration – pervades this phrase 
from his landmark textbook, Six Lectures on Light (1873); it seems one expressing a fact at once 
tautologically true (modern science must, by definition, adhere to some first-hand conception 
of the external) and epistemologically suggestive:  ‘Indeed, it may be doubted whether the real 
life of science can be fully felt and communicated by the man who has not himself been taught 
by direct communion with Nature’ (p. 219).  William Wordsworth would have concurred, if 
perhaps substituting for ‘science’, ‘poetry’.  Tyndall’s choice of ‘communion’ to characterise 
such behaviour is both apt and familiar; it looks simultaneously backwards towards the 
ideologies associated with poets earlier in the century and sideways towards prominent rhe-
torical and lexical proclivities explicit in his own writing.  After all, as discussed in chapter two, 
those Manichean categorisations of good and bad personages in the history of science, of a 
black and white distinctiveness between correct and false physical knowledge, invariably 
evanesce into chiaroscuros of colour and shade – the ‘azure’ of the Belfast peroration, for 
instance – when subjects under discussion transcend empiricism, when they venture beyond 
the terrain (admittedly expansive) claimed as the sole provenance of materialistic investigation.   
Gillian Beer, among others, has remarked on this, delighting in the scientist’s literary 
resourcefulness, his playful erudition and sense of semantic expansiveness, tendencies mar-
shalled, from time to time, in the service of evasiveness and chary equivocation.  Such culti-
vated ambiguity, she notes, is to be discovered not merely at the level of denotated meaning 
but also within the wording of argumentation itself – in the impressionistic vibrancy of his 
linguistic palette, for example.  Indeed, when caught wandering beyond the scientifically 
certain, monochromatic ‘high-and-dry light’ – Beer’s phrasing here fittingly references that of 
the peroration at Belfast – ‘is not Tyndall’s medium; he prefers the liberal oscillation within 
sentences, the vigour of metaphor, and the ardent recomposition of ideas.  To that degree his 
views temptingly ran alongside the religious, even while they repudiated religious authority’ 
(OF, pp. 259 - 60).   
Surrogate religiosity was a feature as well of the nineteenth-century Romantic tradi-
tion, as many of the more perspicacious thinkers of the age intuitively understood, and it is 
with this tradition that Tyndall’s ‘scientific’ sentiments seem sometimes most pleasingly to 
harmonise.  This chapter, then, is an exploration of borderlands in his thought, focusing more 
generally on the latent – or, as I argue, reconstituted – romanticism inhering in Tyndall’s 
interpretations and elucidations of nineteenth-century naturalism.  The power of place, 
embodied in sites of enlightening or pedagogic ‘communion’, so emphasised in the artistic 
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pronouncements of Romantic poets and prophets is likewise strikingly underscored in Tyn-
dall’s own literary productions, not just in prose but in verse as well.  Yet considered attention 
to the verbal representations of this concern, my subject in the middle sections of this chapter, 
provides ample evidence of both the continuities linking, and the disjunctions distinguishing 
between, two separate attempts at engagement with (distinct, even irreconcilable) de-
theologised interpretations – that early in the century, made most iconically by Wordsworth; 
that midway through, put forward by one ardent exponent of scientific materialism (and 
poetic amateur) – of the phenomena of natural and mental worlds, their quandaries and 
confusions.  It will, accordingly, be instructive to start by looking at the ‘high altar’ at which 
Tyndall most frequently ‘worshipped’, and from which he derived the most fervent and long-
lasting inducement:  those peaks, glaciers and foothills encountered amongst the Alpine range.  
 
SALVAGE OR SYNTHESIS?:  TYNDALL AND THE ‘WORDSWORTHIAN PROJECT’ 
 
In 1871, Sheldon Amos, writing in a section of The Westminster Review devoted to coverage of 
recent publications in the fields of politics, sociology and travel, made (perhaps inadvertently) 
his own minor, though characteristically irksome, contribution to ongoing, cross-cultural 
debates concerning the respective intellectual domains of the sciences and the arts in mid- to 
late-Victorian Britain.  These were debates, of course, which by the 1950s were to lead to C. 
P. Snow’s celebrated pronouncements in The Two Cultures, though at the time there was still 
widespread hope for some sort of future metaphysical rapprochement.  Contrasting Hours of 
Exercise in the Alps, a work on mountaineering, with the same author’s Fragments of Science for 
Unscientific People (both first published that year), the reviewer noted that, from his own per-
spective – and no doubt, he supposed, from that as well of many among his readership – 
‘“Hours of Exercise in the Alps” is the title which Professor Tyndall gives to a volume of short 
papers supplementary to that of his “Fragments.”  The previous volume contained sketches of 
his working life, as the second does that of his holiday-making’ (p. 249).   
Tyndall himself, though he fully recognised that the two ‘halves’ of his own personality 
(Professor at the RI, pioneering Alpinist) were not perfectly contiguous, would never have 
endorsed such a bifurcation.  Nor would he have countenanced one work being considered 
supplemental, or somehow ancillary, to the other.  (‘A short time ago’, he explains in prefatory 
notes to Hours of Exercise, ‘I published a book of “Fragments,” which might have been called 
“Hours of Exercise in the Laboratory” […]’ [p. v].)  He would, moreover, have insisted that 
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disjunctions pale when viewed in comparison with strange or unexpected affinities, that 
distinctions of value are both subjective and invidious, pointing out that mountains provided 
him with a respite from work even as they informed the course of his research, while cramped 
London laboratories enabled him both to study and, from time to time, to replicate phenom-
ena he in many instances had first encountered while traversing the altitudinous spaces of 
Switzerland and France.  It was inarguably the case, even there, amid grandiose geographies 
of summits and ice, that it was the methodologies of mid-Victorian inductive science that 
guided his footfalls and directed his vision, all the while conditioning his more general spiritual 
and aesthetic sensibilities as well.1   
In Recollections of an Old Mountaineer, a volume of memoirs first published in 1910, Wal-
ter Larden recounts a meeting with Tyndall amid just such monumental topographies; the 
year was 1881 or 1882: 
 
Once a lean, strong-faced man (the image is dim to me now) came across to lunch; I saw it was 
Tyndall.  I wish I had had the assurance to introduce myself to him as (in a small way) a scientific man!  
It would have been a memory worth possessing.  Those old climbers did more than conquer moun-
tains, with alpenstocks in place of the modern ice axe, and inefficiently-nailed boots, for they con-
quered the fears of men and the superstitions that clung about the unknown.  And Tyndall took the 
mountains in a large spirit; he had imagination and perception.  I wish I had once talked to him!   
(p. 21) 
 
This is retrospective canonisation, in part, but it testifies to the complexity of Tyndall’s cultural 
‘function’ while trekking and climbing.  It suggests something as well of an essential paradox, 
as Bartlett has noted in ‘Preaching Science’:  the irony that, in interpreting and writing about 
his experiences among mountains, ‘being a scientist made Tyndall more “romantic,” more 
willing or able to draw upon tropes of the sublime, than were non-scientist fellow-members of 
the Alpine Club’ (pp. 101 - 02). 
Nor should it be forgotten, as Larden intimates, that the Alps were always, for Tyndall, 
supreme experimental venues, essential locations for study and empirical investigation, every 
bit as significant as the basement laboratories of the RI.  This intercourse was not merely 
intellectual, however, taking place between disciplines alone.  It was textual as well, and 
because of it many of Tyndall’s works slip ready or uncomplicated generic classification.  
Extended passages, for instance, from his travel writings reappear in more ‘scientific’ contexts 
                                                
1  Indeed, early on, his climbing even received, as it were, an apt ‘scientific benediction’:  Tyndall was pre-
sented with his alpenstock (a steel-tipped ‘climbing stick’ then absolutely essential for serious mountaineering) by 
the botanist and noted Himalayan explorer J. D. Hooker; Hooker, however, to mark its ownership, scored 
Tyndall’s initials, not with a knife, but rather by singeing its wooden surface with ordinary sunlight focused 
through a pocket magnifying lens (Clark, p. 61). 
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(several chapters of Hours of Exercise, to take but one obvious example, appeared eventually in 
New Fragments, the 1892 ‘sequel’ to Fragments of Science), even as the intractability of physical 
reference within his ‘straightforward’ tales of mountaineering and high adventure render them 
curiously resistant to labelling.  They, in other words, only infrequently seem ‘travel literature’ 
first and foremost, while, conversely, his various and wide-ranging works on ‘natural philoso-
phy’ rarely confine themselves exclusively to the bald elucidation of facts and equations, 
graphs and physical tendencies.  What sort of text, for instance, is the following, an evocative 
extract from Tyndall’s Glaciers of the Alps (1860)? 
 
The anticipated storm at length gave notice of its coming.  The sea-waves, as observed by Aristotle, 
sometimes reach the shore before the wind which produces them is felt; and here the tempest sent out 
its precursors, which broke in detached shocks upon the cabin before the real storm arrived.  Billows of 
air, in ever quicker succession, rolled over us with a long surging sound, rising and falling as crest 
succeeded trough and trough succeeded crest.  And as the pulses of a vibrating body, when their 
succession is quick enough, blend to a continuous note, so these fitful gusts linked themselves finally to 
a storm which made its own wild music among the crags.  Grandly it swelled, carrying the imagination 
out of doors, to the clouds and darkness, to the loosened avalanches and whirling snow upon the 
mountain heads.  Moored to the rock on two sides, the cabin stood firm, and its manifest security 
allowed the mind the undisturbed enjoyment of the atmospheric war.  We were powerfully shaken, but 
had no fear of being uprooted; and a certain grandeur of the heart rose responsive to the grandeur of 
the storm.  Mounting higher and higher, it at length reached its maximum strength, from which it 
lowered fitfully, until at length, with a melancholy wail, it bade our rock farewell.  (pp. 163 - 64) 
 
A reader, too, one suspects, might be ‘powerfully shaken’; Tyndall’s prose, like the storm it 
describes, is here breathless, sensual, tempestuous.  Nature is personified as warring, chival-
rously giving advance ‘notice of its coming’; it emits at times a ‘wild music’, a melancholic 
‘wail’; it bids ‘our rock farewell’.  His argument glances at Aristotle, meteorology, wave-
mechanics, the theory of sound and harmony.  Their mountain cabin becomes a ship ‘moored 
to the rock’, battered by undulating troughs and crests of wind.  Most notably, a Romantic 
correspondence is established, the orgiastic fury of the storm inciting in the heart a certain 
sympathetic ‘grandeur’. 
Comparable passages appear throughout a range of Tyndall’s more technical works as 
well, many of which devolve from time to time into personal or subjective narrative, into, in 
vital particulars, travellers’ tales.  Indeed, this multivalency, and these crossings-over, between 
forms of scientific and peripatetic description, between forms of realist and imaginative 
representation, are often in and of themselves sources of charm and glancing profundity.  Pace 
that reviewer, in both Fragments and Hours of Exercise, as in all his popular works (and not a few 
of his ‘specialist’ ones as well), science is refigured as quest narrative, with a plot and real 
excitement, at the same time that the new-fangled sport of mountaineering – dubbed pejora-
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tively, and not altogether unfairly, ‘pinnacle chasing’ by Charles Dickens (qtd. in Bartlett, p. 
124) – is remade into something far less simpleminded and chest-thumpingly ‘masculine’.  
 
The remainder of this chapter interrogates some of these overlappings through examination 
of, among other things, the role of place in Tyndall’s prose and occasional verse, before 
turning at its conclusion towards broader discussion of the significance for such a thinker of 
materialistic conceptions of an ‘organic’ or ‘symphonic’ cosmology, metaphors which were, as 
we shall see, closely enmeshed.  It also incorporates an analysis, growing out of these consid-
erations, of the role canonical, late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century English Roman-
ticism – an aesthetic stance heavily indebted to notions put forth by those ‘idealistic’ philoso-
phers cited in my previous chapter – played in the framing of the scientist’s worldview.  
Wordsworth, in particular, is a powerful presence, as, after a fashion, Tyndall took it upon 
himself to refine (and, if possible, bring towards fruition) what might loosely be termed the 
‘Wordsworthian project’ – a lofty goal, to be sure, but one not wholly out of keeping with 
either the man or his times.  This ‘redacted’ project – to borrow, and upend, a phrase from M. 
H. Abrams (itself borrowed, of course, from Sartor Resartus) – was the evincing of a form of 
‘supernatural naturalism’, a way of looking at the world wholly scientific and yet imbued with 
the strength and wonder of earlier philosophies.  Abrams explains:  ‘The title Natural Supernatu-
ralism indicates that my recurrent […] concern will be with the secularization of inherited 
theological ideas and ways of thinking’ (p. 12).  This was accomplished by writers in the first 
half of the nineteenth century with varying degrees of flamboyance, individuals often starting 
from a variety of divergent presumptions.   
Such particularities resulted in a compelling diversity of early and mid-Victorian ‘ro-
manticisms’, distinguishable if interrelated.  Carlyle, writing in the 1830s and afterwards, 
inspired by German alongside English precedents, became so insistent in his annexation of 
Biblical concepts and phrasings as to suggest, not merely analogy, but ‘a deliberate attempt to 
blur the differences between traditional Christian beliefs and the subjectivity of Romantic 
regeneration’ (McSweeney and Sabor, p. xxvii).  Tyndall’s own ‘supernatural naturalism’, a 
production of the 1850s and ’60s, represented, nonetheless, a far more radical break, moving 
from the secularisation of faith to its actual materialisation, the promulgation of a form of 
naturalised religion, a ‘worship’ of the real and evidenced.  It was a small but vociferous 
denomination.  Of its adherents Rev. Watson observed, in 1889:  ‘Now a notable thing in 
regard to the preachers of Nature-religion is the way they press Gospel phrases and ideas into 
- 162 - 
their service […]’ (Gospels, p. 182).   
Yet, in this behaviour, ‘the preachers’, Tyndall among them, were merely partaking in, 
and augmenting, a productive and varied discursive tendency; it was one extending back at 
least (here further to mythologise the event) to the publication in 1800 of Wordsworth’s 
‘Preface to Lyrical Ballads’.  As such, Tyndall’s relationship with the ‘Romantic tradition’ – a 
movement at once homogenised and simplified in his writings – provides a fine case-study in 
mid-Victorian scientific intertextuality at the same time that it counterpoints Tyndall’s own 
subtly different engagements, likewise often intertextual (though not exclusively so), with 
Thomas Carlyle.  There was, as I argued previously, a compendiousness in Tyndall’s re-
sponses to Carlyle, and the scientist’s reactions (whether right or wrong) were, more often than 
not, informed by the whole of his oeuvre, not just Sartor Resartus but also Chartism, not just Past 
and Present but also The French Revolution and On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History.  
They were friends, of course, reading each other’s works, frequently discussing them at length. 
Tyndall’s familiarity with Wordsworth and his contemporaries, by contrast, while 
thorough, was never so personal.  Thus he felt less inhibited by context.  For him, Wordsworth 
and Keats, like Pope or Milton, like Marlowe or Shakespeare, were part of the literary heri-
tage, something past, to be responded to, re-appropriated and imaginatively recast, not 
necessarily engaged in reciprocating dialogue or addressed on equal terms.  Yet Wordsworth 
and Keats, far more than any of those other figures, chimed with Tyndall’s sensibilities, and 
hence his ‘supernatural naturalism’ represents a double inversion:  Romanticism as ethos first 
restrained and then rehabilitated by the selfsame thing, the doctrines of mid-century material-
ism.  This was, however, not a process of inversion yielding identity (as in mathematics or 
formal logic), but rather telling difference (as in English rhetoric, where the phrase ‘he is not 
un-handsome’ is only exceptionally a way of attributing a wholly unqualified attractiveness).  
Tyndall’s ‘litotic’ romanticism, then, while superficially congruent with that of, say, Word-
sworth, encodes a world of difference, in part, of course, by quite literally encoding a different 
world:  the world as known to, and as described by, mid-Victorian molecular, evolutionary 
and thermodynamic theory.   
It was precisely through such a cobbled neo-romanticism that Tyndall attempted to 
synthesise, or perhaps salvage, an aesthetic stance simultaneously adequate to the challenges 
posed by materialistic science and responsive to the questions raised by his own literary 
‘forbearers’:  those sainted translators of the Authorised Version; Milton; and, above all others, 
Carlyle and the Romantics.  Positing a sensibility he hoped would revivify the perceived 
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sterility of a thuggish materialism, he re-forged thereby – or reclaimed – an aesthetic-cum-
philosophical standpoint in which observation and elucidation could be understood as provid-
ing the ‘unheard music’ which, half-a-century prior, had so haunted the young Keats, endow-
ing the experiential world with a shimmering, quasi-mystical counterpart to sensible aware-
ness.  This would be a verifiable analogue to, at once alike and unlike, The Prelude’s (and M. H. 
Abrams’s) ‘correspondent breeze’.   
Sometimes this ‘unheard music’ was sensed at the microscopic level:  in the melodies of 
molecular crystallisation, for example; at others, a macroscopic one:  in the singing of stars in 
distant space, or the sough of ethereal waves.  In Mountaineering in 1861, these two levels of 
natural song are epitomised in two quotations, both from Emerson:  the first, from ‘Monad-
noc’ (‘For the world was made in order, / And the atoms march in tune’ [p. 77; qtd., p. 221]); 
the second, from ‘The House’ (‘She lays her beams in music, / In music every one, / To the 
cadence of the whirling world / Which dances round the sun’ [pp. 140 - 41; qtd., p. 264]).  
Sometimes, too, an ‘unheard music’ was felt on a further, truer level as well:  as tuneful-
ness internal, interacting in fugal fashion with such ‘external’, sustaining voices.  These were 
those sympathetic melodies stirred within the brain – a harp caressed by the breeze, in Col-
eridgean terms – of the well-tempered scientific analyst upon hushed and reverent attention to 
a ‘silently symphonious’ cosmology.  (Put succinctly, Tyndall’s ‘“materialism” vastly different 
from what you suppose […]’, that motto from his much-revised Belfast peroration [BA [2], p. 
56], merely amplified – or un-muted – sequestered orchestrations.)   
At other times such a subliminal world was figured visually instead, as a secret beauty, 
or hidden pattern.  Jacob Korg, in an essay on the influence of Romanticism on pedagogy at 
Cambridge between 1820 and 1840, wrote:  ‘The difference that Romanticism (as a specific 
historical movement) stood for – one that bound men together in generational bonds whatever 
their “discipline” – was a perception that superficial appearance, wherever studied, concealed 
quite a different kind of order than had previously been suspected’ (p. 53).  This is what 
Tyndall recollected of his initial crossing to the Isle of Wight on a private charter:   
 
 And I to give rub the rust from chest and arms  
 Seized a relinquished oar; and long I tugged, 
 And then I steered again, and saw our craft 
 Proudly o’ertake and pass with conquering sweep 
 Her canvassed sisters of the Solent sea. 
 We tacked and tacked, for so the wind decreed;  
 While I with hand upon the helm took in 
 The boatman’s hints, and but linked his facts to laws. 
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 He knew the how, and I resolved the why, 
 And through the light of principles discerned 
A beauty in his acts he did not see. (‘DP’, p. [3]) 
 
Similar private wonders were discerned in the stars above, in atoms beneath boot-soles.  Such 
modes of responsiveness to phenomenological input are everywhere evident in Tyndall’s 
published output; they provide the philosophical foundations for his scientific sense, one not 
absolutely secure, though remarkably resilient, its fracturings and aporias becoming most 
conspicuous in his outpourings of verse, despite such uneasinesses as articulated in discursive 
prose works like the Belfast Address, ‘On the Scientific Use of the Imagination’, and others.   
This seems logical, that Tyndall’s poetry should at once best express his philosophy 
while making most plainly manifest its faults and contradictions.  The form has a habit of 
doing precisely that.  It is a platitude at once tritely ignorable and timelessly correct that the 
era makes the poet as much as the poet the era; as one commentator observed in the 1860 
Encyclopædia Brittanica – casually dismissing the obviousness, on one level, of such an assertion, 
while continuing to insist, upon another, on its radical, even dictatorial, authoritativeness – 
 
That poetry which seeks to please through our sympathies must shift and vary, both in its themes and 
in the manner of treating them, with the changes of society, is a truism on which it is needless to 
enlarge.  If the opinions of men change, if their habits and the objects and associations which interest 
them alter, poetry must adopt itself to this altered state of things.  It does so indeed unconsciously; it 
cannot avoid doing so; for the poet’s own nature has partaken of the change.  (‘poetry’, p. 96) 
 
Tyndall’s science, the ‘opinions of [those] men’ on whom he had most relied, had, no doubt, 
undergone a materialistic, teleological turn, effectively irreversible, in the years after mid-
century, post Darwin and Helmholtz and Thomson.   
His poetic and metaphysical sensibilities struggled to match that turn fitly, to adapt 
their underlying architectures to what was, quite profoundly, an ‘altered state of things’, an 
observation-based, not merely ad hoc ‘metaphysical’, materialism.  That the rest of the world, 
that ordinary Victorians, were less aware of such a transition was the task Tyndall set himself 
remedying in public.  He could seem cocky, immoderate, even blasphemous in doing so.   
In private, however – as memorialised in verses, in letters, in journal entries – his tone 
was to remain far more circumspect; such was particularly the case later in the century, as the 
scientist’s own material ending inescapably approached. 
 
ON THE DESCRIPTION OF NATURE / ON THE NATURE OF DESCRIPTION 
 
Tyndall, of course, was well aware of the ameliorative effects which a subtle change in situa-
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tion could sometimes work on an individual’s mindset, not least through personal experience.  
Once, for instance, while wrestling with conceptual difficulties underlying a fundamental 
problem in electromagnetism (‘The experiments’, he later remarked, ‘which everybody seems 
to understand are the ones that trouble me most […]’ [qtd. in LWJT, p. 53]), he took some 
time out to draft a letter.  It was to Thomas Archer Hirst.  A friend and constant correspon-
dent, he was also a figure who had himself ‘emerged’ – alongside such righteous publicists as 
Huxley, Spencer, Wallace, and, of course, the author – around mid-century ‘from a spiritual 
crisis to become one of the leaders in a new faith in science’.  (As James Secord has quipped, 
the familiar, retrospective narrative [p. 338].)  In it, Tyndall told his protégé of how it was 
often the case that slight glimmerings of theoretical or mathematical insight could swiftly 
rekindle even the most rapidly flagging of enthusiasms.  On such occasions, he explained, ‘I 
have found myself […] converted from a miserable, complaining, rebellious wretch, into a 
loyal and happy worker, in less time than it has taken to write this sentence.  A thought has 
rifted and scattered the cloud of discontent, as the wind disperses the mist upon the hills’ (qtd. 
in LWJT, p. 53).   
His meteorological metaphor was far from accidental.  In fact, he likewise believed that 
it was not merely minor alterations in awareness, changes in internal mental state, which could 
enact upon the psyche such profoundly disproportionate effects.  External transformations 
could work equivalent wonders.2  He noted habitually the transformative physical and psycho-
logical powers – all at once instantaneous, revivifying and inspirational – wrought by Alpine 
vistas or, perhaps, as on that daytrip to Wight, the merest glimpsing of a comely barmaid’s 
charms.  In one untitled poem, for example, preserved in manuscript at the RI, he observed: 
 
The thickset trees which crowd the Undercliff – 
The scented woodbine on the neighbouring knoll – 
The foxglove shaking all its purple bells – 
And roses blushing mid the tender green – 
All blend into a bouquet for the sight; 
But not for sight alone, for beauty sends 
Its finer essence down into the heart […] 
                                                
2  As one epigraph to Hours of Exercise Tyndall selected a passage from the (largely forgotten) American poet 
James Russell Lowell arguing this precise point:  ‘the brain / That forages all climes to line its cells / Ranging 
both worlds on lightest wings of wish, / Will not distil the juices it has sucked / To the sweet substance of pellucid 
thought / Except for him who hath the secret learned / To mix his blood with sunshine, and to take / The wind 
into his pulses […]’ (p. 330; qtd., p. xii).   
Tyndall, however, in typical fashion, left out (one must presume:  deliberately) Lowell’s line referring to ‘both 
worlds’; in all likelihood, he did so because such a line argued for a dualism of metaphysics anathema to mid-
Victorian scientific naturalism’s strict monism/anti-Platonism. 
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while a much later essay of his, in a specimen of prose remarkable as much for its dynamism 
and calculated lyricism as for its unimpeachable scientific precision, reiterated with still greater 
vehemence such ‘quasi-Romantic’ presumptions. 
He, within, was reporting details of an excursion he had made between stops while on 
a whirlwind lecture-tour of a number of cities along the North-eastern seaboard of the United 
States, an excursion on which he first had the opportunity to see (and listen to) the cacopho-
nous splendour of famed Niagara Falls: 
 
Here my guide [to the river beneath the Falls] sheltered me again, and desired me to look up; I did 
so, and could see, as before, the green gleam of the mighty curve sweeping over the upper ledge, and 
the fitful plunge of the water, as the spray between us and it alternately gathered and disappeared.  An 
eminent friend of mine often speaks to me of the mistake of those physicians who regard man’s 
ailments as purely chemical, to be met by chemical remedies only.  He contends for the psychological 
element of cure.  By agreeable emotions, he says, nervous currents are liberated which stimulate blood, 
brain, and viscera.  The influence rained from ladies’ eyes enables my friend to thrive on dishes which 
would kill him if eaten alone.  A sanative effect of the same order I experienced amid the spray and 
thunder of Niagara.  Quickened by the emotions there aroused, the blood sped healthily through the 
arteries, abolishing introspection, […] and enabling one to think with tolerance, if not with tenderness, 
of the most relentless and unassailable foe.  (‘Niagara’, p. 52)  
 
This description may seem off-kilter – perverse in some particulars, grotesque or clinical in 
others – as if it were cast in ‘incorrect’ language for evocation of what, to many, even today, 
would surely have seemed a manifestly transcendent, or spiritual, experience.  (That is, of 
course, assuming that the present-day visitor could somehow manage to overlook the honey-
mooning kitsch of the place!) 
It was, though, entirely apposite for a thinker like Tyndall.  For here, as ever, his prose 
remains that of the trenchant scientific materialist, the ever-stubborn natural philosopher who 
never once conceived of a psychological effect without a physiological cause.   
But it also contains echoes – somewhat muted, perhaps, though for all that unmistak-
able – of the displaced Lake-land poet as well, of the vernacular of men and women ripped 
from turn-of-the-century inns or taverns and dropped, rather unceremoniously, into the 
dissecting rooms or public lecture theatres of fifty years subsequent.  There, suddenly finding 
themselves inhabiting a world of steam engines and electromagnetic telegraphy, rather than 
ruined cottages or rustic carriage-ways, they nevertheless still felt compelled, by force of habit, 
to inscribe in verse using the language they thought best suited to their purposes, not, this time 
around, a Cumbrian tarn or the village of Grasmere, but rather the grander spectacles of 
Niagara or Alp.  Thus we have those eminently logical segues – from Tyndall’s perspective – 
from the sort of (self-conscious, fussily ‘poetic’) rhetoric associated with countless derivative 
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mid-nineteenth-century intimations, and imitations, of the Wordsworthian sublime to that 
drawn more from a Victorian anatomical guidebook.  He does not, as might be expected from 
someone more prototypical, veer in such instances towards either the diction or the metaphors 
associated with a theological or even a (conventionally) philosophical treatise or lecture.  
‘[A]mid the spray and thunder of Niagara’, Tyndall’s ‘soul’, accordingly, never once swoons, 
nor does his heart – considered metaphorically, of course, most certainly not cardiovascularly 
– even for a moment ‘leap up’; rather, freshly oxygenated blood speeds exultingly through 
‘arteries’, thereby perfusing his body’s multifarious ‘viscera’.   
It would seem that, at its core, even Tyndall’s romanticism, his metaphysical sensibil-
ity, was fully grounded in what remains by its definition the stuff of the obstinately, even 
ostentatiously, physical.   
The first drafting of his poem about Wight, for instance, commences with just such a 
jarring flourish of materialistic imagery.  In its opening lines, he celebrates his morning repast 
in terms poetically unfortunate but gastro-intestinally precise:  ‘For breakfast – we attacked it – 
[…] / They to their tea, I to my cocoa mild / Which Mrs. Leary mixes every morn / With 
milk, thus forming a nutritious mud!’ (‘DP’ [1], p. [1]).  (In the fair copy of the poem sent to 
Mrs Pollock this section was excised, perhaps for reasons of decorum.)  His later (infinitely 
more felicitous) excursus on the motive potential of a domesticated horse, by contrast, seems 
somehow less reductively radical, or ‘morally’ caustic:  ‘We put our pony in the hostler’s 
hands, / And bade him to be bountiful with corn, / And charge each fibre of the beast with 
force / To bear us homeward cheerily at eve’ (‘DP’, p. [2]).  Yet horse and human alike are 
both fuelled through analogous processes of ingestion, a piquant challenge to exceptionalism. 
 Tyndall’s lifelong affinity for Wordsworth was, in fact, particularly acute, never suffer-
ing a falling off, let alone (as infamously related by Darwin, in the Autobiography [p. 83]) extinc-
tion.  It is, moreover, evident, and evidenced – if often inconspicuously, in linguistic echo, or 
small gesture – throughout the range of his writings, for both scholarly and popular audiences.   
 When, in a review of Bence Jones’s extensive biography of Faraday, he remarks that 
‘[t]he first volume [of Jones’s work] […] reveals to us the youth who was to be father to the 
man’ (FoS, p. 360), it must have seemed to many among his readership that the scientist was 
invoking nothing more than what must have seemed by then a rhetorical commonplace, not 
making any sort of direct or spiritually significant allusion to ‘My heart leaps up’.  Perhaps, 
they reckoned, Tyndall, aware of the intended audience for his critique (it was to be published 
in The Academy, a recently established highbrow and highly literate monthly), half expected 
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some of his readers to re-contextualise such a reference as one evocative of the species of 
‘natural’ – contrasting with scriptural – piety so central to that lyric.   
 But this explanation does not fully convince, and the quotation, in my opinion, was 
neither accidental nor off-hand.  Tyndall knew precisely what he was doing with such a shop-
worn phrase, at once suggesting, explicitly, the continuity of his mentor’s temperament through 
the long course of his lifetime, and also, implicitly, the closeness of Faraday’s own scientific 
struggles to those of the nature poet, a soul similarly endeavouring to transform ‘a discrete, 
dead, and alien milieu into a human, integral and companionable milieu in which man finds 
himself thoroughly at home’ (Abrams, p. 377).  Like ‘double-minded’ rationales, I suggest, 
underpin many of Tyndall’s ‘romantic’ invocations elsewhere, too:  in his poetry, his prose 
and, not infrequently, in his professional and personal correspondence.   
 A letter to Mrs Pollock of 17 April 1859, mentioned in my previous chapter, told of 
some perambulations in the Lake District, and of that region’s (famously tempestuous) climate.  
Note the effulgence of the scientist’s description of speedily unfurling weather fronts, not to 
mention the sideways glances plainly evident in his language, not merely at the Romantics, 
but also Thomas Gray’s Elegy.  This latter aspect becomes perhaps most conspicuous in 
Tyndall’s concluding remarks on the picturesque attributes of the poet’s final resting place, 
where a lone ‘black cypress gives character to the scene’.3  Consider also the telling conjunc-
tion in this text of the monumental figures of William Wordsworth with Humphry Davy 
(simplistically:  ‘co-founder’ of Romanticism, pioneering post-Lavoisian physical chemist), two 
names deliberately isolated out of a ‘hundred’ others, both of whom came to national promi-
nence in the opening decades of the nineteenth century.  As such, they form a de facto grandfa-
therly counterpart to that ‘patriarchal’ pairing of Michael Faraday with Thomas Carlyle: 
 
I reached Windermere at 6 o’clock and before dinner walked to Orrest Head and saw Wordsworth’s 
“beautiful romance of Nature”.  Next morning at 9 o’clock we rowed from Windermere to Ambleside 
– the lake was smooth and sunny when we departed, but it became black and rough, and to shelter 
ourselves from one storm we pushed ashore and landed on a wooded knoll.  Near the spot stood a 
granite cross marking the spot where two young men had been drowned the year before within 18 feet 
of the shore.  Remember Walter must be taught to swim.  The storm howled over us spitting heavy 
snow flakes against us.  The little lake looked quite grand, black as ink under the black scowl of heaven 
with the crests of its little sputtering waves rendered doubly white by contrast.  The slate rocks all over 
the knoll were carved and sculptured by some local madman, who had a passion for chiseling [sic].  
There were Wordsworth, Davy, and a hundred other names, some deeply cut, others in relief, the rock 
around the letters being chiseled [sic] away.  We landed at Ambleside, walked thence to Rydal mount, 
                                                
3  Compare these lines in Gray’s Elegy Written in a Country Church-yard:  ‘Beneath those rugged elms, that yew 
tree’s shade, / Where heaves the turf in many a mould’ring heap, / Each in his narrow cell for ever laid, / The 
rude Forefathers of the hamlet sleep’ (p. 92). 
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and looked round Wordsworth’s nest.  Thence to Grasmere, and stood for some minutes beside his 
grave.  A clear stream rushes near it, a few trees are at hand; one black cypress gives character to the 
scene, and there the poet sleeps, while the plainest slab of black slate which contains only his name, 
marks his resting place.  If I can manage it I will be buried in a country churchyard.  I hate town 
burials.  (pp. 1954 - 55) 
 
This Davy/Wordsworth conjunction points the way towards the most significant of Tyndall’s 
double-codings, the published Belfast Address, where, in the first Longmans edition, he chose 
emblematically to conclude, and qualify, the body of his argument – in which a ‘parallel 
message’ had always been latent – with extended quotation from ‘Tintern Abbey’ (BA, p. 65). 
He was not the first science writer to attempt such retroactive defusing.  Gideon Man-
tell, notes Stephen Gill in Wordsworth and the Victorians (1998), added to the 1839 edition of his 
Wonders of Geology (1838), a similar coda, quoting the same poem, thus (hopefully) ‘reassur[ing] 
any nervous reader that this scientific work was in no way irreligious […]’; that ‘these facts 
and diagrams could be summed up in a poet’s “prayer”’ (p. 23).  Tyndall’s aspirations were 
comparable, if more pantheistic.  The presence, one imagines, of such a refrain in such a 
venue could hardly have been overlooked.  Nevertheless, its significance was still often dis-
missed (a topic broached in chapter two) – by audiences hostile, unimaginative, or inattentive 
– as ornamental, rather than essential, to the heritage and meaning of the scientist’s overall 
‘materialistic’ epistemology.  (Whether Mantell had any more success remains obscure.)   
Wordsworth’s critical vitality, though perhaps not popular reputation, reached some-
thing of a nadir in the first decades after mid-century – thereafter it revived, somewhat.  
‘Throughout the 1850s and 1860s’, Gill observes, ‘received ideas about Wordsworth were 
promulgated, a particular slant being given by the writers’ opinions, but there was little 
probing or questioning.  Only in a few articles was there any sign of either a considered review 
of the grounds for asserting Wordsworth’s continuing importance, or dissent from the consen-
sus judgement which would provoke debate’ (pp. 209 - 10).  Yet the scientist’s writings through 
this period, and after, surely could be classified – albeit at second-hand – among the former.  
At a time when, as Arnold sighed, it was ‘quite permissible to speak of Wordsworth’s poetry, 
not only with ignorance, but with impertinence’ (‘Wordsworth’, p. 37); at a time when Ruskin 
openly lamented the tempering of an adolescent delight in the ‘pure childish love of nature 
which Wordsworth so idly takes for an intimation of immortality’ (Præterita, 1: 334), Tyndall’s 
fondness, it seems, remained irony-free, not so much qualified as refined, made substantial.   
One poem in particular exemplifies this.  Anyone befuddled by the ‘Wordsworthian-
ism’ of the Belfast Address, confronted by ‘A Morning on Alp Lusgen’, would have been hard-
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pressed to reach the same impasse.   
Anthologised in New Fragments, this late work – drafted c. 1890 – makes unambiguous 
the scientist’s various, deeply resonant spiritual and artistic debts to the writings of that para-
digmatic figure, praised – in a study of 1897, by Charles Herford – as a poet who ‘loved 
“common” things, because they were common […]’, and who ‘loved those rare and strange 
aspects […]’ of common things ‘that called forth or “caught” imagination’ (p. 159).  Tyndall, 
within, typified the panorama from Alp Lusgen, an isolated retreat, with suitably ‘Wordswor-
thian’ style and strength, moving swiftly, as had many devotees before him, from the prosaic 
business of topographic description to the rather more interesting task of spiritual and cosmic 
speculation.  The poem, in short, embodies (if in an updated, Continental mise-en-scène) affec-
tions singled out by Herford.  (It does so in blank verse of considerable vigour and conviviality; 
C. E. Mathews was not being disingenuous when he – writing a portion of Tyndall’s obituary 
notice for The Alpine Journal – described ‘A Morning on Alp Lusgen’ as a ‘poem of considerable 
power […]’ [p. 27].4)  It integrates also, over a few score lines, Tyndall’s thoughts on moun-
taineering, on morality, and, as noted, personal perspectives on both the late Thomas 
Carlyle’s achievement and popular observations on its incompleteness.  It encompasses as well 
Tyndall’s materialism, percolating contemporary critiques of that materialism, and his own 
lingering doubts about the fairness and final sufficiency of such a reductionist philosophy.   
But above these specifically ‘Tyndallic’ tropes, born of the late-nineteenth-century 
natural philosopher, lurks the spectre of the man who had undertaken, in midsummer 1798, a 
nostalgic tour of the countryside; one of his poems, written in documentation, announces: 
 
       again I hear 
These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs 
With a soft inland murmur. –  Once again 
Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs, 
That on a wild secluded scene impress 
Thoughts of deep seclusion; and connect 
The landscape with the quiet of the sky. (p. 163; ll. 2 - 8) 
 
By contrast, Tyndall’s own recasting of Wordsworth’s opening to ‘Tintern Abbey’ in ‘A 
Morning’ reminds us of the ‘parochialism’ (meant, however, by its author in no pejorative 
sense) of his predecessor’s limited perspective, of the fact that Tyndall’s world of skyscraper 
                                                
4  Not all critics were quite as impressed as Mr Mathews:  Eve and Creasey, for instance, pronounced at best 
‘ephemeral’ Tyndall’s ‘From the Alps:  A Fragment’, a precursor to ‘A Morning on Alp Lusgen’ first published in 
the Pall Mall Gazette (LWJT, p. 225).  (Incidentally, that early title nicely ‘scientises’ the poem, incorporating it, by 
implication, in the great body of his work, Fragments of Science.) 
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peaks and tumbled moraines, quite literally, ‘overtops’ all the features of those British land-
scapes which so frequently moved Wordsworth to rapture and artistry.   
As Tyndall notes, writing from an aerie midway up the mountainside, 
 
The plummet from this height must sink afar 
To reach yon rounded mounds which seem so small. 
They shrink in the embrace of vaster forms, 
Though, placed amid the pomp of Cumbrian Fells, 
These hillock crests would overtop them all. 
Steep fall the meadows to the vale in slopes 
Of freshest green, scarred by the humming streams, 
And flecked by spaces of primeval pine. (NF, p. 498) 
 
While the scientist’s language clearly parallels that of his prototype, he adumbrates a world 
quantitatively, not just qualitatively, removed from the one Wordsworth captured so many 
years prior, his pentameter encoding not simply a change in geography, but a shifting in 
worldview.  It was, for instance, a place made far older (‘primeval pine’) and rendered less 
domestic and hospitable in its scope by developments in geology.  Tyndall’s rugged lowlands 
‘shrink’ in the shadow of the ‘vaster forms’ of the local terrain, one ‘flecked’ indiscriminately 
by copses of ancient pine, and ‘scarred’ by the ceaseless processes of erosion and sedimenta-
tion wrought by myriad fast-flowing Alpine streams (these, needless to say, almost certainly 
emit no restful ‘soft inland murmur’ like Wordsworth’s gentle ‘waters […] rolling from […] 
mountain-springs’).   
Nevertheless, despite such belittling magnifications in scale, despite nearly a century of 
convulsions in theoretical paradigm, Tyndall would still have concurred wholeheartedly with 
the famously brash assertion, made by Wordsworth in the ‘Prospectus to The Recluse’, that it 
was ‘the Mind of Man […]’ which was to be his ‘haunt, and the main region of [his] song’ (p. 
590; ll. 40 - 41).5, 6   
He would likewise, no doubt, have seconded the poet’s (equally audacious) celebration, 
twenty-one lines later, of a splendid, sympathetic ‘fitted-ness’; it is between, on the one hand, 
                                                
5  In 1874, writing in defence of his Belfast position, Tyndall characterised one of his adversaries, the Bishop 
of Manchester, as a frustrated and bitter anachronism, a soul fated to occupy most of his time ‘running to and fro 
upon the earth […] wringing his hands over the threatened loss of his ideals […]’, utterly incapable – or unwill-
ing – to believe ‘undoubtingly that in the mind of man we have the substratum of all ideals’ (‘Crystals’, p. 83), 
that it was the precepts of his own Christianity, not those of ‘materialism’s’ enlightened humanism, which might 
come to seem superfluous.   
6  Edward Manier, in 1978’s The Young Darwin and His Cultural Circle, argued that The Excursion, to which these 
lines were prelude (and which expresses similar sentiments), ‘provided powerful poetic expression for some of 
Darwin’s deepest philosophical concerns and convictions’, though conceded that evidence for such formative 
influence was ‘only circumstantial’ (p. 89). 
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the sensory and analytic powers of the ‘Romantic’ mind, and, on the other, the examined 
phenomena of nature: 
 
      my voice proclaims 
How exquisitely the individual Mind 
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less 
Of the whole species) to the external World 
Is fitted: – and how exquisitely, too – 
Theme this but little heard of among men – 
The external World is fitted to the Mind; 
And the creation (by no lower name  
Can it be called) which they with blended might 
Accomplish: – this is our high argument. (p. 590; ll. 62 - 71) 
 
Gillian Beer says of this:  ‘Mind and world have a hoped-for appropriateness to each other – a 
“fitness”.  The notions of just proportions, exact craftsmanship, sexual harmony, healthful 
mutuality, are all poised within the repeated “fitted”’ (Darwin’s, p. 44).  Emergent synergisms, 
captured here, at once inspired – and guided – Tyndall. 
His letter of 17 April 1859 to Mrs Pollock includes a lengthy, topically discursive ac-
count of how he and Edward Frankland, his walking companion, had managed in horrid 
weather to traverse the high fells between Ambleside and Grasmere.  In it, he elaborates on 
the fashion in which the play of light and shadow on the rumpled topography could at times 
seem evocative of specific mental states, at one point even a brooding psychological condition 
suggestive of dark ‘supernatural horror’.  ‘But the blackness’ of the clouds overhead, he wrote,  
 
was above all description grand, and the contrasts wonderful.  The boundary of the storm was marked 
with perfect definition:  outside of it rocks and fells, and lakes lay bathed in sunlight; in front of the 
gloom the hills were of a grimness that suggested a kind of supernatural horror.  Frankland said that if 
a little nitrate of [?] were ignited on Scawfell pike, so as to redden the clouds, we should have a fair 
representation of a certain locality.  (p. 1957) 
 
Hellish premonitions – shared with Frankland – were not the only ones troubling the rambler.  
He later comments on the ‘calm delight’ with which a break in the weather filled him, making 
explicit one crucial presumption of canonical Romanticism, derived from the ‘Prospectus’ 
(pathetic fallacy linking mindscape with mountain):  ‘I cannot describe them’, he said of some 
luminous cloudbanks abruptly visible, ‘and the calm delight they imparted suggested a rela-
tionship between them and the human soul’ (p. 1958).  Even as a child, Tyndall had been 
aware of, and believed in, this identification.   
The outdoors, needless to say, had long been a powerful presence in the scientist’s life, 
from the time of his boyhood in Ireland to that of his death, at age seventy three, in Hindhead, 
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a growing – too rapidly, he thought – village on the outskirts of London.7  In an (undated, 
though obviously late) draft manuscript, he wrote of his never-ending quest for Romantic 
solitude and his lifelong love of nature, quoting from his Lehrjahren – roughly, ‘apprentice 
journal’, a diary of intellectual maturation and personal discovery.  (The ‘screen’, by the way, 
was a lofty contrivance of larch-poles and heather matting erected to interrupt sightlines 
between Tyndall’s house in Hindhead and some unattractive outbuildings on a neighbouring 
property [LWJT, pp. 259 - 60].)  
 
My story of “the Screen” at HindHead 
 
Large has my love for Nature been, 
 I loved her from a child. 
I loved her in her summer sheen 
 And when the winter wild 
Wrapped storms around her awful brow, 
 And ocean formed a throne, 
To bear her, Queen and conqueror, 
 My love was her’s [sic] alone. 
 
Thus I wrote in my Lehrjahren.  The lines were are worthless, but they mark a tendency.  When As an 
imaginative little boy youngster I often crept into the hollow of a tree in windy weather, and listened 
with elation to the sound of the swaying branches overhead.  In my youth I have walked miles upon a 
stormy night to reach a cliffy coast from which I might <see and> hear and observe <view> the raging 
of the sea.  This stamp of natural tendency has never been effaced.  For six and thirty years it took me 
to the Alps, where sixteen years ago, I built <causing me finally to build there> a nest amid <above> 
the heather and bilberries <of Alp Lusgen> at a height of over 7000 feet above the sea.  A retreat in 
England [tear in manuscript] […] to the “sunset of life” was less easy to find. 
 
This entry, even as it echoes the portentously apocalyptic squall detailed in Glaciers of the Alps, 
perhaps also brings to mind William Irvine’s brusque dismissal of Tyndall’s prose:  ‘diluted 
Wordsworthian nature rhapsody’, is how he described his tendency to deliquesce, in ‘height-
ened’ passages (p. 33).  (Maybe Tyndall, aware of his limitations, would not have considered 
this remark so cutting?)  
Beyond ‘Tintern Abbey’, that paragon of the British Romantic tradition, one incon-
testable further influence on ‘A Morning on Alp Lusgen’ was an extended verse ode written in 
praise of an American peak by Ralph Waldo Emerson, foremost among the school of New 
England transcendental thinkers who, ‘beginning in the 1830s, seized upon and expanded the 
assertions by Coleridge, Wordsworth, Carlyle, and their German contemporaries concerning 
                                                
7 Bertrand Russell, in his Autobiography, recalls his childhood awe at Tyndall’s monumental presence in this 
village:  ‘In the year 1883 my Uncle Rollo bought a house on the slopes of Hindhead, where, for a long time, we 
all visited him for three months in every year.  […]  I was frequently taken to see Tyndall, and he gave me one of 
his books, The Forms of Water.  I admired him as an eminent Man of Science, and strongly desired to make some 
impression upon him.  Twice I had some success […]’ (p. 42). 
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the power of renewal in the eye of a man who sees as a child sees’ (Abrams, p. 412).   
‘I can almost hear his [Tyndall’s] melodious voice ringing out with Emerson’s apostro-
phe to the mountain “Monadnoc”, so often repeated among rocky solitudes in Switzerland 
[…]’, recalled Louisa Tyndall to a mutual friend not long after her husband’s passing (qtd. in 
LWJT, p. 286); here is an excerpt:  
 
 Ages are thy days,  
 Thou grand affirmer of the present tense, 
 And type of permanence! 
 Firm ensign of the fatal Being, 
 Amid these coward shapes of joy and grief, 
 That will not bide the seeing! 
 Hither we bring 
 Our insect miseries to the rocks; 
 And the whole flight, with pestering wing, 
 Vanish […] (pp. 81 - 82) 
 
So declaims a pilgrim in the audience of that New Hampshire immensity, one of those ‘cow-
ard shapes’ at once cowed and cured by the mountain’s enormity in space, persistence in time. 
Here landscape overwhelms, eternities threaten; menaced by the infinite, the ‘insect’ 
soul bewildered by Monadnoc seems a fitter analogue for Tyndall upon Alp Lusgen than 
reposing Wordsworth, overlooking that homely Welsh vista of ‘hedge-rows, hardly hedge-
rows, little lines / Of sportive wood run wild:  these pastoral farms, / Green to the very door 
[…]’ (p. 164; ll. 15 - 17).  Indeed, Richard Proctor, in an essay of 1882, even explicitly likened 
his generation’s dawning conception of infinite space and endless time to his generation’s 
increasing acquaintance, via travel and exploration, with the Cyclopean geological forms 
presented by the Alps.  Spiculated outcroppings and vertiginous emptinesses, crushing weights 
and straight-faced pinnacles, these could challenge mens sana, not just corpore sano.   
‘Who can wonder’, he writes, ‘if from these awful depths [of an ‘expanded’ cosmos] 
men have turned in weariness of soul, nay almost in affright, as when the Alpine traveller, 
peering over some fog-enshrouded precipice, sees down […] to deeper and deeper abysses 
[…]’ (‘Newton’, p. 996).  The focus of my next section will be Tyndall’s wary encounter with 
just such a prospect, and the fashion in which it both tested, and affirmed, beliefs. 
 
THE ROMANCE OF THE REAL:  MATERIALISM’S TRANSCENDENTALISM 
 
For all the perfect similarities in terms of aesthetic sensibility between materialistic and Ro-
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mantic (or transcendentalist) ideology, there were always, for Tyndall, differences in elemen-
tary philosophy.   
For him, Wordsworth’s – and, by crude extension, high Romanticism’s – cohering 
symmetry between internal and external worlds was no miraculous boon, nor blessed acci-
dent.  On the contrary, it testified, directly, to the fact that the intellect seems fitted to the 
world because it is of the world, that nature seems comprehensible to the mind because the 
mind is of a piece with it.  This, needless to say, was Tyndall’s ‘high argument’, his ‘[t]heme 
[…] but little heard’; in truth, if there could be said to be one principle unifying (and summa-
rising) all his multifarious writings – essays and books and reviews covering the disciplines of 
biology and physics, mountaineering and epistemology, sociology and practical epidemiology 
– it would be that of the very completeness of this absolute and ineluctable identity between 
mind and matter, where he, following his mentor Fichte, unfailingly insisted that ‘the brain 
and the moral and intellectual processes were, insofar as experiences could tell […], known to 
be indissolubly associated with the physical laws found paramount in nature’ (Kim, p. 134).  
Consequently, Tyndall was open to criticisms of the sort levied by William Blake in marginal 
comments (found in his personal copy of Wordsworth’s ‘Prospectus’):  ‘You shall not bring me 
down to believe such fitting & fitted.  I know better […].  Does not this Fit, & is not this Fitting 
most Exquisitely too, but to what? – not to Mind, but to the Vile Body only & to its Laws of 
Good & Evil & its Enmities against Mind’ (‘Marginalia’, pp. 823 - 24).   
In rebuttal, Tyndall repeatedly emphasised that neither is the body vile, nor the mind 
exalted.  Rather, both, in essentials, are interchangeable, at once eternally and inextricably 
aligned – if low, equal in lowliness; if sublime, identical in sublimity.  In one famous essay, he 
illustrated such exegetical proclivities via a matrimonial twist, linking mind and matter, like 
husband and wife, in allegorical sacrament:  ‘They degrade neither member of the mysterious 
duality referred to’, he said of himself and his materialistic brethren; ‘but they exalt one of 
them from its abasement, and repeal the divorce hitherto existing between both.  In substance, 
if not in words, their position […] is:  “What God hath joined together let not man put 
asunder”’ (FoS, p. 165). 
Mallock, like many among his contemporaries (and like Blake himself, decades prior), 
baulked at such levelling, at materialism’s propensity for knocking everything down to a 
common ground-state:  the matter of the stars above, the soil below – or ontological equiva-
lence with the most grubby proto-hominid.  One such animal, having a fugitive presence 
throughout The New Paul and Virginia (it is glimpsed fleetingly in dense jungle by Prof. Darnley 
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and quickly becomes for him the grail itself), is meant as a comical stand-in for anthropology’s 
fabled ‘missing link’, though it is at the tale’s conclusion revealed to be nothing more than a 
trained and servile monkey ‘wearing’ a piece of women’s jewellery.  Darnley, who frequently 
quotes Tyndall (often verbatim) in his diatribes, opines at one point of such a debased entity:  
‘The missing link is the token of the solemn fact of our origin from inorganic matter.  I did but 
catch one blessed glimpse of him.  He had a silver band about his neck.  He was about three 
feet high.  It is through him that we are related to the stars – the holy, the glorious stars, about 
which we know so little’ (p. 118).  Such overblown rhetoric is meant to invite ridicule and 
censure; such pomposity to incite laughter at the sorry spectacle of circus animal ‘worshipped’ 
by haughty intellectual, a thinly disguised composite of mid-Victorian England’s scientific 
propagandists.  Mallock’s entire scenario is, in effect, carefully gauged to reveal materialism’s 
(like evolutionism’s) ethical poverty.   
Tyndall, again, throughout his career, put forth an (unvarying) counterproposal, point-
ing out that gradations of worth are meaningless – and egotism no refuge – when confronted 
by the majesty of a unified and wholly material creation, even if it is a creation that does, by 
definition, include both the sacred and profane, the self-aware mind and that jibbering mon-
key.   
He, of course, made many score, if not thousands, of declarations, spread throughout 
an entire lifetime of lecturing and active publication, of this, his foundational belief.  The 
following passage, however – meditative, suggestive and precise – represents, to my mind, 
their apotheosis.  Indeed, it is written in the form of a prose-poem, an estimation apparently 
confirmed by its reappearance as a full-page ‘epigraph’ in Fragments of Science for, tellingly, 
Tyndall’s celebrated discourse ‘On the Scientific Use of the Imagination’ (FoS, p. 124).  ‘Old 
Alpine Jottings’ – excerpted from Hours of Exercise in the Alps, republished initially in Macmillan’s 
Magazine, and later reprinted in the catch-all volume New Fragments (again, evidence of cross-
generic, intertextual pollination) – concludes with several observations on the Matterhorn, 
pointedly focusing not on the peak’s aggressively ‘masculine’ power or seeming indomitability, 
but rather on the way its physical appearance, as with that of Niagara Falls, testifies to ‘the 
irresistible and remorseless character of those forces whose summation through the ages pulls 
down even the Matterhorn’.   
‘Hitherto’, he explains, ‘the impression it [the mountain] had made was that of savage 
strength, but here we had inexorable decay’ (NF, p. 495).  In Modern Painters IV (1856), John 
Ruskin, commenting on the Rochers des Fys (his phrasing, incidentally, bringing to mind the 
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valiance of Maxwell on behalf of ‘steadfast’ or incorruptible molecules, as discussed in my 
third chapter), had described that Alpine precipice as particularly ‘frightful’, exemplary of the 
geological type ‘nourishing no root in their crevices, touched by no hue of life on buttress or 
ledge, but, to the utmost, desolate; knowing no shaking of leaves in the wind, nor of grass 
beside the stream, – no motion but their own mortal shivering, the dreadful crumbling of 
atom from atom in their corrupting stones […]’ (pp. 254 - 55).  Such oppressive spectacle 
encodes, for Ruskin, one ‘of those terrible and sad truths which the universe is full of’ (p. 256).   
‘At their most troubled moments’, Paul Sawyer observes of Ruskin’s later scientific 
mediations, they  
 
come close to nightmares – raging struggles of sanctity against blasphemy, purity against the devil, life 
against death; mythopoeia draws close to hallucination, and one senses the darkness of the morning in 
1878 when Ruskin awoke to find the Evil One in his room.  By contrast, the Lucretian universe of 
Tyndall, purged of troublesome projections, seems blandly salutary; for Tyndall feared neither analy-
sis, nor Mother Earth, nor life, nor death.  (p. 240) 
 
(Ruskin, though nearing such despondency in his commentary on the Rochers des Fys, evades 
it via painterly description – an aesthetician’s stratagem, his acculturation of the sublime.) 
In comparison with that of Ruskin, Sawyer is certainly right to describe the Tyndallic 
cosmos as ‘salutary’, but it is neither ‘bland’ nor without projections, often troublesome.  
They, however, tend to be irksome in the interpretive rather than ethical sense, appearing less 
baleful than confounding, like invitations to deep rethinking rather than outrageous assaults 
on the idea of humanity itself.  For instance, having extrapolated forwards towards its over-
throw, Tyndall’s peripatetic ‘thought’ is then drawn backwards, by the inexorable necessities 
of causal reasoning and the twinned laws which govern the conservation of mass and energy, 
 
to a period when the Matterhorn was in the full strength of mountainhood [….] [and] to its possible 
growth and origin.  Nor did it halt there, but wandered on through molten worlds to that nebulous 
haze which philosophers have regarded, and with good reason, as the proximate source of all material 
things.  Could the blue sky above be the residue of that haze?  Would the azure which deepens on the 
heights sink into utter darkness beyond the atmosphere?  I tried to look at this universal cloud, contain-
ing within itself the prediction of all that has since occurred; I tried to imagine it as the seat of those 
forces whose action was to issue in solar and stellar systems, and all that they involve.  Did that formless 
fog contain potentially the sadness with which I regarded the Matterhorn.  Did the thought which thus 
ran back through the ages simply return to its primeval home?  If so, had we not better recast our 
definitions of life and force?  for if life and thought be the very flower of both, any definition which 
omits life and thought must be inadequate, if not untrue.  (NF, pp. 495 - 96) 
 
His chosen language – Tyndall’s evocation of his own peculiar paths of ‘[t]hought […] [that] 
wandered on through molten worlds to that nebulous haze’ – even as it answers Ruskin’s 
slanderings of geological degradation, subtly parallels diction deployed in The Prelude:  specifi-
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cally, Wordsworth’s description of Roubiliac’s statue of Newton in the Antechapel of Trinity 
College, Cambridge. 
So, too, does the manner in which he characterises his own idiosyncratic interpretive 
habits serve to betoken an understated affinity between that celebrated ‘precursor’ and his 
latter-day self.  They were a pair of thinkers, nonetheless, separated by far more than the mere 
matter of a hundred and fifty years.  Newton’s achievement, in Tyndall’s opinion, was that he 
recognised that ‘what is true of the earth as she swings to and fro in her yearly journey round 
the sun, is also true of her minutest atom […]’; thus he busied himself studying, like a curious 
watchmaker analysing the workmanship of an unfamiliar, yet comparable, master-craftsman, 
all the measurable world’s ‘wheels within wheels […] [its] rhythm within rhythm’ (FoS, p. 24).  
(Incidentally, it would seem that even by the mid-nineteenth century such a parable of watch 
and watchmaker was already considered among the literati overly threadbare.8)  Tyndall, by 
contrast, aspired to learn of much vaster and more occulted things.  He tried to apprehend 
nothing less than the presumed ‘utter darkness beyond the atmosphere’; he hoped to peer into 
the ‘universal cloud’ which, through condensation and gravitational collapse, was over untold 
millennia ‘to issue in solar and stellar systems, and all that they involve’.  And he recognised 
that in this looking backwards there was also an element of looking inward, an apprehension, 
not just of the self, but also that part of the self capable of feeling awe, of gazing silently into 
the darkness, filled with amazement and asking (often unanswerable) questions.  ‘Did the 
thought’ – Tyndall directs this urgent query apparently as much at himself as at any hypothe-
sised reader – ‘which thus ran back through the ages simply return to its primeval home?’  For 
it seems, like Newton before him, Tyndall, too, possessed ‘a mind for ever / Voyaging through 
strange seas of Thought, alone’ (Prelude, p. 508; 3.62 - 63).   
As T. W. Heyck has noted:  ‘For the early Victorians, Newton stood as the heroic fig-
ure in human progress, for they saw him, as had their predecessors in the eighteenth century, 
as having demonstrated the perfection of the divine plan’ (p. 52).  For somewhat more secular 
reasons he remained so, later in the era.  But while that natural philosopher, perhaps while 
overlooking the courts of Trinity, surveyed a universe of like regularity, of clockwork planetary 
motion, set to spinning by the hand of God, a universe of ponderous order through and 
                                                
8  ‘To prove design […] Caro has recourse to the old analogy of “the watch”’, remarks the author of ‘Science 
and Positivism’, a philosophical appraisal from The Saturday Review of 4 April 1868; he continues:  ‘An argument is 
no worse for being old, but all the better, if it has often been used but never refuted.  But this is not the case with 
“the watch” as implying a watchmaker – an argument which was not true even when it was new’ (p. 455). 
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through, Tyndall beheld from his own craggy, mountainside perch those many years later – 
Hours of Exercise appeared in 1871 – one both far less human in its scale and far less reducible 
in a mathematical sense.9   
Tyndall’s world, unlike Newton’s, was not predictable in any total way, its large-scale 
behaviour remaining defiantly inexpressible in terms of any conceivable, finite sequence of 
algebraic relations.  Newton’s cosmos – as noted in my opening chapter – by a simple act of 
scalar substitution (or negation) for the time-variable t (in his own elegant formulations of 
Kepler’s three laws for planetary motion), could be run backwards in time, with infinite 
accuracy, as reliably as forwards.10  Tyndall’s, however, governed by what are (so satisfactorily) 
called the irreversible processes of thermodynamic transformation, admits of no such simple 
divination.  Simply put, one can’t un-stir coffee, howsoever one might try.  Nor can one, 
beholding the world as it is, fully reconstruct or even begin adequately to comprehend, in any 
‘quasi-omniscient’ sense, that fulminating primordial cloud, the nebula which did, or did not, 
contain the seeds of the ‘sadness’ with which Tyndall ‘regarded the Matterhorn’.   
It is difficult to determine how much of this he knew, or merely suspected – such ideas 
were at once in the air, and confused.  Edward Daub has demonstrated how, in mid-Victorian 
entropic science, priority disputes, fuzzy analysis and lexical inconsistency led to widespread 
mystification.  Moreover, as Stephen Brush has noted, even in the 1870s, after Boltzmann had 
proved via his H-Theorem that randomness, irreversibility and disorder were deeply linked, ‘it 
was difficult for scientists to abandon the view of Laplace that one assumes phenomena to be 
random because of lack of knowledge rather than because of any inherent indeterminism’ (p. 
584).  Tyndall’s passage embraces – perhaps embodies – such ambivalence.  There may be, it 
suggests, complete and universal determinism (‘the prediction of all that has since occurred’), 
or, then again, there may not.  But, either way, the answer to such a riddle, due to limitations 
(theoretical?  informational?), remains forever beyond the reach of absolute computability.  
The ‘hope’ encapsulated in a jovial couplet penned at the turn of the twentieth century by 
Cambridge mathematical physicist A. A. Robb – ‘No tolerance will be shown to any sort of 
                                                
9  This was the precise analogy drawn by William James to describe F. W. H. Myers’s services to Victorian 
psychology, cited in my opening chapter. 
10  Such an epitome, though prevalent post-Enlightenment, actually refers more to the neo-Newtonian com-
putational determinism of Laplace than to the beliefs of the natural philosopher himself, who was rarely absolut-
ist.  He famously believed, for instance, that instabilities in orbital motion required continual divine correction.  
Moreover, ‘he [Newton] never insisted that universal gravitation was essential to matter – largely because he was 
always concerned with how his laws of motion would correspond with the presence of God in the world […]’; 
thus, Christopher Lukasik argues, ‘his system could not be strictly classified as a mechanistic theory […]’ (p. 226). 
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mystery, / As soon as we can calculate all past and future history’ (p. 9) – was thus understood, 
even then, at the macroscopic level, to be hokum. 
Tyndall also knew well that he was by no means exempt from the equations he wielded 
with such alacrity, an impartial observer watching nature unfold, as if in a terrarium, from 
outside, at a distance.  This was a fact acknowledged in an entry defining materialism in the 
1865 edition of Brande and Cauvin’s A Dictionary of Science, Literature, & Art:  ‘That metaphysi-
cal theory which is founded on the hypothesis that all existence may be resolved into a modifi-
cation of matter, including, of course, the conscious subject’ (p. 722).  But (this seems a subtle 
proviso), ‘conscious subject’ includes not only others perceived, it includes the self perceiving, 
the eye – ultimately, the brain – of the conscientious scientist interacting with matter and its 
spectral emanations.  This Tyndall recognised, discerning an aspect in his own era, and in his 
own science, of the one great truth of quantum mechanics:  that the observer’s role was as 
much that of the watched as the watcher, and that neither could be un-implicated in the 
affairs of the other.   
Yet, like so much of his thought, this ‘axiom’, too – far from novel – had Romantic ori-
gins, or precedents:  ‘Do not forget, then, what thou hast now clearly understood’, an inquisi-
tioning spirit announces, in Fichte’s Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The Vocation of Man; 1800); 
‘In all perception thou perceivest only thine own condition’ (p. 412).  Mid-Victorian developments in 
science, coupled with his own convictions about the intractably material nature of conscious-
ness – mediated, one suspects, by both a latent idealism, and a recollection of Wordsworthian 
self-questioning (à la ‘Tintern Abbey’) – forced Tyndall to admit that a search for origins was 
also a search for self.  Thus, any mental voyage into ‘formless fog’ was inevitably circular, 
landing the traveller once again on the slopes of some lesser peak, in Matterhorn’s shadow, 
peering upwards – in Ruskinian horror?  or Tyndallic delight? – at its time-ravaged silhouette.  
From self to cosmos and from cosmos to self, from matter to mind and back again, the jour-
neys are indistinguishable when looked at from any remote enough vantage point – such as 
that afforded Tyndall by the terrain of the Alps.  One unidentified wag at Punch was, in fact, 
being far more perceptive than he probably realised when, in the number for 12 December 
1874, he observed, in a throwaway quip, tucked in the bottom corner of a page:  ‘THE HORN 
OF THE DILEMMA FOR TYNDALL. – The Matter-horn’ – the joke’s genius, of course, a visual 
one, residing in that hardly incidental mark of hyphenation ([‘Horn’]). 
Where else, though, beyond the monumentally sublime, was ‘poetry’ to be found in 
Tyndall’s accounting?  An echo of ethereal Keats, not rustic Wordsworth, offers one indica-
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tion (though the earlier Romantic expressed not dissimilar sentiments in his own verse from 
time to time).   
Keats, in his justly famed ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’, explained that 
 
Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard 
 Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on; 
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear’d, 
 Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone […] (p. 261; ll. 11 - 14) 
 
a conviction with which Tyndall would seem to agree.  In 1875, the scientist, responding in 
The Fortnightly to a critique of his unshakeable – when was it not? – belief in the capacity of a 
flower to direct its own growth and development (made by the Rev. James Martineau, an 
eminent Unitarian theologian as well as one of the scientist’s most able and persistent antago-
nists), included in the text of his argument what amounts to a brazen declaration of aesthetic 
principle, every bit as radical in its own way as that made by Keats those many years before: 
 
I went some time ago through the greenhouse of a friend.  He had ferns from Ceylon, the branches of 
which were in some cases not much thicker than an ordinary pin – hard, smooth, and cylindrical – 
often leafless for a foot or more.  But at the end of every one of them the unsightly twig unlocked the 
exuberant beauty hidden within it, and broke forth into a mass of fronds, almost large enough to fill 
the arms.  We stand here upon a higher level of the wonderful:  we are conscious of a music subtler 
than that of the piano, passing unheard through these tiny boughs, and issuing in what Mr. Martineau 
would opulently call the “clustered magnificence” of the leaves.  Does it lessen my amazement to know 
that every cluster, and every leaf – their form and texture – lie, like the music in the rod, in the molecu-
lar structure of these apparently insignificant stems?  (‘Materialism’, p. 594) 
 
Here is the romanticism, then:  in that element of self-evidencing pattern seen inhering in 
worldly things themselves, suggesting the ‘subtle’ and ‘unheard’ music of molecular interac-
tion.  It is this recognition of design without insistence on a Designer – this belief in the 
banishment of all divisions between matter and rarefied mind – that would, for Tyndall, have 
served to augment, rather than extinguish, any sympathetic artist’s perception of the truly 
miraculous amid a superfluity of the mundane.11  ‘I see what he [Martineau] sees with a 
wonder superadded’, he writes further on; ‘To me as to him – nay, to me more than to him – 
not even Solomon in all his glory was arrayed like one of these [fern-branches]’ (p. 594). 
 Biblical allusion – the phrase cited is borrowed from Luke 12: 27, a verse simultane-
                                                
11  ‘It is worth pausing’, he remarks in Forms of Water, ‘to think what wonderful work is going on in the at-
mosphere during the formation and descent of every snow-shower:  what building power is brought into play!  
and how imperfect seem the productions of human minds and hands when compared with those formed by the 
blind forces of nature!’, before castigating himself (and others) for such ungenerous choice of adjective:  ‘But who 
ventures to call the forces of nature blind?  In reality, when we speak thus we are describing our own condition.  
The blindness is ours […]’ (pp. 31 - 32). 
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ously luxuriating in the prodigy of material creation and praising the boundless munificence of 
its Creator:  ‘Consider the lilies how they grow:  they toil not, they spin not; and yet I say unto 
you, that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these’ – serves to further buttress 
his point.  Nature is religious, he insists, though not in the unexamined, or ‘retrograde’, 
fashion associated with Martineau’s theology, which would, of course, never have endowed 
even a molecule with animating power or capacity, while persistently denigrating matter as 
unworthy of Mind.  By contrast, as the whole of the ‘animal world […]’, from Tyndall’s 
perspective, is simply ‘a distillation through the vegetable […] from inorganic nature’, faith 
and reason themselves are enthralled to the atomic and, thus, drastically, even paradigm-
shiftingly, akin to rocks and trees, liquids and gasses (‘Materialism’, p. 596).  Few ‘literary’ 
writers earlier in the century would have dared to suggest as much – save, perhaps, for Emer-
son.  The ‘unheard music’ is therefore not merely Keats’s poetic imagination in and of itself, 
but also that startling moment of perception by a suitably prepared observer of emergent signs 
of continuity between mind and matter, of ordering born of chaos.  Hence, a loss of distinction 
between subject and object, artist and landscape, percipient soul and that which it both espies 
and delights in, is not to be mourned by the poet or philosopher.  On the contrary, in it is to 
be found a new portal to the numinous, that ‘higher level of the wonderful’ which Tyndall 
celebrates with such enthusiasm in his ruminations on the Ceylonese ferns of a friend. 
 Wordsworth, in ‘Tintern Abbey’, describes about midway through a volte-face in his 
attitude towards nature, one which had taken place a number of years previously (after that 
period of ‘thoughtless youth’).  He does so in the course of those very lines Tyndall had chosen 
to cite subsequent to the concluding paragraphs of the first authorised edition of his Belfast 
Address; they read, in part: 
    
   For I have learned 
To look on nature, not as in the hour 
Of thoughtless youth; but hearing oftentimes 
The still, sad music of humanity […]   (p. 164; ll. 88 - 91) 
 
This is a subtle transformation.  Ian Ousby says of it:  ‘No longer merely a stimulus to be 
exploited or a spectacle to be judged, nature has become for Wordsworth […] a living force 
embracing the individual soul and communicating with it, to console, uplift and ennoble’ (pp. 
178 - 79).   
Perhaps Tyndall’s obvious affinity with these sentiments can be explained by the fact 
that he, too, in adulthood had come to recognise both the beneficence of this ‘living force’ and 
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its interpenetration with human affairs, though, needless to say, in a fashion far more neces-
sary, if not far more profound, than even Wordsworth could ever have dreamed.  
 
THE MATERIALIST AND THE MUSTARD SEED 
 
‘Tintern Abbey’, fixed at a moment of introspection, expresses a serenity, as well as a raptur-
ous certainty, of conviction.  Tyndall, in his work, let alone throughout his life, was not always 
so cheerful, nor dogmatic.  Indeed, his ‘materialism’, if strong, was ever a precarious balance, 
unresting and active.   
Often self-doubting, pragmatically self-aware, it seemed, at times, in need of vigilance, 
tiny recalibrations or tweakings of assumption and epistemological belief.  Misgivings about 
design (or Design), fears of nihilism and extinction, concern about the roles claimed for 
anthropomorphism and reductionism, constantly tussle in his prose with more optimistic 
passages, paeans to scientific progress or all-conquering rationality.  As with Clifford, these 
instabilities – materialistic ‘heresies’ always threatening – become most glaringly evident in 
works of verse, where the discipline required by poetic composition, in consort with the 
putatively private or confessional nature of the form, conspire to insure compactness and 
memorability of phrasing.  As Yeats once remarked, with typical acuity:  ‘[W]e make out of 
the quarrel with others rhetoric, out of the quarrel with ourselves, poetry’ (qtd. in Henn, p. 
104).  Far more so than in rhetoric, though, poetry’s inward ‘quarrellings’, beyond ideology, 
encompass a variety of idiomatic contretemps as well, internal altercations and unsteady 
alliances between divergent vernaculars and modes of description.  As such, those revelatory 
collisions – or acts of collusion – so prevalent in Tyndall’s prose, between ‘plainspoken’ 
language (and striking instances of unadorned physical explanation), with Biblical reference 
(and invocations of Romantic terminology and conceit), surprise with still greater force, and 
emerge with much greater regularity, within the more intimate venues afforded him by the 
conventions of versification.  He therefore dedicated much to its careful crafting and consid-
ered revision. 
An overlapping of scales is, of course, evident in much of Tyndall’s expository writing, 
where emphasis is continually being placed on the extensibility of materialistic explanation, on 
strict causal law’s draconian implementation across all orders of magnitude in space as well as 
time.  This became an abiding poetic theme, and concern, of his as well.  ‘To the moon’, an 
unpublished piece dated Valentine’s Day 1863, addresses one of his lifelong loves, what Keats 
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in ‘Ode to a Nightingale’ referred to as the ‘Queen-Moon […] on her throne, / Cluster’d 
around by all her starry Fays’ (p. 258; ll. 36 - 37).  (Tyndall, for comparison, invokes ‘that 
heaven / Where thou dost reign, the Queen of all the Stars’.)  The scientist’s is a promiscuous 
affection, however, and his verse, in its first stanzas, ranges over creation, offering a classic 
libertine’s rationale for romantic inconstancy (that vice, of course, archetypically associated 
with Luna as heavenly body), attempting thereby to justify the wantonness of his own aesthetic 
ardours by appeal to (our charmingly personified) satellite’s sense of ‘perspective’ and cosmic 
proportionality: 
 
Say does the crimson of the drooping rose 
When soft it falls upon delighted eyes 
Close up those eyes against the glorious sun 
Which gives all flowers their odours & their bloom? 
  
Or does the song of lark and nightingale 
Mingling at dawn along the Devon shore 
Make the full heart less fitted to enjoy 
The grander music of the gleaming Sea? 
  
Is it not rather so, that where a love 
So large as fills my soul for thee 
Unlocks the doors, the smaller loves of earth 
Troop in without disturbance to the great? 
Dismiss thy fear; retract thy strong reproach, 
And bend thy beauty o’er me as of yore. – 
 
Tyndall’s ode ‘To the moon’ serves thus as a sort of tonic to Keats’s own for a nightingale, 
obliquely invoking the earlier poet’s meditations on the burdens of consciousness and mortal-
ity, dreads occasioned by the warblings of that ‘light-winged Dryad of the trees’ (p. 257; line 
7), only to dismiss them.  He finds, instead, in the several ‘musics’ of nature, a restorative, 
rather than premonition or dirge.  His final lines, for instance, recast Keats’s melancholic 
‘Adieu!  Adieu! […]’ (p. 260; line 75) into a cheerful, even cheeky, leave-taking:  ‘Thou’rt 
bright once more, – come nearer then my love, – / Still nearer – stoop – a little lower – there! 
/ I kiss thy silver cheek and say <goodnight!>  goodnight!’.  (The scientist’s scribbled emenda-
tion is telling, further accentuating the poem’s literary parallelisms and allusive genealogy.) 
 They were different, of course, Keats’s project and Tyndall’s.  Moreover, their poetic 
gifts could hardly have been more unequal.  Yet both wrote night pieces.  Keats sought his 
escape on ‘viewless wings of Poesy’ to a kind of timeless, quasi-narcotic rapture; he abjures the 
world in which ‘but to think is to be full of sorrow’ (p. 258; ll. 33, 27).  Tyndall’s own trans-
port, by contrast, comes by virtue of thought, through his recognition of the interconnectedness 
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of things, of the animating role of sun and tide-governing moon, those celestial bodies (as he 
phrased it in an earlier poem) ‘command[ing] the plastic Sea / Which rolls around the world 
its silvered brine’ (‘Queenly’).  Yet thought’s temptations, those enticements of laboratory 
bench and spectroscope, do not supplant his direct experiences of external nature, but, 
instead, serve to augment them, adding to the Romantic’s litany of conventional wonders a 
few undreamt of in earlier philosophies.  Such bonuses somewhat, though not fully, compen-
sate for the lack that many judicious Victorians were later to surmise in, say, the Belfast 
Address.12   
In ‘To the moon’, a justification of the poetic allure of his generation’s science, Tyndall 
lists two chemical elements – the first isolated in 1826; the second, 1774; both ironically toxic 
to man – as well as the moisture cycle of evaporation and condensation (itself, of course, the 
embodiment on a homely level of the principles of matter and energy conservation), as poten-
tial distractions for a nineteenth-century materialist.  But he then slides immediately from 
proactive confession into protestations of a higher, more constant and fundamental fealty:  
‘Nor Bromine richly brown, nor Chlorine green – / Nor Aqueous Vapour which the praying 
earth / Swings from her censors underneath thy beams, / Has ever caused my love to swerve 
from thee’.  Tyndall’s metaphors of adoration are applied not just to exalted Homo sapiens, but 
to those other patternings of matter and force (a ‘praying earth’ which, priest-like, ‘swings […] 
her censors’ beneath evening’s cathedral vault, for example); these ‘worshipped’ objects – inert 
and insensate, perhaps – are, he hints, likewise ‘enlivened’, set dancing by thermal and gravi-
tational energies derived, ultimately, from heavenly bodies:  from sun and moon. 
 The peroration of Tyndall’s poem on his visit to Wight similarly hinges on such 
conundrums of scale, on the telescoping magnitudes of his own aesthetic entrancements 
(though this time he plays no favourites).   
He is here describing the coach ride back to Wright’s house in Mudeford.  Perhaps 
most notable is the sense of equilibrium conveyed, of the poet’s contentedness with his place, 
and precedence, in the Chain of Being – and that other chain, less abstract, of biological 
beings as well.  He becomes at once the focus of attention and an attribute of the scene, at 
once the Adamic orderer of phenomena and something ordered among those phenomena.  
                                                
12  An editorial in The Times of 20 August 1874 identified as the oration’s argumentative gist:  ‘The strain of 
reason and the emotions of his physical nature will not rest unrecognized; and when the end of the Professor’s 
Address is reached we echo his own thoughts if we say, – “There are more things in Heaven and Earth than are 
dreamt of in his philosophy”’ (‘Professor’). 
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He has seemingly achieved a sense of locale and proportionate significance; his inner mental 
state – an attribute uniquely of sentience, magnified and contextualised in the psyche of the 
pontificating materialist (a soul, he suggests, inclined to canny regard for the ‘actual’ disposi-
tion of physical things) – in soothing accord with the serenity and sanctity ‘evidenced’ by that 
external world surrounding him.  He here puts forth, in all essentials, a scientific pastoral:    
  
 And soft and calm the saintly evening drooped 
 In silence o’er the earth, – the world within 
 As warm and tranquil as the world without. 
 Cradled in foliage lay the smiling fields; 
 The soft green of the pastures gleaming through 
 Their umbrous frames of hazel and of elm. 
 The bean fields came to meet us with their scent, 
 And the pink woodbine netted through the hedge 
 Poured out in sweetness all its floral soul. 
 And when the twilight darkened into night 
 The knolls on either hand were like the sky 
 Studded with twinkling stars – the grass was gemmed 
 With glow-worms, one of which I knelt beside 
 And saw it like a little sun illume  
 In emerald light the leaves and grasses near […] (‘DP’, p. [12]) 
 
Tyndall seemingly shrinks to nothing in these lines, becoming a perceiving presence only, a 
Whitman-esque observer.   
 The synthesising, ‘labouring’ theorist reasserts himself – encoding a generic modula-
tion from scientific pastoral into scientific georgic? – in a passage absent from the copying out 
of the poem as sent to Mrs Pollock.  (Removed for reasons – fairly self-evident! – of social 
appropriateness, I suspect.)  Having noted the microcosm of glow-worm and grass blade, a 
planetary system writ domestically small, Tyndall returned to the waiting carriage, where he  
     
             sought 
 To make the nature of this wondrous thing  
 Called Light, as far as science has explored 
 Its essence, manifest to Mrs. Wright. 
 Poor Wright was silent – afterwards I learned 
 That while we talked of ether and of waves 
 His stomach, shaken sadly of [sic] the sea 
 Began to totter, and when he resigned 
 His charge at Mudeford, he quite gave way. (‘DP’ [1], p. [10]) 
  
This (embarrassing) impingement of the physical on the mental provides another arresting 
instance of Tyndall’s curious otherworldliness, his obliviousness to the concerns of others.  But 
the implicit paralleling of ether waves with physical waves, of shaken atoms with scrambled 
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passenger, has a certain niceness.  Tyndall’s cosmos, here as elsewhere, is a decidedly orches-
tral one.  A sense of melody, of an undulatory or ‘singing’ external world, of that ever-present, 
if unheard, Keatsian music, is for him a common conceit, at once poetically pleasing (convey-
ing a sense of real ‘aliveness’ and anticipation in nature) and scientifically accurate (with 
omnipresent heat as ‘mode of motion’, its energies oscillating atoms and molecules).   
The overture to his poem ‘A Morning on Alp Lusgen’, for instance, glances in its first 
lines at the opening couplet of the first quatrain of the Rubáiyát of Omar Khayyám, before moving 
from poetic convention to theoretical insight made poetic through extension of the ‘rippling’ 
imagery perfusing FitzGerald’s Persian paraphrase (‘Awake! for Morning in the Bowl of Night 
/ Has flung the Stone that puts the Stars to Flight’, in the text of the 1859 first edition [p. 69]): 
  
 The sun has cleared the peaks and quenched the flush 
 Of orient crimson with excess of light. 
 The tall grass quivers in the rhythmic air 
 Without a sound; yet each particular blade  
 Trembles in song, had we but ears to hear. (NF, p. 498) 
 
Associations vibrate without bound in such a cosmology:  between objects, between events, 
connecting the great with the little, the here with the there.   
 ‘We on the earth’s surface live in the midst of ætherial commotion’, as Tyndall informs 
us in a manifesto on ‘The Constitution of Nature’.  It is the hum and throb, the restless, 
rustling energy, of electromagnetic vibration that he overhears, as if it were the purring of 
some titanic engine – one aural landscape increasingly familiar to Victorian senses – appre-
hended in the background of all.13  ‘To the conception of space being filled’, Tyndall immedi-
ately elaborates, ‘we must therefore add the conception of its being in a state of perpetual 
vibration.  The sources of vibration are the ponderable masses of the universe’ (FoS, p. 8).  
Each of these – whether star, fluorescing nebula, solar planet (illuminated by reflected radia-
tion) – throws its light out.  The waves propagate through the hypothesised ether (‘this all-
pervading substance’) like concentred ripples rushing outwards from a pebble carelessly tossed 
into a pool of still water.   
 Tyndall’s language is Carlylean here, with its breathless intimations of a quivering 
under-fabric to the structure of reality itself, of a universe never stilled save in death (or 
thermodynamic equilibration, which is precisely the same thing):  ‘This all-pervading sub-
                                                
13  Tyndall’s statement has a literal truth about it as well when one recalls the accidental, though fortuitous, 
discovery in the mid-1960s (by the radio astronomers Penzias and Wilson) of the primordial echo of the Big Bang 
itself, that low-level buzz omnipresent in the 3°K Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation. 
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stance takes up their [stars’, nebulae’s, planets’] molecular tremors, and conveys them with 
inconceivable rapidity to our organs of vision.  It is the transported shiver of bodies countless 
millions of miles distant, which translates itself in human consciousness into the splendour of 
the firmament at night’ (FoS, p. 4).   
 Carlyle, Beer has noted, deploys ‘prodigious linguistic energy […] into recuperating 
the past and reviving the marvel of the everyday’ (Darwin’s, p. 75).  Tyndall couples a composi-
tional virtuosity indebted to Carlyle’s transcendentalism with, as here, a scientific philosophy 
having at its base the urge to make manifest ‘the bridge between the sensible and the insensi-
ble – the manifestations in sound, light, and motion of the forces acting on molecules’ (Sawyer, 
pp. 228 - 29).  As such, the world Tyndall describes comes to seem at once verbally alive and 
materially vital. 
 His was to prove a compelling and seductive vision, contributing to an enduring mode 
of literary expression and aesthetic appreciation.  The (much later) hallucinatory pantheism 
plainly evident in any number of Dylan Thomas’s most celebrated lyrics (‘The force that 
drives the water through the rocks / Drives my red blood; that dries the mouthing streams / 
Turns mine to wax’, so he writes in the second stanza of ‘The force that through the green 
fuse drives the flower’ [1934]), seems to bear its imprint, as does, more certainly, the nature 
prose of Richard Jefferies, particularly that composed during the 1870s and 1880s.  In a 
notebook entry from 1887 (reproduced in the recent compilation At Home on the Earth [2001]), 
that author, so reverential towards living things, so sympathetic towards the wonders of 
landscape, comes to seem equally energised by the undelimited possibilities of Tyndall’s – or, 
more generically, mid-nineteenth-century scientific naturalism’s – enlightened admiration for 
the most ‘base’ of imagined substances:  ‘Life a property of Matter.  Intelligence a property of 
matter, and infinite capacities unrecognised.  No fear therefore in becoming matter (being 
matter now) as that is only becoming that which is life and intelligence’ (p. 165).  The ordinary 
or unremarkable, throughout Jefferies’s prose, as throughout Tyndall’s thought, is transfigured 
into the extraordinary; the everyday, imbued with a kind of jolting alterity; matter, too, 
estranged and made familiar, if not familial, all at once.   
 Many among their contemporaries found such conceptual rejiggings unsettling, even 
sinister (a recurrent theme, of course, throughout this dissertation).  Rev. Watson, so harsh on 
Clifford’s idea of ‘man as wave’, put things with characteristic starkness in Gospels of Yesterday, 
taking Tyndall’s soothing and melodious cosmic hum and replacing it with the din of a 
maelstrom – and that deafening silence of materialism’s banished God:  ‘And ever there is 
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darkness upon the rhythmic deep, darkness within it, a roar of energy, an awful heat of 
motion, but no eternal truth, no love that endures, no life that is not a movement towards 
death’ (p. 178). 
 Ruskin, equally horrified by materialism, was less extreme in The Ethics of Dust:  Ten 
Lectures to Little Housewives on the Elements of Crystallization (1865), where he targeted one of 
Tyndall’s explanatory proclivities in dialogic form: 
  
 L[ecturer].  I do not see why it should be provoking to be asked what it is to be alive.  Do you 
think you don’t know whether you are alive or not? 
 (ISABEL skips to the end of the room and back). 
 L.  Yes, Isabel, that’s all very fine; and you and I may call that being alive:  but a modern 
philosopher calls it being in a ‘mode of motion.’  It requires a certain quantity of heat to take you to the 
sideboard; and exactly the same quantity to bring you back again.  That’s all. 
 ISABEL.  No, it isn’t.  And besides, I’m not hot. 
 L.  I am, sometimes, at the way they talk.  (p. 46)  
 
Such a stance, such an openness to connection and theoretical unification, was also something 
that could be taken, by some, to debilitating extremes.  One of Tyndall’s acquaintances, 
Thomas James Cobden-Sanderson, confessed to an almost paralysing sense of interrelated-
ness.  Some years later, Virginia Woolf, in a review, described the woozy sensation while 
reading Cobden-Sanderson’s memoirs of encountering a world washed through with meaning, its 
occupants, like its objects and occurrences, inundated by interpretability, each, as it were, a 
Rorschach blot.  ‘Everything seems to suffer a curious magnification’, she writes; ‘Nothing 
exists in itself but only as a means to something else.  The solid objects of daily life become 
rimmed with high purposes, significant, symbolical.  The people that drift through these 
diaries – even Swinburne and Morris – have become curiously thin; we see the stars shining 
through their backbone’ (p. 372). 
 Tyndall never went so far.  All the same, for him, the world-as-understood remained 
somehow other to the world-as-experienced, suffused with a palpable quivering.  Sometimes 
such a prospect appeared a blessed revelation granted via science and rationality, sometimes 
(though more rarely) an enervating curse.  The allusion, therefore, to Mark 4: 9 in ‘A Morning 
on Alp Lusgen’ (Jesus’s admonition to His disciplines:  ‘And he said unto them, He that hath 
ears to hear, let him hear’) hopefully figures the materialist as secularised apostle, as chosen 
possessor – and, in time, charged proselytiser – of Higher Truth, comprehending the world’s 
allegory, glimpsing beneath its masks and superficialities authentic, pulsatory meaning.  
(Coleridge, in reflecting on Wordsworth, likewise invoked this verse, towards similar ends.  In 
Biographia Literaria, he noted of ‘the wonders of the world before us’, that they are ‘an inex-
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haustible treasure, but for which, in consequence of the film of familiarity and selfish solicitude 
we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand’ [2: 
6].)  
 The start of Mark 4 is given over to the parable of the mustard seed.  Encountering 
incomprehension, or obtuseness, among one of His followers, Jesus addressed the group with 
an exasperated aside: 
 
And he said unto them, Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God:  but unto 
them that are without, all these things are done in parables:  That seeing they may see, and not per-
ceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest at any time they should be converted, and 
their sins should be forgiven them.  And he said unto them, Know ye not this parable? and how then 
will ye know all parables?  (4: 11 - 13)  
 
The elementary parable of sower and sowed, then, an allegory underpinning all other allego-
ries in Christian theology, finds a scientific counterpart in the mystery posed by a different 
kind of planting.  That trembling world underlying daily experience apprehended by Tyndall 
beneath worldly appearance has, of course, its own buddings and fruits, unignorable mustard 
trees arising serendipitously from minuscule, sometimes unnoticed, often unremarkable, 
beginnings:  those hothouse fronds, the petals of a water-lily, green pines growing in an Alpine 
declivity.  This is the conviction which characterises much of Tyndall’s published work.  Even 
if does seem to flicker from righteous orthodoxy here and there, it still manages, more often 
than not, to resolve into apology, or the acquiescence of a humble – or, more precisely, 
humbled – servant, departing with a deferential bow.    
 But not always.  Indeed, at times Tyndall’s unfaith – and it is manifested most plainly 
in his poems, or in those letters quoted already – seems to go far beyond that of Jesus’s quizzi-
cal discipline.  Not simple doubt, beyond mere contrarian quibble, it toys with apostasy.  Later 
in ‘A Morning’, for instance, Tyndall’s scientific sense seems, for a moment, overwhelmed by 
his visual one.  Befuddled by the seeming Design evident in (what intellect tells him to be) a 
uniform grove of conifers made to appear uniform solely by chance and those haphazard 
inducements of natural selection, he exclaims: 
 
 Unplanted groves! whose pristine seeds, they say 
 Were sown amid the flames of nascent stars – 
 How came ye thence and hither?  Whence the craft 
 That shook these gentian atoms into form, 
 And died the flower with azure deeper far 
 Than that of heaven itself on days serene? 
 What built these marigolds?  What clothed these knolls 
 With fiery whortle leaves?  What gave the heath 
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 Its purple bloom – the Alpine rose its glow? 
 Shew us the power that fills each tuft of grass 
 With sentient swarms – the art transcending thought, 
 Which paints against the canvas of the eye 
 These crests sublime and pure, and then transmutes 
 The picture into worship? […] (NF, pp. 498 - 99) 
 
The buzzing motif continues:  the ‘sentient swarms’ capering in individual tufts of grass 
suggest both a penumbra of insects and the internal jostling of sun-warmed molecules, the 
atoms deterministically ‘shaken’ into final form:  whether mountain, pine, observing naturalist, 
flowering shrub.  There is a reiterated concern with colour, partly poetically conventional, of 
course, partly occasioned by his own meteorological and atmospheric obsessions.  He marvels 
at the Belfast Address’s ‘azure’ of heaven surpassed in that of the Alpine flower, the purple of 
the heather, the redness of the whortleberry plant.  But there is an unease with the project of 
materialism as well, not seen so clearly before, nor expressed as pithily.  The plangent ‘whats’ 
prefixing these lines convey a poignancy and pathos through insistent repetition:  what might 
seem at first a mood of childlike inquisitiveness descends soon enough into something nigh 
petulance.  Job’s litany of accomplished wonders, some rendered counterfactual by Victorian 
science – a God ‘Which commandeth the sun, and it riseth not; and sealeth up the stars; 
Which alone spreadeth out the heavens, and treadeth upon the waves of the sea; which 
maketh Arcturus, Orion, Pleiades […]’ (Job 9: 7 - 9) – is here referenced not just semantically, 
but syntactically as well.  But Tyndall’s queries, unlike Job’s, do not have the surety of cate-
chism, while those frustrated ‘whats’ leave teasingly unspecified the nature, even the possibil-
ity, of demiurge.  (Forceful, transitive verbs reinforce this notion, communicating a nature 
‘built’ or ‘clothed’, a spectacle rendered wondrous by – uncrafted? – ‘craft’.)   
 Moreover, statements in a draft of a lecture given at Queenwood College, preserved as 
his journal entry for 15 May 1848, demonstrate that such discomposing existential anxieties 
had, in fact, long preoccupied Tyndall.  ‘Can man by searching find out God exclaimed Job in 
his day and the syllables echo on’, he had announced to his students, ‘a question without an 
answer through the ages of prospective eternity’ (p. 291).   
 If not quite riposting Job, Tyndall, in Hours of Exercise in the Alps, a study of 1871, 
nonetheless provided the unwavering response of contemporary naturalism to the specific 
puzzlement articulated so clearly in ‘A Morning on Alp Lusgen’.14  (It was an answer to be 
adroitly lampooned in the anonymous tract Materialistic Views of Professor Tyndall and Harriet 
                                                
14  Bartlett also provides a useful discussion of a section of this passage (pp. 153 - 54).  
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Martineau Criticized [1879]:  ‘And here we may fancy Tyndall to exclaim:  O wise Sun, and as 
sagacious Ocean; O virtuous and all-powerful pair, how can we enough honour thee?’ [p. 
10].) 
 
And as I looked over this wondrous scene towards Mont Blanc, the Grand Combin, the Dent 
Blanche, the Weisshorn, the Dom, and the thousand lesser peaks which seemed to join in celebration 
of the risen day, I asked myself, as on previous occasions:  How was this colossal work performed?  
Who chiselled these mighty and picturesque masses out of a mere protuberance of earth?  And the 
answer was at hand.  Ever young, ever mighty – with the vigour of a thousand worlds still within him – 
the real sculptor was even then climbing up the eastern sky.  It was he who raised aloft the waters 
which cut out these ravines; it was he who planted the glaciers on the mountain-slopes, […] and it was 
he who, acting through the ages, will finally lay low these mighty monuments, rolling them gradually 
seaward […].  (Hours, pp. 190 - 91) 
 
Tyndall’s veneration for the sun encompasses the prophecy of Luke 3: 5 (‘Every valley shall be 
filled, and every mountain and hill shall be brought low; and the crooked shall be made 
straight, and the rough ways shall be made smooth’), supplanting divine with thermodynamic 
equilibration, turning the narrative of salvation into a horror of geological dilapidation and 
entropic ruin. 
 But, as so often, this leaves him spiritually undernourished, for the question he poses in 
‘A Morning’ seems more akin to that posited by Carlyle in Heroes and Hero-Worship, one 
refusing to allow ‘the sun’ to serve as its pat resolution – an ‘answer’ which answers nothing: 
 
We call that fire of the black thunder-cloud ‘electricity,’ and lecture learnedly about it, and grind the 
like of it out of glass and silk:  but what is it?  What made it?  Whence comes it?  Whither goes it?  
Science has done much for us; but it is a poor science that would hide from us the great deep sacred 
infinitude of Nescience, whither we can never penetrate, on which all science swims as a mere superfi-
cial film.  This world, after all our science and sciences, is still a miracle; wonderful, inscrutable, magical 
and more, to whosoever will think of it.  (pp. 7 - 8) 
 
Carlyle, among the nineteenth century’s earlier thinkers, had not been alone in raising such 
awkward ‘ontological’ questions.  They were a particular preoccupation of the American 
transcendentalists.    
 A work quoted by Tyndall in his lecture ‘Matter and Force’ (FoS, p. 89), Emerson’s 
‘The Rhodora’ told of the poet’s encounter with a flower growing in a remote and inhospita-
ble swamp, far from potential human observers – a flower, it would seem, languishing 
pointlessly: 
 
 Rhodora!  If the sages ask thee why 
 This charm is wasted on the earth and sky, 
 Tell them, dear, if eyes were made for seeing,  
 Then beauty is its own excuse for being: 
 Why thou wert there, O rival of the rose! 
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 I never thought to ask, I never knew: 
 But in my simple ignorance suppose 
 The self-same Power that brought me there brought you. 
  
This precise perplexity confronted Tyndall, and he could not, in ‘A Morning on Alp Lusgen’, 
despite the lapsed decades, for all the relentless progress of cosmological theory, give an 
answer any less rooted in ‘simple ignorance’, nor more sophisticated than further noddings 
towards that ‘self-same Power’. 
Furthermore, the security of scale, so central to Tyndall’s earlier ‘To the moon’, is, 
here, unmistakably absent, almost extravagantly so – that sense of nature conceived as unity, 
of parts fitted to whole, of a kind of synergistic rightness.  (It also, of course, features climacti-
cally in the account of 30 June 1856.)  Common sense, he argues in ‘A Morning’, asserts the 
absurdity of any genealogy linking starburst with marigold, evanescent flower with cataclysmic 
astrophysical event unimaginably distant in both time and space.  This seems the obverse of 
Francis Thompson’s epigrammatic observation later that century (beloved nowadays by some 
chaos and quantum theorists) set forth in his poem ‘The Mistress of Vision’:  ‘Hiddenly / To 
each other linkèd are, / That thou canst not stir a flower / Without troubling of a star’ (p. 69).  
Conversely, the materialist, as here described, can’t seem to trouble a star without stirring a 
flower, somehow, somewhere.  This could seem almost too implausible, or hubristic, to be 
regarded as sane belief.  Put another way, the very panorama Tyndall glimpses, the evidence 
of his own eyes, seems to suggest, even confirm, the illogic of the nebular hypothesis, and inter 
alia the correctness of Rev. Martineau’s persistent objections.  An Alpine rose, it seems, can 
challenge all materialisms, threatening to debunk any reductive or ateleological system of 
metaphysical conjecture.  And yet more ludicrous still, Tyndall proposes, is that correlated 
internal mental state – a variety of Romantic ‘worship’ – triggered within him alongside these 
rather more esoteric reflections, allegedly by mere rearrangement of molecules!  Incredulity is 
his initial response to the concept that somehow ethereal waves of light, of quantifiable wave-
length, are interpreted as vista and then endowed with something beyond themselves:  a sense 
of the Burkean sublime.  All this enacted, effortlessly and with near instantaneity, amid the 
chemistry-store ordinariness of brain-stuff and perceptive-networks.  Consequently, Tyndall 
distances himself, momentarily disillusioned, from the whole interpretive charade espoused by 
‘rationalist’ colleagues, their extreme fetishisations of the material – this excerpt begins with a 
bitter:  ‘pristine seeds, they say / Were sown amid the flames of nascent stars’ – before, finally, 
achieving a sort of peace, though not content.  The stanza ends with a sigh of weary supplica-
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tion:  ‘Science dumb / We yearn, and grope, and guess, but cannot know’ (NF, p. 499).   
His ‘they’ has become ‘we’, but not blindly, nor without fevered introspection.  Mate-
rialism’s disciple, in other words – as with the querulous soul encountered in Mark – had his 
doubts, too, it seems, moments in which the world’s parable seemed to poise unsteadily on the 
epistemological axis lying between absurdism and maddening incomprehensibility, like an 
Alpinist precariously traversing some knife-like ridge. 
In Forms of Water, Tyndall – amidst a (somewhat boastful) discussion of materialistic 
science’s expertise in their remorseless, even surgical, disentangling – spoke of ‘the way in 
which the various threads of what we call Nature are woven together’ (p. 123).  In an essay on 
‘Prayer and Natural Law’, however, he conceded that mountains in particular can provide a 
noteworthy challenge to reductive and syncretic interpretive methodologies, where the impos-
sible cornucopia of physical form – ‘World is crazier and more of it than we think’, as Louis 
Macneice phrased the predicament in ‘Snow’ (1935) – seems to shirk off any single or simple 
explanation.  Up high, he suggests, the ‘threads’ of nature can seem unkempt or knotty; their 
‘woven’ aggregations, matted and makeshift.  ‘Accounts of mountain-goers from the 1800s’, as 
Robert Macfarlane has explained, ‘tend to be exuberant with detail, written by travellers 
whose eyes have become newly sensitive to the particular beauties of the mountains.  […]  
Again and again in travel journals, attention is drawn to curious geological outcrops:  arches, 
caves, stalactites and pinnacles […]’ (p. 211).  Ruskin’s Modern Painters IV, for instance, pro-
vided its readers with formidable catalogues of topographic exotica, while Whymper’s Scram-
bles Among the Alps (1871) – featuring such listings as ‘[t]here are precipices, apparent, but not 
actual; there are precipices absolutely perpendicular; there are precipices overhanging:  there 
are glaciers, and there are hanging glaciers; there are glaciers which tumble great séracs over 
greater cliffs […]’ (p. 83) – threatens at times to collapse under the burden of precise descrip-
tion.  
The very snowy variousness, and causal suddenness, of mountain landscape was, how-
ever, for Tyndall, one key to its uncompromising aesthetic appeal.  ‘In this entanglement of 
[Alpine] phenomena it seems hopeless to seek for law or orderly connection’, he asserted in 
that essay – before, with considerable élan, adducing law and orderly connection (FoS, p. 31). 
But such an explanatory aptitude still leaves, for all its impressiveness and transferabil-
ity, some cardinal questions unaddressed.  This he admitted with unusual forthrightness in ‘A 
Morning on Alp Lusgen’, a poem which received its widest circulation as an epilogue (the ‘last 
word’) to New Fragments (itself – as it turned out – the scientist’s final major publication).   
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The personified mountain in Emerson’s ‘Monadnoc’ had expressed anticipation, even 
impatience:  ‘I await the bard and sage, / Who, in large thoughts, like a fair pearl-seed, / Shall 
string Monadnoc like a bead’ (p. 79).  Tyndall, while asserting his own science’s fitness for the 
peak’s physical encapsulation, finally has to concede – in ‘A Morning’, most poignantly – that 
he, like his science, remains dismayingly ill-equipped for any attempt at such a mightier task. 
 
STRANGE MATTERS:  TYNDALL’S STRUNG COSMOS 
 
Unheard or not, the concept of a celestial music is – beyond its inherent playfulness – one that 
has been, since the beginning of recorded physical speculation and across a range of world 
cultures, endlessly revitalised.  From the Pythagorean music of the spheres, to the plucked 
strings quivering in a 10-dimensional manifold in superstring theory, whose ‘vibrational 
patterns orchestrate the evolution of the cosmos’, many have argued that ‘the winds of change 
[…] gust through an aeolian universe’ – so physicist Brian Greene has phrased things, in The 
Elegant Universe (1999; p. 135).  Such analogies, if properly chosen, can have pleasingly heuris-
tic functions as well, revealing, or suggesting, rules and properties which might not otherwise 
be so evident:  such was certainly the case with the symphonic cosmology set forth by Tyndall. 
‘Rhythm’, he wrote in Mountaineering in 1861, ‘is the rule with nature […].  The passage 
of a resined bow across a string is typical of her operations’ (p. 264).  She has a pulse, too:  
‘thus beats the heart of the universe […]’ – this a comparison from a discussion of the conser-
vation, and endless interconvertibility, of potential energy and vis viva (or ‘kinetic energy’, in 
the modern nomenclature [FoS, p. 22]).  Event follows event, he explained, in accord with 
implacable causality, thumping ‘ever onward in the uninterrupted rhythm of cause and effect 
[…]’ (p. 45):  from the frantic moto perpetuo of oscillating atoms on an Ångström scale to the 
lugubrious, lento tempos of planets orbiting suns.  Tyndall enacted some of these metaphors in 
his demonstrations at the RI, in his ‘singing’ (and dancing!) ‘jets of gas’, behaving like a 
conductor at the podium.  He urged his listeners to attempt similar exploits at home.  In the 
Rede Lecture, given 16 May 1865 in the Senate House of the University of Cambridge, he 
spoke midway through of the fashion in which the ‘air of a room accommodates itself to the 
requirements of an orchestra, transmitting each vibration of every pipe and string’; he contin-
ued (testing the pliancy of such an undulatory or ‘wave’ model, and moving thereby from 
concert hall to cosmic void), ‘so does the inter-stellar æther accommodate itself to the re-
quirements of light and heat’, two phenomena re-conceptualised by nineteenth-century 
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science as transverse wave oscillations, as (in materialism’s iconic phrase) ‘modes of motion’.   
He concluded this memorable address with an exponential zooming in, a ‘return’ from 
the illimitability of space to the confines of a drawing room, and, from thence (penetrating 
further, and more intimately, inwards), to precepts derived from materialistic physiology, 
explaining to his audience:  ‘If you open a piano and sing into it, a certain string will respond.  
Change the pitch of your voice; the first string ceases to vibrate, but another replies.  […]  
[T]hus is sentient man acted on by Nature, the optic, the auditory, and other nerves of the 
human body being so many strings differently tuned, and responsive to different forms of the 
universal power’ (p. 218).   
That invocation of a ‘universal power’ seems, again, decidedly Carlylean, but then so is 
the musical model precipitating it, and those analogies used in illustration.  As Turner has 
noted:  ‘Transmitted through Carlyle the romantic heritage of seeking the meaning of life 
through a particularistic or empirical apprehension and examination of nature allowed the 
scientific publicists to confront the naturalistic universe without regret for past supernatural-
ism’ (‘Victorian’, p. 338).  Often, for instance, Tyndall invoked the language of clothing in a 
conventional way – he wrote, for example, in ‘Atoms, Molecules, and Ether Waves’ of the 
‘cloak’ provided by our earthly atmosphere:  ‘Were that garment removed, terrestrial life 
would probably perish through the consequent refrigeration’ (NF, p. 93) – but at other times 
the speculations of Teufelsdröckh seem not far beneath, plainly visible through the diaphanous 
weavings of the scientist’s own allusive vocabulary.  He began his ‘Lecture on Magnetism’, to 
take one instance, with a suitable disclaimer, declaring himself an ‘exponent’ of the view of 
nature finding it ‘an organic whole, as a body each of whose members sympathises with the 
rest, changing, it is true, but without one real break of continuity, or a single interruption in 
the fixed relations of cause and effect’ (FoS, p. 378).  Such a concept, and such language, 
clearly evidences the heritage of Carlylean metaphysics.  ‘To him’, the scientist said of Carlyle, 
‘the universe was not a Mechanism, but an Organism – each part of it thrilling and respond-
ing sympathetically with all other parts’ (NF, p. 335); so, too, that ‘supply’ accommodating 
universe of materialistic cosmology, as the scientist explained in his Rede Lecture.  In it, he 
defined the ‘temperature of space’ as a function correlated with the visible and invisible 
radiations emitted by the panoply of stars:  a measure derived, he explained, from ‘the cease-
less thrill of those distant orbs collectively in the æther […]’; moreover, like the separate 
instruments constituting any orchestra, the light from each remains individual and distinct – a 
point glimpsed clearly ‘across the entanglement of wave-motions produced by all other stars’ 
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(FoS, p. 178; my italics).   
This sense of organism was abetted by a renewed appreciation among his scientific 
peers for the mortality of all material things, stars as much as starfish.  ‘We had only solar and 
stellar chemistry’ – Lord Kelvin announced of the early days of spectroscopic analysis (in his 
1871 BAAS Inaugural) – ‘we now have solar and stellar physiology’ (Thomson, p. xcviii), a 
theory of the life processes and internal workings of stars, not just awareness of ascensions and 
declinations. 
 The Earth-Spirit in Goethe’s Faust, Part One had declaimed to the terrified doctor: 
  
In the tides of life, in Action’s storm, 
 A fluctuant wave,  
 A shuttle free, 
Birth and the Grave, 
 An infinite sea, 
 A weaving, flowing, 
 Life, all-glowing, 
 Thus at Time’s humming loom ’tis my hand prepares 
 The garment of life which the Deity wears! (1: 25 - 26) 
 
Sartor Resartus’s harried ‘editor’ – noting the indebtedness to Goethe of Teufelsdröckh’s ‘clothes 
philosophy’, in particular such outpourings as the professor’s ecstatic:  ‘O Nature! – Or what is 
nature?  Ha!  Why do I not name thee GOD?  Art not thou the “Living Garment of God”?’ (p. 
142) – wonders whether or not the ‘clothes philosophy’ being set forth within the book was 
ever likely to have a transformative effect on an English readership, a population beaten down 
by Mill’s Utilitarianism and mechanistic philosophy.  He needn’t have worried, however.  
(Tyndall, by the way, quoted Carlyle’s/Goethe’s ‘living garment’ line explicitly in his essay 
‘On the Scientific Use of the Imagination’ [FoS, p. 165].)  In America, too, the book made an 
impact.  Do the following lines from Emerson’s ‘Monadnoc’, however, allude to Goethe?  
Carlyle?  both?  neither?  Is this the voice of the mountain (a ‘constant giver’) as surrogate – 
transcendental, after a fashion, though hardly divine – for Faustus’s Earth-Spirit?:  ‘In his own 
loom’s garment dressed / By his proper bounty blessed / Fast abides this constant giver, / 
Pouring many a cheerful river’ (p. 70). 
 Tyndall’s own usage, on first appraisal, of such Goethian ‘weaving’ metaphors seems 
more materialistic still.  In ‘“Materialism” and Its Opponents’ – that defence of the preroga-
tives of naturalism (and the rightness of his pontifications at Belfast), perhaps excusing an arch 
tone which seems calculated to shock – he speaks of human gestation:  ‘I figure it [the baby] 
growing in the womb, woven by something not itself, without the conscious participation of 
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either the father or mother, and appearing in due time, a living miracle […]’ (p. 598).  Simi-
larly, in an essay nearly as prickly, Tyndall seems blithely – perhaps freakishly – disinterested, 
not only in making any distinction between raw organic elements and biological life, but 
between different orders of biological life:  ‘So also as regards the reunion of the carbon and the 
oxygen, the molecular machinery through which the combining energy acts may, in one case, 
weave the texture of a frog, while in another it may weave the texture of a man’ (FoS, p. 440).  
This seems, on one level, the sort of assertion – a corrosive debasement of humanity augured 
by the devices of industrialism – which drove Teufelsdröckh to contemplate suicide prior to 
‘The Everlasting “Yea”’:  ‘To our less philosophical readers […]’, Sartor Resartus’s ‘editor’ 
explains, ‘it is now clear that the so passionate Teufelsdröckh precipitated through “a shivered 
Universe” in this extraordinary way, has only one of three things which he can next do:  
Establish himself in Bedlam; begin writing Satanic Poetry [that is, atheistic, after Shelley]; or 
blow out his brains’ (p. 114).   
 But, on another level, as we have seen, the cosmology of Tyndall was not so much 
‘shivered’ (broken apart) as ‘shivering’, trembling with a sensuous feeling for matter-in-life and 
life-in-matter (the same double sense animating a stanza in Maxwell’s ‘Tyndallic Ode’).  ‘Reac-
tion against mechanistic science led to nature’s being perceived as living and growing’, Barton 
explains, ‘nature was appreciated in its fecundity, its grandeur, and its immensity’ (p. 123).  As 
such, Tyndall’s ‘weaving’ metaphors can be seen as encoding a view of the world, and as 
suggestive of a philosophy about being in that world, as distinct in its own way from eight-
eenth-century mechanical theories (which, as practiced by Harriet Martineau and others, 
persisted in the ‘practical materialism of the present’) as it is from ‘the torn swaddling bands of 
the past’, those fetters – or outgrown, moth-eaten clothes – of unreconstructed theological 
orthodoxy (‘Materialism’, p. 599). 







The world does not speak.  Only we do.  The world can, once we 
have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold be-
liefs.  But it cannot propose a language for us to speak.  Only other 
human beings can do that.   
- Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 19890  
Bertrand Russell – a man tremendously influenced by W. K. Clifford’s The Common Sense of the 
Exact Sciences (1885), which he read before he was sixteen (Monk, pp. 26 - 27) – set forth his 
decidedly Cliffordian worldview in ‘A Free Man’s Worship’, an article of 1903.  After enu-
merating first a catalogue of cultural failure and entropic decay (descriptive of a universe 
inextricably sunk into the final thermodynamic equilibration of ‘heat death’), he concluded by 
noting that such eschatological predictions, though undeniably gloomy, ‘if not quite beyond 
dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.  
Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, 
can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built’ (p. 13).  The words ‘scaffold’ and ‘scaffold-
ing’, of course, have a dark double meaning:  at once support and essential apparatus of 
construction (and, by extension, clear sign of civilisation ascendant, of a society rebuilding), 
they name also the platform from which the condemned go to meet their doom by hanging.  
In a later essay, ‘What I Believe’, reprinted in the volume Why I am Not a Christian (1957), this 
double-ness of signification was made explicit:  ‘Many a man has borne himself proudly on the 
scaffold; surely, the same pride should teach us to think truly about man’s place in the world.  
Even if the open windows of science make us shiver after the cosy indoor warmth of tradi-
tional humanizing myths, in the end the fresh air brings vigour, and the great spaces have a 
splendour of their own’ (p. 43).  These are sentiments with which Clifford himself would surely 
have concurred, and their phrasing brings to mind not only that scientist’s defence of scientism 
(discussed in chapter three) but also the coda to The Origin of Species, in which Darwin insisted 
that, despite the apparent nihilism inherent in his doctrine of speciation and evolution by the 
ruthless mechanisms of predation and natural selection, there was nonetheless still ‘a grandeur 
                                                
Epigraph from Rorty, p. 6; following epigraph page quotation from Van Wylen, Sonntag and Borgnakke, p. 272. 
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in this view of life’ (p. 396) – though scant comfort it must have seemed to many among his 
generation, if not to Darwin himself.   
 Such sanguine consolations were indeed commonplace (if not commonplaces) in mid- 
to late-Victorian scientific perorations, suffusing many of them with a fatalistic melancholy.  
However, they, like their authors, only rarely shaded into the outright ‘unyielding despair’ 
anticipated by Russell.   
This was in large part due, as argued throughout this dissertation, to the persistence of, 
if not always the substances, then at least the languages of those ‘traditional humanizing 
myths’ which Russell, himself a scientific propagandist in the Turnerian mould, would later 
reference – and dismiss – with such an evocative admixture of arrogance and nostalgia.  
Tyndall had his Romanticism, his residue of Carlylean or Emersonian transcendentalism; 
Clifford, the boisterous humanism of Swinburne or Whitman, the steely stoicism of Spinoza 
and Epicurus, the examples set by nineteenth-century positivists (for instance, Harrison and 
Comte), and by his own ‘materialistic’ predecessors (for instance, Tyndall).   
Both Tyndall and Clifford had also, like the Romantic poets and Carlyle before them, 
the cadences of the King James Bible from which to borrow, if not earn, a linguistic gravitas 
and moral authority.  This final resource was invaluable, as it was commonly – and, in the 
case of, say, Clifford’s implementation, correctly – perceived by many in the mid-Victorian 
reading public that atheism was a necessary appurtenance to contemporary ‘materialism’.  As 
phrased by one particularly vehement opponent, such an approach to cosmology was ‘imper-
fect in a scientific sense, destructive in a religious, and degrading to humanity in every point of 
view […]’; moreover, its various explanatory elaborations, despite ‘superficial’ literary and 
philosophical idiosyncrasies, were to be uniformly condemned as fruits ‘from one and the 
same tree – “The boundless Upas, the all-blasting tree,” the tree of atheism’ (Materialistic, p. v).  
Clifford was well aware of this widespread perception, observing that ‘it cannot be doubted 
that theistic belief is a comfort and a solace to those who hold it, and that the loss of it is a very 
painful loss.  It cannot be doubted, at least, by many of us in this generation, who either 
profess it now, or received it in our childhood and have parted from it since with such search-
ing trouble as only cradle-faiths can cause’ (‘Influence’, p. 355).  He, personally, was resolute 
in his atheism, his abandonment of those ‘cradle-faiths’.  In that, he was the polar opposite of 
Maxwell, who, as he wrote in a letter 7 March 1852, believed that ‘[y]ou may fly to the ends 
of the world and find no God but the Author of Salvation.  You may search the scriptures and 
find not a text to stop you in your explorations’ (qtd. in LJCM, p. 179).  This he asserted to the 
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end of his days, for all the rumblings made by colleagues.  Tyndall, however, unlike both 
Clifford and Maxwell, was always one to remain guarded in public proclamations on the 
existence – or non-existence – of divinity.  This was a fact lost on many observers, but some 
acknowledged at least an agnostic trend to his thought.   
A few even saw Tyndall’s ‘supernatural naturalism’ as a prolegomena to some future 
faithfulness, one sympathetic commentator at The Westminster Review, for example, writing in 
1879: 
 
To emancipate the minds of men from any form of slavery by substituting intelligent comprehension 
for unreasoning formulae or wonder, has ever been the first step in the liberation of human energies, so 
that they may produce greater happiness for the individual and advance the progress of the whole 
community; and we cannot doubt that these utterances of Professor Tyndall will go far towards 
creating a new element of religious belief in this country […].  (‘Science’ [1879], p. 604) 
 
Nevertheless (as argued in chapters four and five), Tyndall’s emergent faith, for all its appeal, 
was not without its own novel challenges, nor were its rewards entirely commensurate with 
those stereotypically associated with more normative systems of theological belief.   
Others, including many not considered among Turner’s ‘publicists’, could still accept, 
even proselytise, the facts of nineteenth-century materialistic science – its reduction of every-
thing to Stoff and Kraft, matter and force – but only as temporary approximations to some 
superseding truth.  Among those discussed, Hinton insisted that the ‘meaning’ of matter must 
eventually be appreciated from the standpoint of transcendent geometric dimensions.  Myers 
hypothesised that the supraliminal – he was to label it the ‘methereal’ (Human, 1: 8) – reality in 
which departed souls reside was founded not on impersonal quantity, but rather private 
human affection (‘Shall they not recognize that no terrene Matter or Energy, but Love itself is 
the imperishable of that higher world […]’? [‘Modern’, p. 110]).  Jefferies, searching for an 
egress from the perceived bleakness of contemporary reductionism, speculated that there 
might be an infinite hierarchy of cosmological ‘conditions’ (‘All natural things known to us as 
yet may be referred to those two conditions:  One, Force; Two, Matter.  A third, a fourth, a 
fifth – no one can say how many conditions […] may exist […]’ [‘Dawn’, p. 311]).  For such 
thinkers, materialism, a stripping away of some (now outgrown or irrelevant?) ‘humanizing 
myths’, was a starting point, the ideological foundation for humane and revivifying conjecture. 
Russell, in a preface to an edition of The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences, composed 
during dreary days towards the end of World War II, had hoped that readers of Clifford’s text 
(full of its enthusiasm for human progress and rationalism) might ‘imbibe something of its 
author’s belief in the possibility of excellent things, and that this [might] help them to acquire 
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some of the strength that is needed to fight against the evils of the age in which we are com-
pelled to live’ (p. x).  Yet many of the agnostic thinkers discussed in this dissertation, not just 
Clifford, looked towards humanity’s future with hope, even ebullience, foreseeing comparable 
possibilities in the advancement of science.  Tyndall, for instance, predicted a cultural climate 
more amenable to the claims of his Belfast Address, even as he anticipated a science more fit 
to answer some of his most riddling concerns.  This perhaps surprising undercurrent of 
optimism – evident despite fears of religious revival or secular strife; evident despite the 
seeming darkness of their several anthropological, biological and thermodynamic visions, and 
perhaps made most conspicuous by the continued emphasis in their writings on the joy of 
discovery rather than the drudgery of duty and routine – was, however, not merely a conse-
quence of personal psychology, but also a by-product of the ‘sort’ of science they were at-
tempting to describe, as analysed in my opening chapter.  One final example illustrates this 
perfectly. 
Whitehead made an apposite point when he noted midway through Science and the Mod-
ern World: 
 
The nineteenth century has been a perplexed century, in a sense which is not true of any of its prede-
cessors of the modern period.  In the earlier times there were opposing camps, bitterly at variance on 
questions which they deemed fundamental.  But, except for a few stragglers, either camp was whole-
hearted.  The importance of Tennyson’s poem [In Memoriam A. H. H.] lies in the fact that it exactly 
expressed the character of its period.  Each individual was divided against himself.  In the earlier times, 
the deep thinkers were the clear thinkers, – Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz.  They knew exactly 
what they meant and said it.  In the nineteenth century, some of the deeper thinkers among theologi-
ans and philosophers were muddled thinkers.  (pp. 101 - 02) 
 
I would suggest that, to Whitehead’s list, one might add ‘scientists’, too, for is there not some-
thing ‘muddled’, ‘perplexed’, if not tremulous and over-awed, about, say, Tyndall’s mediations 
on the governing principles of thermodynamics? 
 
I have called the philosophy of Heat a new philosophy, without, however, restricting the term to 
the subject of Heat.  The fact is, it cannot be so restricted:  for the connection of this agent with the 
general energies of the universe is such, that if we master it perfectly, we master all.  Even now we can 
discern, though but darkly, the greatness of the issues which connect themselves with the progress we 
have made – issues which were probably beyond the contemplation of those, by whose industry and 
genius the foundations of our present knowledge were laid.  (Heat, p. xv) 
 
Tyndall strives for a language overmatching previous technical vernaculars, cobbling here, as 
elsewhere, his response to specific forms of contemporary scientific belief from whatever 
vocabularies were thought suitable.  His sly wheeling in of the extraordinarily familiar Biblical 
phrase (from 1 Corinthians 13: 12) ‘though but darkly’ (and, alongside it, all the intimations of 
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a steady and required progression from childish ignorance to the comprehension of responsi-
ble adulthood that such a reference would automatically entail) allows him, for instance, to 
convey a clear sense of undelimited disciplinarity; such a reference also implicitly suggests 
something of the increased spiritual significance attributed by Tyndall to ‘materialistic’ theo-
rising in mid-Victorian intellectual life.  At the same time, Tyndall’s ‘heat philosophy’ recalls 
Herr Prof. Teufelsdröck’s transcendental fulminations – occasioned by the chance sighting of 
a blacksmith’s convective hearth – on cosmological and ‘thermodynamic’ interconnectedness. 
 Whitehead continued, speaking again of nineteenth-century philosophers, theologians 
and poets:  ‘Their assent was claimed by incompatible doctrines; and their efforts at recon-
ciliation [between doctrines] produced inevitable confusion’ (p. 102).  So was it commonly for 
the era’s scientists as well, with their several allegiances and often conflicting aspirations.  
Maxwell’s unflappable commitment to the Church of Scotland; Tyndall’s, to a sort of Roman-
tic pantheism; and Clifford’s, to a meliorist and reassuring quasi-positivism, did not sit alto-
gether easily alongside their equal fealties to the methods of rationalism and empiricism as 
espoused by nineteenth-century inductive science; nor did the vernaculars associated with 
such diverse interpretive traditions meld without disjointedness.  At the same time, a degree of 
disjointedness was sometimes actively courted.  Clifford’s extraordinary (to modern ears) essay 
‘Cosmic Emotion’ had its genesis in a talk given 4 May 1873 before the Sunday Lecture 
Society, ‘The Relations between Science and some Modern Poetry’ (Pollock, p. 68).  Such a 
title was neither accidental nor a non sequitur.  Note how he made use of the plural, ‘rela-
tions’.  Scientists needed poetry – needed literature more generally – even as poets (to be 
relevant to the rapidly changing culture in which they – and their readers – lived) needed 
science.  Science, in effect, enabled poets and philosophers to suggest at one stroke something 
about their world, a certain unsettling confluence of epistemologies and beliefs, which needed 
making sense of (serving immediately to justify their own disparate efforts to somehow try and 
do so, through ‘explanatory’ productions in prose and verse), while poetry, conversely, en-
abled scientists to insinuate what they might never have dared to argue so openly otherwise – 
or, in other words, it allowed them to more readily give voice in their writings to the not-said, 
though frequently implicit. 
For some, therefore – such publicists, for instance, as P. G. Tait and John Tyndall – a 
redolently poetic or allusive language became the characteristic tenor of expository prose 
throughout this period, the ideal dialect in which they could address their own particular 
concerns, wage their own private battles, and, to borrow Russell’s phrase, fight resolutely 
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‘against the evils of the age in which [they were] compelled to live’.  That each of them was 
able to do so so effectively acts as a testimony to both the multivalency of the discourses 
available at the time and also their often considerable prowess in shaping these extant, subtly 
incompatible vocabularies towards their own peculiar ends.  Others – for instance, W. K. 
Clifford and James Clerk Maxwell – in pursuit of the same goals, chose different tactics, 
plainer idioms, marshalling alternative registers of metaphor and citation.  This, too, they 
went about with both zeal and success – again, further evidence of the discursive diversity in 
play.  For all these reasons, then, ‘materialistic’ language in the latter decades of the nine-
teenth century was predestined to be anything but monotonic. 
 
 











‘If the second law is valid for the universe (we of course do not know if the universe  
can be considered an isolated system), how did it get in the state of low entropy?  On the  
other end of the scale, if all processes known to us have an entropy increase associated  
with them, what is the future of the natural world as we know it?  
Quite obviously it is impossible to give conclusive answers to these questions  
on the basis of the second law of thermodynamics alone.  However, we see  
the second law of thermodynamics as the description of the prior and 
continuing work of a creator, who also holds the answer to our future destiny  
and that of the universe’.  









‘The ancient writers who celebrated the heavens’ declaration of the glory of the  
Lord saw only through a glass darkly.  Unbeknown to them and countless others  
who followed them, the Universe has revealed itself by the instruments that  
modern science has made possible to be far bigger, more spectacular, and more humbling 
than we ever imagined it to be’.  
- John D. Barrow, 15 March 2006, Templeton Prize News Conference 
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